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| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler.tex | 153 |
1 files changed, 117 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex index a84962dd2..361efadde 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler.tex +++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -647,34 +647,35 @@ taxability. \subsection{Withdrawal} -To withdraw anonymous digital coins, the customer performs the -following interaction with the mint: +Let $G$ be the generator of an elliptic curve. To withdraw anonymous +digital coins, the customer performs the following interaction with +the mint: \begin{enumerate} \item The customer identifies a mint with an auditor-approved coin signing public-private key pair $K := (K_s, K_p)$ and randomly generates: \begin{itemize} - \item withdrawal key $W := (W_s,W_p)$ with private key $W_s$ and public key $W_p$, - \item coin key $C := (C_s,C_p)$ with private key $C_s$ and public key $C_p$, + \item withdrawal key $W := (w_s,W_p)$ with private key $w_s$ and public key $W_p$, + \item coin key $C := (c_s,C_p)$ with private key $c_s$ and public key $C_p := c_s G$, \item blinding factor $b$, and commits $\langle W, C, b \rangle$ to disk. \end{itemize} \item The customer transfers an amount of money corresponding to (at least) $K_p$ to the mint, with $W_p$ in the subject line of the transaction. \item The mint receives the transaction and credits the $W_p$ reserve with the respective amount in its database. - \item The customer sends $S_W(E_b(C_p))$ to the mint to request withdrawal of $C$; here, $E_b$ denotes Chaum-style blinding with blinding factor $b$. - \item The mint checks if the same withdrawal request was issued before; in this case, it sends $S_{K}(E_b(C_p))$ to the customer.\footnote{Here $S_K$ + \item The customer sends $S_W(B_b(C_p))$ to the mint to request withdrawal of $C$; here, $B_b$ denotes Chaum-style blinding with blinding factor $b$. + \item The mint checks if the same withdrawal request was issued before; in this case, it sends $S_{K}(B_b(C_p))$ to the customer.\footnote{Here $S_K$ denotes a Chaum-style blind signature with private key $K_s$.} If this is a fresh withdrawal request, the mint performs the following transaction: \begin{enumerate} \item checks if the reserve $W_p$ has sufficient funds for a coin of value corresponding to $K_p$ - \item stores the withdrawal request $\langle S_W(E_b(C_p)), S_K(E_b(C_p)) \rangle$ in its database for future reference, + \item stores the withdrawal request and response $\langle S_W(B_b(C_p)), S_K(B_b(C_p)) \rangle$ in its database for future reference, \item deducts the amount corresponding to $K_p$ from the reserve, - \item and sends $S_{K}(E_b(C_p))$ to the customer. \end{enumerate} + and then sends $S_{K}(B_b(C_p))$ to the customer. If the guards for the transaction fail, the mint sends a descriptive error back to the customer, with proof that it operated correctly (i.e. by showing the transaction history for the reserve). - \item The customer computes (and verifies) the unblinded signature $S_K(C_p) = D_b(S_K(E_b(C_p)))$. - The customer writes $\langle S_K(C_p), C_s \rangle$ to disk (effectively adding the coin to the + \item The customer computes (and verifies) the unblinded signature $S_K(C_p) = B^{-1}_b(S_K(B_b(C_p)))$. + The customer writes $\langle S_K(C_p), c_s \rangle$ to disk (effectively adding the coin to the local wallet) for future use. \end{enumerate} We note that the authorization to create and access a reserve using a @@ -688,17 +689,17 @@ withdraw funds, those can also be used with Taler. A customer can spend coins at a merchant, under the condition that the merchant trusts the specific mint that minted the coin. Merchants are -identified by their public key $M := (M_s, M_p)$, which must be known +identified by their public key $M := (m_s, M_p)$, which must be known to the customer apriori. The following steps describe the protocol between customer, merchant and mint -for a transaction involving a coin $C := (C_s, C_p)$, which was previously signed +for a transaction involving a coin $C := (c_s, C_p)$, which was previously signed by a mint's denomination key $K$, i.e. the customer posses $\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$: \begin{enumerate} \item\label{contract} Let $\vec{D} := D_1, \ldots, D_n$ be the list of - mints accepted by the merchant where each $D_i$ is a mint's public + mints accepted