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-rw-r--r--system/xen/dom0/README.dom02
-rw-r--r--system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64 (renamed from system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64)92
-rw-r--r--system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh4
-rw-r--r--system/xen/domU/domU.sh2
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xen.SlackBuild4
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xen.info10
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch59
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch165
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch113
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch62
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch60
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch255
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch82
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch96
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch159
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch171
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch55
17 files changed, 63 insertions, 1328 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
index 327e2e00c7a4..20972b1e5c38 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ kernel-xen.sh: This script builds the Linux Kernel for a Xen Hypervisor.
* To make things a bit easier, a copy of Xen EFI binary can be found here:
- http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.16.1.efi.gz
+ http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.17.0.efi.gz
!!! Make sure to understand what are you doing at this point, you could
easily lose your data. Always create backups !!!
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64 b/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64
index bba5259b1cd5..f5a8efce82d5 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.27-xen.x86_64
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/config-5.15.80-xen.x86_64
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#
# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 5.15.27 Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 5.15.80 Kernel Configuration
#
CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (GCC) 11.2.0"
CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ CONFIG_CC_CAN_LINK=y
CONFIG_CC_CAN_LINK_STATIC=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT=y
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_INLINE=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_NO_PROFILE_FN_ATTR=y
CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y
@@ -348,7 +349,6 @@ CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y
CONFIG_X86_X2APIC=y
CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE=y
# CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set
-CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL=y
# CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM is not set
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_LPSS=y
@@ -517,6 +517,14 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_LIVEPATCH=y
CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y
# end of Processor type and features
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y
+CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
+CONFIG_RETHUNK=y
+CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY=y
+CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY=y
+CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MHP_MEMMAP_ON_MEMORY_ENABLE=y
CONFIG_USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID=y
@@ -741,6 +749,7 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=y
CONFIG_HAVE_NMI=y
CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD=y
@@ -2470,6 +2479,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=y
+# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set
CONFIG_CDROM=y
CONFIG_PARIDE=m
@@ -3131,6 +3141,7 @@ CONFIG_ATL1=m
CONFIG_ATL1E=m
CONFIG_ATL1C=m
CONFIG_ALX=m
+CONFIG_CX_ECAT=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROADCOM=y
CONFIG_B44=m
CONFIG_B44_PCI_AUTOSELECT=y
@@ -3148,8 +3159,6 @@ CONFIG_BNXT=m
CONFIG_BNXT_SRIOV=y
CONFIG_BNXT_FLOWER_OFFLOAD=y
CONFIG_BNXT_HWMON=y
-CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y
-CONFIG_BNA=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CADENCE=y
CONFIG_MACB=m
CONFIG_MACB_USE_HWSTAMP=y
@@ -3174,7 +3183,6 @@ CONFIG_CHELSIO_IPSEC_INLINE=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CISCO=y
CONFIG_ENIC=m
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CORTINA is not set
-CONFIG_CX_ECAT=m
CONFIG_DNET=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_DEC=y
CONFIG_NET_TULIP=y
@@ -3229,8 +3237,6 @@ CONFIG_I40EVF=m
CONFIG_ICE=m
CONFIG_FM10K=m
CONFIG_IGC=m
-CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSOFT=y
-CONFIG_MICROSOFT_MANA=m
CONFIG_JME=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_LITEX=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MARVELL=y
@@ -3280,10 +3286,13 @@ CONFIG_KS8851_MLL=m
CONFIG_KSZ884X_PCI=m
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROCHIP is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSEMI is not set
+CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROSOFT=y
+CONFIG_MICROSOFT_MANA=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MYRI=y
CONFIG_MYRI10GE=m
CONFIG_MYRI10GE_DCA=y
CONFIG_FEALNX=m
+# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NI is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NATSEMI=y
CONFIG_NATSEMI=m
CONFIG_NS83820=m
@@ -3296,7 +3305,6 @@ CONFIG_NFP=m
CONFIG_NFP_APP_FLOWER=y
CONFIG_NFP_APP_ABM_NIC=y
# CONFIG_NFP_DEBUG is not set
-# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NI is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_8390=y
CONFIG_PCMCIA_AXNET=m
CONFIG_NE2K_PCI=m
@@ -3324,6 +3332,8 @@ CONFIG_QED_RDMA=y
CONFIG_QED_ISCSI=y
CONFIG_QED_FCOE=y
CONFIG_QED_OOO=y
+CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y
+CONFIG_BNA=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_QUALCOMM=y
# CONFIG_QCOM_EMAC is not set
# CONFIG_RMNET is not set
@@ -3344,6 +3354,11 @@ CONFIG_ROCKER=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SAMSUNG=y
CONFIG_SXGBE_ETH=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SEEQ=y
+CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SILAN=y
