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| author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2014-08-19 14:40:11 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2014-08-19 14:40:34 +0200 |
| commit | 01094bd01f5d999b7da698c0e655cf723afa8ebb (patch) | |
| tree | ec1fb5e39cea18ed2bfac9bcd971ab4ed48196eb /src/rpcserver.cpp | |
| parent | dd2819701a1a4481ae06b24924b75d55b9feb115 (diff) | |
| download | bitcoin-01094bd01f5d999b7da698c0e655cf723afa8ebb.tar.xz | |
Don't reveal whether password is <20 or >20 characters in RPC
As discussed on IRC.
It seems bad to base a decision to delay based on the password length,
as it leaks a small amount of information.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/rpcserver.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/rpcserver.cpp | 5 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/rpcserver.cpp b/src/rpcserver.cpp index 3b51c91e7c..524627e2de 100644 --- a/src/rpcserver.cpp +++ b/src/rpcserver.cpp @@ -849,11 +849,10 @@ static bool HTTPReq_JSONRPC(AcceptedConnection *conn, if (!HTTPAuthorized(mapHeaders)) { LogPrintf("ThreadRPCServer incorrect password attempt from %s\n", conn->peer_address_to_string()); - /* Deter brute-forcing short passwords. + /* Deter brute-forcing If this results in a DoS the user really shouldn't have their RPC port exposed. */ - if (mapArgs["-rpcpassword"].size() < 20) - MilliSleep(250); + MilliSleep(250); conn->stream() << HTTPError(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, false) << std::flush; return false; |