From 53b07b2b47aa3d4ca80fac74e432783a1e724df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Chow Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 12:27:32 -0500 Subject: verify-commits: Move trusted-keys valid sig check into verify-commits itself Instead of having gpg.sh check against the trusted keys for a valid signature, do it inside of verify-commits itself. This also allows us to use the same trusted-keys throughout the verify-commits.py check rather than it possibly being modified during the clean merge check. --- contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh | 42 +++++--------------------------- contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py | 15 ++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) (limited to 'contrib/verify-commits') diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh index db5bfce208..cfd68e45b8 100755 --- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh @@ -5,12 +5,9 @@ export LC_ALL=C INPUT=$(cat /dev/stdin) -VALID=false -REVSIG=false -IFS=' -' if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then - GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" + printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null + exit $? else # Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling # signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that @@ -20,12 +17,12 @@ else # an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that # they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing # it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure. - GPG_RES="" for LINE in $(gpg --version); do case "$LINE" in "gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*) echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr - GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" + printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null + exit $? ;; # We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+ # gpg will fail otherwise @@ -33,33 +30,6 @@ else # gpg will fail otherwise esac done - [ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)" -fi -for LINE in $GPG_RES; do - case "$LINE" in - "[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*) - while read KEY; do - [ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true - done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys - ;; - "[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*) - [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1 - REVSIG=true - GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}" - ;; - "[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG "*) - [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1 - REVSIG=true - GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}" - ;; - esac -done -if ! $VALID; then - exit 1 -fi -if $VALID && $REVSIG; then - printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "^\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)" - echo "$GOODREVSIG" -else - printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null + printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null + exit $? fi diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py b/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py index 3825caf5de..ee51f66783 100755 --- a/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ def main(): unclean_merge_allowed = f.read().splitlines() with open(dirname + "/allow-incorrect-sha512-commits", "r", encoding="utf8") as f: incorrect_sha512_allowed = f.read().splitlines() + with open(dirname + "/trusted-keys", "r", encoding="utf8") as f: + trusted_keys = f.read().splitlines() # Set commit and branch and set variables current_commit = args.commit @@ -120,10 +122,19 @@ def main(): no_sha1 = False os.environ['BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1'] = "0" if no_sha1 else "1" - os.environ['BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG'] = "1" if current_commit in revsig_allowed else "0" + allow_revsig = current_commit in revsig_allowed # Check that the commit (and parents) was signed with a trusted key - if subprocess.call([GIT, '-c', 'gpg.program={}/gpg.sh'.format(dirname), 'verify-commit', current_commit], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL): + valid_sig = False + verify_res = subprocess.run([GIT, '-c', 'gpg.program={}/gpg.sh'.format(dirname), 'verify-commit', "--raw", current_commit], capture_output=True) + for line in verify_res.stderr.decode().splitlines(): + if line.startswith("[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "): + key = line.split(" ")[-1] + valid_sig = key in trusted_keys + elif (line.startswith("[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG ") or line.startswith("[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG ")) and not allow_revsig: + valid_sig = False + break + if not valid_sig: if prev_commit != "": print("No parent of {} was signed with a trusted key!".format(prev_commit), file=sys.stderr) print("Parents are:", file=sys.stderr) -- cgit v1.2.3