Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#27411: p2p: Restrict self-advertisements with privacy networks to avoid fingerprinting

e7cf8657e1165ea5da3911a9e543837cd8938f97 test: add unit test for local address advertising (Martin Zumsande)
f4754b9dfb84859166843fb2a1888fb3cfebf73c net: restrict self-advertisements with privacy networks (Martin Zumsande)
e4d541c7cfa65da77e80e6786fdcb197ab50d04b net, refactor: pass reference for peer address in GetReachabilityFrom (Martin Zumsande)
62d73f5370415f910c95a67b3d9f97bc85487bbe net, refactor: pass CNode instead of CNetAddr to GetLocalAddress (Martin Zumsande)

Pull request description:

  The current logic for self-advertisements works such that we detect as many local addresses as we can, and then, using the scoring matrix from `CNetAddr::GetReachabilityFrom()`, self-advertise with the address that fits best to our peer.
  It is in general not hard for our peers to distinguish our self-advertisements from other addrs we send them, because we self-advertise every ~24h and because the first addr we send over a connection is likely our self-advertisement.

  `GetReachabilityFrom()` currently only takes into account actual reachability, but not whether we'd _want_ to announce our identity for one network to peers from other networks, which is not straightforward in connection with privacy networks.

  While the general approach is to prefer self-advertising with the address for the network our peer is on, there are several special situations in which we don't have one, and as a result could allow self-advertise other local addresses, for example:

  A) We run i2p and clearnet, use `-i2pacceptincoming=0` (so we have no local i2p address), and we have a local ipv4 address. In this case, we'd advertise the ipv4 address to our outbound i2p peers.

  B) Our `-discover` logic cannot detect any local clearnet addresses in our network environment, but we are actually reachable over clearnet. If we ran bitcoind clearnet-only, we'd always advertise the address our peer sees us with instead, and could get inbound peers this way. Now, if we also have an onion service running (but aren't using tor as a proxy for clearnet connections), we could advertise our onion address to clearnet peers, so that they would be able to connect our clearnet and onion identities.

  This PR tries to avoid these situations by
  1.) never advertising our local Tor or I2P address to peers from other networks.
  2.) never advertising local addresses from non-anonymity networks to peers from Tor or I2P

  Note that this affects only our own self-advertisements, the rules to forward other people's addrs are not changed.

  [Edit] after Initial [discussion](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27411#issuecomment-1497176155): CJDNS is not being treated like Tor and I2P at least for now, because it has different privacy properties and for the practical reason that it has still very few bitcoin nodes.

ACKs for top commit:
  achow101:
    ACK e7cf8657e1165ea5da3911a9e543837cd8938f97
  vasild:
    ACK e7cf8657e1165ea5da3911a9e543837cd8938f97
  luke-jr:
    utACK e7cf8657e1165ea5da3911a9e543837cd8938f97

Tree-SHA512: 3db8415dea6f82223d11a23bd6cbb3b8cf68831321280e926034a1f110cbe22562570013925f6fa20d8f08e41d0202fd69c733d9f16217318a660d2a1a21b795

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/test/fuzz/netaddress.cpp b/src/test/fuzz/netaddress.cpp
index 049ae02f4d..5141d3362d 100644
--- a/src/test/fuzz/netaddress.cpp
+++ b/src/test/fuzz/netaddress.cpp
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(netaddress)
     (void)CServiceHash(0, 0)(service);
 
     const CNetAddr other_net_addr = ConsumeNetAddr(fuzzed_data_provider);
-    (void)net_addr.GetReachabilityFrom(&other_net_addr);
+    (void)net_addr.GetReachabilityFrom(other_net_addr);
     (void)sub_net.Match(other_net_addr);
 
     const CService other_service{net_addr, fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint16_t>()};