diff options
author | Jeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2017-05-07 14:04:15 +0200 |
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committer | Jeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2017-05-12 02:18:50 +0200 |
commit | 93edc84e601d2f813572b8f849fa2ccaa2a96fa5 (patch) | |
tree | abfa8b557476df9df6bbfec518d61667f041de9b | |
parent | d8eebc67e6dd823f7522bcd415ed100a398d0e6b (diff) |
Introduction does not know where it's going towards the end, but
maybe that's okay since we do not know wher it is going yet either.
-rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/postquantum.tex | 19 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex index debb56011..9a4f2e9a8 100644 --- a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex +++ b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ First, we describe attaching contemporary post-quantum key exchanges, based on either super-singular eliptic curve isogenies \cite{SIDH} or ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE) \cite{Peikert14,NewHope}. These provide strong post-quantum security so long as the underlying -scheme remains secure; however, these schemes youth leaves them +scheme remains secure; however, these schemes' youth leaves them relatively untested. Second, we propose a hash based scheme whose anonymity garentee needs @@ -144,24 +144,15 @@ the vible security paramater is numerically far smaller than in the key exchange systems, but covers query complexity which we believe suffices. -We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme in -parallel with the -As is the practice with hash based signature schemes - - - - -In this paper, we describe a post-quantum - -It replaces an elliptic curve Diffe-Hellman operation with a unique -hash-based encryption scheme for the proof-of-trust via key knoledge -property that Taler requires to distinguish untaxable operations from -taxable purchases. +We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme to +align the discription of all our schemes. ... \smallskip +%TODO : What is this part for? + We observe that several elliptic curve blind signature schemes provide information theoreticly secure blinding as well, but Schnorr sgnatures require an extra round trip \cite{??}, and |