Merge branch 'master' into segwit_gbt_updates_20160330

14 files changed, 600 insertions, 312 deletions

diff --git a/README.mediawiki b/README.mediawiki
index 974870e..ee7b0d8 100644
--- a/README.mediawiki
+++ b/README.mediawiki
@@ -505,6 +505,18 @@ Those proposing changes should consider that ultimately consent may rest with th
 | Luke Dashjr
 | Standard
 | Draft
+|-
+| [[bip-0151.mediawiki|151]]
+| Peer-to-Peer Communication Encryption
+| Jonas Schnelli
+| Standard
+| Draft
+|-
+| [[bip-0152.mediawiki|152]]
+| Compact Block Relay
+| Matt Corallo
+| Standard
+| Draft
 |}
 
 <!-- IMPORTANT!  See the instructions at the top of this page, do NOT JUST add BIPs here! -->
diff --git a/bip-0009.mediawiki b/bip-0009.mediawiki
index 162b264..153f6db 100644
--- a/bip-0009.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0009.mediawiki
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ other one simultaneously transitions to STARTED, which would mean both would dem
 
 Note that a block's state never depends on its own nVersion; only on that of its ancestors.
 
-        case STARTED: {
+        case STARTED: 
             if (GetMedianTimePast(block.parent) >= timeout) {
                 return FAILED;
             }
@@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ Note that a block's state never depends on its own nVersion; only on that of its
             walk = block;
             for (i = 0; i < 2016; i++) {
                 walk = walk.parent;
-                if (walk.nVersion & 0xE0000000 == 0x2000000 && (walk.nVersion >> bit) & 1 == 1) {
+                if (walk.nVersion & 0xE0000000 == 0x20000000 && (walk.nVersion >> bit) & 1 == 1) {
                     count++;
                 }
             }
             if (count >= threshold) {
                 return LOCKED_IN;
             }
-        }
+            return STARTED;
 
 After a retarget period of LOCKED_IN, we automatically transition to ACTIVE.
 
diff --git a/bip-0037.mediawiki b/bip-0037.mediawiki
index f76891e..eba0628 100644
--- a/bip-0037.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0037.mediawiki
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   BIP: 37
   Title: Connection Bloom filtering
   Author: Mike Hearn <hearn@google.com>
-          Matt Corallo <bip@bluematt.me>
+          Matt Corallo <bip37@bluematt.me>
   Status: Final
   Type: Standards Track
   Created: 2012-10-24
diff --git a/bip-0075.mediawiki b/bip-0075.mediawiki
index 6d1587e..9ce90f6 100644
--- a/bip-0075.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0075.mediawiki
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
 
 This BIP is an extension to BIP 70 that provides two enhancements to the existing Payment Protocol.
 
-# It allows the requester (Sender) of a Payment Request to voluntarily sign the original request and provide a certificate to allow the payee to know the identity of who they are transacting with.
+# It allows the requester (Sender) of a PaymentRequest to voluntarily sign the original request and provide a certificate to allow the payee to know the identity of who they are transacting with. 
 
-# It encrypts the Payment Request that is returned, before handing it off to the SSL/TLS layer to prevent man in the middle viewing of the Payment Request details.
+# It encrypts the PaymentRequest that is returned, before handing it off to the SSL/TLS layer to prevent man in the middle viewing of the Payment Request details.
 
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "S
 
 ==Motivation==
 
-The motivation for defining this extension to the BIP70 Payment Protocol is to allow 2 parties to exchange payment information in a permissioned and encrypted way such that wallet address communication can become a more automated process. Additionally, this extension allows for the requester of a PaymentRequest to supply a certificate and signature in order to facilitate identification for address release. This also allows for automated creation of off blockchain transaction logs that are human readable, containing who you transacted with, in addition to the information that it contains today.
+The motivation for defining this extension to the [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]] Payment Protocol is to allow 2 parties to exchange payment information in a permissioned and encrypted way such that wallet address communication can become a more automated process. Additionally, this extension allows for the requester of a PaymentRequest to supply a certificate and signature in order to facilitate identification for address release. This also allows for automated creation of off blockchain transaction logs that are human readable, containing who you transacted with, in addition to the information that it contains today.
 
-The motivation for this extension to BIP70 is threefold:
+The motivation for this extension to [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]] is threefold:
 
 # Ensure that the payment details can only be seen by the participants in the transaction, and not by any third party.
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ With this BIP, Bitcoin wallets could maintain an "address book" that only needs
 
 2. Individual Permissioned Address Release
 
-A Bitcoin wallet developer would like to allow users to view a potential sending party's identifying information before deciding whether or not to share payment information with them. Currently, BIP70 specifies that the Merchant Server respond to a "pay now" style request with a PaymentRequest, releasing address and X.509 certificate identity information of the potential receiving party.
+A Bitcoin wallet developer would like to allow users to view a potential sending party's identifying information before deciding whether or not to share payment information with them. Currently, [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]] specifies that the Merchant Server respond to a "pay now" style request with a PaymentRequest, releasing address and X.509 certificate identity information of the potential receiving party.
 
 With this BIP, Bitcoin wallets could prompt a wallet user to release payment information while displaying identity information about the potential sending party via an included certificate. This gives the receiving party more control over who receives their payment and identity information, and could be helpful for businesses that need to follow KYC policies or wallets that want to focus on privacy.
 
@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ A Bitcoin wallet developer would like to use a public Store & Forward service fo
 With this BIP, returned payment information is encrypted with an ECDH-computed shared key before sending to a Store & Forward service. In this case, a successful attack against a Store & Forward service would not be able to read or modify wallet address or payment information, only delete encrypted messages.
 
 ==New Messages==
-Updated [/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto paymentrequest.proto] contains the existing PaymentRequest Protocol Buffer messages as well asthe messages newly defined in this BIP.
+Updated [/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto paymentrequest.proto] contains the existing PaymentRequest Protocol Buffer messages as well as the messages newly defined in this BIP.
 
-Note: Public keys from both parties must be known to each other in order to facilitate encrypted communication. Although including both public keys in every message may get redundant, it provides the most flexibility as each message is completely self-contained.
+'''NOTE''': Public keys from both parties must be known to each other in order to facilitate encrypted communication. Although including both public keys in every message may get redundant, it provides the most flexibility as each message is completely self-contained.
 
 ===InvoiceRequest===
-The InvoiceRequest message allows a Sender to send information to the Receiver such that they can create and return a PaymentRequest.
+The '''InvoiceRequest''' message allows a Sender to send information to the Receiver such that the Receiver can create and return a PaymentRequest.
 
 <pre>
 message InvoiceRequest {
@@ -101,316 +101,250 @@ message InvoiceRequest {
 |-
 | memo                  || Human-readable description of invoice request for the receiver
 |-
-| notification_url      || Secure (usually HTTPS) location where an [[#EncryptedPaymentRequest|EncryptedPaymentRequest]] (see below) SHOULD be sent when ready
+| notification_url      || Secure (usually TLS-protected HTTP) location where an [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] SHOULD be sent when ready
 |-
 | signature             || PKI-dependent signature
 |}
 
+===ProtocolMessageType Enum===
+This enum is used in the newly defined [[#ProtocolMessage|ProtocolMessage]] and [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] messages to define the serialized message type. The '''ProtocolMessageType''' enum is defined in an extensible way to allow for new message type additions to the Payment Protocol.
+<pre>
+enum ProtocolMessageType {
+    INVOICE_REQUEST = 0;
+    PAYMENT_REQUEST = 1;
+    PAYMENT = 2;
+    PAYMENT_ACK =  3;
+}
+</pre>
 
-===EncryptedInvoiceRequest===
-The EncryptedInvoiceRequest message allows a Sender to send an encrypted InvoiceRequest to the Receiver such that the details of the InvoiceRequest are kept secret.
+===ProtocolMessage===
+The '''ProtocolMessage''' message is an encapsulating wrapper for any Payment Protocol message. It allows two-way, non-encrypted communication of Payment Protocol messages. The message also includes a status code and a status message that is used for error communication such that the protocol does not rely on transport-layer error handling.
 <pre>
-message EncryptedInvoiceRequest {
-    required bytes  encrypted_invoice_request = 1;
-    required bytes  invoice_request_hash = 2;
-    required bytes  sender_public_key = 3;
-    required bytes  receiver_public_key = 4;
-    required uint64 nonce = 5;
-    optional bytes  signature = 6;
-    optional bytes  identifier = 7;
+message ProtocolMessage {
+    required ProtocolMessageType message_type = 1;
+    required bytes serialized_message = 2;
+    optional uint64 status_code = 3;
+    optional string status_message = 4;
+    optional bytes identifier = 5;
 }
 </pre>
 
 {| class="wikitable"
 ! Field Name !! Description
 |-
-| encrypted_invoice_request || AES-256-CBC encrypted, serialized InvoiceRequest
+|message_type               || Message Type of serialized_message
 |-
-| invoice_request_hash      || SHA256 Hash of non-encrypted, serialized InvoiceRequest.  MUST be used for verification to prevent oracle attacks.
+|serialized_message         || Serialized Payment Protocol Message
 |-
-| sender_public_key         || Sender's EC public key
+|status_code                || Payment Protocol Status Code
 |-
-| receiver_public_key       || Receiver's EC public key
+|status_message             || Human-readable Payment Protocol status message
 |-
-| nonce                     || The nonce in use for the CBC encryption
-|-
-| signature                 || A signature of this message using Sender's EC key, serialized with a value of "" for signature. REQUIRED if server requires authentication.
-|-
-| identifier                || A unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. invoice_request_hash SHOULD be used by default.
+|identifier                 || Unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. SHA256 of initial serialized InvoiceRequest SHOULD be used by default
 |}
 
