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authorChristopher Jeffrey <chjjeffrey@gmail.com>2016-07-26 23:26:46 -0700
committerChristopher Jeffrey <chjjeffrey@gmail.com>2016-07-26 23:47:03 -0700
commitf388fef2f621c648f0e06aa5bdf06db3efd27b04 (patch)
tree74179ebc484ffd545e0739643477a9c4364a0958 /bip-0151.mediawiki
parent2ac0b472da770dc807eaab94ed2394d2145961f9 (diff)
downloadbips-f388fef2f621c648f0e06aa5bdf06db3efd27b04.tar.xz
BIP151: Clarifications on AAD and sequence numbers.
Diffstat (limited to 'bip-0151.mediawiki')
-rw-r--r--bip-0151.mediawiki6
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/bip-0151.mediawiki b/bip-0151.mediawiki
index cc79712..f565a4e 100644
--- a/bip-0151.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0151.mediawiki
@@ -123,12 +123,14 @@ After a successful <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction from bot
Encrypted messages do not have the 4byte network magic.
+The ciphertext payload length must be included in the AEAD MAC as AAD.
+
The maximum message length needs to be chosen carefully. The 4 byte length field can lead to a required message buffer of 4 GiB.
Processing the message before the authentication succeeds must not be done.
The 4byte sha256 checksum is no longer required because the AEAD.
-Both peers need to track the message number (int64) of sent messages to the remote peer for building a symmetric cipher IV. Padding might be required (96bit IVs).
+Both peers need to track the message sequence number (uint32) of sent messages to the remote peer for building a 64 bit symmetric cipher IV. Sequence numbers are allowed to overflow to zero after 4294967295 (2^32-1).
The encrypted payload will result decrypted in one or many unencrypted messages:
@@ -156,7 +158,7 @@ The Re-Keying must be done after every 1GB of data sent or received (recommended
=== Risks ===
-The encryption does not include an identity authentication scheme. This BIP does not cover a proposal to avoid MITM attacks during the encryption initialization.
+The encryption does not include an identity authentication scheme. This BIP does not cover a proposal to avoid MITM attacks during the encryption initialization.
Identity authentication will be covered in another BIP and will presume communication encryption after this BIP.