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authorMironenko <mironenko@rutoken.ru>2021-12-07 19:55:07 +0300
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2021-12-07 19:55:07 +0300
commitd07e499d3f0768158b096ce30a07233fc665e5d3 (patch)
tree443373fe32f9c5c8e6cb1d18084120ad645b49f7 /bip-0032.mediawiki
parentedffe529056f6dfd33d8f716fb871467c3c09263 (diff)
Fix typo in BIP-32
Diffstat (limited to 'bip-0032.mediawiki')
-rw-r--r--bip-0032.mediawiki2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/bip-0032.mediawiki b/bip-0032.mediawiki
index 7a4ae84..663e999 100644
--- a/bip-0032.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0032.mediawiki
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ In addition to the expectations from the EC public-key cryptography itself:
the intended security properties of this standard are:
* Given a child extended private key (k<sub>i</sub>,c<sub>i</sub>) and the integer i, an attacker cannot find the parent private key k<sub>par</sub> more efficiently than a 2<sup>256</sup> brute force of HMAC-SHA512.
* Given any number (2 ≤ N ≤ 2<sup>32</sup>-1) of (index, extended private key) tuples (i<sub>j</sub>,(k<sub>i<sub>j</sub></sub>,c<sub>i<sub>j</sub></sub>)), with distinct i<sub>j</sub>'s, determining whether they are derived from a common parent extended private key (i.e., whether there exists a (k<sub>par</sub>,c<sub>par</sub>) such that for each j in (0..N-1) CKDpriv((k<sub>par</sub>,c<sub>par</sub>),i<sub>j</sub>)=(k<sub>i<sub>j</sub></sub>,c<sub>i<sub>j</sub></sub>)), cannot be done more efficiently than a 2<sup>256</sup> brute force of HMAC-SHA512.
-Note however that the following properties does not exist:
+Note however that the following properties do not exist:
* Given a parent extended public key (K<sub>par</sub>,c<sub>par</sub>) and a child public key (K<sub>i</sub>), it is hard to find i.
* Given a parent extended public key (K<sub>par</sub>,c<sub>par</sub>) and a non-hardened child private key (k<sub>i</sub>), it is hard to find k<sub>par</sub>.