-===EncryptedPaymentRequest===
-
-The EncryptedPaymentRequest message is an encapsulating message that allows the transmission of an encrypted, serialized PaymentRequest.
-
+===EncryptedProtocolMessage===
+The '''EncryptedProtocolMessage''' message is an encapsualting wrapper for any Payment Protocol message. It allows two-way, authenticated and encrypted communication of Payment Protocol messages in order to keep their contents secret. The message also includes a status code and status message that is used for error communication such that the protocol does not rely on transport-layer error handling.
 <pre>
-message EncryptedPaymentRequest {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment_request = 1;
-        required bytes  payment_request_hash = 2;
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 3;
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 4;
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;
-        optional bool   requires_payment_message = 6;
-        optional bytes  signature = 7;
-        optional bytes  identifier = 8;
+message EncryptedProtocolMessage {
+    required ProtocolMessageType message_type = 1;
+    required bytes encrypted_message = 2;
+    required bytes receiver_public_key = 3;
+    required bytes sender_public_key = 4;
+    required uint64 nonce = 5;
+    optional bytes signature = 6;
+    optional bytes identifier = 7;
+    optional uint64 status_code = 8;
+    optional string status_message = 9;
 }
 </pre>
 {| class="wikitable"
-! Field Name !! Description
+! Field Name   !!  Description
+|-
+| message_type          || Message Type of Decrypted encrypted_message
 |-
-| encrypted_payment_request || AES-256-CBC encrypted, serialized BIP70 PaymentRequest
+| encrypted_message     || AES-256-GCM Encrypted (as defined in BIP75) Payment Protocol Message
 |-
-| payment_request_hash      || SHA256 Hash of non-encrypted, serialized PaymentRequest.  MUST be used for verification to prevent oracle attacks.
+| receiver_public_key   || Receiver's DER-encoded EC Public Key
 |-
-| receiver_public_key       || Receiver's EC public key
+| sender_public_key     || Sender's DER-encoded EC Public Key
 |-
-| sender_public_key         || Sender's EC public key
+| nonce                 || Microseconds since epoch
 |-
-| nonce                     || The nonce in use for the CBC encryption
+| signature             || DER-encoded Signature over the full EncryptedProtocolMessage with EC Key Belonging to Sender / Receiver, respectively
 |-
-| requires_payment_message  || Internal PaymentRequest requires follow-up Payment message
+| identifier            || Unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. SHA256 of initial serialized InvoiceRequest SHOULD be used by default
 |-
-| signature                 || A signature of this message using Receiver's EC key, serialized with a value of "" for signature. REQUIRED if server requires authentication.
+| status_code           || Payment Protocol Status Code
 |-
-| identifier                || MUST use the identifier specified with the InvoiceRequest if the PaymentRequest is in response to an InvoiceRequest. Otherwise, use payment_request_hash or other unique value.
+| status_message        || Human-readable Payment Protocol status message
 |}
 
-===EncryptedPayment===
+==Payment Protocol Process with InvoiceRequests==
+The full process overview for using '''InvoiceRequests''' in the Payment Protocol is defined below. 
+<br/><br/>
+All Payment Protocol messages MUST be encapsulated in either a [[#ProtocolMessage|ProtocolMessage]] or [[#EncryptedProcotolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]]. Once the process begins using [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] messages, all subsequent communications MUST use [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessages]]. 
+<br/><br/>
+All Payment Protocol messages SHOULD be communicated using [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] encapsulating messages with the exception that an [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] MAY be communicated using the [[#ProtocolMessage|ProtocolMessage]] if the receiver's public key is unknown.
+<br/><br/>
 
-The EncryptedPayment message allows a BIP70 Payment message to be transmitted through a third party without revealing the details of the transaction. This message allows Store & Forward servers or other third parties to match and authenticate PaymentRequest and Payment messages without revealing the details of the transaction, thereby protecting privacy.
+The process of creating encrypted Payment Protocol messages is enumerated in [[#Sending_Encrypted_Payment_Protocol_Messages_using_EncryptedProtocolMessages|Sending Encrypted Payment Protocol Messages using EncryptedProtocolMessages]], and the process of decrypting encrypted messages can be found under [[#Validating_and_Decrypting_Payment_Protocol_Messages_using_EncryptedProtocolMessages|Validating and Decrypting Payment Protocol Messages using EncryptedProtocolMessages]].
 
-<pre>
-message EncryptedPayment {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment = 1;
-        required bytes  payment_hash = 2;
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 3;
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 4;
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;
-        optional bytes  signature = 6;
-        optional bytes  identifier = 7;
-}
-</pre>
+A standard exchange from start to finish would look like the following:
+
+# Sender creates InvoiceRequest
+# Sender encapsulates InvoiceRequest in (Encrypted)ProtocolMessage
+# Sender sends (Encrypted)ProtocolMessage to Receiver
+# Receiver retrieves InvoiceRequest in (Encrypted)ProtocolMessage from Sender
+# Receiver creates PaymentRequest
+# Receiver encapsulates PaymentRequest in EncryptedProtocolMessage
+# Receiver transmits EncryptedProtocolMessage to Sender
+# Sender validates PaymentRequest retrieved from the EncryptedProtocolMessage
+# The PaymentRequest is processed according to [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]], including optional Payment and PaymentACK messages encapsulated in EncryptedProtocolMessage messages.
+
+'''NOTE:''' See [[#Initial_Public_Key_Retrieval_for_InvoiceRequest_Encryption|Initial Public Key Retrieval for InvoiceRequest Encryption]] for possible options to retrieve Receiver's public key.
+
+<img src="bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png" alt="Flow diagram of Encrypted InvoiceRequest">
+
+==Message Interaction Details==
+
+===HTTP Content Types for New Message Types===
+When communicated via '''HTTP''', the listed messages MUST be transmitted via TLS-protected HTTP using the appropriate Content-Type header as defined here per message:
+<br/>
 {| class="wikitable"
-! Field Name !! Description
-|-
-| encrypted_payment         || AES-256-CBC encrypted, serialized BIP70 Payment message
-|-
-| payment_hash              || SHA256 Hash of original non-encrypted, serialized Payment message. MUST be used for verification to prevent oracle attacks.
-|-
-| sender_public_key         || Sender's EC public key
-|-
-| receiver_public_key       || Receiver's EC public key
-|-
-| nonce                     || The nonce in use for the CBC encryption
+! Message Type !! Content Type
 |-
-| signature                 || A signature of this message using Sender's EC key, serialized with a value of "" for signature. REQUIRED if server requires authentication.
+| ProtocolMessage                   || application/bitcoin-paymentprotocol-message
 |-
-| identifier                || Use the identifier specified with the EncryptedPaymentRequest, if any.
+| EncryptedProtocolMessage          || application/bitcoin-encrypted-paymentprotocol-message
 |}
 
-===EncryptedPaymentACK===
+===Payment Protocol Status Communication===
 
-An encrypted version of the BIP70 PaymentAck.
+In the case of an error that causes the Payment Protocol process to be stopped or requires that message be retried, a [[#ProtocolMessage|ProtocolMessage]] or [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] MUST be returned by the party generating the error status_code. The content of the message MUST contain the same '''serialized_message''' or '''encrypted_message''' and identifier (if present) and MUST have the status_code set appropriately. 
+<br/><br/>
+The status_message value SHOULD be set with a human readable explanation of the status code. For example, if in an [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]], the AES-256-GCM decryption fails to authenticate, an Authentication Failed (102) '''status_code''' MUST be returned to prevent oracle attacks.
 
