diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'system/xen')
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64 (renamed from system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64) | 92 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/domU/domU.sh | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xen.SlackBuild | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xen.info | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch | 165 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch | 113 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch | 62 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch | 60 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch | 255 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch | 96 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch | 159 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch | 171 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch | 55 |
17 files changed, 63 insertions, 1328 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 index 327e2e00c7a4b..20972b1e5c38b 100644 --- a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 +++ b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ kernel-xen.sh: This script builds the Linux Kernel for a Xen Hypervisor. * To make things a bit easier, a copy of Xen EFI binary can be found here: - http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.16.1.efi.gz + http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.17.0.efi.gz !!! Make sure to understand what are you doing at this point, you could easily lose your data. Always create backups !!! diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64 b/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64 index bba5259b1cd5e..f5a8efce82d56 100644 --- a/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64 +++ b/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86 5.15.27 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86 5.15.80 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (GCC) 11.2.0" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ CONFIG_CC_CAN_LINK=y CONFIG_CC_CAN_LINK_STATIC=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT=y +CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_INLINE=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_NO_PROFILE_FN_ATTR=y CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y @@ -348,7 +349,6 @@ CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y CONFIG_X86_X2APIC=y CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE=y # CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set -CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL=y # CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM is not set CONFIG_X86_INTEL_LPSS=y @@ -517,6 +517,14 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_LIVEPATCH=y CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y # end of Processor type and features +CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y +CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y +CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y +CONFIG_RETHUNK=y +CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES=y CONFIG_ARCH_MHP_MEMMAP_ON_MEMORY_ENABLE=y CONFIG_USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID=y @@ -741,6 +749,7 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE=y CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=y CONFIG_HAVE_NMI=y CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT=y +CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK=y CONFIG_HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS=y CONFIG_GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD=y @@ -2470,6 +2479,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK=m CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=y +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=y CONFIG_PARIDE=m @@ -3131,6 +3141,7 @@ CONFIG_ATL1=m CONFIG_ATL1E=m CONFIG_ATL1C=m CONFIG_ALX=m +CONFIG_CX_ECAT=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROADCOM=y CONFIG_B44=m CONFIG_B44_PCI_AUTOSELECT=y @@ -3148,8 +3159,6 @@ CONFIG_BNXT=m CONFIG_BNXT_SRIOV=y CONFIG_BNXT_FLOWER_OFFLOAD=y CONFIG_BNXT_HWMON=y -CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y -CONFIG_BNA=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CADENCE=y CONFIG_MACB=m CONFIG_MACB_USE_HWSTAMP=y @@ -3174,7 +3183,6 @@ CONFIG_CHELSIO_IPSEC_INLINE=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CISCO=y CONFIG_ENIC=m # CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CORTINA is not set -CONFIG_CX_ECAT=m CONFIG_DNET=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_DEC=y CONFIG_NET_TULIP=y @@ -3229,8 +3237,6 @@ CONFIG_I40EVF=m CONFIG_ICE=m CONFIG_FM10K=m CONFIG_IGC=m -CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSOFT=y -CONFIG_MICROSOFT_MANA=m CONFIG_JME=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_LITEX=y CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MARVELL=y @@ -3280,10 +3286,13 @@ CONFIG_KS8851_MLL=m CONFIG_KSZ884X_PCI=m # CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROCHIP is not set # CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSEMI is not set +CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSOFT=y +CONFIG_MICROSOFT_MANA=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MYRI=y CONFIG_MYRI10GE=m CONFIG_MYRI10GE_DCA=y CONFIG_FEALNX=m +# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NI is not set CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NATSEMI=y CONFIG_NATSEMI=m CONFIG_NS83820=m @@ -3296,7 +3305,6 @@ CONFIG_NFP=m CONFIG_NFP_APP_FLOWER=y CONFIG_NFP_APP_ABM_NIC=y # CONFIG_NFP_DEBUG is not set -# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NI is not set CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_8390=y CONFIG_PCMCIA_AXNET=m CONFIG_NE2K_PCI=m @@ -3324,6 +3332,8 @@ CONFIG_QED_RDMA=y CONFIG_QED_ISCSI=y CONFIG_QED_FCOE=y CONFIG_QED_OOO=y +CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y +CONFIG_BNA=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_QUALCOMM=y # CONFIG_QCOM_EMAC is not set # CONFIG_RMNET is not set @@ -3344,6 +3354,11 @@ CONFIG_ROCKER=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SAMSUNG=y CONFIG_SXGBE_ETH=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SEEQ=y +CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SILAN=y +CONFIG_SC92031=m +CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SIS=y +CONFIG_SIS900=m +CONFIG_SIS190=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SOLARFLARE=y CONFIG_SFC=m CONFIG_SFC_MTD=y @@ -3352,11 +3367,6 @@ CONFIG_SFC_SRIOV=y # CONFIG_SFC_MCDI_LOGGING is not set CONFIG_SFC_FALCON=m CONFIG_SFC_FALCON_MTD=y -CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SILAN=y -CONFIG_SC92031=m -CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SIS=y -CONFIG_SIS900=m -CONFIG_SIS190=m CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SMSC=y CONFIG_PCMCIA_SMC91C92=m CONFIG_EPIC100=m @@ -7471,6 +7481,7 @@ CONFIG_TYPEC_TCPCI=m CONFIG_TYPEC_RT1711H=m CONFIG_TYPEC_TCPCI_MAXIM=m CONFIG_TYPEC_FUSB302=m +CONFIG_TYPEC_WCOVE=m CONFIG_TYPEC_UCSI=m CONFIG_UCSI_CCG=m CONFIG_UCSI_ACPI=m @@ -9502,7 +9513,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT=y CONFIG_SECURITY=y CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y -CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set @@ -9648,8 +9658,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_PCLMUL=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_XXHASH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_PCLMUL=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH=y @@ -9741,29 +9750,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM4=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m @@ -9835,6 +9821,31 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM4=m +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=y CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y @@ -9985,6 +9996,8 @@ CONFIG_SYMBOLIC_ERRNAME=y CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=y # end of printk and dmesg options +CONFIG_AS_HAS_NON_CONST_LEB128=y + # # Compile-time checks and compiler options # @@ -10209,7 +10222,6 @@ CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y # # x86 Debugging # -CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK_USB=y CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP=y CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh index bee1bb42a2541..476c1fb77ff37 100644 --- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh +++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ # Written by Chris Abela <chris.abela@maltats.com>, 20100515 # Modified by Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr> -KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.27} -XEN=${XEN:-4.16.1} +KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.80} +XEN=${XEN:-4.17.0} ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4} ROOTFS=${ROOTFS:-ext4} diff --git a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh index 3fc013ae70ddb..e5b052178f7b2 100644 --- a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh +++ b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ set -e -KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.27} +KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.80} # Build an image for the root file system and another for the swap # Default values : 8GB and 500MB resepectively. diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild index 2d326cc732f17..255f490935456 100644 --- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild +++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild @@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PRGNAM=xen -VERSION=${VERSION:-4.16.2} +VERSION=${VERSION:-4.17.0} BUILD=${BUILD:-1} TAG=${TAG:-_SBo} PKGTYPE=${PKGTYPE:-tgz} -SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.14.0} +SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.16.0} OVMF=${OVMF:-20210824_7b4a99be8a} IPXE=${IPXE:-3c040ad387099483102708bb1839110bc788cefb} diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info index 150bd770b565f..ba26860e3a94e 100644 --- a/system/xen/xen.info +++ b/system/xen/xen.info @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ PRGNAM="xen" -VERSION="4.16.2" +VERSION="4.17.0" HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/" DOWNLOAD="UNSUPPORTED" MD5SUM="" -DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.16.2.tar.gz \ +DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.17.0.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-3c040ad387099483102708bb1839110bc788cefb.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \ @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.16.2.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \ - http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.14.0.tar.gz \ + http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.16.0.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20210824_7b4a99be8a.tar.bz2" -MD5SUM_x86_64="6bd720f53e3c34a35cb8a8897a561e18 \ +MD5SUM_x86_64="b215062ff053378eed41e4a3e05081df \ 23ba00d5e2c5b4343d12665af73e1cb5 \ 36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \ debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \ @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ MD5SUM_x86_64="6bd720f53e3c34a35cb8a8897a561e18 \ 7b72caf22b01464ee7d6165f2fd85f44 \ dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8 \ e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8 \ - 9df3b7de6376850d09161137e7a9b61f \ + 1411e7647ef93424fe88fea5d0ef9a82 \ 322d42a3378394b5486acc1564651a4f" REQUIRES="acpica yajl" MAINTAINER="Mario Preksavec" diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8f352ee86d067..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -From 4b4359122a414cc15156e13e3805988b71ff9da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 06:17:25 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] xen/arm: p2m: Prevent adding mapping when domain is dying - -During the domain destroy process, the domain will still be accessible -until it is fully destroyed. So does the P2M because we don't bail -out early if is_dying is non-zero. If a domain has permission to -modify the other domain's P2M (i.e. dom0, or a stubdomain), then -foreign mapping can be added past relinquish_p2m_mapping(). - -Therefore, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the domain -is dying. This commit prevents such adding of mapping by adding the -d->is_dying check to p2m_set_entry(). Also this commit enhances the -check in relinquish_p2m_mapping() to make sure that no mappings can -be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com> -Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com> -Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> ---- - xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 11 +++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -index fb71fa4c1c90..cbeff90f4371 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -@@ -1093,6 +1093,15 @@ int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, - { - int rc = 0; - -+ /* -+ * Any reference taken by the P2M mappings (e.g. foreign mapping) will -+ * be dropped in relinquish_p2m_mapping(). As the P2M will still -+ * be accessible after, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the -+ * domain is dying. -+ */ -+ if ( unlikely(p2m->domain->is_dying) ) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ - while ( nr ) - { - unsigned long mask; -@@ -1610,6 +1619,8 @@ int relinquish_p2m_mapping(struct domain *d) - unsigned int order; - gfn_t start, end; - -+ BUG_ON(!d->is_dying); -+ /* No mappings can be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released. */ - p2m_write_lock(p2m); - - start = p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn; --- -2.37.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7599a475f9a6f..