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Diffstat (limited to 'doc/paper/taler.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler.tex | 32 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex index 1d1c5dbab..4ef76ca63 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler.tex +++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -1376,23 +1376,29 @@ data being persisted are represented in between $\langle\rangle$. \section{Taxability arguments} -\begin{proposition} -An auditor can detect an exchange operating either the refresh or -linking protocol dishonestly. -\end{proposition} - -\begin{proof} -.. Not sure about this one .. -\end{proof} +We assume the exchange operates honestly when discussing taxability. +We feel this assumption is warratned mostly because a Taler exchange +requires liscenses to operate as a financial institution, which it +risks loosing if it knowingly facilitates tax evasion. +We also expect an auditor monitors the exchange similarly to how +government regulators monitor financial institutions. +In fact, our auditor software component gives the auditor read access +to the exchange's database, and carries out test operations anonymously, +which expands its power over conventional auditors. \begin{proposition} -If the exchange operates the refresh protocol honestly, then -a dishonest wallet looses $1 - {1 \over \kappa}$ of the value -of the coins it refreshes dishonestly. +Assuming the exchange operates the refresh protocol honestly, +a customer operating the refresh protocol dishonestly expects to +loose $1 - {1 \over \kappa}$ of the value of thei coins. \end{proposition} \begin{proof} -.. Can we reference something about cut and choose protocols? Or must we work this all out? .. +An honest esxchange keeps any funds being refreshed if the reveal +phase is never carried out, does not match the commitment, or shows +an incorrect commitment. As a result, a customer dishonestly +refreshing a coin looses their money if they have more than one +dishonet commitment. They have a $1 \over \kappa$ chance of their +dishonest commitment being selected for the refresh. \end{proof} We say a coin is {\em controlled} by a user if the user's wallet knows @@ -1433,6 +1439,8 @@ for the residual value on $C'$ and runs the linking protocol to determine if it was refreshed too. \end{proof} +At a result, there is no way for a user to loose control over a coin, + \section{Privacy arguments} |