aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/doc/paper
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorChristian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>2016-11-09 16:32:43 +0100
committerChristian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>2016-11-09 16:32:43 +0100
commit779af05be914ed14bb74deb2448c281202cafefb (patch)
tree9b718b360c0e9fbc1e2826a80812ccfeeb41650f /doc/paper
parentd3db993d3ab5095dfc228ce543789ecf196f2311 (diff)
re-add conclusion and discussion parts, misc FIXMEs addressed
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/paper')
-rw-r--r--doc/paper/taler.tex71
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex
index d85f55948..28dd4a670 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex
@@ -231,11 +231,8 @@ major irredeemable problems inherent in their designs:
Bitcoin also lacks anonymity, as all Bitcoin transactions are recorded
for eternity, which can enable identification of users. Anonymous
payment systems based on BitCoin such as CryptoNote~\cite{cryptonote}
-(Monero), Zerocash~\cite{zerocash} (ZCash) and BOLOT~\cite{BOLT}
-% FIXME: exacerbate is very strong, lots of people wouldn't believe
-% this claim, it only exacerbates certain aspects (money laundering)
-% and computational/storage cost.
-exacerbate Bitcoin's design issues. These systems exploit the
+(Monero), Zerocash~\cite{zerocash} (ZCash) and BOLT~\cite{BOLT}
+exacerbate the design issues we mention above. These systems exploit the
blockchain's decentralized nature to escape anti-money laundering
regulation~\cite{molander1998cyberpayments} as they provide anonymous,
disintermediated transactions.
@@ -1148,14 +1145,11 @@ perfectly balanced in between frontend and backend. Nevertheless,
these experimental results show that computing-related business costs
will only marginally contribute to the operational costs of the Taler
payment system.
-% FIXME: Say that storage costs dominated? Are storage costs comparable
-% for a self hosted system? Didn't we reduce the storage costs with the
-% key generation trick?
\section{Discussion}
-% \subsection{Well-known attacks}
+\subsection{Well-known attacks}
Taler's security is largely equivalent to that of Chaum's original
design without online checks or the cut-and-choose revelation of
@@ -1181,7 +1175,7 @@ actually facilitates voluntary cooperation between the exchange and
criminals~\cite{sander1999escrow} and where the state could
deanonymize citizens.
-%\subsection{Offline Payments}
+\subsection{Offline Payments}
Chaum's original proposals for anonymous digital cash avoided the need
for online interactions with the exchange to detect double spending by
@@ -1192,19 +1186,19 @@ may be infeasible in practice. Furthermore, a customer may
accidentally deanonymize himself, for example by double-spending a
coin after restoring from backup.
-%\subsection{Merchant Tax Audits}
-%
-%For a tax audit on the merchant, the exchange includes the business
-%transaction-specific hash in the transfer of the traditional
-%currency. A tax auditor can then request the merchant to reveal
-%(meaningful) details about the business transaction ($\mathcal{D}$,
-%$a$, $p$, $r$), including proof that applicable taxes were paid.
-%
-%If a merchant is not able to provide theses values, he can be
-%subjected to financial penalties by the state in relation to the
-%amount transferred by the traditional currency transfer.
+\subsection{Merchant Tax Audits}
+
+For a tax audit on the merchant, the exchange includes the business
+transaction-specific hash in the transfer of the traditional
+currency. A tax auditor can then request the merchant to reveal
+(meaningful) details about the business transaction ($\mathcal{D}$,
+$a$, $p$, $r$), including proof that applicable taxes were paid.
-% \subsection{Cryptographic proof vs. evidence}
+If a merchant is not able to provide theses values, they can be
+subjected to financial penalties by the state in relation to the
+amount transferred by the traditional currency transfer.
+
+\subsection{Cryptographic proof vs. evidence}
In this paper we have use the term ``proof'' in many places as the
protocol provides cryptographic proofs of which parties behave
@@ -1221,7 +1215,7 @@ the participants have to disclose their core secrets.
%We performed some initial performance measurements for the various
%operations on our exchange implementation. The main conclusion was that
%the computational and bandwidth cost for transactions described in
-%this paper is smaller than $10^{-3}$ cent/transaction, and thus
+%this paper is smaller than $10^{-2}$ cent/transaction, and thus
%dwarfed by the other business costs for the exchange. However, this
%figure excludes the cost of currency transfers using traditional
%banking, which a exchange operator would ultimately have to interact with.
@@ -1229,29 +1223,30 @@ the participants have to disclose their core secrets.
%aggregating multiple transfers to the same merchant.
-%\section{Conclusion}
+\section{Conclusion}
-%We have presented an efficient electronic payment system that
-%simultaneously addresses the conflicting objectives created by the
-%citizen's need for privacy and the state's need for taxation. The
-%coin refreshing protocol makes the design flexible and enables a
-%variety of payment methods. The current balance and profits of the
-%exchange are also easily determined, thus audits can be used to ensure
-%that the exchange operates correctly. The libre implementation and open
-%protocol may finally enable modern society to upgrade to proper
-%electronic wallets with efficient, secure and privacy-preserving
-%transactions.
+We have presented an efficient electronic payment system that
+simultaneously addresses the conflicting objectives created by the
+citizen's need for privacy and the state's need for taxation. The
+coin refreshing protocol makes the design flexible and enables a
+variety of payment methods. The current balance and profits of the
+exchange are also easily determined, thus audits can be used to ensure
+that the exchange operates correctly. The free software
+implementation and open protocol may finally enable modern society to
+upgrade to proper electronic wallets with efficient, secure and
+privacy-preserving transactions.
% commented out for anonymized submission
-%\subsection*{Acknowledgements}
+\subsection*{Acknowledgements}
-%This work was supported by a grant from the Renewable Freedom Foundation.
-% FIXME: ARED?
+We thank people (anonymized).
+%This work benefits from the financial support of the Brittany Region
+%(ARED 9178) and a grant from the Renewable Freedom Foundation.
%We thank Tanja Lange, Dan Bernstein, Luis Ressel and Fabian Kirsch for feedback on an earlier
%version of this paper, Nicolas Fournier for implementing and running
%some performance benchmarks, and Richard Stallman, Hellekin Wolf,
%Jacob Appelbaum for productive discussions and support.
-
+\newpage
\bibliographystyle{alpha}
\bibliography{taler,rfc}