-<pre>
-message EncryptedPaymentACK {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment_ack = 1;
-        required bytes  payment_ack_hash = 2;
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 3;
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 4;
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;
-        required bytes  signature = 6;
-        optional bytes  identifier = 7;
-}
-</pre>
+====Payment Protocol Status Codes====
 {| class="wikitable"
-! Field Name !! Description
+! Status Code !! Description
+|- 
+| 1     || OK
 |-
-| encrypted_payment_ack         || AES-256-CBC encrypted, serialized BIP70 PaymentACK message
+| 100   || General / Unknown Error
 |-
-| payment_ack_hash              || SHA256 Hash of original non-encrypted, serialized Payment message. MUST be used for verification to prevent oracle attacks.
+| 102   || Authentication Failed
 |-
-| receiver_public_key           || Receiver's EC public key
+| 102   || Encrypted Message Required
 |-
-| sender_public_key             || Sender's EC public key
+| 200   || Amount Too High
 |-
-| nonce                         || The nonce in use for the CBC encryption
+| 201   || Amount Too Low
 |-
-| signature                     || A signature of this message using Receiver's EC key, serialized with a value of "" for signature. REQUIRED if server requires authentication.
+| 202   || Amount Invalid
 |-
-| identifier                    || Use the identifier specified with the EncryptedPayment, if any.
-|}
-
-==InvoiceRequest / PaymentRequest Process==
-The process overview for using InvoiceRequests and receiving encrypted PaymentRequests is defined below in two sections. Optionally, the Sender MAY choose to encrypt the InvoiceRequest message and therefore MUST follow the '''Encrypted InvoiceRequest Overview''' process below.
-
-===Non-Encrypted InvoiceRequest Overview===
-# Sender creates InvoiceRequest
-# Sender transmits InvoiceRequest to Receiver
-# Receiver validates InvoiceRequest
-# Receiver creates PaymentRequest
-# Receiver encrypts the PaymentRequest
-# Receiver creates EncryptedPaymentRequest (containing an encrypted PaymentRequest)
-# Receiver transmits EncryptedPaymentRequest to Sender
-# Sender validates EncryptedPaymentRequest
-# Sender decrypts and validates encrypted PaymentRequest
-# The PaymentRequest is processed according to BIP70, including optional Payment and PaymentACK messages
-
-
-<img src="bip-0075/invoice-request-process.png" alt="Flow diagram of Non-Encrypted InvoiceRequest">
-
-===Encrypted InvoiceRequest Overview===
-# Sender retrieves Receiver InvoiceRequest Public Key
-# Sender creates InvoiceRequest
-# Sender encrypts the InvoiceRequest
-# Sender creates EncryptedInvoiceRequest (containing an encrypted InvoiceRequest)
-# Sender transmits EncryptedInvoiceRequest to Receiver
-# Receiver decrypts and validates EncryptedInvoiceRequest
-# Receiver validates InvoiceRequest
-# Receiver creates PaymentRequest
-# Receiver encrypts the PaymentRequest
-# Receiver creates EncryptedPaymentRequest (containing an encrypted PaymentRequest)
-# Receiver transmits EncryptedPaymentRequest to Sender
-# Sender validates EncryptedPaymentRequest
-# Sender decrypts and validates encrypted PaymentRequest
-# The PaymentRequest is processed according to BIP70, including optional EncryptedPayment and EncryptedPaymentACK messages
-
-'''NOTE:''' See section [[#Initial_Public_Key_Retrieval_for_InvoiceRequest_Encryption|Initial Public Key Retrieval for InvoiceRequest Encryption]] below for possible options to retrieve Receiver InvoiceRequest public keys.
-
-<img src="bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png" alt="Flow diagram of Encrypted InvoiceRequest">
-
-==Message Interaction Details==
-
-===New Message Content Types===
-Messages MUST be transmitted via TLS-protected HTTP using the appropriate Content-Type header as defined per message type here:
-{| class="wikitable"
-! Message Type !! Content Type
+| 203   || Payment Does Not Meet PaymentRequest Requirements
+|-
+| 300   || Certificate Required
 |-
-| InvoiceRequest                    || application/bitcoin-invoicerequest
+| 301   || Certificate Expired
 |-
-| EncryptedInvoiceRequest           || application/bitcoin-encrypted-invoicerequest
+| 302   || Certificate Invalid for Transaction
 |-
-| EncryptedPaymentRequest           || application/bitcoin-encrypted-paymentrequest
+| 303   || Certificate Revoked
 |-
-| EncryptedPayment                  || application/bitcoin-encrypted-payment
+| 304   || Certificate Not Well Rooted
 |-
-| EncryptedPaymentACK               || application/bitcoin-encrypted-paymentack
 |}
 
-===Message or Communication Errors===
-An invalid or unparsable message or communications error MUST be communicated to the party that initiated the communication. This SHOULD be done through standard HTTP Status Code messaging ([https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231 RFC 7231 Section 6]). If the provided hash of each message does not match the contents of the message once decrypted, a general error should be returned to prevent oracle attacks.
+===Transport Layer Communication Errors===
 
-==Process Step Details==
+Communication errors MUST be communicated to the party that initiated the communication via the communication layer's existing error messaging faciltiies. In the case of TLS-protected HTTP, this SHOULD be done through standard HTTP Status Code messaging ([https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231 RFC 7231 Section 6]).
+
+==Extended Payment Protocol Process Details==
+This BIP extends the Payment Protocol as defined in [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]].
 
 For the following we assume the Sender already knows the Receiver's public key, and the exchange is being facilitated by a Store & Forward server which requires valid signatures for authentication.
 
-Where used, '''nonce''' MUST be set to a non-repeating number AND MUST be chosen by the encryptor. The current epoch time in microseconds SHOULD be used, unless the creating device doesn't have access to a RTC (in the case of a smart card, for example). The service receiving the message containing the '''nonce''' MAY use whatever method to make sure that the '''nonce''' is never repeated.
+'''nonce''' MUST be set to a non-repeating number '''and''' MUST be chosen by the encryptor. The current epoch time in microseconds SHOULD be used, unless the creating device doesn't have access to a RTC (in the case of a smart card, for example). The service receiving the message containing the '''nonce''' MAY use whatever method to make sure that the '''nonce''' is never repeated.
 
 ===InvoiceRequest Message Creation===
-* Create an InvoiceRequest message
-* sender_public_key MUST be set to the public key of an EC keypair
-* nonce MUST be set according to the requirement above.
-* Amount is optional. If the amount is not specified by the InvoiceRequest, the Receiver MAY specify the amount in the returned PaymentRequest. If an amount is specified by the InvoiceRequest and a PaymentRequest cannot be generated for that amount, the InvoiceRequest SHOULD be rejected with HTTP status code 406.
-* Memo is optional. This MAY be set to a human readable description of the InvoiceRequest
-* Set notification_url to URL that the Receiver will submit completed EncryptedPaymentRequest to
-* If NOT including certificate, set pki_type to "none"
+* Create an [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] message
+* '''sender_public_key''' MUST be set to the public key of an EC keypair
+* '''amount''' is optional. If the amount is not specified by the [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]], the Receiver MAY specify the amount in the returned PaymentRequest. If an amount is specified by the [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] and a PaymentRequest cannot be generated for that amount, the [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] SHOULD return the same [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] in a [[#ProtocolMessage|ProtocolMessage]] or [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] with the status_code and status_message fields set appropriately.
+* '''memo''' is optional. This MAY be set to a human readable description of the InvoiceRequest
+* Set '''notification_url''' to URL that the Receiver will submit completed PaymentRequest (encapsulated in an [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]]) to
+* If NOT including certificate, set '''pki_type''' to "none"
 * If including certificate:
-** Set pki_type to "x509+sha256"
-** Set pki_data as it would be set in BIP-0070 (see [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki#Certificates Certificates]) section)
-** Sign InvoiceRequest with signature = "" using the X509 Certificate's private key
-** Set signature value to the computed signature
-
-===EncryptedInvoiceRequest Message Creation===
-* Create an EncryptedInvoiceRequest
-* Retrieve endpoint public key to use in '''ECDH Point Generation''' as specified in [[#Initial_Public_Key_Retrieval_for_InvoiceRequest_Encryption|Initial Public Key Retrieval for InvoiceRequest Encryption]] (see below)
-* sender_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Sender's EC keypair
-* receiver_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Receiver's EC keypair
-* invoice_request_hash MUST be set to the SHA256 hash of the serialized InvoiceRequest (without encryption)
-* Encrypt the serialized InvoiceRequest using AES-256-CBC setup as described in [[#ECDH_Point_Generation_and_AES256_CBC_Mode_Setup|ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (CBC Mode) Setup]] (see below)
-* encrypted_invoice_Request MUST be set to the encrypted values of the InvoiceRequest
-* nonce MUST be set to the nonce used in the AES-256-CBC encryption operation
-* Set identifier to invoice_request_hash
+** Set '''pki_type''' to "x509+sha256"
+** Set '''pki_data''' as it would be set in BIP-0070 ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki#Certificates Certificates])
+** Sign [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] with signature = "" using the X509 Certificate's private key
+** Set '''signature''' value to the computed signature
 
