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authorfanquake <fanquake@gmail.com>2023-05-04 12:07:26 +0100
committerfanquake <fanquake@gmail.com>2023-06-16 10:38:19 +0100
commit32e2ffc39374f61bb2435da507f285459985df9e (patch)
tree44103a701bd14b0c77163db5d557215d40842210 /src/util
parentb3db18a0126bc4181d2a0880c27f45d203d06179 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-32e2ffc39374f61bb2435da507f285459985df9e.tar.xz
Remove the syscall sandbox
After initially being merged in #20487, it's no-longer clear that an internal syscall sandboxing mechanism is something that Bitcoin Core should have/maintain, especially when compared to better maintained/supported alterantives, i.e firejail. Note that given where it's used, the sandbox also gets dragged into the kernel. There is some related discussion in #24771. This should not require any sort of deprecation, as this was only ever an opt-in, experimental feature. Closes #24771.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/util')
-rw-r--r--src/util/syscall_sandbox.cpp927
-rw-r--r--src/util/syscall_sandbox.h54
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 981 deletions
diff --git a/src/util/syscall_sandbox.cpp b/src/util/syscall_sandbox.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index b1579bdb9c..0000000000
--- a/src/util/syscall_sandbox.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,927 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2020-2022 The Bitcoin Core developers
-// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
-// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
-
-#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
-#include <config/bitcoin-config.h>
-#endif // defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
-
-#include <util/syscall_sandbox.h>
-
-#if defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
-#include <array>
-#include <cassert>
-#include <cstdint>
-#include <exception>
-#include <map>
-#include <new>
-#include <set>
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <logging.h>
-#include <tinyformat.h>
-#include <util/threadnames.h>
-
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/filter.h>
-#include <linux/seccomp.h>
-#include <linux/unistd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-namespace {
-bool g_syscall_sandbox_enabled{false};
-bool g_syscall_sandbox_log_violation_before_terminating{false};
-
-#if !defined(__x86_64__)
-#error Syscall sandbox is an experimental feature currently available only under Linux x86-64.
-#endif // defined(__x86_64__)
-
-#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
-#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U
-#endif
-
-// Define system call numbers for x86_64 that are referenced in the system call profile
-// but not provided by the kernel headers used in the GUIX build.
-// Usually, they can be found via "grep name /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/asm/unistd_64.h"
-
-#ifndef __NR_clone3
-#define __NR_clone3 435
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_statx
-#define __NR_statx 332
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_getrandom
-#define __NR_getrandom 318
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_membarrier
-#define __NR_membarrier 324
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_copy_file_range
-#define __NR_copy_file_range 326
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_rseq
-#define __NR_rseq 334
-#endif
-
-// This list of syscalls in LINUX_SYSCALLS is only used to map syscall numbers to syscall names in
-// order to be able to print user friendly error messages which include the syscall name in addition
-// to the syscall number.
-//
-// Example output in case of a syscall violation where the syscall is present in LINUX_SYSCALLS:
-//
-// ```
-// 2021-06-09T12:34:56Z ERROR: The syscall "execve" (syscall number 59) is not allowed by the syscall sandbox in thread "msghand". Please report.
-// ```
-//
-// Example output in case of a syscall violation where the syscall is not present in LINUX_SYSCALLS:
-//
-// ```
-// 2021-06-09T12:34:56Z ERROR: The syscall "*unknown*" (syscall number 314) is not allowed by the syscall sandbox in thread "msghand". Please report.
-// ``
-//
-// LINUX_SYSCALLS contains two types of syscalls:
-// 1.) Syscalls that are present under all architectures or relevant Linux kernel versions for which
-// we support the syscall sandbox feature (currently only Linux x86-64). Examples include read,
-// write, open, close, etc.
-// 2.) Syscalls that are present under a subset of architectures or relevant Linux kernel versions
-// for which we support the syscall sandbox feature. This type of syscalls should be added to
-// LINUX_SYSCALLS conditional on availability like in the following example:
-// ...
-// #if defined(__NR_arch_dependent_syscall)
-// {__NR_arch_dependent_syscall, "arch_dependent_syscall"},
-// #endif // defined(__NR_arch_dependent_syscall)
-// ...