+CONFIG_SC92031=m
+CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SIS=y
+CONFIG_SIS900=m
+CONFIG_SIS190=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SOLARFLARE=y
CONFIG_SFC=m
CONFIG_SFC_MTD=y
@@ -3352,11 +3367,6 @@ CONFIG_SFC_SRIOV=y
# CONFIG_SFC_MCDI_LOGGING is not set
CONFIG_SFC_FALCON=m
CONFIG_SFC_FALCON_MTD=y
-CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SILAN=y
-CONFIG_SC92031=m
-CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SIS=y
-CONFIG_SIS900=m
-CONFIG_SIS190=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SMSC=y
CONFIG_PCMCIA_SMC91C92=m
CONFIG_EPIC100=m
@@ -7471,6 +7481,7 @@ CONFIG_TYPEC_TCPCI=m
CONFIG_TYPEC_RT1711H=m
CONFIG_TYPEC_TCPCI_MAXIM=m
CONFIG_TYPEC_FUSB302=m
+CONFIG_TYPEC_WCOVE=m
CONFIG_TYPEC_UCSI=m
CONFIG_UCSI_CCG=m
CONFIG_UCSI_ACPI=m
@@ -9502,7 +9513,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT=y
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
-CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
# CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set
@@ -9648,8 +9658,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_PCLMUL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_XXHASH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B=y
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_PCLMUL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH=y
@@ -9741,29 +9750,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y
-
-#
-# Crypto library routines
-#
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=y
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=y
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM4=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m
@@ -9835,6 +9821,31 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y
+
+#
+# Crypto library routines
+#
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM4=m
+# end of Crypto library routines
+
+CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
@@ -9985,6 +9996,8 @@ CONFIG_SYMBOLIC_ERRNAME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=y
# end of printk and dmesg options
+CONFIG_AS_HAS_NON_CONST_LEB128=y
+
#
# Compile-time checks and compiler options
#
@@ -10209,7 +10222,6 @@ CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
#
# x86 Debugging
#
-CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK_USB=y
CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP=y
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
index bee1bb42a254..476c1fb77ff3 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
# Written by Chris Abela <chris.abela@maltats.com>, 20100515
# Modified by Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
-KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.27}
-XEN=${XEN:-4.16.1}
+KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.80}
+XEN=${XEN:-4.17.0}
ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4}
ROOTFS=${ROOTFS:-ext4}
diff --git a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
index 3fc013ae70dd..e5b052178f7b 100644
--- a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
+++ b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
set -e
-KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.27}
+KERNEL=${KERNEL:-5.15.80}
# Build an image for the root file system and another for the swap
# Default values : 8GB and 500MB resepectively.
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
index 2d326cc732f1..255f49093545 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
+++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@
cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
PRGNAM=xen
-VERSION=${VERSION:-4.16.2}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-4.17.0}
BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
PKGTYPE=${PKGTYPE:-tgz}
-SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.14.0}
+SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.16.0}
OVMF=${OVMF:-20210824_7b4a99be8a}
IPXE=${IPXE:-3c040ad387099483102708bb1839110bc788cefb}
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info
index 150bd770b565..ba26860e3a94 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.info
+++ b/system/xen/xen.info
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
PRGNAM="xen"
-VERSION="4.16.2"
+VERSION="4.17.0"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/"
DOWNLOAD="UNSUPPORTED"
MD5SUM=""
-DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.16.2.tar.gz \
+DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.17.0.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-3c040ad387099483102708bb1839110bc788cefb.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ DOWNLOAD_x86_64="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.16.2.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \
- http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.14.0.tar.gz \
+ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.16.0.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20210824_7b4a99be8a.tar.bz2"
-MD5SUM_x86_64="6bd720f53e3c34a35cb8a8897a561e18 \
+MD5SUM_x86_64="b215062ff053378eed41e4a3e05081df \
23ba00d5e2c5b4343d12665af73e1cb5 \
36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \
debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ MD5SUM_x86_64="6bd720f53e3c34a35cb8a8897a561e18 \
7b72caf22b01464ee7d6165f2fd85f44 \
dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8 \
e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8 \
- 9df3b7de6376850d09161137e7a9b61f \
+ 1411e7647ef93424fe88fea5d0ef9a82 \
322d42a3378394b5486acc1564651a4f"
REQUIRES="acpica yajl"
MAINTAINER="Mario Preksavec"
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8f352ee86d06..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-01.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 4b4359122a414cc15156e13e3805988b71ff9da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 06:17:25 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] xen/arm: p2m: Prevent adding mapping when domain is dying
-
-During the domain destroy process, the domain will still be accessible
-until it is fully destroyed. So does the P2M because we don't bail
-out early if is_dying is non-zero. If a domain has permission to
-modify the other domain's P2M (i.e. dom0, or a stubdomain), then
-foreign mapping can be added past relinquish_p2m_mapping().
