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authorJeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org>2017-05-07 14:04:15 +0200
committerJeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org>2017-05-12 02:18:50 +0200
commit93edc84e601d2f813572b8f849fa2ccaa2a96fa5 (patch)
treeabfa8b557476df9df6bbfec518d61667f041de9b
parentd8eebc67e6dd823f7522bcd415ed100a398d0e6b (diff)
Introduction does not know where it's going towards the end, but
maybe that's okay since we do not know wher it is going yet either.
-rw-r--r--doc/paper/postquantum.tex19
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
index debb56011..9a4f2e9a8 100644
--- a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ First, we describe attaching contemporary post-quantum key exchanges,
based on either super-singular eliptic curve isogenies \cite{SIDH} or
ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE) \cite{Peikert14,NewHope}.
These provide strong post-quantum security so long as the underlying
-scheme remains secure; however, these schemes youth leaves them
+scheme remains secure; however, these schemes' youth leaves them
relatively untested.
Second, we propose a hash based scheme whose anonymity garentee needs
@@ -144,24 +144,15 @@ the vible security paramater is numerically far smaller than in the
key exchange systems, but covers query complexity which we believe
suffices.
-We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme in
-parallel with the
-As is the practice with hash based signature schemes
-
-
-
-
-In this paper, we describe a post-quantum
-
-It replaces an elliptic curve Diffe-Hellman operation with a unique
-hash-based encryption scheme for the proof-of-trust via key knoledge
-property that Taler requires to distinguish untaxable operations from
-taxable purchases.
+We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme to
+align the discription of all our schemes.
...
\smallskip
+%TODO : What is this part for?
+
We observe that several elliptic curve blind signature schemes provide
information theoreticly secure blinding as well, but
Schnorr sgnatures require an extra round trip \cite{??}, and