Notational cleanups

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex
index c7a1b56b7..19dff3192 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ Now the customer carries out the following interaction with the exchange:
     to request withdrawal of $C$; here, $B_b$ denotes Chaum-style blinding with
     blinding factor $b$.
   \item The exchange checks if the same withdrawal request was issued before;
-    in this case, it sends $S_{K}(B)$ to the customer.%
+    in this case, it sends $S_K(B)$ to the customer.%
 \footnote{$S_K$ denotes a Chaum-style blind signature with private key $K_s$.}
     If this is a fresh withdrawal request, the exchange performs the following transaction:
     \begin{enumerate}
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ generator of the elliptic curve.
     the transfer key pair $T^{(i)} := \left(t^{(i)}_s,T^{(i)}_p\right)$
     and old coin key pair $C' := \left(c_s', C_p'\right)$,
      so that $K_i = H(t^{(i)}_s C'_p)$ too.
-    Now the customer applies key derivtion functions to $K_i$ to generate
+    Now the customer applies key derivtion functions $\KDF_?$ to $K_i$ to generate
     \begin{itemize}
       \item a blinding factor $b^{(i)} = \FDH_K(\KDF_{\textrm{blinding}}(K_i))$.
       \item $c_s^{(i)} = \KDF_{\textrm{Ed25519}}(K_i)$
@@ -1243,22 +1243,22 @@ data being committed to disk are represented in between $\langle\rangle$.
   \item[$t^{(i)}_s$]{private transfer key, a scalar}
   \item[$T^{(i)}_p$]{public transfer key, point on a curve (same curve must be used for $C_p$)}
   \item[$T^{(i)}$]{public-private transfer key pair $T^{(i)} := (t^{(i)}_s,T^{(i)}_s)$}
-  \item[$\vec{T}$]{Vector of $T^{(i)}$}
+  \item[$\vec{t}$]{Vector of $t^{(i)}_s$}
   \item[$c_s^{(i)}$]{Secret key corresponding to a fresh coin, scalar on a curve}
   \item[$C_p^{(i)}$]{Public key corresponding to $c_s^{(i)}$, point on a curve}
   \item[$C^{(i)}$]{Public-private coin key pair $C^{(i)} := (c_s^{(i)}, C_p^{(i)})$}
-  \item[$\vec{C}$]{Vector of $C^{(i)}$ (public and private keys)}
+%  \item[$\vec{C}$]{Vector of $C^{(i)}$ (public and private keys)}
   \item[$b^{(i)}$]{Blinding factor for RSA-style blind signatures}
   \item[$\vec{b}$]{Vector of $b^{(i)}$}
   \item[$B^{(i)}$]{Blinding of $C_p^{(i)}$}
   \item[$\vec{B}$]{Vector of $B^{(i)}$}
   \item[$K_i$]{Symmetric encryption key derived from ECDH operation via hashing}
-  \item[$E_{K_i}()$]{Symmetric encryption using key $K_i$}
-  \item[$E^{(i)}$]{$i$-th encryption of the private information $(c_s^{(i)}, b_i)$}
-  \item[$\vec{E}$]{Vector of $E^{(i)}$}
+%  \item[$E_{K_i}()$]{Symmetric encryption using key $K_i$}
+%  \item[$E^{(i)}$]{$i$-th encryption of the private information $(c_s^{(i)}, b_i)$}
+%  \item[$\vec{E}$]{Vector of $E^{(i)}$}
   \item[$\cal{R}$]{Tuple of revealed vectors in cut-and-choose protocol,
     where the vectors exclude the selected index $\gamma$}
-  \item[$\overline{K_i}$]{Encryption keys derived by the verifier from DH}
+  \item[$\overline{K_i}$]{Link secrets derived by the verifier from DH}
   \item[$\overline{B^{(i)}}$]{Blinded values derived by the verifier}
   \item[$\overline{T_p^{(i)}}$]{Public transfer keys derived by the verifier from revealed private keys}
   \item[$\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$]{Private keys obtained from decryption by the verifier}