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2017-10-15derive history from db instead of storing itFlorian Dold
2017-10-14gitignoreFlorian Dold
2017-10-14update dependenciesFlorian Dold
2017-08-30compute full fees for refresh and spendingFlorian Dold
2017-08-30don't stop injection earlyFlorian Dold
2017-08-30mark errata properlyChristian Grothoff
2017-08-29Footnote but Christian wanted this elsewhereJeffrey Burdges
2017-08-29Actualy this part has nothing to do with BOLT being fragileJeffrey Burdges
2017-08-29Rephrase BOLT fixJeffrey Burdges
2017-08-29Merge branch 'master' of ssh://taler.net/wallet-webexJeffrey Burdges
2017-08-29Errata: Statement about BOLT correctedJeffrey Burdges
Discussion : Christian & Florian, This is about the UI paper in SPACE, not the protocol paper with real crypto discussions. And the text in question never existed in the protocol paper. Ian, I'm the member of our team who looked into BOLT the most, mostly looking to see if any of the ideas helped us. I might manage to reconstruct more details later, but right now my description there sounds bizarre and wrong. In Taler, our denomination key expirations limit the exchange's liability to double its deposits, even in the case that its private keys are all compromised and used to create unbacked coins. In practice, offline ecash schemes lack this limit due to their decreased ability to rotate denomination keys. I do not see why I wrote that BOLT lacked this property: If I recall, both BOLT payment channel types are created with fixed initial value commitments. In particular, intermediaries have already committed the maximum funds they could transfer to each merchant. That would prevent unbacked transfers in the payment channel, and thus limit liability, even when the intermediary gets compromised. There is an anonymity cost if BOLT's approach limits the number of users in payment channels with each intermediary of course. I do not know if a compromised BOLT intermediary could complete payments to merchants while refunding customers, but even if so that's still not the sort of "unlimited" liability you get in offline ecash schemes. It's just the sort of 2x limit on liability that Taler provides. In BOLT, the x would be value committed to outgoing channels, while in Taler x is value deposited by customers, so I suppose the intermediary could technically be robbed of their money without seeing any incoming money. That's not "unlimited" though. It's limited by the intermediary's commitments to the network. I doubt I even thought about it this deeply though when I wrote that. I think once-upon-a-time I wanted to express some vague concern around intermediaries and anonymity sets in BOLT, but never thought about it clearly, and later managed to confuse myself with conventional ecash issues when discussing related work with Christian while we were writing this usability paper. Sorry for writing what appears to be nonsense! Jeff On Mon, 2017-08-28 at 21:10 +0200, Christian Grothoff wrote: > > -------- Forwarded Message -------- > Subject: bolt attack? > Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 18:49:43 +0000 > From: Ian Miers <imiers@cs.jhu.edu> > To: christian@grothoff.org <christian@grothoff.org> > > > > Hi, > Someone pointed me at a copy of your Taler paper from 2016 and pointed > out that it describes Bolt saying there "are numerous seemingly > fragile aspects of the BOLT protocol, including aborts deanonymizing > customers, *intermediaries risking unlimited losses,* and theft if a > party fails to post a refute message in a timely fashion." > > The unlimited loss to intermediaries comment surprised both them and > me. Are you referring to some specific attack or an issue involving > timeouts and delays? > > Thanks, > Ian
2017-08-27version bump: 0.4.0-pre1Florian Dold
2017-08-27show error in create reserve dialogFlorian Dold
2017-08-27proper rounding for amount operationsFlorian Dold
2017-08-27make sure that refreshing works after refundFlorian Dold
2017-08-27canonicalize account info JSON when collecting themFlorian Dold
2017-08-27node_modulesFlorian Dold
2017-08-27better error report / retry prompt for failed paymentsFlorian Dold
2017-08-27implement refundsFlorian Dold
2017-08-25add rudimentary error reporting in a new tabFlorian Dold
2017-08-14remove fileFlorian Dold
2017-08-14node_modulesFlorian Dold
2017-08-14fix build system / typesFlorian Dold
2017-08-14implement returning coins to user's accountFlorian Dold
2017-08-09fix errors in injectionFlorian Dold
Sometimes chrome reports a different URL for a tab than what it is internally displaying (e.g. for error pages). Previously this lead to a "scary" error message being logged.
2017-07-20do not swallow errorsFlorian Dold
2017-07-20Store bank account information for reserve.Florian Dold
Fixes #4852.
2017-07-19fix #5112Marcello Stanisci
2017-07-19Option to show the browser in selenium test; useful to debug.Marcello Stanisci
2017-07-01consider client age in commpatibility checkChristian Grothoff
2017-06-28Fix #5095.Marcello Stanisci
2017-06-27Adapt screen scraped withdrawing to new bank interface.Marcello Stanisci
2017-06-27READMEMarcello Stanisci
2017-06-06fix 'make dist', add changelog, version numbers for 0.3v0.3.0Florian Dold
2017-06-06fix timer typoFlorian Dold
2017-06-05wallet db version belongs with wallet, not webexFlorian Dold
2017-06-05pretty reset pageFlorian Dold
2017-06-05properly implement db resettingFlorian Dold
2017-06-05don't also open history links in popupFlorian Dold
2017-06-05fix db dump pageFlorian Dold
2017-06-04v0.2.8Florian Dold
2017-06-04check trust by key, not by URLFlorian Dold
2017-06-04warn about incompatible versions on withdrawFlorian Dold
2017-06-04v0.2.7Florian Dold
2017-06-04Add libtool version comparison module and testsFlorian Dold
2017-06-04v0.2.6Florian Dold
2017-06-04nicer auditor display on withdrawFlorian Dold
2017-06-04some UI fixesFlorian Dold
2017-06-04memidb work in progressFlorian Dold
2017-06-03missing propertyFlorian Dold
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