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,165 +0,0 @@ -From 0d5846490348fa09a0d0915d7c795685a016ce10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 06:17:26 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] xen/arm: p2m: Handle preemption when freeing intermediate - page tables - -At the moment the P2M page tables will be freed when the domain structure -is freed without any preemption. As the P2M is quite large, iterating -through this may take more time than it is reasonable without intermediate -preemption (to run softirqs and perhaps scheduler). - -Split p2m_teardown() in two parts: one preemptible and called when -relinquishing the resources, the other one non-preemptible and called -when freeing the domain structure. - -As we are now freeing the P2M pages early, we also need to prevent -further allocation if someone call p2m_set_entry() past p2m_teardown() -(I wasn't able to prove this will never happen). This is done by -the checking domain->is_dying from previous patch in p2m_set_entry(). - -Similarly, we want to make sure that no-one can accessed the free -pages. Therefore the root is cleared before freeing pages. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com> -Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com> -Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> ---- - xen/arch/arm/domain.c | 10 +++++++-- - xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 13 +++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c -index 96e1b235501d..2694c39127c5 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c -@@ -789,10 +789,10 @@ fail: - void arch_domain_destroy(struct domain *d) - { - /* IOMMU page table is shared with P2M, always call -- * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_teardown(). -+ * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_final_teardown(). - */ - iommu_domain_destroy(d); -- p2m_teardown(d); -+ p2m_final_teardown(d); - domain_vgic_free(d); - domain_vuart_free(d); - free_xenheap_page(d->shared_info); -@@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ enum { - PROG_xen, - PROG_page, - PROG_mapping, -+ PROG_p2m, - PROG_done, - }; - -@@ -1056,6 +1057,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d) - if ( ret ) - return ret; - -+ PROGRESS(p2m): -+ ret = p2m_teardown(d); -+ if ( ret ) -+ return ret; -+ - PROGRESS(done): - break; - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -index cbeff90f4371..3bcd1e897e88 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -@@ -1527,17 +1527,58 @@ static void p2m_free_vmid(struct domain *d) - spin_unlock(&vmid_alloc_lock); - } - --void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d) -+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d) - { - struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); -+ unsigned long count = 0; - struct page_info *pg; -+ unsigned int i; -+ int rc = 0; -+ -+ p2m_write_lock(p2m); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are about to free the intermediate page-tables, so clear the -+ * root to prevent any walk to use them. -+ */ -+ for ( i = 0; i < P2M_ROOT_PAGES; i++ ) -+ clear_and_clean_page(p2m->root + i); -+ -+ /* -+ * The domain will not be scheduled anymore, so in theory we should -+ * not need to flush the TLBs. Do it for safety purpose. -+ * -+ * Note that all the devices have already been de-assigned. So we don't -+ * need to flush the IOMMU TLB here. -+ */ -+ p2m_force_tlb_flush_sync(p2m); -+ -+ while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) ) -+ { -+ free_domheap_page(pg); -+ count++; -+ /* Arbitrarily preempt every 512 iterations */ -+ if ( !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() ) -+ { -+ rc = -ERESTART; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ p2m_write_unlock(p2m); -+ -+ return rc; -+} -+ -+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d) -+{ -+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); - - /* p2m not actually initialized */ - if ( !p2m->domain ) - return; - -- while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) ) -- free_domheap_page(pg); -+ ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pages)); - - if ( p2m->root ) - free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER); -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h -index 8f11d9c97b5d..b3ba83283e11 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h -@@ -192,8 +192,17 @@ void setup_virt_paging(void); - /* Init the datastructures for later use by the p2m code */ - int p2m_init(struct domain *d); - --/* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */ --void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d); -+/* -+ * The P2M resources are freed in two parts: -+ * - p2m_teardown() will be called when relinquish the resources. It -+ * will free large resources (e.g. intermediate page-tables) that -+ * requires preemption. -+ * - p2m_final_teardown() will be called when domain struct is been -+ * freed. This *cannot* be preempted and therefore one small -+ * resources should be freed here. -+ */ -+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d); -+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d); - - /* - * Remove mapping refcount on each mapping page in the p2m --- -2.37.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7411d900ea9e6..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,113 +0,0 @@ -From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/p2m: add option to skip root pagetable removal in p2m_teardown() - -Add a new parameter to p2m_teardown() in order to select whether the -root page table should also be freed. Note that all users are -adjusted to pass the parameter to remove the root page tables, so -behavior is not modified. - -No functional change intended. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org> -Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h -@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d); - int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m); - - /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */ --void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m); -+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root); - void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d); - - /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */ ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -541,18 +541,18 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d - } - - for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ ) -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i]); -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true); - } - - /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) { -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i]); -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true); - } - - if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 ) - hap_teardown(d, NULL); - -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d)); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true); - /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */ - paging_lock(d); - hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL); ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c -@@ -749,11 +749,11 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p - * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must - * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them). - */ --void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m) -+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root) - /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen. - * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */ - { -- struct page_info *pg; -+ struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL; - struct domain *d; - - if (p2m == NULL) -@@ -763,10 +763,22 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m - - p2m_lock(p2m); - ASSERT(atomic_read(&d->shr_pages) == 0); -- p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null(); -+ -+ if ( remove_root ) -+ p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null(); -+ else if ( !pagetable_is_null(p2m->phys_table) ) -+ { -+ root_pg = pagetable_get_page(p2m->phys_table); -+ clear_domain_page(pagetable_get_mfn(p2m->phys_table)); -+ } - - while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) ) -- d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg); -+ if ( pg != root_pg ) -+ d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg); -+ -+ if ( root_pg ) -+ page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages); -+ - p2m_unlock(p2m); - } - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32 - paging_unlock(d); - out_unlocked: - if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) ) -- p2m_teardown(p2m); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m, true); - if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL ) - { - pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask; -@@ -2866,7 +2866,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain - shadow_teardown(d, NULL); - - /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */ -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d)); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true); - /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */ - paging_lock(d); - shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL); diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2170b8e1a3277..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: x86/HAP: adjust monitor table related error handling - -hap_make_monitor_table() will return INVALID_MFN if it encounters an -error condition, but hap_update_paging_modes() wasn’t handling this -value, resulting in an inappropriate value being stored in -monitor_table. This would subsequently misguide at least -hap_vcpu_teardown(). Avoid this by bailing early. - -Further, when a domain has/was already crashed or (perhaps less -important as there's no such path known to lead here) is already dying, -avoid calling domain_crash() on it again - that's at best confusing. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ - #include <asm/domain.h> - #include <xen/numa.h> - #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h> -+#include <public/sched.h> - - #include "private.h" - -@@ -405,8 +406,13 @@ static mfn_t hap_make_monitor_table(stru - return m4mfn; - - oom: -- printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "out of memory building monitor pagetable\n"); -- domain_crash(d); -+ if ( !d->is_dying && -+ (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) ) -+ { -+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pd: out of memory building monitor pagetable\n", -+ d); -+ domain_crash(d); -+ } - return INVALID_MFN; - } - -@@ -766,6 +772,9 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(stru - if ( pagetable_is_null(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table) ) - { - mfn_t mmfn = hap_make_monitor_table(v); -+ -+ if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) ) -+ goto unlock; - v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn); - make_cr3(v, mmfn); - hvm_update_host_cr3(v); -@@ -774,6 +783,7 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(stru - /* CR3 is effectively updated by a mode change. Flush ASIDs, etc. */ - hap_update_cr3(v, 0, false); - -+ unlock: - paging_unlock(d); - put_gfn(d, cr3_gfn); - } diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dc626c7f542f3..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: x86/shadow: tolerate failure of sh_set_toplevel_shadow() - -Subsequently sh_set_toplevel_shadow() will be adjusted to install a -blank entry in case prealloc fails. There are, in fact, pre-existing -error paths which would put in place a blank entry. The 4- and 2-level -code in sh_update_cr3(), however, assume the top level entry to be -valid. - -Hence bail from the function in the unlikely event that it's not. Note -that 3-level logic works differently: In particular a guest is free to -supply a PDPTR pointing at 4 non-present (or otherwise deemed invalid) -entries. The guest will crash, but we already cope with that. - -Really mfn_valid() is likely wrong to use in sh_set_toplevel_shadow(), -and it should instead be !mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN). Avoid such a change -in security context, but add a respective assertion. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> -Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -2516,6 +2516,7 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu - /* Now figure out the new contents: is this a valid guest MFN? */ - if ( !mfn_valid(gmfn) ) - { -+ ASSERT(mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN)); - new_entry = pagetable_null(); - goto install_new_entry; - } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -@@ -3312,6 +3312,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc - if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 4, 0) != 0 ) - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); - sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l4_shadow, sh_make_shadow); -+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) ) -+ { -+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down); -+ return; -+ } - if ( !shadow_mode_external(d) && !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) ) - { - mfn_t smfn = pagetable_get_mfn(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0]); -@@ -3370,6 +3375,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc - if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 2, 0) != 0 ) - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); - sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l2_shadow, sh_make_shadow); -+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) ) -+ { -+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down); -+ return; -+ } - #else - #error This should never happen - #endif diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8c89eb32c7a4b..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,255 +0,0 @@ -From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/shadow: tolerate failure in shadow_prealloc() - -Prevent _shadow_prealloc() from calling BUG() when unable to fulfill -the pre-allocation and instead return true/false. Modify -shadow_prealloc() to crash the domain on allocation failure (if the -domain is not already dying), as shadow cannot operate normally after -that. Modify callers to also gracefully handle {_,}shadow_prealloc() -failing to fulfill the request. - -Note this in turn requires adjusting the callers of -sh_make_monitor_table() also to handle it returning INVALID_MFN. -sh_update_paging_modes() is also modified to add additional error -paths in case of allocation failure, some of those will return with -null monitor page tables (and the domain likely crashed). This is no -different that current error paths, but the newly introduced ones are -more likely to trigger. - -The now added failure points in sh_update_paging_modes() also require -that on some error return paths the previous structures are cleared, -and thus monitor table is null. - -While there adjust the 'type' parameter type of shadow_prealloc() to -unsigned int rather than u32. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ - #include <asm/flushtlb.h> - #include <asm/shadow.h> - #include <xen/numa.h> -+#include <public/sched.h> - #include "private.h" - - DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint32_t,trace_shadow_path_flags); -@@ -928,14 +929,15 @@ static inline void trace_shadow_prealloc - - /* Make sure there are at least count order-sized pages - * available in the shadow page pool. */ --static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages) -+static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages) - { - struct vcpu *v; - struct page_info *sp, *t; - mfn_t smfn; - int i; - -- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return; -+ if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) -+ return true; - - /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */ - ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]); -@@ -951,7 +953,8 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma - sh_unpin(d, smfn); - - /* See if that freed up enough space */ -- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return; -+ if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) -+ return true; - } - - /* Stage two: all shadow pages are in use in hierarchies that are -@@ -974,7 +977,7 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma - if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) - { - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); -- return; -+ return true; - } - } - } -@@ -987,7 +990,12 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma - d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages, - d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages, - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages); -- BUG(); -+ -+ ASSERT(d->is_dying); -+ -+ guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); -+ -+ return false; - } - - /* Make sure there are at least count pages of the order according to -@@ -995,9 +1003,19 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma - * This must be called before any calls to shadow_alloc(). Since this - * will free existing shadows to make room, it must be called early enough - * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */ --void shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 type, unsigned int count) -+bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count) - { -- return _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count); -+ bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count); -+ -+ if ( !ret && !d->is_dying && -+ (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) ) -+ /* -+ * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in -+ * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it. -+ */ -+ domain_crash(d); -+ -+ return ret; - } - - /* Deliberately free all the memory we can: this will tear down all of -@@ -1218,7 +1236,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t - static struct page_info * - shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d) - { -- struct page_info *pg; -+ struct page_info *pg = NULL; - - /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the - * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */ -@@ -1236,16 +1254,18 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d) - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages, - shadow_min_acceptable_pages(d)); - } -- paging_unlock(d); -- return NULL; -+ goto out; - } - -- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1); -+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1) ) -+ goto out; -+ - pg = mfn_to_page(shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 0)); - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages++; - d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages--; - ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask)); - -+ out: - paging_unlock(d); - - return pg; -@@ -1336,7 +1356,9 @@ int shadow_set_allocation(struct domain - else if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages > pages ) - { - /* Need to return memory to domheap */ -- _shadow_prealloc(d, 1); -+ if ( !_shadow_prealloc(d, 1) ) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ - sp = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist); - ASSERT(sp); - /* -@@ -2334,12 +2356,13 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc - if ( mfn_eq(v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[0], INVALID_MFN) ) - { - int i; -+ -+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, SHADOW_OOS_PAGES) ) -+ return; -+ - for(i = 0; i < SHADOW_OOS_PAGES; i++) -- { -- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 1); - v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[i] = - shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 0); -- } - } - #endif /* OOS */ - -@@ -2403,6 +2426,9 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc - mfn_t mmfn = sh_make_monitor_table( - v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels); - -+ if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) ) -+ return; -+ - v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn); - make_cr3(v, mmfn); - hvm_update_host_cr3(v); -@@ -2441,6 +2467,12 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc - v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_null(); - new_mfn = sh_make_monitor_table( - v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels); -+ if ( mfn_eq(new_mfn, INVALID_MFN) ) -+ { -+ sh_destroy_monitor_table(v, old_mfn, -+ old_mode->shadow.shadow_levels); -+ return; -+ } - v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(new_mfn); - SHADOW_PRINTK("new monitor table %"PRI_mfn "\n", - mfn_x(new_mfn)); -@@ -2526,7 +2558,12 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu - if ( !mfn_valid(smfn) ) - { - /* Make sure there's enough free shadow memory. */ -- shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1); -+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1) ) -+ { -+ new_entry = pagetable_null(); -+ goto install_new_entry; -+ } -+ - /* Shadow the page. */ - smfn = make_shadow(v, gmfn, root_type); - } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c -@@ -700,7 +700,9 @@ mfn_t sh_make_monitor_table(const struct - ASSERT(!pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table)); - - /* Guarantee we can get the memory we need */ -- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS); -+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS) ) -+ return INVALID_MFN; -+ - m4mfn = shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, 0); - mfn_to_page(m4mfn)->shadow_flags = 4; - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -@@ -2440,9 +2440,14 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, - * Preallocate shadow pages *before* removing writable accesses - * otherwhise an OOS L1 might be demoted and promoted again with - * writable mappings. */ -- shadow_prealloc(d, -- SH_type_l1_shadow, -- GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4 ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1); -+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_l1_shadow, -+ GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4 -+ ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1) ) -+ { -+ paging_unlock(d); -+ put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn)); -+ return 0; -+ } - - rc = gw_remove_write_accesses(v, va, &gw); - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h -@@ -383,7 +383,8 @@ void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mf - void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type); - - /* Shadow page allocation functions */ --void shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 shadow_type, unsigned int count); -+bool __must_check shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int shadow_type, -+ unsigned int count); - mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d, - u32 shadow_type, - unsigned long backpointer); diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9eea91c42df73..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/p2m: refuse new allocations for dying domains - -This will in particular prevent any attempts to add entries to the p2m, -once - in a subsequent change - non-root entries have been removed. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc(struc - - ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d)); - -+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) -+ return NULL; -+ - pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.hap.freelist); - if ( unlikely(!pg) ) - return NULL; -@@ -281,7 +284,7 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_p - d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages++; - ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask)); - } -- else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed ) -+ else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed && !d->is_dying ) - { - d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed = 1; - dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "d%i failed to allocate from HAP pool\n", ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo - if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) - return true; - -+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) -+ /* No reclaim when the domain is dying, teardown will take care of it. */ -+ return false; -+ - /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */ - ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]); - -@@ -991,7 +995,7 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo - d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages, - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages); - -- ASSERT(d->is_dying); -+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); - - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); - -@@ -1005,10 +1009,13 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo - * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */ - bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count) - { -- bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count); -+ bool ret; -+ -+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) -+ return false; - -- if ( !ret && !d->is_dying && -- (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) ) -+ ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count); -+ if ( !ret && (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) ) - /* - * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in - * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it. -@@ -1238,6 +1245,9 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d) - { - struct page_info *pg = NULL; - -+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) -+ return NULL; -+ - /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the - * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */ - paging_lock_recursive(d); diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 92cdb4942b6a7..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/p2m: truly free paging pool memory for dying domains - -Modify {hap,shadow}_free to free the page immediately if the domain is -dying, so that pages don't accumulate in the pool when -{shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called. This is to limit the amount of -work which needs to be done there (in a non-preemptable manner). - -Note the call to shadow_free() in shadow_free_p2m_page() is moved after -increasing total_pages, so that the decrease done in shadow_free() in -case the domain is dying doesn't underflow the counter, even if just for -a short interval. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -265,6 +265,18 @@ static void hap_free(struct domain *d, m - - ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d)); - -+ /* -+ * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less work is -+ * left to hap_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have preemption checks -+ * added. -+ */ -+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) -+ { -+ free_domheap_page(pg); -+ d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages--; -+ return; -+ } -+ - d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages++; - page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.hap.freelist); - } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d, - void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn) - { - struct page_info *next = NULL, *sp = mfn_to_page(smfn); -+ bool dying = ACCESS_ONCE(d->is_dying); - struct page_list_head *pin_list; - unsigned int pages; - u32 shadow_type; -@@ -1229,11 +1230,32 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t - * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */ - page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp); - perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count); -- page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist); -+ -+ /* -+ * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less -+ * work is left to shadow_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have -+ * preemption checks added. -+ */ -+ if ( unlikely(dying) ) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The backpointer field (sh.back) used by shadow code aliases the -+ * domain owner field, unconditionally clear it here to avoid -+ * free_domheap_page() attempting to parse it. -+ */ -+ page_set_owner(sp, NULL); -+ free_domheap_page(sp); -+ } -+ else -+ page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist); -+ - sp = next; - } - -- d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages; -+ if ( unlikely(dying) ) -+ d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages -= pages; -+ else -+ d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages; - } - - /* Divert a page from the pool to be used by the p2m mapping. -@@ -1303,9 +1325,9 @@ shadow_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, s - * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */ - paging_lock_recursive(d); - -- shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg)); - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages--; - d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages++; -+ shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg)); - - paging_unlock(d); - } diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 60259e1c09917..