-const std::map<uint32_t, std::string> LINUX_SYSCALLS{
- {__NR_accept, "accept"},
- {__NR_accept4, "accept4"},
- {__NR_access, "access"},
- {__NR_acct, "acct"},
- {__NR_add_key, "add_key"},
- {__NR_adjtimex, "adjtimex"},
- {__NR_afs_syscall, "afs_syscall"},
- {__NR_alarm, "alarm"},
- {__NR_arch_prctl, "arch_prctl"},
- {__NR_bind, "bind"},
- {__NR_bpf, "bpf"},
- {__NR_brk, "brk"},
- {__NR_capget, "capget"},
- {__NR_capset, "capset"},
- {__NR_chdir, "chdir"},
- {__NR_chmod, "chmod"},
- {__NR_chown, "chown"},
- {__NR_chroot, "chroot"},
- {__NR_clock_adjtime, "clock_adjtime"},
- {__NR_clock_getres, "clock_getres"},
- {__NR_clock_gettime, "clock_gettime"},
- {__NR_clock_nanosleep, "clock_nanosleep"},
- {__NR_clock_settime, "clock_settime"},
- {__NR_clone, "clone"},
- {__NR_clone3, "clone3"},
- {__NR_close, "close"},
- {__NR_connect, "connect"},
- {__NR_copy_file_range, "copy_file_range"},
- {__NR_creat, "creat"},
- {__NR_create_module, "create_module"},
- {__NR_delete_module, "delete_module"},
- {__NR_dup, "dup"},
- {__NR_dup2, "dup2"},
- {__NR_dup3, "dup3"},
- {__NR_epoll_create, "epoll_create"},
- {__NR_epoll_create1, "epoll_create1"},
- {__NR_epoll_ctl, "epoll_ctl"},
- {__NR_epoll_ctl_old, "epoll_ctl_old"},
- {__NR_epoll_pwait, "epoll_pwait"},
- {__NR_epoll_wait, "epoll_wait"},
- {__NR_epoll_wait_old, "epoll_wait_old"},
- {__NR_eventfd, "eventfd"},
- {__NR_eventfd2, "eventfd2"},
- {__NR_execve, "execve"},
- {__NR_execveat, "execveat"},
- {__NR_exit, "exit"},
- {__NR_exit_group, "exit_group"},
- {__NR_faccessat, "faccessat"},
- {__NR_fadvise64, "fadvise64"},
- {__NR_fallocate, "fallocate"},
- {__NR_fanotify_init, "fanotify_init"},
- {__NR_fanotify_mark, "fanotify_mark"},
- {__NR_fchdir, "fchdir"},
- {__NR_fchmod, "fchmod"},
- {__NR_fchmodat, "fchmodat"},
- {__NR_fchown, "fchown"},
- {__NR_fchownat, "fchownat"},
- {__NR_fcntl, "fcntl"},
- {__NR_fdatasync, "fdatasync"},
- {__NR_fgetxattr, "fgetxattr"},
- {__NR_finit_module, "finit_module"},
- {__NR_flistxattr, "flistxattr"},
- {__NR_flock, "flock"},
- {__NR_fork, "fork"},
- {__NR_fremovexattr, "fremovexattr"},
- {__NR_fsetxattr, "fsetxattr"},
- {__NR_fstat, "fstat"},
- {__NR_fstatfs, "fstatfs"},
- {__NR_fsync, "fsync"},
- {__NR_ftruncate, "ftruncate"},
- {__NR_futex, "futex"},
- {__NR_futimesat, "futimesat"},
- {__NR_get_kernel_syms, "get_kernel_syms"},
- {__NR_get_mempolicy, "get_mempolicy"},
- {__NR_get_robust_list, "get_robust_list"},
- {__NR_get_thread_area, "get_thread_area"},
- {__NR_getcpu, "getcpu"},
- {__NR_getcwd, "getcwd"},
- {__NR_getdents, "getdents"},
- {__NR_getdents64, "getdents64"},
- {__NR_getegid, "getegid"},
- {__NR_geteuid, "geteuid"},
- {__NR_getgid, "getgid"},
- {__NR_getgroups, "getgroups"},
- {__NR_getitimer, "getitimer"},
- {__NR_getpeername, "getpeername"},
- {__NR_getpgid, "getpgid"},
- {__NR_getpgrp, "getpgrp"},
- {__NR_getpid, "getpid"},
- {__NR_getpmsg, "getpmsg"},
- {__NR_getppid, "getppid"},
- {__NR_getpriority, "getpriority"},
- {__NR_getrandom, "getrandom"},
- {__NR_getresgid, "getresgid"},
- {__NR_getresuid, "getresuid"},
- {__NR_getrlimit, "getrlimit"},
- {__NR_getrusage, "getrusage"},
- {__NR_getsid, "getsid"},
- {__NR_getsockname, "getsockname"},
- {__NR_getsockopt, "getsockopt"},
- {__NR_gettid, "gettid"},
- {__NR_gettimeofday, "gettimeofday"},
- {__NR_getuid, "getuid"},
- {__NR_getxattr, "getxattr"},
- {__NR_init_module, "init_module"},
- {__NR_inotify_add_watch, "inotify_add_watch"},
- {__NR_inotify_init, "inotify_init"},
- {__NR_inotify_init1, "inotify_init1"},
- {__NR_inotify_rm_watch, "inotify_rm_watch"},
- {__NR_io_cancel, "io_cancel"},
- {__NR_io_destroy, "io_destroy"},