 ===InvoiceRequest Validation===
-* Validate sender_public_key is a valid EC public key
-* The nonce MUST not be repeated. The service receiving the InvoiceRequest MAY use whatever method to make sure that the nonce is never repeated.
-* Validate notification_url if set, contains characters deemed valid for a URL (avoiding XSS related characters, etc).
-* If pki_type is None, InvoiceRequest is VALID
-* If pki_type is x509+sha256 and signature is valid for the serialized InvoiceRequest where signature is set to "", InvoiceRequest is VALID
-
-===EncryptedPaymentRequest Message Creation and PaymentRequest Encryption===
-* Encrypt the serialized PaymentRequest using AES-256-CBC setup as described in [[#ECDH_Point_Generation_and_AES256_CBC_Mode_Setup|ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (CBC Mode) Setup]] (see below)
-* Create EncryptedPaymentRequest message
-* Set encrypted_payment_request to be the encrypted value of the PaymentRequest
-* Set payment_request_hash to generated SHA256 hash of the serialized PaymentRequest (without encryption)
-* sender_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Sender's EC keypair
-* receiver_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Receiver's EC keypair
-* nonce MUST be set to the nonce used in the AES-256-CBC encryption operation
-* requires_payment_message MAY be set to true if the PaymentRequest requires a Payment message
-* Set identifier to the value received in EncryptedInvoiceRequest
-* Set signature to ""
-* Sign the serialized EncryptedPayment message with the Receiver's EC public key
-* Set signature to the result of the signature operation above
-
-===EncryptedPaymentRequest Validation and Decryption===
-* Decrypt the serialized PaymentRequest using AES-256-CBC setup as described in [[#ECDH_Point_Generation_and_AES256_CBC_Mode_Setup|ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (CBC Mode) Setup]] (see below)
-* Validate payment_request_hash matches SHA256 of the decrypted, serialized PaymentRequest
-* Deserialize the serialized PaymentRequest
-
-===ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (CBC Mode) Setup===
-* Generate the '''secret point''' using [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_Diffie–Hellman ECDH] using the local entity's private key and the remote entity's public key as inputs.
+* Validate '''sender_public_key''' is a valid EC public key 
+* Validate '''notification_url''', if set, contains characters deemed valid for a URL (avoiding XSS related characters, etc).
+* If '''pki_type''' is None, [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] is VALID
+* If '''pki_type''' is x509+sha256 and '''signature''' is valid for the serialized [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] where signature is set to "", [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] is VALID
+
+===Sending Encrypted Payment Protocol Messages using EncryptedProtocolMessages===
+* Encrypt the serialized Payment Protocol message using AES-256-CBC setup as described in [[#ECDH_Point_Generation_and_AES256_GCM_Mode_Setup|ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (GCM Mode) Setup]]
+* Create [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] message
+* Set '''encrypted_message''' to be the encrypted value of the Payment Protocol message
+* '''sender_public_key''' MUST be set to the public key of the Sender's EC keypair
+* '''receiver_public_key''' MUST be set to the public key of the Receiver's EC keypair
+* '''nonce''' MUST be set to the nonce used in the AES-256-CBC encryption operation
+* Set '''identifier''' to the identifier value received in the originating InvoiceRequest's ProtocolMessage or EncryptedProtocolMessage wrapper message
+* Set '''signature''' to ""
+* Sign the serialized [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] message with the communicating party's EC public key
+* Set '''signature''' to the result of the signature operation above
+
+'''SIGNATURE NOTE:''' [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] messages are signed with the public keys of the party transmitting the message. This allows a Store & Forward server or other transmission system to prevent spam or other abuses. For those who are privacy conscious and don't want the server to track the interactions between two public keys, the Sender can generate a new public key for each interaction to keep their identity anonymous.
+
+===Validating and Decrypting Payment Protocol Messages using EncryptedProtocolMessages===
+* The '''nonce''' MUST not be repeated. The service receiving the [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] MAY use whatever method to make sure that the nonce is never repeated.
+* Decrypt the serialized Payment Protocol message using AES-256-GCM setup as described in [[#ECDH_Point_Generation_and_AES256_GCM_Mode_Setup|ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (GCM Mode) Setup]]
+* Deserialize the serialized Payment Protocol message
+
+===ECDH Point Generation and AES-256 (GCM Mode) Setup===
+'''NOTE''': AES-256-GCM is used because it provides authenticated encryption facilities, thus negating the need for a separate message hash for authentication.
+
+* Generate the '''secret point''' using [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_Diffie–Hellman ECDH] using the local entity's private key and the remote entity's public key as inputs
 * Initialize [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf HMAC_DRBG]
-** Use '''secret point's''' X value for Entropy
-** Use the given message's nonce field for Nonce
-* Initialize AES-256 in CBC Mode
+** Use '''SHA512(secret point's X value in Big-Endian bytes)''' for Entropy
+** Use the given message's '''nonce''' field for Nonce
+
+* Initialize AES-256 in GCM Mode
+** Initialize HMAC_DRBG with Security Strength of 256 bits
 ** Use HMAC_DRBG.GENERATE(32) as the Encryption Key (256 bits)
-** Use HMAC_DRBG.GENERATE(16) as the Initialization Vector (IV) (128 bits)
+** Use HMAC_DRBG.GENERATE(12) as the Initialization Vector (IV) (96 bits)
+
+====AES-256 GCM Authentication Tag Use====
+The 16 byte authentication tag resulting from the AES-GCM encrypt operation MUST be prefixed to the returned ciphertext. The decrypt operation will use the first 16 bytes of the ciphertext as the GCM authentication tag and the remainder of the ciphertext as the ciphertext in the decrypt operation.
+
+====AES-256 GCM Additional Authenticated Data====
+When either '''status_code''' OR '''status_message''' are present, the AES-256 GCM authenticated data used in both the encrypt and decrypt operations MUST be: STRING(status_code) || status_message. Otherwise, there is no additional authenticated data. This provides that, while not encrypted, the status_code and status_message are authenticated. 
 
 ===Initial Public Key Retrieval for InvoiceRequest Encryption===
-Initial public key retrieval for InvoiceRequest encryption can be done in a number of ways including, but not limited to, the following:
-* Wallet Name public key asset type resolution - DNSSEC-validated name resolution returns Base64 encoded DER-formatted EC public key via TXT Record [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
-* Key Server lookup - Key Server lookup (similar to PGP's pgp.mit.edu) based on key server identifier (i.e., e-mail address) returns Base64 encoded DER-formatted EC public key [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
-* QR Code - Use of QR-code to encode DER-formatted EC public key [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
-
-==EncryptedPayment and EncryptedPaymentACK Details==
-
-===EncryptedPayment Message Creation===
-* Encrypt the serialized Payment using AES-256-CBC using secret key calculated in the [[#EncryptedPaymentRequest_Message_Creation_and_PaymentRequest_Encryption|EncryptedPaymentRequest Message Creation and PaymentRequest Encryption]] step (see above)
-* Create EncryptedPayment message
-* Set encrypted_payment to be the encrypted value of the Payment
-* Set payment_hash to generated SHA256 hash of the serialized Payment (without encryption)
-* sender_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Sender's EC keypair
-* receiver_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Receiver's EC keypair
-* nonce MUST be set to the nonce used in the AES-256-CBC encryption operation
-* Set identifier to the value received in EncryptedPaymentRequest
-* Set signature to ""
-* Sign the serialized EncryptedPayment message with the Sender's EC public key
-* Set signature to the result of the signature operation above
-
-===EncryptedPaymentACK Message Creation===
-* Encrypt the serialized PaymentACK using AES-256-CBC using secret key calculated in the [[#EncryptedPaymentRequest_Message_Creation_and_PaymentRequest_Encryption|EncryptedPaymentRequest Message Creation and PaymentRequest Encryption]] step (see above)
-* Create EncryptedPaymentACK message
-* Set encrypted_payment_ack to be the encrypted value of the PaymentACK
-* Set payment_ack_hash to generated SHA256 hash of the serialized PaymentACK (without encryption)
-* sender_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Sender's EC keypair
-* receiver_public_key MUST be set to the public key of the Receiver's EC keypair
-* nonce MUST be set to the nonce used in the AES-256-CBC encryption operation
-* Set identifier to the value received in EncryptedPaymentRequest
-* Set signature to ""
-* Sign the serialized EncryptedPaymentACK message with the Receiver's EC public key
-* Set signature to the result of the signature operation above
-
-
-'''SIGNATURE NOTE:''' EncryptedPaymentRequest, EncryptedPayment, and EncryptedPaymentACK messages are signed with the public keys of the party transmitting the message. This allows a Store & Forward server or other transmission system to prevent spam or other abuses. For those who are privacy conscious and don't want the server to track the interactions between two public keys, the Sender can generate a new public key for each interaction to keep their identity anonymous.
-
-==Payment / PaymentACK Messages with a Store & Forward Server==
-When a Store & Forward server is in use during the Payment Protocol exchange, an EncryptedPayment message generated as the result of a EncryptedPaymentRequest with the requires_payment_message flag set to true MUST be accepted by a Store & Forward server. The accepted Payment message is NOT validated as the Store & Forward server does not have access to encrypted data.
-
-Store & Forward servers MAY accept and/or overwrite EncryptedPayment messages until an EncryptedPaymentACK message with matching identifier and valid Receiver signature is received, after which the server MAY reject all further EncryptedPayment messages matching that identifier. This feature SHOULD be used for updating Payment metadata or replacing invalid transactions with valid ones. Clients SHOULD keep in mind Receivers can broadcast a transaction without returning an ACK. If a payment message needs to be updated, it SHOULD include at least one input referenced in the original transaction to prevent the Receiver from broadcasting both transactions and getting paid twice.
+Initial public key retrieval for [[#InvoiceRequest|InvoiceRequest]] encryption via [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] encapsulation can be done in a number of ways including, but not limited to, the following:
+# Wallet Name public key asset type resolution - DNSSEC-validated name resolution returns Base64 encoded DER-formatted EC public key via TXT Record [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
+# Key Server lookup - Key Server lookup (similar to PGP's pgp.mit.edu) based on key server identifier (i.e., e-mail address) returns Base64 encoded DER-formatted EC public key [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
+# QR Code - Use of QR-code to encode DER-formatted EC public key [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt RFC 5480]
+# Address Service Public Key Exposure
+
+==Payment / PaymentACK Messages with a HTTP Store & Forward Server==
+If a Store & Forward server wishes to protect themselves from spam or abuse, they MAY enact whatever rules they deem fit, such as the following:
+
+* Once an InvoiceRequest or PaymentRequest is received, all subsequent messages using the same identifier must use the same Sender and Receiver public keys.
+* For each unique identifier, only one message each of type InvoiceRequest, PaymentRequest, and PaymentACK may be submitted. Payment messages may be submitted/overwritten multiple times. All messages submitted after a PaymentACK is received will be rejected.
+* Specific messages are only saved until they have been verifiably received by the intended recipient or a certain amount of time has passed, whichever comes first.
+
+<br/><br/>
+Clients SHOULD keep in mind Receivers can broadcast a transaction without returning an ACK. If a Payment message needs to be updated, it SHOULD include at least one input referenced in the original transaction to prevent the Receiver from broadcasting both transactions and getting paid twice.
 
