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Diffstat (limited to 'bip-taproot.mediawiki')
-rw-r--r-- | bip-taproot.mediawiki | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/bip-taproot.mediawiki b/bip-taproot.mediawiki index 7f2f443..882a377 100644 --- a/bip-taproot.mediawiki +++ b/bip-taproot.mediawiki @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Specifically, it seeks to minimize how much information about the spendability c As a result we choose this combination of technologies: * '''Merkle branches''' let us only reveal the actually executed part of the script to the blockchain, as opposed to all possible ways a script can be executed. Among the various known mechanisms for implementing this, one where the Merkle tree becomes part of the script's structure directly maximizes the space savings, so that approach is chosen. * '''Taproot''' on top of that lets us merge the traditionally separate pay-to-pubkey and pay-to-scripthash policies, making all outputs spendable by either a key or (optionally) a script, and indistinguishable from each other. As long as the key-based spending path is used for spending, it is not revealed whether a script path was permitted as well, resulting in space savings and an increase in scripting privacy at spending time. -* Taproot's advantages become apparent under the assumption that most applications involve outputs that could be spent by all parties agreeing. That's where '''Schnorr''' signatures come in, as they permit [https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/068 key aggregation]: a public key can be constructed from multiple participant public keys, and which requires cooperation between all participants to sign for. Such multi-party public keys and signatures are indistinguishable from their single-party equivalents. This means that the all-parties-agree case can be handled using the key-based spending path, which is efficient and (under the Taproot assumption) private using taproot. This can be generalized to arbitrary M-of-N policies, as Schnorr signatures support threshold signing, at the cost of more complex setup protocols. +* Taproot's advantages become apparent under the assumption that most applications involve outputs that could be spent by all parties agreeing. That's where '''Schnorr''' signatures come in, as they permit [https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/068 key aggregation]: a public key can be constructed from multiple participant public keys, and which requires cooperation between all participants to sign for. Such multi-party public keys and signatures are indistinguishable from their single-party equivalents. This means that with taproot most applications can use the key-based spending path, which is both efficient and private. This can be generalized to arbitrary M-of-N policies, as Schnorr signatures support threshold signing, at the cost of more complex setup protocols. * As Schnorr signatures also permit '''batch validation''', allowing multiple signatures to be validated together more efficiently than validating each one independently, we make sure all parts of the design are compatible with this. * Where unused bits appear as a result of the above changes, they are reserved for mechanisms for '''future extensions'''. As a result, every script in the Merkle tree has an associated version such that new script versions can be introduced with a soft fork while remaining compatible with bip-taproot. Additionally, future soft forks can make use of the currently unused <code>annex</code> in the witness (see [[#Rationale]]). * While the core semantics of the '''signature hashing algorithm''' are not changed, a number of improvements are included in this proposal. The new signature hashing algorithm fixes the verification capabilities of offline signing devices by including amount and scriptPubKey in the digest, avoids unnecessary hashing, uses '''tagged hashes''' and defines a default sighash byte. |