- {__NR_io_getevents, "io_getevents"},
- {__NR_io_setup, "io_setup"},
- {__NR_io_submit, "io_submit"},
- {__NR_ioctl, "ioctl"},
- {__NR_ioperm, "ioperm"},
- {__NR_iopl, "iopl"},
- {__NR_ioprio_get, "ioprio_get"},
- {__NR_ioprio_set, "ioprio_set"},
- {__NR_kcmp, "kcmp"},
- {__NR_kexec_file_load, "kexec_file_load"},
- {__NR_kexec_load, "kexec_load"},
- {__NR_keyctl, "keyctl"},
- {__NR_kill, "kill"},
- {__NR_lchown, "lchown"},
- {__NR_lgetxattr, "lgetxattr"},
- {__NR_link, "link"},
- {__NR_linkat, "linkat"},
- {__NR_listen, "listen"},
- {__NR_listxattr, "listxattr"},
- {__NR_llistxattr, "llistxattr"},
- {__NR_lookup_dcookie, "lookup_dcookie"},
- {__NR_lremovexattr, "lremovexattr"},
- {__NR_lseek, "lseek"},
- {__NR_lsetxattr, "lsetxattr"},
- {__NR_lstat, "lstat"},
- {__NR_madvise, "madvise"},
- {__NR_mbind, "mbind"},
- {__NR_membarrier, "membarrier"},
- {__NR_memfd_create, "memfd_create"},
- {__NR_migrate_pages, "migrate_pages"},
- {__NR_mincore, "mincore"},
- {__NR_mkdir, "mkdir"},
- {__NR_mkdirat, "mkdirat"},
- {__NR_mknod, "mknod"},
- {__NR_mknodat, "mknodat"},
- {__NR_mlock, "mlock"},
- {__NR_mlock2, "mlock2"},
- {__NR_mlockall, "mlockall"},
- {__NR_mmap, "mmap"},
- {__NR_modify_ldt, "modify_ldt"},
- {__NR_mount, "mount"},
- {__NR_move_pages, "move_pages"},
- {__NR_mprotect, "mprotect"},
- {__NR_mq_getsetattr, "mq_getsetattr"},
- {__NR_mq_notify, "mq_notify"},
- {__NR_mq_open, "mq_open"},
- {__NR_mq_timedreceive, "mq_timedreceive"},
- {__NR_mq_timedsend, "mq_timedsend"},
- {__NR_mq_unlink, "mq_unlink"},
- {__NR_mremap, "mremap"},
- {__NR_msgctl, "msgctl"},
- {__NR_msgget, "msgget"},
- {__NR_msgrcv, "msgrcv"},
- {__NR_msgsnd, "msgsnd"},
- {__NR_msync, "msync"},
- {__NR_munlock, "munlock"},
- {__NR_munlockall, "munlockall"},
- {__NR_munmap, "munmap"},
- {__NR_name_to_handle_at, "name_to_handle_at"},
- {__NR_nanosleep, "nanosleep"},
- {__NR_newfstatat, "newfstatat"},
- {__NR_nfsservctl, "nfsservctl"},
- {__NR_open, "open"},
- {__NR_open_by_handle_at, "open_by_handle_at"},
- {__NR_openat, "openat"},
- {__NR_pause, "pause"},
- {__NR_perf_event_open, "perf_event_open"},
- {__NR_personality, "personality"},
- {__NR_pipe, "pipe"},
- {__NR_pipe2, "pipe2"},
- {__NR_pivot_root, "pivot_root"},
-#ifdef __NR_pkey_alloc
- {__NR_pkey_alloc, "pkey_alloc"},
-#endif
-#ifdef __NR_pkey_free
- {__NR_pkey_free, "pkey_free"},
-#endif
-#ifdef __NR_pkey_mprotect
- {__NR_pkey_mprotect, "pkey_mprotect"},
-#endif
- {__NR_poll, "poll"},
- {__NR_ppoll, "ppoll"},
- {__NR_prctl, "prctl"},
- {__NR_pread64, "pread64"},
- {__NR_preadv, "preadv"},
-#ifdef __NR_preadv2
- {__NR_preadv2, "preadv2"},
-#endif
- {__NR_prlimit64, "prlimit64"},
- {__NR_process_vm_readv, "process_vm_readv"},
- {__NR_process_vm_writev, "process_vm_writev"},
- {__NR_pselect6, "pselect6"},
- {__NR_ptrace, "ptrace"},
- {__NR_putpmsg, "putpmsg"},
- {__NR_pwrite64, "pwrite64"},
- {__NR_pwritev, "pwritev"},
-#ifdef __NR_pwritev2
- {__NR_pwritev2, "pwritev2"},
-#endif
- {__NR__sysctl, "_sysctl"},
- {__NR_query_module, "query_module"},
- {__NR_quotactl, "quotactl"},
- {__NR_read, "read"},
- {__NR_readahead, "readahead"},
- {__NR_readlink, "readlink"},
- {__NR_readlinkat, "readlinkat"},
- {__NR_readv, "readv"},
- {__NR_reboot, "reboot"},
- {__NR_recvfrom, "recvfrom"},
- {__NR_recvmmsg, "recvmmsg"},
- {__NR_recvmsg, "recvmsg"},
- {__NR_remap_file_pages, "remap_file_pages"},
- {__NR_removexattr, "removexattr"},
- {__NR_rename, "rename"},
- {__NR_renameat, "renameat"},
- {__NR_renameat2, "renameat2"},
- {__NR_request_key, "request_key"},
- {__NR_restart_syscall, "restart_syscall"},
- {__NR_rmdir, "rmdir"},
