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author | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2015-09-24 12:22:20 +0200 |
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committer | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2015-09-24 12:22:20 +0200 |
commit | 43ff6d447a62b74e17c7370e7d9cfc0f5b2e5b59 (patch) | |
tree | 7e1fbc67f549abec045a61f1646e5e601a9f2fa8 /doc/paper/taler.tex | |
parent | a8816b77702876bf89f0c0c5f98261d1e63da79a (diff) | |
download | exchange-43ff6d447a62b74e17c7370e7d9cfc0f5b2e5b59.tar.xz |
expand security discussion in paper
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/paper/taler.tex')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler.tex | 55 |
1 files changed, 37 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex index 199de85e4..c504e843f 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler.tex +++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -923,6 +923,31 @@ that is unlinkable to the refunded transaction. \section{Discussion} +Taler's security is largely equivalent to that of Chaum's original +design without online checks (and without the cut-and-choose +revelation of double-spending customers for offline spending). We +specifically note that the digital equivalent of the ``Columbian Black +Market Exchange''~\cite{fatf1997} is a theoretical problem for both +Chaum and Taler, as individuals with a strong mutual trust foundation +can simply copy electronic coins and thereby establish a limited form +of black transfers. However, unlike the situation with physical +checks with blank recipients in the Columbian black market, the +transitivity is limited as each participant can deposit the electronic +coins and thereby cheat any other participant, while in the Columbian +black market each participant only needs to trust the issuer of the +check and not also all previous owners of the physical check. + +As with any unconditionally anonymous payment system, the ``Perfect +Crime'' attack~\cite{solms1992perfect} where blackmail is used to +force the mint to issue anonymous coins also continues to apply in +principle. However, as mentioned Taler does faciliate limits on +withdrawals, which we believe is a better trade-off than the +problematic escrow systems where the necessary intransparency +actually facilitates voluntary cooperation between the mint and +criminals~\cite{sander1999escrow} and where state can selectively +deanonymize activists to support the deep state's quest for absolute +security. + \subsection{Offline Payments} Chaum's original proposals for anonymous digital cash avoided the need @@ -952,28 +977,22 @@ currency. A tax auditor can then request the merchant to reveal (meaningful) details about the business transaction ($\mathcal{D}$, $a$, $p$, $r$), including proof that applicable taxes were paid. -If a merchant is not able to provide theses values, he can be punished -in relation to the amount transferred by the traditional currency -transfer. - +If a merchant is not able to provide theses values, he can be +subjected to financial penalties by the state in relation to the +amount transferred by the traditional currency transfer. -\section{Future Work} -%The legal status of the system needs to be investigated in the various -%legal systems of the world. However, given that the system enables -%taxation and is able to impose withdrawal limits and thus is not -%suitable for money laundering, we are optimistic that states will find -%the design desirable. +\subsection{System Performance} We performed some initial performance measurements for the various -operations. The main conclusion was that the computational and -bandwidth cost for transactions described in this paper is smaller -than $10^{-3}$ cent/transaction, and thus dwarfed by the other -business costs for the mint. However, this figure excludes the cost -of currency transfers using traditional banking, which a mint operator -would ultimately have to interact with. Here, mint operators should -be able to reduce their expenses by aggregating multiple transfers to -the same merchant. +operations on our mint implementation. The main conclusion was that +the computational and bandwidth cost for transactions described in +this paper is smaller than $10^{-3}$ cent/transaction, and thus +dwarfed by the other business costs for the mint. However, this +figure excludes the cost of currency transfers using traditional +banking, which a mint operator would ultimately have to interact with. +Here, mint operators should be able to reduce their expenses by +aggregating multiple transfers to the same merchant. \section{Conclusion} |