diff options
author | Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> | 2020-03-30 18:06:51 +0100 |
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committer | Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> | 2020-04-03 19:23:53 +0100 |
commit | f4e1dbc578a051db08a40c05276ebf525b98f949 (patch) | |
tree | 522c5adde80898ba14cb425d6e4dec22b30c33a0 /target | |
parent | 8a2b76ffc9ff610c3439617e19f1eb9be02be50f (diff) |
target/arm: PSTATE.PAN should not clear exec bits
Our implementation of the PSTATE.PAN bit incorrectly cleared all
access permission bits for privileged access to memory which is
user-accessible. It should only affect the privileged read and write
permissions; execute permission is dealt with via XN/PXN instead.
Fixes: 81636b70c226dc27d7ebc8d
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200330170651.20901-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Diffstat (limited to 'target')
-rw-r--r-- | target/arm/helper.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index 163c91a1cc..ed7eb8ab54 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -10025,9 +10025,11 @@ static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64, prot_rw = user_rw; } else { if (user_rw && regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx)) { - return 0; + /* PAN forbids data accesses but doesn't affect insn fetch */ + prot_rw = 0; + } else { + prot_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, false); } - prot_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, false); } if (ns && arm_is_secure(env) && (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_SIF)) { |