- {__NR_rseq, "rseq"},
- {__NR_rt_sigaction, "rt_sigaction"},
- {__NR_rt_sigpending, "rt_sigpending"},
- {__NR_rt_sigprocmask, "rt_sigprocmask"},
- {__NR_rt_sigqueueinfo, "rt_sigqueueinfo"},
- {__NR_rt_sigreturn, "rt_sigreturn"},
- {__NR_rt_sigsuspend, "rt_sigsuspend"},
- {__NR_rt_sigtimedwait, "rt_sigtimedwait"},
- {__NR_rt_tgsigqueueinfo, "rt_tgsigqueueinfo"},
- {__NR_sched_get_priority_max, "sched_get_priority_max"},
- {__NR_sched_get_priority_min, "sched_get_priority_min"},
- {__NR_sched_getaffinity, "sched_getaffinity"},
- {__NR_sched_getattr, "sched_getattr"},
- {__NR_sched_getparam, "sched_getparam"},
- {__NR_sched_getscheduler, "sched_getscheduler"},
- {__NR_sched_rr_get_interval, "sched_rr_get_interval"},
- {__NR_sched_setaffinity, "sched_setaffinity"},
- {__NR_sched_setattr, "sched_setattr"},
- {__NR_sched_setparam, "sched_setparam"},
- {__NR_sched_setscheduler, "sched_setscheduler"},
- {__NR_sched_yield, "sched_yield"},
- {__NR_seccomp, "seccomp"},
- {__NR_security, "security"},
- {__NR_select, "select"},
- {__NR_semctl, "semctl"},
- {__NR_semget, "semget"},
- {__NR_semop, "semop"},
- {__NR_semtimedop, "semtimedop"},
- {__NR_sendfile, "sendfile"},
- {__NR_sendmmsg, "sendmmsg"},
- {__NR_sendmsg, "sendmsg"},
- {__NR_sendto, "sendto"},
- {__NR_set_mempolicy, "set_mempolicy"},
- {__NR_set_robust_list, "set_robust_list"},
- {__NR_set_thread_area, "set_thread_area"},
- {__NR_set_tid_address, "set_tid_address"},
- {__NR_setdomainname, "setdomainname"},
- {__NR_setfsgid, "setfsgid"},
- {__NR_setfsuid, "setfsuid"},
- {__NR_setgid, "setgid"},
- {__NR_setgroups, "setgroups"},
- {__NR_sethostname, "sethostname"},
- {__NR_setitimer, "setitimer"},
- {__NR_setns, "setns"},
- {__NR_setpgid, "setpgid"},
- {__NR_setpriority, "setpriority"},
- {__NR_setregid, "setregid"},
- {__NR_setresgid, "setresgid"},
- {__NR_setresuid, "setresuid"},
- {__NR_setreuid, "setreuid"},
- {__NR_setrlimit, "setrlimit"},
- {__NR_setsid, "setsid"},
- {__NR_setsockopt, "setsockopt"},
- {__NR_settimeofday, "settimeofday"},
- {__NR_setuid, "setuid"},
- {__NR_setxattr, "setxattr"},
- {__NR_shmat, "shmat"},
- {__NR_shmctl, "shmctl"},
- {__NR_shmdt, "shmdt"},
- {__NR_shmget, "shmget"},
- {__NR_shutdown, "shutdown"},
- {__NR_sigaltstack, "sigaltstack"},
- {__NR_signalfd, "signalfd"},
- {__NR_signalfd4, "signalfd4"},
- {__NR_socket, "socket"},
- {__NR_socketpair, "socketpair"},
- {__NR_splice, "splice"},
- {__NR_stat, "stat"},
- {__NR_statfs, "statfs"},
- {__NR_statx, "statx"},
- {__NR_swapoff, "swapoff"},
- {__NR_swapon, "swapon"},
- {__NR_symlink, "symlink"},
- {__NR_symlinkat, "symlinkat"},
- {__NR_sync, "sync"},
- {__NR_sync_file_range, "sync_file_range"},
- {__NR_syncfs, "syncfs"},
- {__NR_sysfs, "sysfs"},
- {__NR_sysinfo, "sysinfo"},
- {__NR_syslog, "syslog"},
- {__NR_tee, "tee"},
- {__NR_tgkill, "tgkill"},
- {__NR_time, "time"},
- {__NR_timer_create, "timer_create"},
- {__NR_timer_delete, "timer_delete"},
- {__NR_timer_getoverrun, "timer_getoverrun"},
- {__NR_timer_gettime, "timer_gettime"},
- {__NR_timer_settime, "timer_settime"},
- {__NR_timerfd_create, "timerfd_create"},
- {__NR_timerfd_gettime, "timerfd_gettime"},
- {__NR_timerfd_settime, "timerfd_settime"},
- {__NR_times, "times"},
- {__NR_tkill, "tkill"},
- {__NR_truncate, "truncate"},
- {__NR_tuxcall, "tuxcall"},
- {__NR_umask, "umask"},
- {__NR_umount2, "umount2"},
- {__NR_uname, "uname"},
- {__NR_unlink, "unlink"},
- {__NR_unlinkat, "unlinkat"},
- {__NR_unshare, "unshare"},
- {__NR_uselib, "uselib"},
- {__NR_userfaultfd, "userfaultfd"},
- {__NR_ustat, "ustat"},
- {__NR_utime, "utime"},
- {__NR_utimensat, "utimensat"},
