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diff --git a/src/secp256k1/examples/ellswift.c b/src/secp256k1/examples/ellswift.c
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+/*************************************************************************
+ * Written in 2024 by Sebastian Falbesoner                               *
+ * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    *
+ * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  *
+ * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     *
+ * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       *
+ * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
+ *************************************************************************/
+
+/** This file demonstrates how to use the ElligatorSwift module to perform
+ *  a key exchange according to BIP 324. Additionally, see the documentation
+ *  in include/secp256k1_ellswift.h and doc/ellswift.md.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <secp256k1.h>
+#include <secp256k1_ellswift.h>
+
+#include "examples_util.h"
+
+int main(void) {
+    secp256k1_context* ctx;
+    unsigned char randomize[32];
+    unsigned char auxrand1[32];
+    unsigned char auxrand2[32];
+    unsigned char seckey1[32];
+    unsigned char seckey2[32];
+    unsigned char ellswift_pubkey1[64];
+    unsigned char ellswift_pubkey2[64];
+    unsigned char shared_secret1[32];
+    unsigned char shared_secret2[32];
+    int return_val;
+
+    /* Create a secp256k1 context */
+    ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
+    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
+        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
+     * leakage. See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
+     * information about it. This should never fail. */
+    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
+    assert(return_val);
+
+    /*** Generate secret keys ***/
+
+    /* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
+     * order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
+     * happening is negligible. */
+    while (1) {
+        if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
+            printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Generate ElligatorSwift public keys. This should never fail with valid context and
+       verified secret keys. Note that providing additional randomness (fourth parameter) is
+       optional, but recommended. */
+    if (!fill_random(auxrand1, sizeof(auxrand1)) || !fill_random(auxrand2, sizeof(auxrand2))) {
+        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey1, seckey1, auxrand1);
+    assert(return_val);
+    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey2, seckey2, auxrand2);
+    assert(return_val);
+
+    /*** Create the shared secret on each side ***/
+
+    /* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey1 and ellswift_pubkey2. Should never fail
+     * with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. Note that both parties pass both
+     * EllSwift pubkeys in the same order; the pubkey of the calling party is
+     * determined by the "party" boolean (sixth parameter). */
+    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret1, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
+        seckey1, 0, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
+    assert(return_val);
+
+    /* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey2 and ellswift_pubkey1. Should never fail
+     * with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. */
+    return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret2, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
+        seckey2, 1, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
+    assert(return_val);
+
+    /* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
+    return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
+    assert(return_val == 0);
+
+    printf(  "     Secret Key1: ");
+    print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
+    printf(  "EllSwift Pubkey1: ");
+    print_hex(ellswift_pubkey1, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey1));
+    printf("\n     Secret Key2: ");
+    print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
+    printf(  "EllSwift Pubkey2: ");
+    print_hex(ellswift_pubkey2, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey2));
+    printf("\n   Shared Secret: ");
+    print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
+
+    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
+    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
+
+    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
+     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
+     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
+     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
+     *
+     * Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
+     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */
+    secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
+    secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
+    secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
+    secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
+
+    return 0;
+}