by the merchant where each $D_j$ is a mint's public key. The merchant creates a digitally signed contract $\mathcal{A} := S_M(m, f, a, H(p, r), \vec{D})$ where $m$ is an identifier for this transaction, $a$ is data relevant to the contract indicating which services @@ -707,7 +708,7 @@ $\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$: a random nounce. The merchant commits $\langle \mathcal{A} \rangle$ to disk and sends $\mathcal{A}$ it to the customer. \item\label{deposit} The customer must possess or acquire a coin minted by a mint that is - accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_i + accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_j \in \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n\}$, and has a value $\geq f$. (The customer can of course also use multiple coins where the total value adds up to the cost of the transaction and run the following steps for each of @@ -716,8 +717,8 @@ $\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$: % The customer then generates a \emph{deposit-permission} $\mathcal{D} := S_c(\widetilde{C}, m, f, H(a), H(p,r), M_p)$ - and sends $\langle \mathcal{D}, D_i\rangle$ to the merchant, - where $D_i$ is the mint which signed $K$. + and sends $\langle \mathcal{D}, D_j\rangle$ to the merchant, + where $D_j$ is the mint which signed $K$. \item The merchant gives $(\mathcal{D}, p, r)$ to the mint, revealing $p$ only to the mint. @@ -787,15 +788,14 @@ generator of the elliptic curve. \begin{itemize} \item randomly generates transfer key $T^{(i)} := \left(t^{(i)}_s,T^{(i)}_p\right)$ where $T^{(i)}_p := t^{(i)}_s G$, \item randomly generates coin key pair \\ $C^{(i)} := \left(c_s^{(i)}, C_p^{(i)}\right)$ where $C^{(i)}_p := c^{(i)}_s G$, - \item randomly generates blinding factors $b_i$, - \item computes $E_i := E_{K_i}\left(c_s^{(i)}, b_i\right)$ where $K_i := H(c'_s T_p^{(i)})$. (The encryption key $K_i$ is + \item randomly generates blinding factors $b^{(i)}$, + \item computes $E^{(i)} := E_{K_i}\left(c_s^{(i)}, b^{(i)}\right)$ where $K_i := H(c'_s T_p^{(i)})$. (The encryption key $K_i$ is computed by multiplying the private key $c'_s$ of the original coin with the point on the curve that represents the public key $T^{(i)}_p$ of the transfer key $T^{(i)}$. This is basically DH between coin and transfer key.), \end{itemize} and commits $\langle C', \vec{T}, \vec{C}, \vec{b} \rangle$ to disk. - \item The customer computes $B_i := E_{b_i}(C^{(i)}_p)$ for $i=1,\ldots,\kappa$ and sends a commitment - $S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T_p}))$ to the mint; - here $E_{b_i}$ denotes Chaum-style blinding with blinding factor $b_i$. + \item The customer computes $B^{(i)} := B_{b^{(i)}}(C^{(i)}_p)$ for $i \in 1,\ldots,\kappa$ and sends a commitment + $S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T_p}))$ to the mint. \item The mint generates a random $\gamma$ with $1 \le \gamma \le \kappa$ and marks $C'_p$ as spent by committing $\langle C', \gamma, S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T}) \rangle$ to disk. @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ generator of the elliptic curve. possible to use any equivalent mint signing key known to the customer here, as $K$ merely serves as proof to the customer that the mint selected this particular $\gamma$.} \item The customer commits $\langle C', S_K(C'_p, \gamma) \rangle$ to disk. - \item The customer computes $\mathfrak{R} := \left(t_s^{(i)}, C_p^{(i)}, b_i\right)_{i \ne \gamma}$ + \item The customer computes $\mathfrak{R} := \left(t_s^{(i)}, C_p^{(i)}, b^{(i)}\right)_{i \ne \gamma}$ and sends $S_{C'}(\mathfrak{R})$ to the mint. \item \label{step:refresh-ccheck} The mint checks whether $\mathfrak{R}$ is consistent with the commitments; specifically, it computes for $i \not= \gamma$: @@ -812,23 +812,23 @@ generator of the elliptic curve. \begin{minipage}{5cm} \begin{align*} \overline{K}_i :&= H(t_s^{(i)} C_p'), \\ - (\overline{c}_s^{(i)}, \overline{b}_i) :&= D_{\overline{K}_i}(E_i), \\ - \overline{C}^{(i)}_p :&= \overline{c}_s^{(i)} G, + (\overline{c}_s^{(i)}, \overline{b}_i) :&= D_{\overline{K}_i}(E^{(i)}), \\ + \overline{C^{(i)}_p} :&= \overline{c}_s^{(i)} G, \end{align*} \end{minipage} \begin{minipage}{5cm} \begin{align*} - \overline{B}_i :&= E_{b_i}(C_p^{(i)}), \\ - \overline{T}_i :&= t_s^{(i)} G, \\ + \overline{T_p^{(i)}} :&= t_s^{(i)} G, \\ \\ + \overline{B^{(i)}} :&= B_{b^{(i)}}(\overline{C_p^{(i)}}), \end{align*} \end{minipage} - and