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authorPieter Wuille <pieter@wuille.net>2020-09-11 12:44:08 -0700
committerPieter Wuille <pieter@wuille.net>2020-09-11 12:44:08 -0700
commitb9c1a7648131c5deec9704ee9acd00ec1820b9ce (patch)
tree1b2db0573d7c4f2f90589da7886816d0db73b8c7 /src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h
parent67f232b5d874b501c114bced5d764db7f4f5ce99 (diff)
Squashed 'src/secp256k1/' changes from 2ed54da18a..8ab24e8dad
8ab24e8dad Merge #558: Add schnorrsig module which implements BIP-340 compliant signatures f3733c5433 Merge #797: Fix Jacobi benchmarks and other benchmark improvements cb5524adc5 Add benchmark for secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var 5c6af60ec5 Make jacobi benchmarks vary inputs d0fdd5f009 Randomize the Z coordinates in bench_internal c7a3424c5f Rename bench_internal variables 875d68b95f Merge #699: Initialize field elements when resulting in infinity 54caf2e74f Merge #799: Add fallback LE/BE for architectures with known endianness + SHA256 selftest f431b3f28a valgrind_ctime_test: Add schnorrsig_sign 16ffa9d97c schnorrsig: Add taproot test case 8dfd53ee3f schnorrsig: Add benchmark for sign and verify 4e43520026 schnorrsig: Add BIP-340 compatible signing and verification 7332d2db6b schnorrsig: Add BIP-340 nonce function 7a703fd97d schnorrsig: Init empty experimental module eabd9bc46a Allow initializing tagged sha256 6fcb5b845d extrakeys: Add keypair_xonly_tweak_add 58254463f9 extrakeys: Add keypair struct with create, pub and pub_xonly f0010349b8 Separate helper functions for pubkey_create and seckey_tweak_add 910d9c284c extrakeys: Add xonly_pubkey_tweak_add & xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_test 176bfb1110 Separate helper function for ec_pubkey_tweak_add 4cd2ee474d extrakeys: Add xonly_pubkey with serialize, parse and from_pubkey f49c9896b0 Merge #806: Trivial: Add test logs to gitignore aabf00c155 Merge #648: Prevent ints from wrapping around in scratch space functions f5adab16a9 Merge #805: Remove the extremely outdated TODO file. bceefd6547 Add test logs to gitignore 1c325199d5 Remove the extremely outdated TODO file. 47e6618e11 extrakeys: Init empty experimental module 3e08b02e2a Make the secp256k1_declassify argument constant 8bc6aeffa9 Add SHA256 selftest 670cdd3f8b Merge #798: Check assumptions on integer implementation at compile time 5e5fb28b4a Use additional system macros to figure out endianness 7c068998ba Compile-time check assumptions on integer types 02b6c87b52 Add support for (signed) __int128 979961c506 Merge #787: Use preprocessor macros instead of autoconf to detect endianness 887bd1f8b6 Merge #793: Make scalar/field choice depend on C-detected __int128 availability 0dccf98a21 Use preprocessor macros instead of autoconf to detect endianness b2c8c42cf1 Merge #795: Avoid linking libcrypto in the valgrind ct test. 57d3a3c64c Avoid linking libcrypto in the valgrind ct test. 79f1f7a4f1 Autodetect __int128 availability on the C side 0d7727f95e Add SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET to 5x52 field 805082de11 Merge #696: Run a Travis test on s390x (big endian) 39295362cf Test travis s390x (big endian) 6034a04fb1 Merge #778: secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero supports infinity f60915906d Merge #779: travis: Fix argument quoting for ./configure 9e49a9b255 travis: Fix argument quoting for ./configure 18d36327fd secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero supports infinity 214cb3c321 Merge #772: Improve constant-timeness on PowerPC 40412b1930 Merge #774: tests: Abort if malloc() fails during context cloning tests 2e1b9e0458 tests: Abort if malloc() fails during context cloning tests 67a429f31f Suppress a harmless variable-time optimization by clang in _int_cmov 5b196338f0 Remove redundant "? 1 : 0" after comparisons in scalar code 3e5cfc5c73 Merge #741: Remove unnecessary sign variable from wnaf_const 66bb9320c0 Merge #773: Fix some compile problems on weird/old compilers. 1309c03c45 Fix some compile problems on weird/old compilers. 2309c7dd4a Merge #769: Undef HAVE___INT128 in basic-config.h to fix gen_context compilation 22e578bb11 Undef HAVE___INT128 in basic-config.h to fix gen_context compilation 3f4a5a10e4 Merge #765: remove dead store in ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax f00d6575ca remove dead store in ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax dbd41db16a Merge #759: Fix uninitialized variables in ecmult_multi test 2e7fc5b537 Fix uninitialized variables in ecmult_multi test 37dba329c6 Remove unnecessary sign variable from wnaf_const 6bb0b77e15 Fix test_constant_wnaf for -1 and add a test for it. 47a7b8382f Clear field elements when writing infinity 61d1ecb028 Added test with additions resulting in infinity 60f7f2de5d Don't assume that ALIGNMENT > 1 in tests ada6361dec Use ROUND_TO_ALIGN in scratch_create 8ecc6ce50e Add check preventing rounding to alignment from wrapping around in scratch_alloc 4edaf06fb0 Add check preventing integer multiplication wrapping around in scratch_max_allocation git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1 git-subtree-split: 8ab24e8dad9d43fc6661842149899e3cc9213b24
Diffstat (limited to 'src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h')
-rw-r--r--src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h524
1 files changed, 524 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h b/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc9d40eda1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,524 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Jonas Nick *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_
+#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS_TESTS_
+
+#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
+
+static secp256k1_context* api_test_context(int flags, int *ecount) {
+ secp256k1_context *ctx0 = secp256k1_context_create(flags);
+ secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount);
+ secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx0, counting_illegal_callback_fn, ecount);
+ return ctx0;
+}
+
+void test_xonly_pubkey(void) {
+ secp256k1_pubkey pk;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp;
+ secp256k1_ge pk1;
+ secp256k1_ge pk2;
+ secp256k1_fe y;
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ unsigned char xy_sk[32];
+ unsigned char buf32[32];
+ unsigned char ones32[32];
+ unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 };
+ int pk_parity;
+ int i;
+
+ int ecount;
+ secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount);
+
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ memset(ones32, 0xFF, 32);
+ secp256k1_rand256(xy_sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+
+ /* Test xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey */
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(sign, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ memset(&pk, 0, sizeof(pk));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+
+ /* Choose a secret key such that the resulting pubkey and xonly_pubkey match. */
+ memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk));
+ sk[0] = 1;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&pk, &xonly_pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0);
+ CHECK(pk_parity == 0);
+
+ /* Choose a secret key such that pubkey and xonly_pubkey are each others
+ * negation. */
+ sk[0] = 2;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) != 0);
+ CHECK(pk_parity == 1);
+ secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk1, &pk);
+ secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk2, (secp256k1_pubkey *) &xonly_pk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.x, &pk2.x) == 1);
+ secp256k1_fe_negate(&y, &pk2.y, 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal(&pk1.y, &y) == 1);
+
+ /* Test xonly_pubkey_serialize and xonly_pubkey_parse */
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, NULL, &xonly_pk) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(buf32, zeros64, 32) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ {
+ /* A pubkey filled with 0s will fail to serialize due to pubkey_load
+ * special casing. */
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pk_tmp;
+ memset(&pk_tmp, 0, sizeof(pk_tmp));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &pk_tmp) == 0);
+ }
+ /* pubkey_load called illegal callback */
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(none, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1);
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, NULL, buf32) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+
+ /* Serialization and parse roundtrip */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &xonly_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk_tmp, buf32) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+
+ /* Test parsing invalid field elements */
+ memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk));
+ /* Overflowing field element */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, ones32) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+ memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk));
+ /* There's no point with x-coordinate 0 on secp256k1 */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(none, &xonly_pk, zeros64) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+ /* If a random 32-byte string can not be parsed with ec_pubkey_parse
+ * (because interpreted as X coordinate it does not correspond to a point on
+ * the curve) then xonly_pubkey_parse should fail as well. */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ unsigned char rand33[33];
+ secp256k1_rand256(&rand33[1]);
+ rand33[0] = SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN;
+ if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pk, rand33, 33)) {
+ memset(&xonly_pk, 1, sizeof(xonly_pk));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, zeros64, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+ } else {
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(ctx, &xonly_pk, &rand33[1]) == 1);
+ }
+ }
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(none);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(sign);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(verify);
+}
+
+void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak(void) {
+ unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char overflows[32];
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk;
+ secp256k1_pubkey output_pk;
+ int pk_parity;
+ unsigned char tweak[32];
+ int i;
+
+ int ecount;
+ secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount);
+
+ memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows));
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1);
+
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(none, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(sign, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, NULL, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, NULL, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 4);
+ /* NULL internal_xonly_pk zeroes the output_pk */
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 5);
+ /* NULL tweak zeroes the output_pk */
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+
+ /* Invalid tweak zeroes the output_pk */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+
+ /* A zero tweak is fine */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, zeros64) == 1);
+
+ /* Fails if the resulting key was infinity */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak;
+ /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak =
+ * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL);
+ secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak);
+ CHECK((secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, sk) == 0)
+ || (secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0));
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Invalid pk with a valid tweak */
