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| author | Jeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2017-05-18 14:50:06 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2017-05-18 14:50:06 +0200 |
| commit | 2f4953fe75e2cd44b4b28bea6afea5ed8c2d5aa1 (patch) | |
| tree | 4402bc0d2cfb282c49d56dd88f9c23c6507405ea | |
| parent | 4637a1ea6b0386f92901a13fa5844a78fdfc941a (diff) | |
Tweaks to FC2017
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt | 15 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt index 4c0087ff5..de1c64a30 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt +++ b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ only transforms a dirty coin into a fresh coin with the same denomination. The misbehavior will not be detected by the exchange, as the fresh coin is unlinkable to the original coin. -> When refreshing a coin, the old coin is obviously marked as spend. +> When refreshing a coin, the old coin is obviously marked as spent. > This attack is based on a misunderstanding of refreshing. The implementation of Taler in this paper is @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Specific comments: signature? > The "K" here means that the domain of the full domain hash is the -> modulus of the public key K_v of the key pair K. +> modulus of the RSA public key K_v of the key pair K. - Section 4.1, step 4, How can the exchange know that this was indeed a new withdrawal request? If a new blinding factor b is used, then a customer can @@ -175,13 +175,18 @@ Specific comments: the coin (i.e. cannot link with withdrawal) but this is still an anonymity problem. -> Yes, this is why the user has to refresh a partially spend coin -> before reusing it, unless they don't care about their anonymity. +> Yes, this is why the wallet refreshes a partially spend coin before +> reusing it, although a user who did not care about their anonymity +> could change that. - Section 4.3, doesn’t seem very fair to compare with Zcash or at least it should be highlighted that a quite weaker level of anonymity is achieved. -> We added a remark on the high level of anonymity that Zerocash achieves +> We added remarks on the level of anonymity that Zerocash achieves. +> We suspect Zerocash's inherent scaling issues limit its anonymity +> for normal purchases, as compaired to that a large Taler exchange +> provides. We mention that Zerocash is likely to provide better +> anonymtiy for large transactions that do not need to be cashed out. - Section 4.3, step 1, where is the key t_s^(i) selected from? What does S_{C’} denotes? Is that a commitment (as noted in the text) or a signature (as noted |