checks if $\overline{C}^{(i)}_p = C^{(i)}_p$ and $H(E_i, \overline{B}_i, \overline{T}^{(i)}_p) = H(E_i, B_i, T^{(i)}_p)$ - and $\overline{T}_i = T_i$. + and checks if $\overline{B^{(i)}} = B^{(i)}$ + and $\overline{T^{(i)}_p} = T^{(i)}_p$. \item \label{step:refresh-done} If the commitments were consistent, the mint sends the blind signature $\widetilde{C} := - S_{K}(B_\gamma)$ to the customer. Otherwise, the mint responds + S_{K}(B^{(\gamma)})$ to the customer. Otherwise, the mint responds with an error the value of $C'$. \end{enumerate} @@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ generator of the elliptic curve. \subsection{Linking} For a coin that was successfully refreshed, the mint responds to a -request $S_{C'}(\mathtt{link})$ with $(T^{(\gamma)}_p$, $E_{\gamma}, +request $S_{C'}(\mathtt{link})$ with $(T^{(\gamma)}_p$, $B^{(\gamma)}, \widetilde{C})$. % This allows the owner of the melted coin to also obtain the private @@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ computing base (TCB) is public and free software. %This work was supported by a grant from the Renewable Freedom Foundation. % FIXME: ARED? -%We thank Tanja Lange and Dan Bernstein for feedback on an earlier +%We thank Tanja Lange, Dan Bernstein and Fabian Kirsch for feedback on an earlier %version of this paper, Nicolas Fournier for implementing and running %some performance benchmarks, and Richard Stallman, Hellekin Wolf, %Jacob Appelbaum for productive discussions and support. @@ -1105,15 +1105,15 @@ coin first. \item\label{offer2} The merchant sends an \emph{offer:} $\langle S_M(m, f), \vec{D} \rangle$ containing the price of the offer $f$, a transaction ID $m$ and the list of mints $D_1, \ldots, D_n$ accepted by the merchant - where each $D_i$ is a mint's public key. + where each $D_j$ is a mint's public key. \item\label{lock2} The customer must possess or acquire a coin minted by a mint that is - accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_i + accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_j \in \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n\}$, and has a value $\geq f$. Customer then generates a \emph{lock-permission} $\mathcal{L} := S_c(\widetilde{C}, t, m, f, M_p)$ where $t$ specifies the time until which the - lock is valid and sends $\langle \mathcal{L}, D_i\rangle$ to the merchant, - where $D_i$ is the mint which signed $K$. + lock is valid and sends $\langle \mathcal{L}, D_j\rangle$ to the merchant, + where $D_j$ is the mint which signed $K$. \item The merchant asks the mint to apply the lock by sending $\langle \mathcal{L} \rangle$ to the mint. \item The mint validates $\widetilde{C}$ and detects double spending if there is @@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ coin first. \item\label{contract2} The merchant creates a digitally signed contract $\mathcal{A} := S_M(m, f, a, H(p, r))$ where $a$ is data relevant to the contract indicating which services or goods the merchant will deliver to the customer, and $p$ is the - merchant's payment information (e.g. his IBAN number) and $r$ is an random nounce. + merchant's payment information (e.g. his IBAN number) and $r$ is an random nonce. The merchant commits $\langle \mathcal{A} \rangle$ to disk and sends it to the customer. \item The customer creates a \emph{deposit-permission} $\mathcal{D} := S_c(\widetilde{C}, f, m, M_p, H(a), H(p, r))$, commits @@ -1315,4 +1315,85 @@ If an organization detects that it cannot support itself with microdonations, it can always choose to switch to the macropayment system with slightly higher transaction costs to remain in business. +\newpage +\section{Notation summary} + +The paper uses the subscript $p$ to indicate public keys and $s$ to +indicate secret (private) keys. For keys, we also use small letters +for scalars and capital letters for points on an elliptic curve. The +capital letter without the subscript $p$ stands for the key pair. The +superscript $(i)$ is used to indicate one of the elements of a vector +during the cut-and-choose protocol. Bold-face is used to indicate a +vector over these elements. A line above indicates a value computed +by the verifier during the cut-and-choose operation. We use $f()$ to +indicate the application of a function $f$ to one or more arguments. + +\begin{description} + \item[$K_s$]{Private (RSA) key of the mint used for coin signing} + \item[$K_p$]{Public (RSA) key corresponding