diff options
| author | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2017-05-18 15:05:28 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2017-05-18 15:05:37 +0200 |
| commit | 57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202 (patch) | |
| tree | 80973e761854cb95b30def942935fa3caa0406a2 | |
| parent | 998858bc8f95eb1966e3edacb6583c5af4dd46d2 (diff) | |
inline FC reviews/responses in main paper
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler.tex | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt | 2 |
2 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex index 5e8f03921..ccdc54444 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler.tex +++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ \usetikzlibrary{calc} \usepackage{eurosym} \usepackage[T1]{fontenc} - +\usepackage{verbatim} +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} % Copyright %\setcopyright{none} @@ -1868,6 +1869,16 @@ data being persisted are represented in between $\langle\rangle$. \item[$\overline{C^{(i)}_p}$]{Public coin keys computed from $\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$ by the verifier} \end{description} +\newpage +\onecolumn +\section{Supplemental: Reviews and Responses from Financial Cryptography} + +\subsection{FC 2016} +\verbatiminput{taler_FC2016.txt} + +\subsection{FC 2017} +\verbatiminput{taler_FC2017.txt} + \end{document} diff --git a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt index de1c64a30..66f8560ad 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt +++ b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ be insecure. > We added a section with proofs I find two (possible) attacks against the refresh protocol. As the -exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp′ , the attacker can +exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp', the attacker can send an arbitrary public key to the exchange that will accept, and obtain a fresh coin. The attacker can spend partially a coin multiple times via refreshing the coin and obtaining a fresh coin in turn, as the refresh protocol |