+ memset(&internal_xonly_pk, 0, sizeof(internal_xonly_pk));
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(none);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(sign);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(verify);
+}
+
+void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check(void) {
+ unsigned char zeros64[64] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char overflows[32];
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ secp256k1_pubkey internal_pk;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_xonly_pk;
+ secp256k1_pubkey output_pk;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_xonly_pk;
+ unsigned char output_pk32[32];
+ unsigned char buf32[32];
+ int pk_parity;
+ unsigned char tweak[32];
+
+ int ecount;
+ secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount);
+
+ memset(overflows, 0xff, sizeof(overflows));
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &internal_pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &internal_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &internal_pk) == 1);
+
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(verify, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(verify, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(none, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(sign, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, NULL, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+ /* invalid pk_parity value */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, 2, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, NULL, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 4);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(verify, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 5);
+
+ memset(tweak, 1, sizeof(tweak));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &internal_xonly_pk, NULL, &internal_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &output_xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &output_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, output_pk32, &output_xonly_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 1);
+
+ /* Wrong pk_parity */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, !pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+ /* Wrong public key */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, buf32, &internal_xonly_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, buf32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, tweak) == 0);
+
+ /* Overflowing tweak not allowed */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, output_pk32, pk_parity, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk, &internal_xonly_pk, overflows) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk, zeros64, sizeof(output_pk)) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 5);
+
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(none);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(sign);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(verify);
+}
+
+/* Starts with an initial pubkey and recursively creates N_PUBKEYS - 1
+ * additional pubkeys by calling tweak_add. Then verifies every tweak starting
+ * from the last pubkey. */
+#define N_PUBKEYS 32
+void test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive(void) {
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ secp256k1_pubkey pk[N_PUBKEYS];
+ unsigned char pk_serialized[32];
+ unsigned char tweak[N_PUBKEYS - 1][32];
+ int i;
+
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pk[0], sk) == 1);
+ /* Add tweaks */
+ for (i = 0; i < N_PUBKEYS - 1; i++) {
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk;
+ memset(tweak[i], i + 1, sizeof(tweak[i]));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i]) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pk[i + 1], &xonly_pk, tweak[i]) == 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Verify tweaks */
+ for (i = N_PUBKEYS - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk;
+ int pk_parity;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk[i]) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk_serialized, &xonly_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(ctx, &xonly_pk, NULL, &pk[i - 1]) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk_serialized, pk_parity, &xonly_pk, tweak[i - 1]) == 1);
+ }
+}
+#undef N_PUBKEYS
+
+void test_keypair(void) {
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char overflows[32];
+ secp256k1_keypair keypair;
+ secp256k1_pubkey pk, pk_tmp;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly_pk, xonly_pk_tmp;
+ int pk_parity, pk_parity_tmp;
+ int ecount;
+ secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount);
+
+ CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair));
+ memset(overflows, 0xFF, sizeof(overflows));
+
+ /* Test keypair_create */
+ ecount = 0;
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(none, &keypair, sk) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(verify, &keypair, sk) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, NULL, sk) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 4);
+
+ /* Invalid secret key */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, zeros96) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, overflows) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &keypair, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+
+ /* Test keypair_pub */
+ ecount = 0;
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, NULL, &keypair) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0);
+
+ /* Using an invalid keypair is fine for keypair_pub */
+ memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &pk, sizeof(pk)) == 0);
+
+ /* keypair holds the same pubkey as pubkey_create */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(none, &pk_tmp, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&pk, &pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0);
