Remove oversized message detection from log and interface

3 files changed, 7 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp
index 210258c25a..8b9ef1d0aa 100644
--- a/src/net.cpp
+++ b/src/net.cpp
@@ -577,12 +577,6 @@ bool CNode::ReceiveMsgBytes(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes, bool& complete
             return false;
         }
 
-        if (m_deserializer->OversizedMessageDetected()) {
-            LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Oversized message from peer=%i, disconnecting\n", GetId());
-            m_deserializer->Reset();
-            return false;
-        }
-
         pch += handled;
         nBytes -= handled;
 
@@ -655,9 +649,10 @@ int V1TransportDeserializer::readHeader(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    // reject messages larger than MAX_SIZE
-    if (hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_SIZE)
+    // reject messages larger than MAX_SIZE or MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
+    if (hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_SIZE || hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
         return -1;
+    }
 
     // switch state to reading message data
     in_data = true;
diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index 6122508471..570ae83465 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -642,8 +642,6 @@ public:
     virtual void Reset() = 0;
     // returns true if the current deserialization is complete
     virtual bool Complete() const = 0;
-    // checks if the potential message in deserialization is oversized
-    virtual bool OversizedMessageDetected() const = 0;
     // set the serialization context version
     virtual void SetVersion(int version) = 0;
     // read and deserialize data
@@ -695,9 +693,6 @@ public:
         hdrbuf.SetVersion(nVersionIn);
         vRecv.SetVersion(nVersionIn);
     }
-    bool OversizedMessageDetected() const {
-        return (in_data && hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-    }
     int Read(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes) {
         return in_data ? readData(pch, nBytes) : readHeader(pch, nBytes);
     }
diff --git a/test/functional/p2p_invalid_messages.py b/test/functional/p2p_invalid_messages.py
index 8fcf5b878f..f0ceb8e6a3 100755
--- a/test/functional/p2p_invalid_messages.py
+++ b/test/functional/p2p_invalid_messages.py
@@ -101,11 +101,10 @@ class InvalidMessagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
             msg_over_size = msg_unrecognized(str_data="b" * (valid_data_limit + 1))
             assert len(msg_over_size.serialize()) == (msg_limit + 1)
 
-            with node.assert_debug_log(["Oversized message from peer=4, disconnecting"]):
-                # An unknown message type (or *any* message type) over
-                # MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH should result in a disconnect.
-                node.p2p.send_message(msg_over_size)
-                node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
+            # An unknown message type (or *any* message type) over
+            # MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH should result in a disconnect.
+            node.p2p.send_message(msg_over_size)
+            node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
 
             node.disconnect_p2ps()
             conn = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())