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authorAndrew Chow <github@achow101.com>2023-02-07 12:27:32 -0500
committerAndrew Chow <github@achow101.com>2023-02-16 12:46:40 -0500
commit53b07b2b47aa3d4ca80fac74e432783a1e724df3 (patch)
tree950e332bebe19e08c4a7845277daed2f94582261 /contrib/verify-commits
parent75f0e0b607cd7ff7afd56853eb34a2b285b22ad2 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-53b07b2b47aa3d4ca80fac74e432783a1e724df3.tar.xz
verify-commits: Move trusted-keys valid sig check into verify-commits itself
Instead of having gpg.sh check against the trusted keys for a valid signature, do it inside of verify-commits itself. This also allows us to use the same trusted-keys throughout the verify-commits.py check rather than it possibly being modified during the clean merge check.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/verify-commits')
-rwxr-xr-xcontrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh42
-rwxr-xr-xcontrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py15
2 files changed, 19 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
index db5bfce208..cfd68e45b8 100755
--- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
+++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
@@ -5,12 +5,9 @@
export LC_ALL=C
INPUT=$(cat /dev/stdin)
-VALID=false
-REVSIG=false
-IFS='
-'
if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then
- GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
+ printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
+ exit $?
else
# Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling
# signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that
@@ -20,12 +17,12 @@ else
# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
- GPG_RES=""
for LINE in $(gpg --version); do
case "$LINE" in
"gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*)
echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr
- GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
+ printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
+ exit $?
;;
# We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+
# gpg will fail otherwise
@@ -33,33 +30,6 @@ else
# gpg will fail otherwise
esac
done
- [ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
-fi
-for LINE in $GPG_RES; do
- case "$LINE" in
- "[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*)
- while read KEY; do
- [ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true
- done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys
- ;;
- "[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*)
- [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
- REVSIG=true
- GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
- ;;
- "[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG "*)
- [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
- REVSIG=true
- GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
- ;;
- esac
-done
-if ! $VALID; then
- exit 1
-fi
-if $VALID && $REVSIG; then
- printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "^\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)"
- echo "$GOODREVSIG"
-else
- printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
+ printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null
+ exit $?
fi
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py b/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py
index 3825caf5de..ee51f66783 100755
--- a/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py
+++ b/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ def main():
unclean_merge_allowed = f.read().splitlines()
with open(dirname + "/allow-incorrect-sha512-commits", "r", encoding="utf8") as f:
incorrect_sha512_allowed = f.read().splitlines()
+ with open(dirname + "/trusted-keys", "r", encoding="utf8") as f:
+ trusted_keys = f.read().splitlines()
# Set commit and branch and set variables
current_commit = args.commit
@@ -120,10 +122,19 @@ def main():
no_sha1 = False
os.environ['BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1'] = "0" if no_sha1 else "1"
- os.environ['BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG'] = "1" if current_commit in revsig_allowed else "0"
+ allow_revsig = current_commit in revsig_allowed
# Check that the commit (and parents) was signed with a trusted key
- if subprocess.call([GIT, '-c', 'gpg.program={}/gpg.sh'.format(dirname), 'verify-commit', current_commit], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL):
+ valid_sig = False
+ verify_res = subprocess.run([GIT, '-c', 'gpg.program={}/gpg.sh'.format(dirname), 'verify-commit', "--raw", current_commit], capture_output=True)
+ for line in verify_res.stderr.decode().splitlines():
+ if line.startswith("[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "):
+ key = line.split(" ")[-1]
+ valid_sig = key in trusted_keys
+ elif (line.startswith("[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG ") or line.startswith("[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG ")) and not allow_revsig:
+ valid_sig = False
+ break
+ if not valid_sig:
if prev_commit != "":
print("No parent of {} was signed with a trusted key!".format(prev_commit), file=sys.stderr)
print("Parents are:", file=sys.stderr)