 ==Public Key & Signature Encoding==
-* Each EC public key (sender_public_key, receiver_public_key) included in any message defined in this BIP MUST be DER [ITU.X690.1994] encoded.
-* Each ECC signature included in any message defined in this BIP MUST use the SHA-256 hashing algorithm and MUST be DER [ITU.X690.1994] encoded.
+* All EC public keys ('''sender_public_key''', '''receiver_public_key''') included in any message defined in this BIP MUST be DER [ITU.X690.1994] encoded.
+* All ECC signatures included in any message defined in this BIP MUST use the SHA-256 hashing algorithm and MUST be DER [ITU.X690.1994] encoded.
 
 ==Implementation==
 A reference implementation for a Store & Forward server supporting this proposal can be found here:
@@ -419,35 +353,31 @@ A reference implementation for a Store & Forward server supporting this proposal
 
 A reference client implementation can be found in the InvoiceRequest functional testing for Addressimo here:
 
-[https://github.com/netkicorp/addressimo/blob/master/functest/functest_ir.py InvoiceRequest Client Reference Implementation]
+[https://github.com/netkicorp/addressimo/blob/master/functest/functest_bip75.py BIP75 Client Reference Implementation]
 
 ==BIP70 Extension==
-The following flowchart is borrowed from BIP70 and expanded upon in order to visually describe how this BIP is an extension to BIP70.
+The following flowchart is borrowed from [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]] and expanded upon in order to visually describe how this BIP is an extension to [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70]].
 
 <img src="bip-0075/bip70-extension.png" alt="Flowchart explaining how this BIP extends BIP 70">
 
 ==Mobile to Mobile Examples==
 
-===EncryptedPayment Required===
-The following diagram shows a sample flow in which one mobile client is sending value to a second mobile client with the use of an InvoiceRequest, a Store & Forward server, an EncryptedPaymentRequest (with require_payment_message = true), an EncryptedPayment and an EncryptedPaymentACK. In this case, the Receiver submits the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
-
-<img src="bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png" alt="EncryptedPayment Required flow diagram">
-
-===EncryptedPayment NOT Required===
-The following diagram shows a sample flow in which one mobile client is sending value to a second mobile client with the use of an InvoiceRequest, a Store & Forward server, and an EncryptedPaymentRequest (with require_payment_message = false). In this case, the Sender submits the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
+===Full Payment Protocol===
+The following diagram shows a sample flow in which one mobile client is sending value to a second mobile client with the use of an InvoiceRequest, a Store & Forward server, PaymentRequest, Payment and PaymentACK. In this case, the PaymentRequest, Payment and PaymentACK messages are encrypted using [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] '''and''' the Receiver submits the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
 
-<img src="bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-without-payment.png" alt="EncryptedPayment NOT Required flow diagram">
+<img src="bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png" alt="Payment Required flow diagram">
 
-===Using EncryptedInvoiceRequest Message===
-The following diagram shows a sample flow in which one mobile client is sending value to a second mobile client with the use of an EncryptedInvoiceRequest, a Store & Forward server, and an EncryptedPaymentRequest (with require_payment_message = false). In this case, the Sender submits the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
+===Encrypting Initial InvoiceRequest via EncryptedProtocolMessage===
+The following diagram shows a sample flow in which one mobile client is sending value to a second mobile client using an [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] to transmit the InvoiceRequest using encryption, Store & Forward server, and PaymentRequest. In this case, all Payment Protocol messages are encrypting using [[#EncryptedProtocolMessage|EncryptedProtocolMessage]] '''and''' the Sender submits the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
 
-<img src="bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png" alt="EncryptedInvoiceRequest without payment">
+<img src="bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png" alt="Encrypted InvoiceRequest without payment">
 
 ==References==
 
 * [[bip-0070.mediawiki|BIP70 - Payment Protocol]]
 * [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_Diffie–Hellman ECDH]
 * [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf HMAC_DRBG]
+* [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC]
 * [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979 RFC6979]
 * [https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address_reuse Address Reuse]
 * [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf FIPS 180-4 (Secure Hash Standard)]
diff --git a/bip-0075/bip70-extension.png b/bip-0075/bip70-extension.png
index d235992..e02db32 100644..100755
--- a/bip-0075/bip70-extension.png
+++ b/bip-0075/bip70-extension.png
diff --git a/bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png b/bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png
index beb5df1..918cf70 100644
--- a/bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png
+++ b/bip-0075/encrypted-invoice-request-process.png
diff --git a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png
index af66a4d..fb0b5d1 100755
--- a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png
+++ b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-encrypted-ir-without-payment.png
diff --git a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png
index c668eac..729fa79 100755
--- a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png
+++ b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-with-payment.png
diff --git a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-without-payment.png b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-without-payment.png
index ab18d0f..19cf842 100755
--- a/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-without-payment.png
+++ b/bip-0075/mobile-sf-ir-without-payment.png
diff --git a/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto b/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto
index 1c9cc8e..3c1ef40 100644
--- a/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto
+++ b/bip-0075/paymentrequest.proto
@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ message PaymentDetails {
         optional string memo = 5;                   // Human-readable description of request for the customer
         optional string payment_url = 6;            // URL to send Payment and get PaymentACK
         optional bytes  merchant_data = 7;          // Arbitrary data to include in the Payment message
-        optional uint64 subtractable_fee = 1000;    // How many Satoshis can be subtracted from the requested amount and instead applied towards the fee
-        optional uint64 fee_per_kb = 1001;          // Minimum transaction fee that must be included with the transaction in order for it to be accepted with zero confirmations.
-        optional bool replace_by_fee = 1002;        // Indicates the sender can enable the Replace By Fee flag for this transaction and the receiver will still consider it accepted with zero confirmations. Otherwise, RBF transactions will not be accepted by the receiver until they are confirmed.
 }
 message PaymentRequest {
         optional uint32 payment_details_version = 1 [default = 1];
@@ -38,20 +35,19 @@ message X509Certificates {
         repeated bytes certificate = 1;    // DER-encoded X.509 certificate chain
 }
 message Payment {
-        optional bytes merchant_data = 1;  // From PaymentDetails.merchant_data
-        repeated bytes transactions = 2;   // Signed transactions that satisfy PaymentDetails.outputs
-        repeated Output refund_to = 3;     // Where to send refunds, if a refund is necessary
-        optional string memo = 4;          // Human-readable message for the merchant
+        optional bytes merchant_data = 1;       // From PaymentDetails.merchant_data
+        repeated bytes transactions = 2;        // Signed transactions that satisfy PaymentDetails.outputs
+        repeated Output refund_to = 3;          // Where to send refunds, if a refund is necessary
+        optional string memo = 4;               // Human-readable message for the merchant
 }
 message PaymentACK {
-        required Payment payment = 1;      // Payment message that triggered this ACK
-        optional string memo = 2;          // Human-readable message for customer
+        required Payment payment = 1;           // Payment message that triggered this ACK
+        optional string memo = 2;               // Human-readable message for customer
 }
 
 // BIP-IR Extensions
-
 message InvoiceRequest {
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 1;              // Sender's EC Public Key
+        required bytes  sender_public_key = 1;              // Sender's DER-Encoded EC Public Key
         optional uint64 amount = 3 [default = 0];           // amount is integer-number-of-satoshis
         optional string pki_type = 4 [default = "none"];    // none / x509+sha256
         optional bytes  pki_data = 5;                       // Depends on pki_type
@@ -60,43 +56,29 @@ message InvoiceRequest {
         optional bytes  signature = 8;                      // PKI-dependent signature
 }
 
-message EncryptedInvoiceRequest {
-        required bytes  encrypted_invoice_request = 1;      // AES-256-CBC Encrypted InvoiceRequest as defined in InvoiceRequest Spec
-        required bytes  invoice_request_hash = 2;           // SHA256 Hash of Non-Encrypted, Serialized InvoiceRequest (used for authentication)
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 3;              // Sender's EC Public Key
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 4;            // Receiver's EC Public Key
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;                          // Microseconds since epoch
-        optional bytes  identifier = 6;                     // Unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. invoice_request_hash SHOULD be used by default
-        optional bytes  signature = 7;                      // Signature of this message using Sender's EC key
-}
-
-message EncryptedPaymentRequest {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment_request = 1;                   // AES-256-CBC Encrypted PaymentRequest as defined in InvoiceRequest Spec
-        required bytes  payment_request_hash = 2;                        // SHA256 Hash of Non-Encrypted, Serialized PaymentRequest (used for authentication)
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 3;                         // Receiver's EC Public Key
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 4;                           // Sender's EC Public Key
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;                                       // Microseconds since epoch
-        optional bool   requires_payment_message = 6 [default = false];  // Requires Payment/PaymentACK message exchange
-        optional bytes  signature = 7;                                   // Signature of this message using Receiver's EC key
-        optional bytes  identifier = 8;                                  // MUST use the identifier specified with the InvoiceRequest if the PaymentRequest is in response to an InvoiceRequest. Otherwise, use payment_request_hash or other unique value.
+enum ProtocolMessageType {
+    INVOICE_REQUEST = 0;
+    PAYMENT_REQUEST = 1;
+    PAYMENT = 2;
+    PAYMENT_ACK =  3;
 }
 
