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authorOmar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>2022-09-06 16:11:09 +0000
committerOmar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>2022-09-06 16:11:09 +0000
commitd29a2ee2246e1b1b0c5222a823820e42422c894e (patch)
tree8e786de95e3fc1dc168b6318ddf4b4def2ff872f /sandbox.c
parent5df699d1ab09618573bc4d076dfb3c4b3a78b4b4 (diff)
get rid of the CGI support
I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD. This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure defaults. On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however. For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost: fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were FastCGI applications. fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will follow.
Diffstat (limited to 'sandbox.c')
-rw-r--r--sandbox.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sandbox.c b/sandbox.c
index d221260..45f175d 100644
--- a/sandbox.c
+++ b/sandbox.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ sandbox_server_process(void)
}
}
- if (pledge("stdio recvfd rpath inet", NULL) == -1)
+ if (pledge("stdio recvfd rpath inet dns", NULL) == -1)
fatal("pledge");
}