diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/validation.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/validation.cpp | 90 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp index caa4ff3115..98383cd133 100644 --- a/src/validation.cpp +++ b/src/validation.cpp @@ -3639,6 +3639,54 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st return true; } +static bool CheckMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state) +{ + bool mutated; + uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); + if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); + + // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences + // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, + // while still invalidating it. + if (mutated) + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction"); + + return true; +} + +static bool CheckWitnessMalleation(const CBlock& block, bool expect_witness_commitment, BlockValidationState& state) +{ + if (expect_witness_commitment) { + int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block); + if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) { + bool malleated = false; + uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated); + // The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself + // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the + // witness tree. + if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) { + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); + } + CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness); + if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); + } + + return true; + } + } + + // No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam + for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { + if (tx->HasWitness()) { + return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); + } + } + + return true; +} + bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot) { // These are checks that are independent of context. @@ -3657,17 +3705,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu } // Check the merkle root. - if (fCheckMerkleRoot) { - bool mutated; - uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); - if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); - - // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences - // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, - // while still invalidating it. - if (mutated) - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction"); + if (fCheckMerkleRoot && !CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) { + return false; } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any @@ -3866,33 +3905,8 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat // * There must be at least one output whose scriptPubKey is a single 36-byte push, the first 4 bytes of which are // {0xaa, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xed}, and the following 32 bytes are SHA256^2(witness root, witness reserved value). In case there are // multiple, the last one is used. - bool fHaveWitness = false; - if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) { - int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block); - if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) { - bool malleated = false; - uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated); - // The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself - // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the - // witness tree. - if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); - } - CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness); - if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); - } - fHaveWitness = true; - } - } - - // No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam - if (!fHaveWitness) { - for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { - if (tx->HasWitness()) { - return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); - } - } + if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT), state)) { + return false; } // After the coinbase witness reserved value and commitment are verified, |