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author | Luke-Jr <luke_github1@dashjr.org> | 2016-03-15 06:34:42 +0000 |
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committer | Luke-Jr <luke_github1@dashjr.org> | 2016-03-15 06:34:42 +0000 |
commit | 5a942b04c0c966fa80666b3d4144a75d85865f0a (patch) | |
tree | ae9964fd4db082f1e968bb846ba9ca444fd5f2f7 | |
parent | d6e848dc4b07ae2c84796fee73b593b6f8120914 (diff) | |
parent | 46a91a8dc4936af3b3d8f3de7f36487e6aff2631 (diff) | |
download | bips-5a942b04c0c966fa80666b3d4144a75d85865f0a.tar.xz |
Merge pull request #353 from priestc/master
Added paragraph about address re-use for BIP131
-rw-r--r-- | bip-0131.mediawiki | 20 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bip-0131.mediawiki b/bip-0131.mediawiki index c30ef54..1efe713 100644 --- a/bip-0131.mediawiki +++ b/bip-0131.mediawiki @@ -77,6 +77,26 @@ the user when their wallet contains many UTXOs that qualify it to benefit from a coalescing transaction. Wallets should not simply replace non-coalescing transactions with coalescing transactions in all instances. +== Isn't this BIP bad because it encourage address re-use? == + +Address re-use comes in two forms: re-use by the ''sender'', and re-use by the ''receiver''. + +Re-use by the sender is basically using the same address for the change output. This is generally considered bad +since people looking through your transaction history can determine who you do business with. When +you generate a new address for every change, your privacy is conserved as it is impossible to know which +output is a recipient, and which output is the change output. This BIP has '''no effect''' on re-use +by the sender. + +On the other hand, address re-use by the ''receiver'' occurs under completely different circumstances. +When you publish an address and have multiple people send to that address, you are engaging in address re-use +from the receiver. This activity has historically been considered bad because it leads to re-using a private key. +When you re-use a private key too many times, you run the risk of an attacker performing statistical analysis +on the multiple signatures, which can lead to an attacker finding out your private key. + +This BIP introduces a way to spend multiple inputs ''without'' re-using the private key. In a sense, this BIP +fixes the problem that makes address re-use bad for the receiver. After this BIP becomes implemented +and deployed, address re-use by the receiver will no longer be considered bad form. + ==Copyright== This document is placed in the public domain. |