-
-Therefore, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the domain
-is dying. This commit prevents such adding of mapping by adding the
-d->is_dying check to p2m_set_entry(). Also this commit enhances the
-check in relinquish_p2m_mapping() to make sure that no mappings can
-be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index fb71fa4c1c90..cbeff90f4371 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1093,6 +1093,15 @@ int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
- {
- int rc = 0;
-
-+ /*
-+ * Any reference taken by the P2M mappings (e.g. foreign mapping) will
-+ * be dropped in relinquish_p2m_mapping(). As the P2M will still
-+ * be accessible after, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the
-+ * domain is dying.
-+ */
-+ if ( unlikely(p2m->domain->is_dying) )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
- while ( nr )
- {
- unsigned long mask;
-@@ -1610,6 +1619,8 @@ int relinquish_p2m_mapping(struct domain *d)
- unsigned int order;
- gfn_t start, end;
-
-+ BUG_ON(!d->is_dying);
-+ /* No mappings can be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released. */
- p2m_write_lock(p2m);
-
- start = p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn;
---
-2.37.1
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7599a475f9a6..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-02.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-From 0d5846490348fa09a0d0915d7c795685a016ce10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 06:17:26 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] xen/arm: p2m: Handle preemption when freeing intermediate
- page tables
-
-At the moment the P2M page tables will be freed when the domain structure
-is freed without any preemption. As the P2M is quite large, iterating
-through this may take more time than it is reasonable without intermediate
-preemption (to run softirqs and perhaps scheduler).
-
-Split p2m_teardown() in two parts: one preemptible and called when
-relinquishing the resources, the other one non-preemptible and called
-when freeing the domain structure.
-
-As we are now freeing the P2M pages early, we also need to prevent
-further allocation if someone call p2m_set_entry() past p2m_teardown()
-(I wasn't able to prove this will never happen). This is done by
-the checking domain->is_dying from previous patch in p2m_set_entry().
-
-Similarly, we want to make sure that no-one can accessed the free
-pages. Therefore the root is cleared before freeing pages.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/domain.c | 10 +++++++--
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 13 +++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index 96e1b235501d..2694c39127c5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -789,10 +789,10 @@ fail:
- void arch_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
- {
- /* IOMMU page table is shared with P2M, always call
-- * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_teardown().
-+ * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_final_teardown().
- */
- iommu_domain_destroy(d);
-- p2m_teardown(d);
-+ p2m_final_teardown(d);
- domain_vgic_free(d);
- domain_vuart_free(d);
- free_xenheap_page(d->shared_info);
-@@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ enum {
- PROG_xen,
- PROG_page,
- PROG_mapping,
-+ PROG_p2m,
- PROG_done,
- };
-
-@@ -1056,6 +1057,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
- if ( ret )
- return ret;
-
-+ PROGRESS(p2m):
-+ ret = p2m_teardown(d);
-+ if ( ret )
-+ return ret;
-+
- PROGRESS(done):
- break;
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index cbeff90f4371..3bcd1e897e88 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1527,17 +1527,58 @@ static void p2m_free_vmid(struct domain *d)
- spin_unlock(&vmid_alloc_lock);
- }
-
--void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
- {
- struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-+ unsigned long count = 0;
- struct page_info *pg;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ int rc = 0;
-+
-+ p2m_write_lock(p2m);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are about to free the intermediate page-tables, so clear the
-+ * root to prevent any walk to use them.
-+ */
-+ for ( i = 0; i < P2M_ROOT_PAGES; i++ )
-+ clear_and_clean_page(p2m->root + i);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The domain will not be scheduled anymore, so in theory we should
-+ * not need to flush the TLBs. Do it for safety purpose.
-+ *
-+ * Note that all the devices have already been de-assigned. So we don't
-+ * need to flush the IOMMU TLB here.
-+ */
-+ p2m_force_tlb_flush_sync(p2m);
-+
-+ while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-+ {
-+ free_domheap_page(pg);
-+ count++;
-+ /* Arbitrarily preempt every 512 iterations */
-+ if ( !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-+ {
-+ rc = -ERESTART;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ p2m_write_unlock(p2m);
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-
- /* p2m not actually initialized */
- if ( !p2m->domain )
- return;
-
-- while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-- free_domheap_page(pg);
-+ ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pages));
-
- if ( p2m->root )
- free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 8f11d9c97b5d..b3ba83283e11 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -192,8 +192,17 @@ void setup_virt_paging(void);
- /* Init the datastructures for later use by the p2m code */
- int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
-
--/* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d);
-+/*
-+ * The P2M resources are freed in two parts:
-+ * - p2m_teardown() will be called when relinquish the resources. It
-+ * will free large resources (e.g. intermediate page-tables) that
-+ * requires preemption.