- {__NR_utimes, "utimes"},
- {__NR_vfork, "vfork"},
- {__NR_vhangup, "vhangup"},
- {__NR_vmsplice, "vmsplice"},
- {__NR_vserver, "vserver"},
- {__NR_wait4, "wait4"},
- {__NR_waitid, "waitid"},
- {__NR_write, "write"},
- {__NR_writev, "writev"},
-};
-
-std::string GetLinuxSyscallName(uint32_t syscall_number)
-{
- const auto element = LINUX_SYSCALLS.find(syscall_number);
- if (element != LINUX_SYSCALLS.end()) {
- return element->second;
- }
- return "*unknown*";
-}
-
-// See Linux kernel developer Kees Cook's seccomp guide at <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/> for
-// an accessible introduction to using seccomp.
-//
-// This function largely follows <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/step-3/syscall-reporter.c> and
-// <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/step-3/seccomp-bpf.h>.
-//
-// Seccomp BPF resources:
-// * Seccomp BPF documentation: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html>
-// * seccomp(2) manual page: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/online/pages/man2/seccomp.2.html>
-// * Seccomp BPF demo code samples: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/seccomp>
-void SyscallSandboxDebugSignalHandler(int, siginfo_t* signal_info, void* void_signal_context)
-{
- // The si_code field inside the siginfo_t argument that is passed to a SA_SIGINFO signal handler
- // is a value indicating why the signal was sent.
- //
- // The following value can be placed in si_code for a SIGSYS signal:
- // * SYS_SECCOMP (since Linux 3.5): Triggered by a seccomp(2) filter rule.
- constexpr int32_t SYS_SECCOMP_SI_CODE{1};
- assert(signal_info->si_code == SYS_SECCOMP_SI_CODE);
-
- // The ucontext_t structure contains signal context information that was saved on the user-space
- // stack by the kernel.
- const ucontext_t* signal_context = static_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_signal_context);
- assert(signal_context != nullptr);
-
- std::set_new_handler(std::terminate);
- // Portability note: REG_RAX is Linux x86_64 specific.
- const uint32_t syscall_number = static_cast<uint32_t>(signal_context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX]);
- const std::string syscall_name = GetLinuxSyscallName(syscall_number);
- const std::string thread_name = !util::ThreadGetInternalName().empty() ? util::ThreadGetInternalName() : "*unnamed*";
- const std::string error_message = strprintf("ERROR: The syscall \"%s\" (syscall number %d) is not allowed by the syscall sandbox in thread \"%s\". Please report.", syscall_name, syscall_number, thread_name);
- tfm::format(std::cerr, "%s\n", error_message);
- LogPrintf("%s\n", error_message);
- std::terminate();
-}
-
-// This function largely follows install_syscall_reporter from Kees Cook's seccomp guide:
-// <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/step-3/syscall-reporter.c>
-bool SetupSyscallSandboxDebugHandler()
-{
- struct sigaction action = {};
- sigset_t mask;
- sigemptyset(&mask);
- sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
- action.sa_sigaction = &SyscallSandboxDebugSignalHandler;
- action.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
- if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &action, nullptr) < 0) {
- return false;
- }
- if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, nullptr)) {
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-enum class SyscallSandboxAction {
- KILL_PROCESS,
- INVOKE_SIGNAL_HANDLER,
-};
-
-class SeccompPolicyBuilder
-{
- std::set<uint32_t> allowed_syscalls;
-
-public:
- SeccompPolicyBuilder()
- {
- // Allowed by default.
