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| author | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-07-18 15:25:05 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-07-18 15:25:05 +0100 |
| commit | 8ee662984fccf055901ecba0bf81dbf47ed734e7 (patch) | |
| tree | 52c86d39e3dbf04be4e50cd84a120f4563819d6b /src/secp256k1/examples | |
| parent | 673acab223c0f896767b1ae784659df9f95452ae (diff) | |
| parent | ff061fde183f68d3b77db24b5742f54e58952de6 (diff) | |
| download | bitcoin-8ee662984fccf055901ecba0bf81dbf47ed734e7.tar.xz | |
Update secp256k1 subtree to latest upstream master
Diffstat (limited to 'src/secp256k1/examples')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h | 2 |
2 files changed, 1 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt b/src/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt index e095b7f84f..e2ea473008 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/src/secp256k1/examples/CMakeLists.txt @@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ target_link_libraries(example INTERFACE secp256k1 $<$<PLATFORM_ID:Windows>:bcrypt> ) -if(NOT BUILD_SHARED_LIBS AND MSVC) - target_link_options(example INTERFACE /IGNORE:4217) -endif() add_executable(ecdsa_example ecdsa.c) target_link_libraries(ecdsa_example example) diff --git a/src/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h b/src/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h index 8e3a8f00cf..3293b64032 100644 --- a/src/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h +++ b/src/secp256k1/examples/examples_util.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void secure_erase(void *ptr, size_t len) { * As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that * might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets. * This method used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it is - * pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficently, + * pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficiently, * just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by * Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background. */ |