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Diffstat (limited to 'bip-0099.mediawiki')
| -rw-r--r-- | bip-0099.mediawiki | 45 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/bip-0099.mediawiki b/bip-0099.mediawiki index eaabd8e..7d0207c 100644 --- a/bip-0099.mediawiki +++ b/bip-0099.mediawiki @@ -137,27 +137,49 @@ consider the risk of motivating a schism hardfork before attempting such a consensus fork. A deployment plan for this case is also unnecessary. -===Schism[1] hardforks=== - -In all of the following examples there's clearly a confrontation that -is being resolved using an intentional consensus fork. - -Being a schism hardfork, there will likely be 2 chains -coexisting for at least some time, maybe forever. Maybe bitcoin -becomes bitcoinA and bitcoinB. The implications for market +===Schism hardforks=== + +Fundamental disagreements and controversies are part of social +systems, like the one defined as the human participants in the Bitcoin +network. Without judging the motivation of the rule discrepancies or +what rules were in place first, we're definining schism[1] hardforks as +those in which - for whatever reason - users are consiously going to validate 2 +different sets of consensus rules. Since they will validate different +rulesets, they will end up following 2 different chains for at least +some time, maybe forever. + +One possible result observed in the past[non_proportional_inflatacoin_fork] +is that one of the chains rapidly disappears, but nothing indicates +that this must always be the case. + +While 2 chains cohexist, they can be considered two different +currencies. +We could say that bitcoin becomes bitcoinA and bitcoinB. The implications for market capitalization are completely unpredictable, + maybe mc(bitcoinA) = mc(bitcoinB) = mc(old_bitcoin), + maybe mc(bitcoinA) + mc(bitcoinB) = mc(old_bitcoin), + maybe mc(bitcoinA) + mc(bitcoinB) = 1000 * mc(old_bitcoin), + maybe mc(bitcoinA) + mc(bitcoinB) = 0, + ... +Schism hardforks have been compared to one type of altcoins called +"spinoffs"[spinoffs] that distribute all or part of its initial seigniorage to +bitcoin owners at a given block height. + This is very disruptive and hopefully will never be needed. But if it's needed the best deployment path is just to activate the rule changes after certain block height in the future. On the other hand, it is healthy decentralization-wise that many independent software projects are ready to deploy a schism hardfork. +In all of the following examples there's clearly a confrontation that +is being resolved using an intentional consensus hardfork. + ====ASIC-reset hardfork==== Imagine ASIC production has been consolidated to a single company and @@ -320,6 +342,10 @@ worth of blocks). [2] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0050.mediawiki +[non_proportional_inflatacoin_fork] TODO missing link + +[spinoffs] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563972.0 + [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki [4] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/compare/0.11...jtimon:hardfork-timewarp-0.11 @@ -332,7 +358,8 @@ https://github.com/freicoin/freicoin/commit/beb2fa54745180d755949470466cbffd1cd6 ==Attribution== -Incorporated corrections and suggestions from: Andy Chase, Bryan Bishop, Btcdrak, Gregory Sanders, Luke Dashjr, Marco Falke. +Incorporated corrections and suggestions from: Andy Chase, Bryan Bishop, +Btcdrak, Gavin Andresen, Gregory Sanders, Luke Dashjr, Marco Falke. ==Copyright== |