bip-schnorr: more on provable security

I'll try to get a link to the CCS paper that does not have a paywall...

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/bip-schnorr.mediawiki b/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
index c936ed3..d7ac9b1 100644
--- a/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ Bitcoin has traditionally used
 transactions. These are [https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf standardized], but have a number of downsides
 compared to [http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/opus4/files/4280/schnorr.pdf Schnorr signatures] over the same curve:
 
-* '''Security proof''': The security of Schnorr signatures is easily [https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2000_joc.pdf provable] in the random oracle model assuming the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is hard. Such a proof does not exist for ECDSA.
-* '''Non-malleability''': ECDSA signatures are inherently malleable; a third party without access to the secret key can alter an existing valid signature for a given public key and message into another signature that is valid for the same key and message. This issue is discussed in [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki BIP62] and [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0066.mediawiki BIP66]. On the other hand, Schnorr signatures are provably non-malleable<ref>More precisely they are '' '''strongly''' unforgeable under chosen message attacks '' (SUF-CMA), which informally means that without knowledge of the secret key but given a valid signature of a message, it is not possible to come up with a second valid signature for the same message.  A security proof in the random oracle model can be found for example in [https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/191 a paper by Kiltz, Masny and Pan], which essentially restates [https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2000_joc.pdf the original security proof of Schnorr signatures by Pointcheval and Stern] more explicitly. These proofs are for the Schnorr signature variant using ''(e,s)'' instead of ''(R,s)'' (see Design above). Since we use a unique encoding of ''R'', there is an efficiently computable bijection that maps ''(R, s)'' to ''(e, s)'', which allows to convert a successful SUF-CMA attacker for the ''(e, s)'' variant to a successful SUF-CMA attacker for the ''(r, s)'' variant (and vice-versa). Furthermore, the aforementioned proofs consider a variant of Schnorr signatures without key prefixing (see Design above), but it can be verified that the proofs are also correct for the variant with key prefixing. As a result, the aforementioned security proofs apply to the variant of Schnorr signatures proposed in this document.</ref>.
+* '''Provable security''': Schnorr signatures are provably secure. In more detail, they are ''strongly unforgeable under chosen message attack (SUF-CMA)''<ref>Informally, this means that without knowledge of the secret key but given valid signatures of arbitrary messages, it is not possible to come up with further valid signatures.</ref> [https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2000_joc.pdf in the random oracle model assuming the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)] and [http://www.neven.org/papers/schnorr.pdf in the generic group model assuming prefix assuming variants of preimage and second preimage resistance of the used hash function]<ref>A detailed security proof in the random oracle model, which essentially restates [https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2000_joc.pdf the original security proof by Pointcheval and Stern] more explicitly, can be found in [https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/191 a paper by Kiltz, Masny and Pan]. All these security proofs assume a variant of Schnorr signatures that use ''(e,s)'' instead of ''(R,s)'' (see Design above). Since we use a unique encoding of ''R'', there is an efficiently computable bijection that maps ''(R, s)'' to ''(e, s)'', which allows to convert a successful SUF-CMA attacker for the ''(e, s)'' variant to a successful SUF-CMA attacker for the ''(r, s)'' variant (and vice-versa). Furthermore, the proofs consider a variant of Schnorr signatures without key prefixing (see Design above), but it can be verified that the proofs are also correct for the variant with key prefixing. As a result, all the aforementioned security proofs apply to the variant of Schnorr signatures proposed in this document.</ref>. The [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2978413 best known security proof for ECDSA] relies on stronger assumptions.
+* '''Non-malleability''': The SUF-CMA security of Schnorr signatures implies that they are non-malleable. On the other hand, ECDSA signatures are inherently malleable; a third party without access to the secret key can alter an existing valid signature for a given public key and message into another signature that is valid for the same key and message. This issue is discussed in [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki BIP62] and [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0066.mediawiki BIP66].
 * '''Linearity''': Schnorr signatures have the remarkable property that multiple parties can collaborate to produce a signature that is valid for the sum of their public keys. This is the building block for various higher-level constructions that improve efficiency and privacy, such as multisignatures and others (see Applications below).
 
 For all these advantages, there are virtually no disadvantages, apart