-message EncryptedPayment {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment = 1;           // AES-256-CBC Encrypted BIP70 Payment as defined in InvoiceRequest Spec
-        required bytes  payment_hash = 2;                // SHA256 Hash of Non-Encrypted, Serialized BIP70 Payment
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 3;           // Sender's EC Public Key
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 4;         // Receiver's EC Public Key
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;                       // Microseconds since epoch
-        required bytes  signature = 6;                   // Signature over EncryptedPayment with Sender's EC Key
-        optional bytes  identifier = 7;                  // Use the identifier specified with the EncryptedPaymentRequest, if any.
+message ProtocolMessage {
+    required ProtocolMessageType message_type = 1;  // Message Type of serialized_message
+    required bytes serialized_message = 2;          // Serialized Payment Protocol Message
+    optional uint64 status_code = 3;                // Payment Protocol Status Code
+    optional string status_message = 4;             // Human-readable Payment Protocol status message
+    optional bytes identifier = 5;                  // Unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. SHA256 of initial serialized InvoiceRequest SHOULD be used by default
 }
 
-message EncryptedPaymentACK {
-        required bytes  encrypted_payment_ack = 1;       // AES-256-CBC Encrypted BIP70 PaymentACK as defined in InvoiceRequest Spec
-        required bytes  payment_ack_hash = 2;            // SHA256 Hash of Non-Encrypted, Serialized BIP70 PaymentACK
-        required bytes  receiver_public_key = 3;         // Receiver's EC Public Key
-        required bytes  sender_public_key = 4;           // Sender's EC Public Key
-        required uint64 nonce = 5;                       // Microseconds since epoch
-        required bytes  signature = 6;                   // Signature over EncryptedPaymentACK with Receiver's EC Key
-        optional bytes  identifier = 7;                  // Use the identifier specified with the EncryptedPaymentRequest, if any.
-}
+message EncryptedProtocolMessage {
+    required ProtocolMessageType message_type = 1;  // Message Type of Decrypted encrypted_message
+    required bytes encrypted_message = 2;           // AES-256-GCM Encrypted (as defined in BIP75) Payment Protocol Message
+    required bytes receiver_public_key = 3;         // Receiver's DER-encoded EC Public Key
+    required bytes sender_public_key = 4;           // Sender's DER-encoded EC Public Key
+    required uint64 nonce = 5;                      // Microseconds since epoch
+    optional bytes signature = 6;                   // Signature over the full EncryptedProtocolMessage with EC Key Belonging to Sender / Receiver, respectively
+    optional bytes identifier = 7;                  // Unique key to identify this entire exchange on the server. SHA256 of initial serialized InvoiceRequest SHOULD be used by default
+    optional uint64 status_code = 8;                // Payment Protocol Status Code
+    optional string status_message = 9;            // Human-readable Payment Protocol status message
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/bip-0111.mediawiki b/bip-0111.mediawiki
index e0ae9e8..f759f5c 100644
--- a/bip-0111.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0111.mediawiki
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 <pre>
   BIP: 111
   Title: NODE_BLOOM service bit
-  Author: Matt Corallo <bip@bluematt.me>
+  Author: Matt Corallo <bip111@bluematt.me>
           Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
   Status: Draft
   Type: Standards Track
diff --git a/bip-0151.mediawiki b/bip-0151.mediawiki
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d3901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bip-0151.mediawiki
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+<pre>
+  BIP: 151
+  Title: Peer-to-Peer Communication Encryption
+  Author: Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch>
+  Status: Draft
+  Type: Standards Track
+  Created: 2016-03-23
+</pre>
+
+== Abstract ==
+
+This BIP describes an alternative way that a peer can encrypt their communication between a selective subset of remote peers.
+
+== Motivation ==
+
+
+The Bitcoin network does not encrypt communication between peers today. This opens up security issues (eg: traffic manipulation by others) and allows for mass surveillance / analysis of bitcoin users. Mostly this is negligible because of the nature of Bitcoins trust model, however for SPV nodes this can have significant privacy impacts [1] and could reduce the censorship-resistance of a peer.
+
+Encrypting peer traffic will make analysis and specific user targeting much more difficult than it currently is. Today it's trivial for a network provider or any other men-in-the-middle to identify a Bitcoin user and its controlled addresses/keys (and link with his Google profile, etc.). Just created and broadcasted transactions will reveal the amount and the payee to the network provider.
+
+This BIP also describes a way that data manipulation (blocking commands by a intercepting TCP/IP node) would be identifiable by the communicating peers.
+
+Analyzing the type of p2p communication would still be possible because of the characteristics (size, sending-interval, etc.) of the encrypted messages.
+
+Encrypting traffic between peers is already possible with VPN, tor, stunnel, curveCP or any other encryption mechanism on a deeper OSI level, however, most mechanism are not practical for SPV or other DHCP/NAT environment and will require significant knowhow in how to setup such a secure channel.
+
+== Specification ==
+
+A peer that supports encryption must accept encryption requests from all peers.
+
+A independent ECDH negotiation for both communication directions is required and therefore a bidirectional communication will use two symmetric cipher keys (one per direction).
+
+Both peers must only send encrypted messages after a successful ECDH negotiation in ''both directions''.
+
+Encryption initialization must happen before sending any other messages to the responding peer (<code>encinit</code> message after a <code>version</code> message must be ignored).
+
+=== Symmetric Encryption Cipher Keys ===
+
+The symmetric encryption cipher keys will be calculated with ECDH by sharing the pubkeys of a ephemeral key. Once the ECDH secret is calculated on each side, the symmetric encryption cipher keys must be calculated with <code>HMAC_SHA512(key=ecdh_secret|cipher-type,msg="encryption key")</code>.
+
+<code>K_1</code> must be the left 32bytes of the <code>HMAC_SHA512</code> hash.
+
+<code>K_2</code> must be the right 32bytes of the <code>HMAC_SHA512</code> hash.
+
+It is important to include the cipher-type into the symmetric cipher key to avoid weak-cipher-attacks.
+
+=== Session ID ===
+
+Both sides must also calculate the 256bit session-id using <code>HMAC_SHA256(key=ecdh_secret,msg="session id")</code>. The session-id can be used for linking the encryption-session to an identity check.
+
+=== The <code>encinit</code> message type ===
+
+To request encrypted communication, the requesting peer generates an EC ephemeral-session-keypair and sends an <code>encinit</code> message to the responding peer and waits for a <code>encack</code> message. The responding node must do the same <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction for the opposite communication direction.
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 33bytes || ephemeral-pubkey || comp.-pubkey || The session pubkey from the requesting peer
+|-
+| 1bytes || symmetric key cipher type  || int8 || symmetric key cipher type to use
+|}
+
+Possible symmetric key ciphers types
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Number !! symmetric key ciphers type
+|-
+| 0 || chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+|}
+
+=== ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suite ===
+
+ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein [2]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
+a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
+
+Poly1305, also by Daniel Bernstein [3], is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
+256 bit secret key.
+
+The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com specified and defined by openssh [4] combines these two primitives into an authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that proposed for TLS by Adam Langley [5], but differs in the layout of data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet lengths.
+
+<code>K_1</code> must be used to only encrypt the payload size of the encrypted message to avoid leaking information by revealing the message size.
+
+<code>K_2</code> must be used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD.
+
+Optimized implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305 are very fast in general, therefore it is very likely that encrypted messages require less CPU cycles per bytes then the current unencrypted p2p message format. A quick analysis by Pieter Wuille of the current ''standard implementations'' has shown that SHA256 requires more CPU cycles per byte then ChaCha20 & Poly1304 [5].
+
+=== The <code>encack</code> message type ===
+
+The responding peer accepts the encryption request by sending a <code>encack</code> message.
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 33bytes || ephemeral-pubkey || comp.-pubkey || The session pubkey from the responding peer
+|}
+
+At this point, the shared secret key for the symmetric key cipher must be calculated by using ECDH (own privkey x remote pub key).
+Private keys will never be transmitted. The shared secret can only be calculated if an attacker knows at least one private key and the remote peer's public key.
+
+* '''The <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction must be done from both sides.'''
+* Each communication direction uses its own secret key for the symmetric cipher.
+* The second <code>encinit</code> request (from the responding peer) must use the same symmetric cipher type.
+* All unencrypted messages before the second <code>encack</code> response (from the responding peer) must be ignored.
+* After a successful <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction, the "encrypted messages structure" must be used. Non-encrypted messages from the requesting peer must lead to a connection termination.
+
+After a successful <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction from both sides, the messages format must use the "encrypted messages structure". Non-encrypted messages from the requesting peer must lead to a connection termination (can be detected by the 4 byte network magic in the unencrypted message structure).
+
+=== Encrypted Messages Structure  ===
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 4 || length || uint32_t || Length of ciphertext payload in number of bytes