-+ * - p2m_final_teardown() will be called when domain struct is been
-+ * freed. This *cannot* be preempted and therefore one small
-+ * resources should be freed here.
-+ */
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d);
-+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
-
- /*
- * Remove mapping refcount on each mapping page in the p2m
---
-2.37.1
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7411d900ea9e..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-03.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/p2m: add option to skip root pagetable removal in p2m_teardown()
-
-Add a new parameter to p2m_teardown() in order to select whether the
-root page table should also be freed. Note that all users are
-adjusted to pass the parameter to remove the root page tables, so
-behavior is not modified.
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
-
- /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root);
- void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
-
- /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -541,18 +541,18 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d
- }
-
- for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i]);
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
- }
-
- /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i]);
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true);
- }
-
- if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
- hap_teardown(d, NULL);
-
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d));
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
- /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */
- paging_lock(d);
- hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -749,11 +749,11 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p
- * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must
- * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them).
- */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root)
- /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen.
- * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */
- {
-- struct page_info *pg;
-+ struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL;
- struct domain *d;
-
- if (p2m == NULL)
-@@ -763,10 +763,22 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m
-
- p2m_lock(p2m);
- ASSERT(atomic_read(&d->shr_pages) == 0);
-- p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null();
-+
-+ if ( remove_root )
-+ p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null();
-+ else if ( !pagetable_is_null(p2m->phys_table) )
-+ {
-+ root_pg = pagetable_get_page(p2m->phys_table);
-+ clear_domain_page(pagetable_get_mfn(p2m->phys_table));
-+ }
-
- while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-- d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+ if ( pg != root_pg )
-+ d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+
-+ if ( root_pg )
-+ page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages);
-+
- p2m_unlock(p2m);
- }
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32
- paging_unlock(d);
- out_unlocked:
- if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) )
-- p2m_teardown(p2m);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m, true);
- if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL )
- {
- pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-@@ -2866,7 +2866,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain
- shadow_teardown(d, NULL);
-
- /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d));
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
- /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */
- paging_lock(d);
- shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2170b8e1a327..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-04.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HAP: adjust monitor table related error handling
-
-hap_make_monitor_table() will return INVALID_MFN if it encounters an
-error condition, but hap_update_paging_modes() wasn’t handling this
-value, resulting in an inappropriate value being stored in
-monitor_table. This would subsequently misguide at least
-hap_vcpu_teardown(). Avoid this by bailing early.
-
-Further, when a domain has/was already crashed or (perhaps less
-important as there's no such path known to lead here) is already dying,
-avoid calling domain_crash() on it again - that's at best confusing.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include <asm/domain.h>
- #include <xen/numa.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
-+#include <public/sched.h>
-
- #include "private.h"
-
-@@ -405,8 +406,13 @@ static mfn_t hap_make_monitor_table(stru
- return m4mfn;
-
- oom:
-- printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "out of memory building monitor pagetable\n");
-- domain_crash(d);
-+ if ( !d->is_dying &&
-+ (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+ {
-+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pd: out of memory building monitor pagetable\n",
-+ d);
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ }
- return INVALID_MFN;
- }
-
-@@ -766,6 +772,9 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(stru
- if ( pagetable_is_null(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table) )
- {
- mfn_t mmfn = hap_make_monitor_table(v);
-+
-+ if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+ goto unlock;
- v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn);
- make_cr3(v, mmfn);
- hvm_update_host_cr3(v);
-@@ -774,6 +783,7 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(stru
- /* CR3 is effectively updated by a mode change. Flush ASIDs, etc. */
- hap_update_cr3(v, 0, false);
-
-+ unlock:
- paging_unlock(d);
- put_gfn(d, cr3_gfn);
- }
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dc626c7f542f..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: tolerate failure of sh_set_toplevel_shadow()
-
-Subsequently sh_set_toplevel_shadow() will be adjusted to install a
-blank entry in case prealloc fails. There are, in fact, pre-existing
-error paths which would put in place a blank entry. The 4- and 2-level
-code in sh_update_cr3(), however, assume the top level entry to be
-valid.
-
-Hence bail from the function in the unlikely event that it's not. Note
-that 3-level logic works differently: In particular a guest is free to
-supply a PDPTR pointing at 4 non-present (or otherwise deemed invalid)
-entries. The guest will crash, but we already cope with that.