to $K_s$} + \item[$K$]{Public-priate (RSA) coin signing key pair $K := (K_s, K_p)$} + \item[$b$]{RSA blinding factor for RSA-style blind signatures} + \item[$B_b()$]{RSA blinding over the argument using blinding factor $b$} + \item[$B^{-1}_b()$]{RSA unblinding of the argument using blinding factor $b$, inverse of $B_b()$} + \item[$S_K()$]{Chaum-style RSA signature, commutes with blinding operation $B_b()$} + \item[$w_s$]{Private key from customer for authentication} + \item[$W_p$]{Public key corresponding to $w_s$} + \item[$W$]{Public-private customer authentication key pair $W := (w_s, W_p)$} + \item[$S_W()$]{Signature over the argument(s) involving key $W$} + \item[$m_s$]{Private key from merchant for authentication} + \item[$M_p$]{Public key corresponding to $m_s$} + \item[$M$]{Public-private merchant authentication key pair $M := (m_s, M_p)$} + \item[$S_M()$]{Signature over the argument(s) involving key $M$} + \item[$G$]{Generator of the elliptic curve} + \item[$c_s$]{Secret key corresponding to a coin, scalar on a curve} + \item[$C_p$]{Public key corresponding to $c_s$, point on a curve} + \item[$C$]{Public-private coin key pair $C := (c_s, C_p)$} + \item[$S_{C}()$]{Signature over the argument(s) involving key $C$ (using EdDSA)} + \item[$c_s'$]{Private key of a ``dirty'' coin (otherwise like $c_s$)} + \item[$C_p'$]{Public key of a ``dirty'' coin (otherwise like $C_p$)} + \item[$C'$]{Dirty coin (otherwise like $C$)} + \item[$\widetilde{C}$]{Mint signature $S_K(C_p)$ indicating validity of a fresh coin (with key $C$)} + \item[$n$]{Number of mints accepted by a merchant} + \item[$j$]{Index into a set of accepted mints, $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$} + \item[$D_j$]{Public key of a mint (not used to sign coins)} + \item[$\vec{D}$]{Vector of $D_j$ signifying mints accepted by a merchant} + \item[$a$]{Complete text of a contract between customer and merchant} + \item[$f$]{Amount a customer agrees to pay to a merchant for a contract} + \item[$m$]{Unique transaction identifier chosen by the merchant} + \item[$H()$]{Hash function} + \item[$p$]{Payment details of a merchant (i.e. wire transfer details for a bank transfer)} + \item[$r$]{Random nonce} + \item[${\cal A}$]{Complete contract signed by the merchant} + \item[${\cal D}$]{Deposit permission, signing over a certain amount of coin to the merchant as payment and to signify acceptance of a particular contract} + \item[$\kappa$]{Security parameter $\ge 3$} + \item[$i$]{Index over cut-and-choose set, $i \in \{1,\ldots,\kappa\}$} + \item[$\gamma$]{Selected index in cut-and-choose protocol, $\gamma \in \{1,\ldots,\kappa\}$} + \item[$t^{(i)}_s$]{private transfer key, a scalar} + \item[$T^{(i)}_s$]{private transfer key, point on a curve (same curve must be used for $C_p$)} + \item[$T^{(i)}$]{public-private transfer key pair $T^{(i)} := (t^{(i)}_s,T^{(i)}_s)$} + \item[$\vec{T}$]{Vector of $T^{(i)}$} + \item[$c_s^{(i)}$]{Secret key corresponding to a fresh coin, scalar on a curve} + \item[$C_p^{(i)}$]{Public key corresponding to $c_s^{(i)}$, point on a curve} + \item[$C^{(i)}$]{Public-private coin key pair $C^{(i)} := (c_s^{(i)}, C_p^{(i)})$} + \item[$\vec{C}$]{Vector of $C^{(i)}$ (public and private keys)} + \item[$b^{(i)}$]{Blinding factor for RSA-style blind signatures} + \item[$\vec{b}$]{Vector of $b^{(i)}$} + \item[$B^(i)$]{Blinding of $C_p^{(i)}$} + \item[$\vec{B}$]{Vector of $B^{(i)}$} + \item[$K_i$]{Symmetric encryption key derived from ECDH operation via hashing} + \item[$E_{K_i}()$]{Symmetric encryption using key $K_i$} + \item[$E^{(i)}$]{$i$-th encryption of the private information $(c_s^{(i)}, b_i)$} + \item[$\vec{E}$]{Vector of $E^{(i)}$} + \item[$\cal{R}$]{Tuple of revealed vectors in cut-and-choose protocol, + where the vectors exclude the selected index $\gamma$} + \item[$\overline{K_i}$]{Encryption keys derived by the verifier from DH} + \item[$\overline{B^{(i)}}$]{Blinded values derived by the verifier} + \item[$\overline{T_p^{(i)}}$]{Public transfer keys derived by the verifier from revealed private keys} + \item[$\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$]{Private keys obtained from decryption by the verifier} + \item[$\overline{b_s^{(i)}}$]{Blinding factors obtained from decryption by the verifier} + \item[$\overline{C^{(i)}_p}$]{Public coin keys computed from $\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$ by the verifier} +\end{description} + + + \end{document} |