+|-
+| ? || ciphertext payload || ? || One or many ciphertext command & message data
+|-
+| 16 || MAC tag || ? || 128bit MAC-tag
+|}
+
+Encrypted messages do not have the 4byte network magic.
+
+The maximum message length needs to be chosen carefully. The 4 byte length field can lead to a required message buffer of 4 GiB.
+Processing the message before the authentication succeeds must not be done.
+
+The 4byte sha256 checksum is no longer required because the AEAD.
+
+Both peers need to track the message number (int64) of sent messages to the remote peer for building a symmetric cipher IV. Padding might be required (96bit IVs).
+
+The encrypted payload will result decrypted in one or many unencrypted messages:
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| ? || command || varlen || ASCII string identifying the packet content, we are using varlen in the encrypted messages.
+|-
+| 4 || length || uint32_t || Length of plaintext payload
+|-
+| ? || payload || ? || The actual data
+|}
+If more data is present, another message must be deserialized. There is no explicit amount-of-messages integer.
+
+
+=== Re-Keying ===
+
+A responding peer can inform the requesting peer over a re-keying with a <code>encack</code> message containing 33byte of zeros to indicate that all encrypted message following after this <code>encack</code> message will be encrypted with ''the next symmetric cipher key''.
+
+The new symmetric cipher key will be calculated by <code>SHA256(SHA256(old_symetric_cipher_key))</code>.
+
+Re-Keying interval is a peer policy with a minimum timespan of 10 seconds.
+
+The Re-Keying must be done after every 1GB of data sent or received (recommended by RFC4253 SSH Transport).
+
+=== Risks ===
+
+The encryption does not include an identity authentication scheme. This BIP does not cover a proposal to avoid MITM attacks during the encryption initialization. 
+
+Identity authentication will be covered in another BIP and will presume communication encryption after this BIP.
+
+== Compatibility ==
+
+This proposal is backward compatible. Non-supporting peers will ignore the <code>encinit</code> messages.
+
+== Reference implementation ==
+
+== References ==
+
+* [1] http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:48205/eth-48205-01.pdf
+* [2] ChaCha20 http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+* [3] Poly1305 http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
+* [4] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/05855bf2ce7d5cd0a6db18bc0b4214ed5ef7516d/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
+* [5] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
+
+== Acknowledgements ==
+* Pieter Wuille and Gregory Maxwell for most of the ideas in this BIP.
+
+== Copyright ==
+This work is placed in the public domain.
+
+
diff --git a/bip-0152.mediawiki b/bip-0152.mediawiki
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+<pre>
+  BIP: 152
+  Title: Compact Block Relay
+  Author: Matt Corallo <bip152@bluematt.me>
+  Status: Draft
+  Type: Standards Track
+  Created: 2016-04-27
+</pre>
+
+==Abstract==
+
+Compact blocks on the wire as a way to save bandwidth for nodes on the P2P network.
+
+The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
+
+==Motivation==
+
+Historically, the Bitcoin P2P protocol has not been very bandwidth efficient for block relay. Every transaction in a block is included when relayed, even though a large number of the transactions in a given block are already available to nodes before the block is relayed. This causes moderate inbound bandwidth spikes for nodes when receiving blocks, but can cause very significant outbound bandwidth spikes for some nodes which receive a block before their peers. When such spikes occur, buffer bloat can make consumer-grade internet connections temporarily unusable, and can delay the relay of blocks to remote peers who may choose to wait instead of redundantly requesting the same block from other, less congested, peers.
+
+Thus, decreasing the bandwidth used during block relay is very useful for many individuals running nodes.
+
+While the goal of this work is explicitly not to reduce block transfer latency, it does, as a side effect reduce block transfer latencies in some rather significant ways. Additionally, this work forms a foundation for future work explicitly targeting low-latency block transfer.
+
+==Specification==
+
+===Intended Protocol Flow===
+<img src=bip-0152/protocol-flow.png></img>
+
+The protocol is intended to be used in two ways, depending on the peers and bandwidth available, as discussed [[#Implementation_Details|later]]. The "high-bandwidth" mode, which nodes may only enable for a few of their peers, is enabled by setting the first boolean to 1 in a <code>sendcmpct</code> message. In this mode, peers send new block announcements with the short transaction IDs already (via a <code>cmpctblock</code> message), possibly even before fully validating the block (as indicated by the grey box in the image above). In some cases no further round-trip is needed, and the receiver can reconstruct the block and process it as usual immediately. When some transactions were not available from local sources (ie mempool), a <code>getblocktxn</code>/<code>blocktxn</code> roundtrip is necessary, bringing the best-case latency to the same 1.5*RTT minimum time that nodes take today, though with significantly less bandwidth usage.
+
+The "low-bandwidth" mode is enabled by setting the first boolean to 0 in a <code>sendcmpct</code> message. In this mode, peers send new block announcements with the usual inv/headers announcements (as per BIP130, and after fully validating the block). The receiving peer may then request the block using a MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK <code>getdata</code> request, which will receive a response of the header and short transaction IDs. In some cases no further round-trip is needed, and the receiver can reconstruct the block and process it as usual, taking the same 1.5*RTT minimum time that nodes take today, though with significantly less bandwidth usage. When some transactions were not available from local sources (ie mempool), a <code>getblocktxn</code>/<code>blocktxn</code> roundtrip is necessary, bringing the latency to at least 2.5*RTT in this case, again with significantly less bandwidth usage than today. Because TCP often exhibits worse transfer latency for larger data sizes (as a multiple of RTT), total latency is expected to be reduced even when the full 2.5*RTT transfer mechanism is used.
+
+===New data structures===
+Several new data structures are added to the P2P network to relay compact blocks: PrefilledTransaction, HeaderAndShortIDs, BlockTransactionsRequest, and BlockTransactions.
+
+For the purposes of this section, CompactSize refers to the variable-length integer encoding used across the existing P2P protocol to encode array lengths, among other things, in 1, 3, 5 or 9 bytes. Only CompactSize encodings which are minimally-encoded (ie the shortest length possible) are used by this spec. Any other CompactSize encodings are left with undefined behavior.
+
+Several uses of CompactSize below are "differentially encoded". For these, instead of using raw indexes, the number encoded is the difference between the current index and the previous index, minus one. For example, a first index of 0 implies a real index of 0, a second index of 0 thereafter refers to a real index of 1, etc.
+
+====PrefilledTransaction====
+A PrefilledTransaction structure is used in HeaderAndShortIDs to provide a list of a few transactions explicitly.
+
+{|
+|Field Name||Type||Size||Encoding||Purpose
+|-
+|index||CompactSize||1, 3 bytes||Compact Size, differentially encoded since the last PrefilledTransaction in a list||The index into the block at which this transaction is
+|-
+|tx||Transaction||variable||As encoded in "tx" messages||The transaction which is in the block at index index.
+|}
+
+====HeaderAndShortIDs====
+A HeaderAndShortIDs structure is used to relay a block header, the short transactions IDs used for matching already-available transactions, and a select few transactions which we expect a peer may be missing.
+
+{|
+|Field Name||Type||Size||Encoding||Purpose
+|-
+|header||Block header||80 bytes||First 80 bytes of the block as defined by the encoding used by "block" messages||The header of the block being provided
+|-
+|nonce||uint64_t||8 bytes||Little Endian||A nonce for use in short transaction ID calculations
+|-
+|shortids_length||CompactSize||1 or 3 bytes||As used to encode array lengths elsewhere||||The number of short transaction IDs in shortids (ie block tx count - prefilledtxn_length)
+|-
+|shortids||List of 6-byte integers||6*shortids_length bytes||Little Endian||The short transaction IDs calculated from the transactions which were not provided explicitly in prefilledtxn
+|-
+|prefilledtxn_length||CompactSize||1 or 3 bytes||As used to encode array lengths elsewhere||||The number of prefilled transactions in prefilledtxn (ie block tx count - shortids_length)
+|-
+|prefilledtxn||List of PrefilledTransactions||variable size*prefilledtxn_length||As defined by PrefilledTransaction definition, above||Used to provide the coinbase transaction and a select few which we expect a peer may be missing
+|}
+
+====BlockTransactionsRequest====
+A BlockTransactionsRequest structure is used to list transaction indexes in a block being requested.
+
+{|
+|Field Name||Type||Size||Encoding||Purpose
+|-
+|blockhash||Binary blob||32 bytes||The output from a double-SHA256 of the block header, as used elsewhere||The blockhash of the block which the transactions being requested are in
+|-
+|indexes_length||CompactSize||1 or 3 bytes||As used to encode array lengths elsewhere||||The number of transactions being requested
+|-
+|indexes||List of CompactSizes||1 or 3 bytes*indexes_length||Differentially encoded||The indexes of the transactions being requested in the block
+|}
+
+====BlockTransactions====
+A BlockTransactions structure is used to provide some of the transactions in a block, as requested.
+
+{|
+|Field Name||Type||Size||Encoding||Purpose
+|-
+|blockhash||Binary blob||32 bytes||The output from a double-SHA256 of the block header, as used elsewhere||The blockhash of the block which the transactions being provided are in
+|-
+|transactions_length||CompactSize||1 or 3 bytes||As used to encode array lengths elsewhere||||The number of transactions provided
+|-
+|transactions||List of Transactions||variable||As encoded in "tx" messages||The transactions provided
+|}
+
+====Short transaction IDs====
+Short transaction IDs are used to represent a transaction without sending a full 256-bit hash. They are calculated by:
+# single-SHA256 hashing the block header with the nonce appended (in little-endian)
+# Running SipHash-2-4 with the input being the transaction ID and the keys (k0/k1) set to the first two little-endian 64-bit integers from the above hash, respectively.