-
-Really mfn_valid() is likely wrong to use in sh_set_toplevel_shadow(),
-and it should instead be !mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN). Avoid such a change
-in security context, but add a respective assertion.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2516,6 +2516,7 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu
- /* Now figure out the new contents: is this a valid guest MFN? */
- if ( !mfn_valid(gmfn) )
- {
-+ ASSERT(mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN));
- new_entry = pagetable_null();
- goto install_new_entry;
- }
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -3312,6 +3312,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc
- if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 4, 0) != 0 )
- guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
- sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l4_shadow, sh_make_shadow);
-+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down);
-+ return;
-+ }
- if ( !shadow_mode_external(d) && !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) )
- {
- mfn_t smfn = pagetable_get_mfn(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0]);
-@@ -3370,6 +3375,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc
- if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 2, 0) != 0 )
- guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
- sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l2_shadow, sh_make_shadow);
-+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down);
-+ return;
-+ }
- #else
- #error This should never happen
- #endif
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c89eb32c7a4..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-06.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: tolerate failure in shadow_prealloc()
-
-Prevent _shadow_prealloc() from calling BUG() when unable to fulfill
-the pre-allocation and instead return true/false. Modify
-shadow_prealloc() to crash the domain on allocation failure (if the
-domain is not already dying), as shadow cannot operate normally after
-that. Modify callers to also gracefully handle {_,}shadow_prealloc()
-failing to fulfill the request.
-
-Note this in turn requires adjusting the callers of
-sh_make_monitor_table() also to handle it returning INVALID_MFN.
-sh_update_paging_modes() is also modified to add additional error
-paths in case of allocation failure, some of those will return with
-null monitor page tables (and the domain likely crashed). This is no
-different that current error paths, but the newly introduced ones are
-more likely to trigger.
-
-The now added failure points in sh_update_paging_modes() also require
-that on some error return paths the previous structures are cleared,
-and thus monitor table is null.
-
-While there adjust the 'type' parameter type of shadow_prealloc() to
-unsigned int rather than u32.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include <asm/flushtlb.h>
- #include <asm/shadow.h>
- #include <xen/numa.h>
-+#include <public/sched.h>
- #include "private.h"
-
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint32_t,trace_shadow_path_flags);
-@@ -928,14 +929,15 @@ static inline void trace_shadow_prealloc
-
- /* Make sure there are at least count order-sized pages
- * available in the shadow page pool. */
--static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-+static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
- {
- struct vcpu *v;
- struct page_info *sp, *t;
- mfn_t smfn;
- int i;
-
-- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return;
-+ if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-+ return true;
-
- /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
- ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
-@@ -951,7 +953,8 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma
- sh_unpin(d, smfn);
-
- /* See if that freed up enough space */
-- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return;
-+ if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-+ return true;
- }
-
- /* Stage two: all shadow pages are in use in hierarchies that are
-@@ -974,7 +977,7 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma
- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
- {
- guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-- return;
-+ return true;
- }
- }
- }
-@@ -987,7 +990,12 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma
- d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages,
- d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
-- BUG();
-+
-+ ASSERT(d->is_dying);
-+
-+ guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-+
-+ return false;
- }
-
- /* Make sure there are at least count pages of the order according to
-@@ -995,9 +1003,19 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct doma
- * This must be called before any calls to shadow_alloc(). Since this
- * will free existing shadows to make room, it must be called early enough
- * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */
--void shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 type, unsigned int count)
-+bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count)
- {
-- return _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+ bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+
-+ if ( !ret && !d->is_dying &&
-+ (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+ /*
-+ * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in
-+ * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it.
-+ */
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+
-+ return ret;
- }
-
- /* Deliberately free all the memory we can: this will tear down all of
-@@ -1218,7 +1236,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t
- static struct page_info *
- shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
- {
-- struct page_info *pg;
-+ struct page_info *pg = NULL;
-
- /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the
- * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-@@ -1236,16 +1254,18 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages,
- shadow_min_acceptable_pages(d));
- }
-- paging_unlock(d);
-- return NULL;
-+ goto out;
- }
-
-- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1);
-+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1) )
-+ goto out;
-+
- pg = mfn_to_page(shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 0));
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages++;
- d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages--;
- ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
-
-+ out:
- paging_unlock(d);
-
- return pg;
-@@ -1336,7 +1356,9 @@ int shadow_set_allocation(struct domain
- else if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages > pages )
- {
- /* Need to return memory to domheap */
-- _shadow_prealloc(d, 1);
-+ if ( !_shadow_prealloc(d, 1) )
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
- sp = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
- ASSERT(sp);
- /*
-@@ -2334,12 +2356,13 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc
- if ( mfn_eq(v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[0], INVALID_MFN) )
- {
- int i;
-+
-+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, SHADOW_OOS_PAGES) )
-+ return;
-+
- for(i = 0; i < SHADOW_OOS_PAGES; i++)
-- {
-- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 1);
- v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[i] =
- shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 0);
-- }
- }
- #endif /* OOS */
-
-@@ -2403,6 +2426,9 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc
- mfn_t mmfn = sh_make_monitor_table(
- v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
-
-+ if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+ return;
-+
- v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn);
- make_cr3(v, mmfn);