- AllowAddressSpaceAccess();
- AllowEpoll();
- AllowEventFd();
- AllowFutex();
- AllowGeneralIo();
- AllowGetRandom();
- AllowGetSimpleId();
- AllowGetTime();
- AllowGlobalProcessEnvironment();
- AllowGlobalSystemStatus();
- AllowKernelInternalApi();
- AllowNetworkSocketInformation();
- AllowOperationOnExistingFileDescriptor();
- AllowPipe();
- AllowPrctl();
- AllowProcessStartOrDeath();
- AllowScheduling();
- AllowSignalHandling();
- AllowSleep();
- AllowUmask();
- }
-
- void AllowAddressSpaceAccess()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_brk); // change data segment size
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_madvise); // give advice about use of memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_membarrier); // issue memory barriers on a set of threads
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mincore); // check if virtual memory is in RAM
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mlock); // lock memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mmap); // map files or devices into memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mprotect); // set protection on a region of memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mremap); // remap a file in memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_munlock); // unlock memory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_munmap); // unmap files or devices into memory
- }
-
- void AllowEpoll()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_epoll_create1); // open an epoll file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_epoll_ctl); // control interface for an epoll file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_epoll_pwait); // wait for an I/O event on an epoll file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_epoll_wait); // wait for an I/O event on an epoll file descriptor
- }
-
- void AllowEventFd()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_eventfd2); // create a file descriptor for event notification
- }
-
- void AllowFileSystem()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_access); // check user's permissions for a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_chdir); // change working directory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_chmod); // change permissions of a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_copy_file_range); // copy a range of data from one file to another
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fallocate); // manipulate file space
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fchmod); // change permissions of a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fchown); // change ownership of a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fdatasync); // synchronize a file's in-core state with storage device
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_flock); // apply or remove an advisory lock on an open file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fstat); // get file status
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fstatfs); // get file system status
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fsync); // synchronize a file's in-core state with storage device
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_ftruncate); // truncate a file to a specified length
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getcwd); // get current working directory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getdents); // get directory entries
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getdents64); // get directory entries
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_lstat); // get file status
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_mkdir); // create a directory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_newfstatat); // get file status
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_open); // open and possibly create a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_openat); // open and possibly create a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_readlink); // read value of a symbolic link
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rename); // change the name or location of a file
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rmdir); // delete a directory
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sendfile); // transfer data between file descriptors
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_stat); // get file status
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_statfs); // get filesystem statistics
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_statx); // get file status (extended)
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_unlink); // delete a name and possibly the file it refers to
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_unlinkat); // delete relative to a directory file descriptor
- }
-
- void AllowFutex()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_futex); // fast user-space locking
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_set_robust_list); // set list of robust futexes
- }
-
- void AllowGeneralIo()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_ioctl); // control device
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_lseek); // reposition read/write file offset
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_poll); // wait for some event on a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_ppoll); // wait for some event on a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_pread64); // read from a file descriptor at a given offset
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_pwrite64); // write to a file descriptor at a given offset
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_read); // read from a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_readv); // read data into multiple buffers
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_recvfrom); // receive a message from a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_recvmsg); // receive a message from a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_select); // synchronous I/O multiplexing
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sendmmsg); // send multiple messages on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sendmsg); // send a message on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sendto); // send a message on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_write); // write to a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_writev); // write data into multiple buffers
- }
-
- void AllowGetRandom()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getrandom); // obtain a series of random bytes
- }
-
- void AllowGetSimpleId()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getegid); // get group identity
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_geteuid); // get user identity
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getgid); // get group identity
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getpgid); // get process group
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getpid); // get process identification
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getppid); // get process identification
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getresgid); // get real, effective and saved group IDs
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getresuid); // get real, effective and saved user IDs
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getsid); // get session ID
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_gettid); // get thread identification
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getuid); // get user identity
- }
-
- void AllowGetTime()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clock_getres); // find the resolution (precision) of the specified clock
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clock_gettime); // retrieve the time of the specified clock
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_gettimeofday); // get timeval
- }
-
- void AllowGlobalProcessEnvironment()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getrlimit); // get resource limits
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getrusage); // get resource usage