+
+ /** Test keypair_xonly_pub **/
+ ecount = 0;
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, NULL, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+ /* Using an invalid keypair will set the xonly_pk to 0 (first reset
+ * xonly_pk). */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1);
+ memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair));
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(zeros96, &xonly_pk, sizeof(xonly_pk)) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+
+ /** keypair holds the same xonly pubkey as pubkey_create **/
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pk, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(none, &xonly_pk, &pk_parity, &pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(sign, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(none, &xonly_pk_tmp, &pk_parity_tmp, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&xonly_pk, &xonly_pk_tmp, sizeof(pk)) == 0);
+ CHECK(pk_parity == pk_parity_tmp);
+
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(none);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(sign);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(verify);
+}
+
+void test_keypair_add(void) {
+ unsigned char sk[32];
+ secp256k1_keypair keypair;
+ unsigned char overflows[32];
+ unsigned char zeros96[96] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char tweak[32];
+ int i;
+ int ecount = 0;
+ secp256k1_context *none = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *sign = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN, &ecount);
+ secp256k1_context *verify = api_test_context(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY, &ecount);
+
+ CHECK(sizeof(zeros96) == sizeof(keypair));
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ memset(overflows, 0xFF, 32);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(none, &keypair, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(sign, &keypair, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, NULL, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, NULL) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 4);
+ /* This does not set the keypair to zeroes */
+ CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) != 0);
+
+ /* Invalid tweak zeroes the keypair */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, overflows) == 0);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+
+ /* A zero tweak is fine */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, zeros96) == 1);
+
+ /* Fails if the resulting keypair was (sk=0, pk=infinity) */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ secp256k1_scalar scalar_tweak;
+ secp256k1_keypair keypair_tmp;
+ secp256k1_rand256(sk);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ memcpy(&keypair_tmp, &keypair, sizeof(keypair));
+ /* Because sk may be negated before adding, we need to try with tweak =
+ * sk as well as tweak = -sk. */
+ secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&scalar_tweak, sk, NULL);
+ secp256k1_scalar_negate(&scalar_tweak, &scalar_tweak);
+ secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tweak, &scalar_tweak);
+ CHECK((secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 0)
+ || (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair_tmp, tweak) == 0));
+ CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0
+ || memcmp(&keypair_tmp, zeros96, sizeof(keypair_tmp)) == 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Invalid keypair with a valid tweak */
+ memset(&keypair, 0, sizeof(keypair));
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ ecount = 0;
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&keypair, zeros96, sizeof(keypair)) == 0);
+ /* Only seckey part of keypair invalid */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ memset(&keypair, 0, 32);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 2);
+ /* Only pubkey part of keypair invalid */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ memset(&keypair.data[32], 0, 64);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(verify, &keypair, tweak) == 0);
+ CHECK(ecount == 3);
+
+ /* Check that the keypair_tweak_add implementation is correct */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, sk) == 1);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey internal_pk;
+ secp256k1_xonly_pubkey output_pk;
+ secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_xy;
+ secp256k1_pubkey output_pk_expected;
+ unsigned char pk32[32];
+ int pk_parity;
+
+ secp256k1_rand256(tweak);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &internal_pk, NULL, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(ctx, &output_pk, &pk_parity, &keypair) == 1);
+
+ /* Check that it passes xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk32, &output_pk) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(ctx, pk32, pk_parity, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1);
+
+ /* Check that the resulting pubkey matches xonly_pubkey_tweak_add */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &output_pk_xy, &keypair) == 1);
+ CHECK(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &internal_pk, tweak) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0);
+
+ /* Check that the secret key in the keypair is tweaked correctly */
+ CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &output_pk_expected, &keypair.data[0]) == 1);
+ CHECK(memcmp(&output_pk_xy, &output_pk_expected, sizeof(output_pk_xy)) == 0);
+ }
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(none);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(sign);
+ secp256k1_context_destroy(verify);
+}
+
+void run_extrakeys_tests(void) {
+ /* xonly key test cases */
+ test_xonly_pubkey();
+ test_xonly_pubkey_tweak();
+ test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_check();
+ test_xonly_pubkey_tweak_recursive();
+
+ /* keypair tests */
+ test_keypair();
+ test_keypair_add();
+}
+
+#endif