- hvm_update_host_cr3(v);
-@@ -2441,6 +2467,12 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struc
- v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_null();
- new_mfn = sh_make_monitor_table(
- v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
-+ if ( mfn_eq(new_mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+ {
-+ sh_destroy_monitor_table(v, old_mfn,
-+ old_mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
-+ return;
-+ }
- v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(new_mfn);
- SHADOW_PRINTK("new monitor table %"PRI_mfn "\n",
- mfn_x(new_mfn));
-@@ -2526,7 +2558,12 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu
- if ( !mfn_valid(smfn) )
- {
- /* Make sure there's enough free shadow memory. */
-- shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1);
-+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1) )
-+ {
-+ new_entry = pagetable_null();
-+ goto install_new_entry;
-+ }
-+
- /* Shadow the page. */
- smfn = make_shadow(v, gmfn, root_type);
- }
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c
-@@ -700,7 +700,9 @@ mfn_t sh_make_monitor_table(const struct
- ASSERT(!pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table));
-
- /* Guarantee we can get the memory we need */
-- shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS);
-+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS) )
-+ return INVALID_MFN;
-+
- m4mfn = shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, 0);
- mfn_to_page(m4mfn)->shadow_flags = 4;
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -2440,9 +2440,14 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
- * Preallocate shadow pages *before* removing writable accesses
- * otherwhise an OOS L1 might be demoted and promoted again with
- * writable mappings. */
-- shadow_prealloc(d,
-- SH_type_l1_shadow,
-- GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4 ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1);
-+ if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_l1_shadow,
-+ GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4
-+ ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1) )
-+ {
-+ paging_unlock(d);
-+ put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- rc = gw_remove_write_accesses(v, va, &gw);
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-@@ -383,7 +383,8 @@ void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mf
- void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type);
-
- /* Shadow page allocation functions */
--void shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 shadow_type, unsigned int count);
-+bool __must_check shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int shadow_type,
-+ unsigned int count);
- mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d,
- u32 shadow_type,
- unsigned long backpointer);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9eea91c42df7..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-07.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/p2m: refuse new allocations for dying domains
-
-This will in particular prevent any attempts to add entries to the p2m,
-once - in a subsequent change - non-root entries have been removed.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc(struc
-
- ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d));
-
-+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+ return NULL;
-+
- pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.hap.freelist);
- if ( unlikely(!pg) )
- return NULL;
-@@ -281,7 +284,7 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_p
- d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages++;
- ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
- }
-- else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed )
-+ else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed && !d->is_dying )
- {
- d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed = 1;
- dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "d%i failed to allocate from HAP pool\n",
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo
- if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
- return true;
-
-+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+ /* No reclaim when the domain is dying, teardown will take care of it. */
-+ return false;
-+
- /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
- ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
-
-@@ -991,7 +995,7 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo
- d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
-
-- ASSERT(d->is_dying);
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-
- guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-
-@@ -1005,10 +1009,13 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_preallo
- * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */
- bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count)
- {
-- bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+ bool ret;
-+
-+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+ return false;
-
-- if ( !ret && !d->is_dying &&
-- (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+ ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+ if ( !ret && (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
- /*
- * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in
- * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it.
-@@ -1238,6 +1245,9 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
- {
- struct page_info *pg = NULL;
-
-+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+ return NULL;
-+
- /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the
- * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
- paging_lock_recursive(d);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 92cdb4942b6a..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-08.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/p2m: truly free paging pool memory for dying domains
-
-Modify {hap,shadow}_free to free the page immediately if the domain is
-dying, so that pages don't accumulate in the pool when
-{shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called. This is to limit the amount of
-work which needs to be done there (in a non-preemptable manner).
-
-Note the call to shadow_free() in shadow_free_p2m_page() is moved after
-increasing total_pages, so that the decrease done in shadow_free() in
-case the domain is dying doesn't underflow the counter, even if just for
-a short interval.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -265,6 +265,18 @@ static void hap_free(struct domain *d, m
-
- ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d));
-
-+ /*
-+ * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less work is
-+ * left to hap_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have preemption checks
-+ * added.
-+ */
-+ if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+ {
-+ free_domheap_page(pg);
-+ d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages--;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages++;
- page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.hap.freelist);
- }
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d,
- void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn)
- {
- struct page_info *next = NULL, *sp = mfn_to_page(smfn);
-+ bool dying = ACCESS_ONCE(d->is_dying);
- struct page_list_head *pin_list;
- unsigned int pages;
- u32 shadow_type;
-@@ -1229,11 +1230,32 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t
- * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */
- page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp);
- perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count);
-- page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less
-+ * work is left to shadow_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have
-+ * preemption checks added.