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_prlimit64); // get/set resource limits
- }
-
- void AllowGlobalSystemStatus()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sysinfo); // return system information
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_uname); // get name and information about current kernel
- }
-
- void AllowKernelInternalApi()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_restart_syscall); // restart a system call after interruption by a stop signal
- }
-
- void AllowNetwork()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_accept); // accept a connection on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_accept4); // accept a connection on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_bind); // bind a name to a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_connect); // initiate a connection on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_listen); // listen for connections on a socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_setsockopt); // set options on sockets
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_socket); // create an endpoint for communication
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_socketpair); // create a pair of connected sockets
- }
-
- void AllowNetworkSocketInformation()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getpeername); // get name of connected peer socket
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getsockname); // get socket name
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_getsockopt); // get options on sockets
- }
-
- void AllowOperationOnExistingFileDescriptor()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_close); // close a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_dup); // duplicate a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_dup2); // duplicate a file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fcntl); // manipulate file descriptor
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_shutdown); // shut down part of a full-duplex connection
- }
-
- void AllowPipe()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_pipe); // create pipe
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_pipe2); // create pipe
- }
-
- void AllowPrctl()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_arch_prctl); // set architecture-specific thread state
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_prctl); // operations on a process
- }
-
- void AllowProcessStartOrDeath()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clone); // create a child process
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clone3); // create a child process
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_exit); // terminate the calling process
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_exit_group); // exit all threads in a process
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_fork); // create a child process
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_tgkill); // send a signal to a thread
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_wait4); // wait for process to change state, BSD style
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rseq); // register restartable sequence for thread
- }
-
- void AllowScheduling()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sched_getaffinity); // set a thread's CPU affinity mask
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sched_getparam); // get scheduling parameters
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sched_getscheduler); // get scheduling policy/parameters
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sched_setscheduler); // set scheduling policy/parameters
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sched_yield); // yield the processor
- }
-
- void AllowSignalHandling()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rt_sigaction); // examine and change a signal action
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rt_sigprocmask); // examine and change blocked signals
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_rt_sigreturn); // return from signal handler and cleanup stack frame
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_sigaltstack); // set and/or get signal stack context
- }
-
- void AllowSleep()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clock_nanosleep); // high-resolution sleep with specifiable clock
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_nanosleep); // high-resolution sleep
- }
-
- void AllowUmask()
- {
- allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_umask); // set file mode creation mask
- }
-
- // See Linux kernel developer Kees Cook's seccomp guide at <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/>
- // for an accessible introduction to using seccomp.
- //
- // This function largely follows <https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/step-3/seccomp-bpf.h>.
- std::vector<sock_filter> BuildFilter(SyscallSandboxAction default_action)
- {
- std::vector<sock_filter> bpf_policy;
- // See VALIDATE_ARCHITECTURE in seccomp-bpf.h referenced above.
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)));
- // Portability note: AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 is Linux x86_64 specific.
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 1, 0));
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS));
- // See EXAMINE_SYSCALL in seccomp-bpf.h referenced above.
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)));
- for (const uint32_t allowed_syscall : allowed_syscalls) {
- // See ALLOW_SYSCALL in seccomp-bpf.h referenced above.
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, allowed_syscall, 0, 1));
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW));
- }
- switch (default_action) {
- case SyscallSandboxAction::KILL_PROCESS:
- // Disallow syscall and kill the process.
- //
- // See KILL_PROCESS in seccomp-bpf.h referenced above.
- //
- // Note that we're using SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (kill the process) instead
- // of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (kill the thread). The SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
- // action was introduced in Linux 4.14.
- //
- // SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: Results in the entire process exiting immediately without
- // executing the system call.
- //
- // SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS documentation:
- // <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html>
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS));
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxAction::INVOKE_SIGNAL_HANDLER:
- // Disallow syscall and force a SIGSYS to trigger syscall debug reporter.
- //
- // SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: Results in the kernel sending a SIGSYS signal to the triggering
- // task without executing the system call.
- //
- // SECCOMP_RET_TRAP documentation:
- // <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html>
- bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP));
- break;
- }
- return bpf_policy;
- }
-};
-} // namespace
-
-bool SetupSyscallSandbox(bool log_syscall_violation_before_terminating)
-{
- assert(!g_syscall_sandbox_enabled && "SetupSyscallSandbox(...) should only be called once.");
- g_syscall_sandbox_enabled = true;
- g_syscall_sandbox_log_violation_before_terminating = log_syscall_violation_before_terminating;
- if (log_syscall_violation_before_terminating) {
- if (!SetupSyscallSandboxDebugHandler()) {
- return false;
- }
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-void TestDisallowedSandboxCall()
-{
- // The getgroups syscall is assumed NOT to be allowed by the syscall sandbox policy.
- std::array<gid_t, 1> groups;
- [[maybe_unused]] int32_t ignored = getgroups(groups.size(), groups.data());
-}
-#endif // defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
-
-void SetSyscallSandboxPolicy(SyscallSandboxPolicy syscall_policy)
-{
-#if defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
- if (!g_syscall_sandbox_enabled) {
- return;
- }
- SeccompPolicyBuilder seccomp_policy_builder;
- switch (syscall_policy) {
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION: // Thread: main thread (state: init)
- // SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION is the first policy loaded.
