diff options
| author | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-11-07 11:16:48 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-11-07 11:17:00 +0000 |
| commit | 2b3f43b96ef0b674bf350f50f317477b8d3e1e56 (patch) | |
| tree | 096eb5eb296dfc1bf31c039ad0ee632c19344c80 /src/test | |
| parent | 0387ca0774be0fa05a81cb91f880c53a7ad5fade (diff) | |
| parent | fa7ba926300f44b350d04262e569cc607e4991d8 (diff) | |
| download | bitcoin-2b3f43b96ef0b674bf350f50f317477b8d3e1e56.tar.xz | |
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#28789: fuzz: Avoid utxo_total_supply timeout (take 2)
fa7ba926300f44b350d04262e569cc607e4991d8 fuzz: Avoid utxo_total_supply timeout (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Looks like this still may take a long time to run large fuzz inputs. Thus, reduce it further, but still allow it to catch the regression, if re-introduced:
```diff
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
index f949655909..4bdd15c5ee 100644
--- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
+++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state)
std::set<COutPoint> vInOutPoints;
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) {
if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second)
- return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
+ {}//return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
}
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
```
This is the second take, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27780. If in the future it still times out, I think the fuzz test can just be removed.
Example input:
```
JREROy5pcnAgQyw7IC4ODg4ODg4ODg4O0dEODg4ODg4ZDg4ODg4ODg4ODg7RDg4ODg4ODg4O0dEODg4ODg4ODg4ODg7R0Q4ODg4ODg4ODtHRDg4ODtHR0dEODg4O0dEODg7R0Q4ODg4ODg4ODtHRDg4ODg4ODg4ODg4O0dEODg4ODg4ODg7R0Q4ODg7R0Q4O0dEODg4ODg4ODg4ODg7R0Q4ODg4ODtHRDg4ODtHR
ACKs for top commit:
dergoegge:
ACK fa7ba926300f44b350d04262e569cc607e4991d8
brunoerg:
utACK fa7ba926300f44b350d04262e569cc607e4991d8
Tree-SHA512: 154a4895834babede6ce7b775562a7026637af1097e53e55676e92f6cf966ae0c092300ebf7e51a397eebd11f7b41d020586663e781f70d084efda1c0fe851b4
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp b/src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp index 318797faf2..a8f0f3b7ff 100644 --- a/src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp +++ b/src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(utxo_total_supply) assert(ActiveHeight() == 0); // Get at which height we duplicate the coinbase // Assuming that the fuzzer will mine relatively short chains (less than 200 blocks), we want the duplicate coinbase to be not too high. - // Up to 2000 seems reasonable. - int64_t duplicate_coinbase_height = fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange(0, 20 * COINBASE_MATURITY); + // Up to 300 seems reasonable. + int64_t duplicate_coinbase_height = fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange(0, 300); // Always pad with OP_0 at the end to avoid bad-cb-length error const CScript duplicate_coinbase_script = CScript() << duplicate_coinbase_height << OP_0; // Mine the first block with this duplicate @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(utxo_total_supply) // Limit to avoid timeout, but enough to cover duplicate_coinbase_height // and CVE-2018-17144. - LIMITED_WHILE(fuzzed_data_provider.remaining_bytes(), 2'000) + LIMITED_WHILE(fuzzed_data_provider.remaining_bytes(), 2'00) { CallOneOf( fuzzed_data_provider, |