-+ */
-+ if ( unlikely(dying) )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The backpointer field (sh.back) used by shadow code aliases the
-+ * domain owner field, unconditionally clear it here to avoid
-+ * free_domheap_page() attempting to parse it.
-+ */
-+ page_set_owner(sp, NULL);
-+ free_domheap_page(sp);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-+
- sp = next;
- }
-
-- d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages;
-+ if ( unlikely(dying) )
-+ d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages -= pages;
-+ else
-+ d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages;
- }
-
- /* Divert a page from the pool to be used by the p2m mapping.
-@@ -1303,9 +1325,9 @@ shadow_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, s
- * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
- paging_lock_recursive(d);
-
-- shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg));
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages--;
- d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages++;
-+ shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg));
-
- paging_unlock(d);
- }
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 60259e1c0991..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-09.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/p2m: free the paging memory pool preemptively
-
-The paging memory pool is currently freed in two different places:
-from {shadow,hap}_teardown() via domain_relinquish_resources() and
-from {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() via complete_domain_destroy().
-While the former does handle preemption, the later doesn't.
-
-Attempt to move as much p2m related freeing as possible to happen
-before the call to {shadow,hap}_teardown(), so that most memory can be
-freed in a preemptive way. In order to avoid causing issues to
-existing callers leave the root p2m page tables set and free them in
-{hap,shadow}_final_teardown(). Also modify {hap,shadow}_free to free
-the page immediately if the domain is dying, so that pages don't
-accumulate in the pool when {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called.
-
-Move altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() to be done in hap_teardown(), as that's
-the place where altp2m_active gets disabled now.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
- #include <xen/livepatch.h>
- #include <public/sysctl.h>
- #include <public/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h>
--#include <asm/altp2m.h>
- #include <asm/regs.h>
- #include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
- #include <asm/system.h>
-@@ -2381,12 +2380,6 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d
- vpmu_destroy(v);
- }
-
-- if ( altp2m_active(d) )
-- {
-- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-- altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v);
-- }
--
- if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
- {
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <xen/domain_page.h>
- #include <xen/guest_access.h>
- #include <xen/keyhandler.h>
-+#include <asm/altp2m.h>
- #include <asm/event.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
- #include <asm/current.h>
-@@ -546,24 +547,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d
- unsigned int i;
-
- if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
-- {
-- d->arch.altp2m_active = 0;
--
-- if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp )
-- {
-- free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_eptp);
-- d->arch.altp2m_eptp = NULL;
-- }
--
-- if ( d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp )
-- {
-- free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
-- d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp = NULL;
-- }
--
- for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
-- }
-
- /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
-@@ -578,6 +563,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d
- paging_lock(d);
- hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
- ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages == 0);
-+ ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages == 0);
-+ ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages == 0);
- paging_unlock(d);
- }
-
-@@ -603,6 +590,7 @@ void hap_vcpu_teardown(struct vcpu *v)
- void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
- {
- struct vcpu *v;
-+ unsigned int i;
-
- ASSERT(d->is_dying);
- ASSERT(d != current->domain);
-@@ -611,6 +599,28 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- hap_vcpu_teardown(v);
-
-+ /* Leave the root pt in case we get further attempts to modify the p2m. */
-+ if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
-+ {
-+ if ( altp2m_active(d) )
-+ for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-+ altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v);
-+
-+ d->arch.altp2m_active = 0;
-+
-+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_eptp);
-+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
-+
-+ for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */
-+ for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ )
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false);
-+
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+
- paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */
-
- if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2824,8 +2824,17 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, b
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- shadow_vcpu_teardown(v);
-
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+
- paging_lock(d);
-
-+ /*
-+ * Reclaim all shadow memory so that shadow_set_allocation() doesn't find
-+ * in-use pages, as _shadow_prealloc() will no longer try to reclaim pages
-+ * because the domain is dying.
-+ */
-+ shadow_blow_tables(d);
-+
- #if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & (SHOPT_VIRTUAL_TLB|SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC))
- /* Free the virtual-TLB array attached to each vcpu */
- for_each_vcpu(d, v)
-@@ -2946,6 +2955,9 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain
- d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages,
- d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
- d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
-+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages);
-+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages);
-+ ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
- paging_unlock(d);
- }
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 258b7fff3194..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-10.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Subject: xen/x86: p2m: Add preemption in p2m_teardown()
-
-The list p2m->pages contain all the pages used by the P2M. On large
-instance this can be quite large and the time spent to call
-d->arch.paging.free_page() will take more than 1ms for a 80GB guest
-on a Xen running in nested environment on a c5.metal.