- //
- // Subsequently loaded policies can reduce the abilities further, but
- // abilities can never be regained.
- //
- // SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION must thus be a superset of all
- // other policies.
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION_DNS_SEED: // Thread: dnsseed
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION_LOAD_BLOCKS: // Thread: loadblk
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::INITIALIZATION_MAP_PORT: // Thread: mapport
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::MESSAGE_HANDLER: // Thread: msghand
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::NET: // Thread: net
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::NET_ADD_CONNECTION: // Thread: addcon
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::NET_HTTP_SERVER: // Thread: http
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::NET_HTTP_SERVER_WORKER: // Thread: httpworker.<N>
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::NET_OPEN_CONNECTION: // Thread: opencon
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::SCHEDULER: // Thread: scheduler
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::TOR_CONTROL: // Thread: torcontrol
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowNetwork();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::TX_INDEX: // Thread: txindex
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::VALIDATION_SCRIPT_CHECK: // Thread: scriptch.<N>
- break;
- case SyscallSandboxPolicy::SHUTOFF: // Thread: main thread (state: shutoff)
- seccomp_policy_builder.AllowFileSystem();
- break;
- }
-
- const SyscallSandboxAction default_action = g_syscall_sandbox_log_violation_before_terminating ? SyscallSandboxAction::INVOKE_SIGNAL_HANDLER : SyscallSandboxAction::KILL_PROCESS;
- std::vector<sock_filter> filter = seccomp_policy_builder.BuildFilter(default_action);
- const sock_fprog prog = {
- .len = static_cast<uint16_t>(filter.size()),
- .filter = filter.data(),
- };
- // Do not allow abilities to be regained after being dropped.
- //
- // PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS documentation: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html>
- if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
- throw std::runtime_error("Syscall sandbox enforcement failed: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
- }
- // Install seccomp-bpf syscall filter.
- //
- // PR_SET_SECCOMP documentation: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html>
- if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0) {
- throw std::runtime_error("Syscall sandbox enforcement failed: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
- }
-
- const std::string thread_name = !util::ThreadGetInternalName().empty() ? util::ThreadGetInternalName() : "*unnamed*";
- LogPrint(BCLog::UTIL, "Syscall filter installed for thread \"%s\"\n", thread_name);
-#endif // defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
-}
diff --git a/src/util/syscall_sandbox.h b/src/util/syscall_sandbox.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 3e56ebe937..0000000000
--- a/src/util/syscall_sandbox.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2020-2022 The Bitcoin Core developers
-// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
-// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
-
-#ifndef BITCOIN_UTIL_SYSCALL_SANDBOX_H
-#define BITCOIN_UTIL_SYSCALL_SANDBOX_H
-
-enum class SyscallSandboxPolicy {
- // 1. Initialization
- INITIALIZATION,
- INITIALIZATION_DNS_SEED,
- INITIALIZATION_LOAD_BLOCKS,
- INITIALIZATION_MAP_PORT,
-
- // 2. Steady state (non-initialization, non-shutdown)
- MESSAGE_HANDLER,
- NET,
- NET_ADD_CONNECTION,
- NET_HTTP_SERVER,
- NET_HTTP_SERVER_WORKER,
- NET_OPEN_CONNECTION,
- SCHEDULER,
- TOR_CONTROL,
- TX_INDEX,
- VALIDATION_SCRIPT_CHECK,
-
- // 3. Shutdown
- SHUTOFF,
-};
-
-//! Force the current thread (and threads created from the current thread) into a restricted-service
-//! operating mode where only a subset of all syscalls are available.
-//!
-//! Subsequent calls to this function can reduce the abilities further, but abilities can never be
-//! regained.
-//!
-//! This function is a no-op unless SetupSyscallSandbox(...) has been called.
-//!
-//! SetupSyscallSandbox(...) is called during bitcoind initialization if Bitcoin Core was compiled
-//! with seccomp-bpf support (--with-seccomp) *and* the parameter -sandbox=<mode> was passed to
-//! bitcoind.
-//!
-//! This experimental feature is available under Linux x86_64 only.
-void SetSyscallSandboxPolicy(SyscallSandboxPolicy syscall_policy);
-
-#if defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
-//! Setup and enable the experimental syscall sandbox for the running process.
-[[nodiscard]] bool SetupSyscallSandbox(bool log_syscall_violation_before_terminating);
-
-//! Invoke a disallowed syscall. Use for testing purposes.
-void TestDisallowedSandboxCall();
-#endif // defined(USE_SYSCALL_SANDBOX)
-
-#endif // BITCOIN_UTIL_SYSCALL_SANDBOX_H