+# Dropping the 2 most significant bytes from the SipHash output to make it 6 bytes.
+
+===New messages===
+A new inv type (MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK == 4) and several new protocol messages are added: sendcmpct, cmpctblock, getblocktxn, and blocktxn.
+
+====sendcmpct====
+# The sendcmpct message is defined as a message containing a 1-byte integer followed by a 8-byte integer where pchCommand == "sendcmpct".
+# The first integer SHALL be interpreted as a boolean (and MUST have a value of either 1 or 0)
+# The second integer SHALL be interpreted as a little-endian version number. Nodes sending a sendcmpct message MUST currently set this value to 1.
+# Upon receipt of a "sendcmpct" message with the first and second integers set to 1, the node SHOULD announce new blocks by sending a cmpctblock message.
+# Upon receipt of a "sendcmpct" message with the first integer set to 0, the node SHOULD NOT announce new blocks by sending a cmpctblock message, but SHOULD announce new blocks by sending invs or headers, as defined by BIP130.
+# Upon receipt of a "sendcmpct" message with the second integer set to something other than 1, nodes MUST treat the peer as if they had not received the message (as it indicates the peer will provide an unexpected encoding in cmpctblock, and/or other, messages). This allows future versions to send duplicate sendcmpct messages with different versions as a part of a version handshake for future versions.
+# Nodes SHOULD check for a protocol version of >= 70014 before sending sendcmpct messages.
+# Nodes MUST NOT send a request for a MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK object to a peer before having received a sendcmpct message from that peer.
+
+====MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK====
+# getdata messages may now contain requests for MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK objects.
+# Upon receipt of a getdata containing a request for a MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK object with the hash of a block which was recently announced and after having sent the requesting peer a sendcmpct message, nodes MUST respond with a cmpctblock message containing appropriate data representing the block being requested.
+# MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK inv objects MUST NOT appear anywhere except for in getdata messages.
+
+====cmpctblock====
+# The cmpctblock message is defined as as a message containing a serialized HeaderAndShortIDs message and pchCommand == "cmpctblock".
+# Upon receipt of a cmpctblock message after sending a sendcmpct message, nodes SHOULD calculate the short transaction ID for each unconfirmed transaction they have available (ie in their mempool) and compare each to each short transaction ID in the cmpctblock message.
+# After finding already-available transactions, nodes which do not have all transactions available to reconstruct the full block SHOULD request the missing transactions using a getblocktxn message.
+# A node MUST NOT send a cmpctblock message unless they are able to respond to a getblocktxn message which requests every transaction in the block.
+# A node MUST NOT send a cmpctblock message without having validated that the header properly commits to each transaction in the block, and properly builds on top of the existing chain with a valid proof-of-work. A node MAY send a cmpctblock before validating that each transaction in the block validly spends existing UTXO set entries.
+
+====getblocktxn====
+# The getblocktxn message is defined as as a message containing a serialized BlockTransactionsRequest message and pchCommand == "getblocktxn".
+# Upon receipt of a properly-formatted getblocktxnmessage, nodes which recently provided the sender of such a message a cmpctblock for the block hash identified in this message MUST respond with an appropriate blocktxn message. Such a blocktxn message MUST contain exactly and only each transaction which is present in the appropriate block at the index specified in the getblocktxn indexes list, in the order requested.
+
+====blocktxn====
+# The blocktxn message is defined as as a message containing a serialized BlockTransactions message and pchCommand == "blocktxn".
+# Upon receipt of a properly-formatted requested blocktxn message, nodes SHOULD attempt to reconstruct the full block by:
+## Taking the prefilledtxn transactions from the original cmpctblock and placing them in the marked positions.
+## For each short transaction ID from the original cmpctblock, in order, find the corresponding transaction either from the blocktxn message or from other sources and place it in the first available position in the block.
+# Once the block has been reconstructed, it shall be processed as normal, keeping in mind that short transaction IDs are expected to occasionally collide, and that nodes MUST NOT be penalized for such collisions, wherever they appear.
+
+===Implementation Notes===
+# For nodes which have sufficient inbound bandwidth, sending a sendcmpct message with the first integer set to 1 to up to 3 peers is RECOMMENDED. If possible, it is RECOMMENDED that those peers be selected based on their past performance in providing blocks quickly (eg the three peers which provided the highest number of the recent N blocks the quickest), allowing nodes to receive blocks which come from those peers in only 0.5*RTT.
+
+# Nodes MUST NOT send such sendcmpct messages to more than three peers, as it encourages wasting outbound bandwidth across the network.
+
+# All nodes SHOULD send a sendcmpct message to all appropriate peers. This will reduce their outbound bandwidth usage by allowing their peers to request compact blocks instead of full blocks.
+
+# Nodes with limited inbound bandwidth SHOULD request blocks using MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK/getblocktxn requests, when possible. While this increases worst-case message round-trips, it is expected to reduce overall transfer latency as TCP is more likely to exhibit poor throughput on low-bandwidth nodes.
+
+# Nodes sending cmpctblock messages SHOULD limit prefilledtxn to 10KB of transactions. When in doubt, nodes SHOULD only include the coinbase transaction in prefilledtxn.
+
+# Nodes MAY pick one nonce per block they wish to send, and only build a cmpctblock message once for all peers which they wish to send a given block to. Nodes SHOULD NOT use the same nonce across multiple different blocks.
+
+# Nodes MAY impose additional requirements on when they announce new blocks by sending cmpctblock messages. For example, nodes with limited outbound bandwidth MAY choose to announce new blocks using inv/header messages (as per BIP130) to conserve outbound bandwidth.
+
+# Note that the MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK section does not require that nodes respond to MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK getdata requests for blocks which they did not recently announce. This allows nodes to calculate cmpctblock messages at announce-time instead of at request-time. Thus, nodes MUST NOT request blocks using MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK getdatas unless it is in response to an inv/headers block announcement (as per BIP130), and MUST NOT request blocks using MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK getdatas in response to headers messages which were, themselves, responses to getheaders requests.
+
+# While the current version sends transactions with the same encodings as is used in tx messages and elsewhere in the protocol, the version field in sendcmpct is intended to allow this to change in the future. For this reason, it is recommended that the code used to decode PrefilledTransaction and BlockTransactions messages be prepared to take a different transaction encoding, if and when the version field in sendcmpct changes in a future BIP.
+
+# Any undefined behavior in this spec may cause failure to transfer block to, peer disconnection by, or self-destruction by the receiving node. A node receiving non-minimally-encoded CompactSize encodings should make a best-effort to eat the sender's cat.
+
+==Justification==
+
+====Protocol design====
+There have been many proposals to save wire bytes when relaying blocks. Many of them have a two-fold goal of reducing block relay time and thus rely on the use of significant processing power in order to avoid introducing additional worst-case RTTs. Because this work is not focused primarily on reducing block relay time, its design is much simpler (ie does not rely on set reconciliation protocols). Still, in testing at the time of writing, nodes are able to relay blocks without the extra getblocktxn/blocktxn RTT around 90% of the time. With a smart compact-block-announcement policy, it is thus expected that this work might allow blocks to be relayed between nodes in 0.5*RTT instead of 1.5*RTT at least 75% of the time.
+
+====Short transaction ID calculation====
+The short transaction ID calculation is designed to take absolutely minimal processing time during block compaction to avoid introducing serious DoS vulnerabilities such as those introduced by the bloom-filtering in BIP 37. As such, it is possible for a node to construct one compact-block representation of a block for relay to multiple peers. Additionally, only one cryptographic hash (2 SHA rounds) is used when calculating the short transaction IDs for an entire block.
+
+SipHash-2-4 is used for calculating short transaction IDs primarily because it is fast and is reasonably able to limit the ability of an attacker who does not know the block hash or nonce to cause collisions in short transaction IDs. If an attacker were able to cause such collisions, filling mempools (and, thus, blocks) with them would cause poor network propagation of new (or non-attacker, in the case of a miner) blocks. As SipHash was designed, in part, to be used as a key selector for hash maps with malicious data, it should work very well for our use.
+
+The 8-byte nonce in short transaction ID calculation is used to introduce additional entropy on a per-node level. While the use of 8 bytes is sufficient for an attacker to maliciously cause short transaction ID collisions in their own block relay, this would have less of an effect than if such an attacker were relaying headers/invs and not responding to requests for the full block.
+
+==Backward compatibility==
+
+Older clients remain fully compatible and interoperable after this change.
+
+==Implementation==
+
+https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bitcoin/tree/udp
+
+==Acknowledgements==
+
+Thanks to Gregory Maxwell for the initial suggestion as well as a lot of back-and-forth design and significant testing.
+Thanks to Nicolas Dorier for the protocol flow diagram.
+
+==Copyright==
+
+This document is placed in the public domain.
diff --git a/bip-0152/protocol-flow.png b/bip-0152/protocol-flow.png
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