-
-By extrapolation, it would take > 100ms for a 8TB guest (what we
-current security support). So add some preemption in p2m_teardown()
-and propagate to the callers. Note there are 3 places where
-the preemption is not enabled:
- - hap_final_teardown()/shadow_final_teardown(): We are
- preventing update the P2M once the domain is dying (so
- no more pages could be allocated) and most of the P2M pages
- will be freed in preemptive manneer when relinquishing the
- resources. So this is fine to disable preemption.
- - shadow_enable(): This is fine because it will undo the allocation
- that may have been made by p2m_alloc_table() (so only the root
- page table).
-
-The preemption is arbitrarily checked every 1024 iterations.
-
-Note that with the current approach, Xen doesn't keep track on whether
-the alt/nested P2Ms have been cleared. So there are some redundant work.
-However, this is not expected to incurr too much overhead (the P2M lock
-shouldn't be contended during teardown). So this is optimization is
-left outside of the security event.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
-
- /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root);
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted);
- void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
-
- /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -548,17 +548,17 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d
-
- if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
- for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true, NULL);
-
- /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true);
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true, NULL);
- }
-
- if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
- hap_teardown(d, NULL);
-
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL);
- /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */
- paging_lock(d);
- hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-@@ -612,14 +612,24 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool
- FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
-
- for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false);
-+ {
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false, preempted);
-+ if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+ return;
-+ }
- }
-
- /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */
- for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ )
-- p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false);
-+ {
-+ p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false, preempted);
-+ if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+ return;
-+ }
-
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted);
-+ if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+ return;
-
- paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -749,12 +749,13 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p
- * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must
- * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them).
- */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root)
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted)
- /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen.
- * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */
- {
- struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL;
- struct domain *d;
-+ unsigned int i = 0;
-
- if (p2m == NULL)
- return;
-@@ -773,8 +774,19 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m
- }
-
- while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-- if ( pg != root_pg )
-- d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+ {
-+ if ( pg == root_pg )
-+ continue;
-+
-+ d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+
-+ /* Arbitrarily check preemption every 1024 iterations */
-+ if ( preempted && !(++i % 1024) && general_preempt_check() )
-+ {
-+ *preempted = true;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-
- if ( root_pg )
- page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages);
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2770,8 +2770,12 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32
- out_locked:
- paging_unlock(d);
- out_unlocked:
-+ /*
-+ * This is fine to ignore the preemption here because only the root
-+ * will be allocated by p2m_alloc_table().
-+ */
- if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) )
-- p2m_teardown(p2m, true);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m, true, NULL);
- if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL )
- {
- pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-@@ -2824,7 +2828,9 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, b
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- shadow_vcpu_teardown(v);
-
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted);
-+ if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+ return;
-
- paging_lock(d);
-
-@@ -2945,7 +2951,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain
- shadow_teardown(d, NULL);
-
- /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */
-- p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-+ p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL);
- /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */
- paging_lock(d);
- shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50dcae4a8184..000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa411.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: correct locking on transitive grant copy error path
-
-While the comment next to the lock dropping in preparation of
-recursively calling acquire_grant_for_copy() mistakenly talks about the
-rd == td case (excluded a few lines further up), the same concerns apply
-to the calling of release_grant_for_copy() on a subsequent error path.
-
-This is CVE-2022-33748 / XSA-411.
-
-Fixes: ad48fb963dbf ("gnttab: fix transitive grant handling")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-v2: Extend code comment.
-
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -2622,9 +2622,8 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy(
- trans_domid);
-
- /*
-- * acquire_grant_for_copy() could take the lock on the
-- * remote table (if rd == td), so we have to drop the lock
-- * here and reacquire.
-+ * acquire_grant_for_copy() will take the lock on the remote table,
-+ * so we have to drop the lock here and reacquire.
- */
- active_entry_release(act);
- grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-@@ -2661,11 +2660,25 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy(
- act->trans_gref != trans_gref ||
- !act->is_sub_page)) )
- {
-+ /*
-+ * Like above for acquire_grant_for_copy() we need to drop and then
-+ * re-acquire the locks here to prevent lock order inversion issues.
-+ * Unlike for acquire_grant_for_copy() we don't need to re-check
-+ * anything, as release_grant_for_copy() doesn't depend on the grant
-+ * table entry: It only updates internal state and the status flags.
-+ */
-+ active_entry_release(act);
-+ grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-+
- release_grant_for_copy(td, trans_gref, readonly);
- rcu_unlock_domain(td);
-+
-+ grant_read_lock(rgt);
-+ act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, gref);
- reduce_status_for_pin(rd, act, status, readonly);
- active_entry_release(act);
- grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-+
- put_page(*page);
- *page = NULL;
- return ERESTART;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-11-27 02:18:42 +0000