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,159 +0,0 @@ -From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/p2m: free the paging memory pool preemptively - -The paging memory pool is currently freed in two different places: -from {shadow,hap}_teardown() via domain_relinquish_resources() and -from {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() via complete_domain_destroy(). -While the former does handle preemption, the later doesn't. - -Attempt to move as much p2m related freeing as possible to happen -before the call to {shadow,hap}_teardown(), so that most memory can be -freed in a preemptive way. In order to avoid causing issues to -existing callers leave the root p2m page tables set and free them in -{hap,shadow}_final_teardown(). Also modify {hap,shadow}_free to free -the page immediately if the domain is dying, so that pages don't -accumulate in the pool when {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called. - -Move altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() to be done in hap_teardown(), as that's -the place where altp2m_active gets disabled now. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c -@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ - #include <xen/livepatch.h> - #include <public/sysctl.h> - #include <public/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h> --#include <asm/altp2m.h> - #include <asm/regs.h> - #include <asm/mc146818rtc.h> - #include <asm/system.h> -@@ -2381,12 +2380,6 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d - vpmu_destroy(v); - } - -- if ( altp2m_active(d) ) -- { -- for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) -- altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v); -- } -- - if ( is_pv_domain(d) ) - { - for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - #include <xen/domain_page.h> - #include <xen/guest_access.h> - #include <xen/keyhandler.h> -+#include <asm/altp2m.h> - #include <asm/event.h> - #include <asm/page.h> - #include <asm/current.h> -@@ -546,24 +547,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d - unsigned int i; - - if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() ) -- { -- d->arch.altp2m_active = 0; -- -- if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp ) -- { -- free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_eptp); -- d->arch.altp2m_eptp = NULL; -- } -- -- if ( d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp ) -- { -- free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp); -- d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp = NULL; -- } -- - for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ ) - p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true); -- } - - /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) { -@@ -578,6 +563,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d - paging_lock(d); - hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL); - ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages == 0); -+ ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages == 0); -+ ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages == 0); - paging_unlock(d); - } - -@@ -603,6 +590,7 @@ void hap_vcpu_teardown(struct vcpu *v) - void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted) - { - struct vcpu *v; -+ unsigned int i; - - ASSERT(d->is_dying); - ASSERT(d != current->domain); -@@ -611,6 +599,28 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool - for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) - hap_vcpu_teardown(v); - -+ /* Leave the root pt in case we get further attempts to modify the p2m. */ -+ if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() ) -+ { -+ if ( altp2m_active(d) ) -+ for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) -+ altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v); -+ -+ d->arch.altp2m_active = 0; -+ -+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_eptp); -+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp); -+ -+ for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ ) -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false); -+ } -+ -+ /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */ -+ for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ ) -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false); -+ -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false); -+ - paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */ - - if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 ) ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -2824,8 +2824,17 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, b - for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) - shadow_vcpu_teardown(v); - -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false); -+ - paging_lock(d); - -+ /* -+ * Reclaim all shadow memory so that shadow_set_allocation() doesn't find -+ * in-use pages, as _shadow_prealloc() will no longer try to reclaim pages -+ * because the domain is dying. -+ */ -+ shadow_blow_tables(d); -+ - #if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & (SHOPT_VIRTUAL_TLB|SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)) - /* Free the virtual-TLB array attached to each vcpu */ - for_each_vcpu(d, v) -@@ -2946,6 +2955,9 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain - d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages, - d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages, - d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages); -+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages); -+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages); -+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages); - paging_unlock(d); - } - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 258b7fff31945..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,171 +0,0 @@ -From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Subject: xen/x86: p2m: Add preemption in p2m_teardown() - -The list p2m->pages contain all the pages used by the P2M. On large -instance this can be quite large and the time spent to call -d->arch.paging.free_page() will take more than 1ms for a 80GB guest -on a Xen running in nested environment on a c5.metal. - -By extrapolation, it would take > 100ms for a 8TB guest (what we -current security support). So add some preemption in p2m_teardown() -and propagate to the callers. Note there are 3 places where -the preemption is not enabled: - - hap_final_teardown()/shadow_final_teardown(): We are - preventing update the P2M once the domain is dying (so - no more pages could be allocated) and most of the P2M pages - will be freed in preemptive manneer when relinquishing the - resources. So this is fine to disable preemption. - - shadow_enable(): This is fine because it will undo the allocation - that may have been made by p2m_alloc_table() (so only the root - page table). - -The preemption is arbitrarily checked every 1024 iterations. - -Note that with the current approach, Xen doesn't keep track on whether -the alt/nested P2Ms have been cleared. So there are some redundant work. -However, this is not expected to incurr too much overhead (the P2M lock -shouldn't be contended during teardown). So this is optimization is -left outside of the security event. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> - ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h -@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d); - int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m); - - /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */ --void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root); -+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted); - void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d); - - /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */ ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -548,17 +548,17 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d - - if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() ) - for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ ) -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true); -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true, NULL); - - /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) { -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true); -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true, NULL); - } - - if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 ) - hap_teardown(d, NULL); - -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL); - /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */ - paging_lock(d); - hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL); -@@ -612,14 +612,24 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool - FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp); - - for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ ) -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false); -+ { -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false, preempted); -+ if ( preempted && *preempted ) -+ return; -+ } - } - - /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */ - for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ ) -- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false); -+ { -+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false, preempted); -+ if ( preempted && *preempted ) -+ return; -+ } - -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted); -+ if ( preempted && *preempted ) -+ return; - - paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */ - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c -@@ -749,12 +749,13 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p - * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must - * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them). - */ --void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root) -+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted) - /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen. - * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */ - { - struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL; - struct domain *d; -+ unsigned int i = 0; - - if (p2m == NULL) - return; -@@ -773,8 +774,19 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m - } - - while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) ) -- if ( pg != root_pg ) -- d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg); -+ { -+ if ( pg == root_pg ) -+ continue; -+ -+ d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg); -+ -+ /* Arbitrarily check preemption every 1024 iterations */ -+ if ( preempted && !(++i % 1024) && general_preempt_check() ) -+ { -+ *preempted = true; -+ break; -+ } -+ } - - if ( root_pg ) - page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages); ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -2770,8 +2770,12 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32 - out_locked: - paging_unlock(d); - out_unlocked: -+ /* -+ * This is fine to ignore the preemption here because only the root -+ * will be allocated by p2m_alloc_table(). -+ */ - if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) ) -- p2m_teardown(p2m, true); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m, true, NULL); - if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL ) - { - pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask; -@@ -2824,7 +2828,9 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, b - for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) - shadow_vcpu_teardown(v); - -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted); -+ if ( preempted && *preempted ) -+ return; - - paging_lock(d); - -@@ -2945,7 +2951,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain - shadow_teardown(d, NULL); - - /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */ -- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true); -+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL); - /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */ - paging_lock(d); - shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL); diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 50dcae4a81847..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: gnttab: correct locking on transitive grant copy error path - -While the comment next to the lock dropping in preparation of -recursively calling acquire_grant_for_copy() mistakenly talks about the -rd == td case (excluded a few lines further up), the same concerns apply -to the calling of release_grant_for_copy() on a subsequent error path. - -This is CVE-2022-33748 / XSA-411. - -Fixes: ad48fb963dbf ("gnttab: fix transitive grant handling") -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> ---- -v2: Extend code comment. - ---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c -+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c -@@ -2622,9 +2622,8 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy( - trans_domid); - - /* -- * acquire_grant_for_copy() could take the lock on the -- * remote table (if rd == td), so we have to drop the lock -- * here and reacquire. -+ * acquire_grant_for_copy() will take the lock on the remote table, -+ * so we have to drop the lock here and reacquire. - */ - active_entry_release(act); - grant_read_unlock(rgt); -@@ -2661,11 +2660,25 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy( - act->trans_gref != trans_gref || - !act->is_sub_page)) ) - { -+ /* -+ * Like above for acquire_grant_for_copy() we need to drop and then -+ * re-acquire the locks here to prevent lock order inversion issues. -+ * Unlike for acquire_grant_for_copy() we don't need to re-check -+ * anything, as release_grant_for_copy() doesn't depend on the grant -+ * table entry: It only updates internal state and the status flags. -+ */ -+ active_entry_release(act); -+ grant_read_unlock(rgt); -+ - release_grant_for_copy(td, trans_gref, readonly); - rcu_unlock_domain(td); -+ -+ grant_read_lock(rgt); -+ act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, gref); - reduce_status_for_pin(rd, act, status, readonly); - active_entry_release(act); - grant_read_unlock(rgt); -+ - put_page(*page); - *page = NULL; - return ERESTART; |