Replace private key with secret key

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/bip-schnorr.mediawiki b/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
index a5f7c59..e1b3ed2 100644
--- a/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
@@ -133,9 +133,9 @@ The algorithm ''PubKey(sk)'' is defined as:
 * Fail if ''d = 0'' or ''d ≥ n''.
 * Return ''bytes(d⋅G)''.
 
-Note that we use a very different public key format (32 bytes) than the ones used by existing systems (which typically use elliptic curve points as public keys, or 33-byte or 65-byte encodings of them). A side effect is that ''PubKey(sk) = PubKey(bytes(n - int(sk))'', so every public key has two corresponding private keys.
+Note that we use a very different public key format (32 bytes) than the ones used by existing systems (which typically use elliptic curve points as public keys, or 33-byte or 65-byte encodings of them). A side effect is that ''PubKey(sk) = PubKey(bytes(n - int(sk))'', so every public key has two corresponding secret keys.
 
-As an alternative to generating keys randomly, it is also possible and safe to repurpose existing key generation algorithms for ECDSA in a compatible way. The private keys constructed by such an algorithm can be used as ''sk'' directly. The public keys constructed by such an algorithm (assuming they use the 33-byte compressed encoding) need to be converted by dropping the first byte. Specifically, [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki BIP32] and schemes built on top of it remain usable.
+As an alternative to generating keys randomly, it is also possible and safe to repurpose existing key generation algorithms for ECDSA in a compatible way. The secret keys constructed by such an algorithm can be used as ''sk'' directly. The public keys constructed by such an algorithm (assuming they use the 33-byte compressed encoding) need to be converted by dropping the first byte. Specifically, [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki BIP32] and schemes built on top of it remain usable.
 
 ==== Default Signing ====
 
@@ -161,9 +161,9 @@ It should be noted that various alternative signing algorithms can be used to pr
 
 '''Synthetic nonces''' When a random number generator (RNG) is available, 32 bytes of RNG output can be appended to the input to ''hash<sub>BIPSchnorrDerive</sub>''. This will change the corresponding line in the signing algorithm to ''k' = int(hash<sub>BIPSchnorrDerive</sub>(bytes(d) || m || get_32_bytes_from_rng())) mod n'', where ''get_32_bytes_from_rng()'' is the call to the RNG. Adding RNG output may improve protection against [https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000925.html fault injection attacks and side-channel attacks]. It is safe to add randomness from a low-quality randomness source, i.e., an RNG with low entropy.
 
-'''Nonce exfiltration protection''' It is possible to strengthen the nonce generation algorithm using a second device. In this case, the second device contributes randomness which the actual signer provably incorporates into its nonce. This prevents certain attacks where the signer device is compromised and intentionally tries to leak the private key through its nonce selection.
+'''Nonce exfiltration protection''' It is possible to strengthen the nonce generation algorithm using a second device. In this case, the second device contributes randomness which the actual signer provably incorporates into its nonce. This prevents certain attacks where the signer device is compromised and intentionally tries to leak the secret key through its nonce selection.
 
-'''Multisignatures''' This signature scheme is compatible with various types of multisignature and threshold schemes such as [https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/068 MuSig], where a single public key requires holders of multiple private keys to participate in signing (see Applications below).
+'''Multisignatures''' This signature scheme is compatible with various types of multisignature and threshold schemes such as [https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/068 MuSig], where a single public key requires holders of multiple secret keys to participate in signing (see Applications below).
 '''It is important to note that multisignature signing schemes in general are insecure with the nonce generation from the default signing algorithm above (or any deterministic nonce algorithm).'''
 
 ==== Verification ====