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-rw-r--r--system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch79
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f71fa19130c1..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest
-
-... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to
-failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing
-exactly the canonicalization being added here.)
-
-Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite
-a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all
-branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting
-from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only
-way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the
-injection.
-
-Note further that there are a two early returns from
-vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to
-domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can
-neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP,
-so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic.
-
-This is XSA-170.
-
-Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -2968,7 +2968,7 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
- void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- unsigned long exit_qualification, exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0;
-- unsigned int vector = 0;
-+ unsigned int vector = 0, mode;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
-
- __vmread(GUEST_RIP, &regs->rip);
-@@ -3566,6 +3566,41 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
- out:
- if ( nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) )
- nvmx_idtv_handling();
-+
-+ /*
-+ * VM entry will fail (causing the guest to get crashed) if rIP (and
-+ * rFLAGS, but we don't have an issue there) doesn't meet certain
-+ * criteria. As we must not allow less than fully privileged mode to have
-+ * such an effect on the domain, we correct rIP in that case (accepting
-+ * this not being architecturally correct behavior, as the injected #GP
-+ * fault will then not see the correct [invalid] return address).
-+ * And since we know the guest will crash, we crash it right away if it
-+ * already is in most privileged mode.
-+ */
-+ mode = vmx_guest_x86_mode(v);
-+ if ( mode == 8 ? !is_canonical_address(regs->rip)
-+ : regs->rip != regs->_eip )
-+ {
-+ struct segment_register ss;
-+
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad rIP %lx for mode %u\n", regs->rip, mode);
-+
-+ vmx_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &ss);
-+ if ( ss.attr.fields.dpl )
-+ {
-+ __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, &intr_info);
-+ if ( !(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
-+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
-+ /* Need to fix rIP nevertheless. */
-+ if ( mode == 8 )
-+ regs->rip = (long)(regs->rip << (64 - VADDR_BITS)) >>
-+ (64 - VADDR_BITS);
-+ else
-+ regs->rip = regs->_eip;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ domain_crash(v->domain);
-+ }
- }
-
- void vmx_vmenter_helper(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)