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authorJohn Newbery <john@johnnewbery.com>2019-09-30 16:25:04 -0400
committerJohn Newbery <john@johnnewbery.com>2019-10-10 13:31:53 -0400
commite9d5a59e34ff2d538d8f5315efd9908bf24d0fdc (patch)
tree1019a60f2c8c49fc377b87968b04f59349716de7 /src/validation.cpp
parent0053e16714323c1694c834fdca74f064a1a33529 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-e9d5a59e34ff2d538d8f5315efd9908bf24d0fdc.tar.xz
[validation] Remove REJECT code from CValidationState
We no longer send BIP 61 REJECT messages, so there's no need to set a REJECT code in the CValidationState object.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/validation.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/validation.cpp113
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 57 deletions
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 726f251c5a..3d9bf55090 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -508,11 +508,11 @@ private:
{
CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(package_size);
if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
}
if (package_fee < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
}
return true;
}
@@ -565,29 +565,29 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "coinbase");
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
std::string reason;
if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason);
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, reason);
// Do not work on transactions that are too small.
// A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes.
// Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842 by not relaying
// 64-byte transactions.
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "tx-size-small");
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
// be mined yet.
if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-final");
// is it already in the memory pool?
if (m_pool.exists(hash)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-in-mempool");
}
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
}
}
if (fReplacementOptOut) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-known");
}
}
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
// CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
if (!CheckSequenceLocks(m_pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-BIP68-final");
CAmount nFees = 0;
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, GetSpendHeight(m_view), nFees)) {
@@ -679,11 +679,11 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
// Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
unsigned int nSize = entry->GetTxSize();
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
// No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected
@@ -716,8 +716,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
- REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee",
- strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
+ "absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
// Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit.
@@ -774,7 +773,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
if (nSize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT ||
!m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, 2, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants + 1, m_limit_descendant_size + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
}
}
@@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
{
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
hash.ToString(),
hashAncestor.ToString()));
@@ -827,7 +826,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
{
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
hash.ToString(),
newFeeRate.ToString(),
@@ -855,7 +854,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
}
} else {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too many potential replacements",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
hash.ToString(),
nConflictingCount,
@@ -879,7 +878,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
// tx that's in the mempool.
if (m_pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
hash.ToString(), j));
}
@@ -891,7 +890,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// transactions would not be paid for.
if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
{
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
}
@@ -901,7 +900,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
{
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(),
FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
@@ -930,7 +929,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, Precompute
!CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
- state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
@@ -1013,7 +1012,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
if (!bypass_limits) {
LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, std::chrono::hours{gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY)});
if (!m_pool.exists(hash))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool full");
}
return true;
}
@@ -1548,7 +1547,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i,
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
if (check2())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
}
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
// ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS
@@ -1559,7 +1558,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
// support, to avoid splitting the network (but this
// depends on the details of how net_processing handles
// such errors).
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
}
}
@@ -2062,7 +2061,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"),
- REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-BIP30");
+ "bad-txns-BIP30");
}
}
}
@@ -2107,14 +2106,14 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// defined for a block, so we reset the reason flag to
// CONSENSUS here.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
- state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
nFees += txfee;
if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__),
- REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
+ "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
}
// Check that transaction is BIP68 final
@@ -2127,7 +2126,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) {
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__),
- REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
+ "bad-txns-nonfinal");
}
}
@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"),
- REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
+ "bad-blk-sigops");
txdata.emplace_back(tx);
if (!tx.IsCoinBase())
@@ -2154,7 +2153,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// consider whether rewriting to CONSENSUS or
// RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE would be more appropriate.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
- state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@@ -2176,10 +2175,10 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS,
error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)",
block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward),
- REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-amount");
+ "bad-cb-amount");
if (!control.Wait())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), "block-validation-failed");
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
@@ -3256,7 +3255,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state,
{
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
return true;
}
@@ -3278,13 +3277,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
// while still invalidating it.
if (mutated)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@@ -3295,20 +3294,20 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
// Size limits
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
// Check transactions
// Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true))
- return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
+ return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage()));
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
@@ -3317,7 +3316,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
}
if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
block.fChecked = true;
@@ -3418,7 +3417,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// Check proof of work
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
// Check against checkpoints
if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
@@ -3427,23 +3426,23 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// g_blockman.m_block_index.
CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints());
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
}
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
// check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
return true;
@@ -3473,7 +3472,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// Check that all transactions are finalized
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
}
}
@@ -3483,7 +3482,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}
@@ -3505,11 +3504,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
// witness tree.
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
}
CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin());
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
}
fHaveWitness = true;
}
@@ -3519,7 +3518,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
if (!fHaveWitness) {
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
}
}
}
@@ -3531,7 +3530,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
// failed).
if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
}
return true;
@@ -3551,7 +3550,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState
if (ppindex)
*ppindex = pindex;
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), "duplicate");
return true;
}
@@ -3562,10 +3561,10 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr;
BlockMap::iterator mi = m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock);
if (mi == m_block_index.end())
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), "prev-blk-not-found");
pindexPrev = (*mi).second;
if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), "bad-prevblk");
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime()))
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@@ -3602,7 +3601,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(invalid_walk);
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
}
- return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), "bad-prevblk");
}
}
}