system/xen: Updated for version 4.13.0.

Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr> Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>
author: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr> 2020-04-15 14:52:28 +0200
committer: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org> 2020-04-19 10:52:33 +0700
commit: 08a409483ce6acd12bfb884dac0d0603cc85ce28 (patch)
tree: e822a4e5f46a8ab9768224bdf2f97ed28b625e4e /system
parent: bddbdfdccbc87f272fd604ef992b4df2f6e71f45 (diff)
41 files changed, 478 insertions, 4958 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/README b/system/xen/README
index f5f8c96b6d473..2999a8e54d26b 100644
--- a/system/xen/README
+++ b/system/xen/README
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Solaris, and various versions of the BSD operating systems.
 This script has a few optional dependencies:
 
   mbootpack - creates LILO compatible kernel images
-  libssh2 - mostly used by libvirt, enable with USE_LIBSSH2=yes
+  libssh - mostly used by libvirt, enable with USE_LIBSSH=yes
+           (previously known as USE_LIBSSH2)
   ocaml-findlib - autodetected, builds oxenstored binary
   spice - enable with USE_SPICE=yes
 
@@ -15,6 +16,8 @@ Linking with the stock libraries:
 
   bluez - enable with USE_BLUEZ=yes
   gtk - enable with USE_GTK=yes
+  audio - enable with USE_AUDIO=yes
+          (or a comma-delimited list: oss alsa sdl pa)
 
 Reading material:
 
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
index 728e3bae79bdf..f798e2ddc7def 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Xen EFI binary.
 
 To make things a bit easier, a copy of Xen EFI binary can be found here:
 
-  http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.12.1.efi.gz
+  http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.13.0.efi.gz
 
 If an automatic boot to Xen kernel is desired, the binary should be renamed and
 copied to the following location: /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.202-xen.i686 b/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.217-xen.i686
index b31c558e377e3..d60d6d74255a1 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.202-xen.i686
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.217-xen.i686
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 4.4.202 Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 4.4.217 Kernel Configuration
 #
 # CONFIG_64BIT is not set
 CONFIG_X86_32=y
@@ -7113,6 +7113,7 @@ CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT=y
 # CONFIG_DEBUG_TLBFLUSH is not set
 # CONFIG_IOMMU_STRESS is not set
 CONFIG_HAVE_MMIOTRACE_SUPPORT=y
+# CONFIG_X86_DECODER_SELFTEST is not set
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0X80=0
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0XED=1
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_UDELAY=2
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.202-xen.x86_64 b/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.217-xen.x86_64
index f81a31b9ab97d..df9403f2dfe9a 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.202-xen.x86_64
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/config-4.4.217-xen.x86_64
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 4.4.202 Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 4.4.217 Kernel Configuration
 #
 CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_X86_64=y
@@ -6925,6 +6925,7 @@ CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT=y
 # CONFIG_IOMMU_DEBUG is not set
 # CONFIG_IOMMU_STRESS is not set
 CONFIG_HAVE_MMIOTRACE_SUPPORT=y
+# CONFIG_X86_DECODER_SELFTEST is not set
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0X80=0
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0XED=1
 CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_UDELAY=2
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
index 7228dcc541470..483d6460c28cd 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 # Written by Chris Abela <chris.abela@maltats.com>, 20100515
 # Modified by Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
 
-KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.202}
-XEN=${XEN:-4.12.1}
+KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.217}
+XEN=${XEN:-4.13.0}
 BOOTLOADER=${BOOTLOADER:-lilo}
 
 ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4}
diff --git a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
index f017c1bd23737..4056208f5ab26 100644
--- a/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
+++ b/system/xen/domU/domU.sh
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 set -e
 
-KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.202}
+KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.217}
 
 # Build an image for the root file system and another for the swap
 # Default values : 8GB and 500MB resepectively.
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
index 52bec8230e342..262ff9996a4cf 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
+++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 # Slackware build script for xen
 
-# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019  Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
+# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020  Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
 # All rights reserved.
 #
 # Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
 #  ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
 PRGNAM=xen
-VERSION=${VERSION:-4.12.1}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-4.13.0}
 BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
 TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
 
-SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.12.0}
-OVMF=${OVMF:-20180725_ef529e6ab7}
-IPXE=${IPXE:-d2063b7693e0e35db97b2264aa987eb6341ae779}
+SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.12.1}
+OVMF=${OVMF:-20190606_20d2e5a125}
+IPXE=${IPXE:-1dd56dbd11082fb622c2ed21cfaced4f47d798a6}
 
 if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
   case "$( uname -m )" in
@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ EOF
       esac
 esac
 
-case "${USE_LIBSSH2:-no}" in
-  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-libssh2" ;;
-    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-libssh2" ;;
+case "${USE_LIBSSH:-no}" in
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-libssh" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-libssh" ;;
 esac
 
 case "${USE_BLUEZ:-no}" in
@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ case "${USE_SPICE:-no}" in
     *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-spice" ;;
 esac
 
+case "${USE_AUDIO:-no}" in
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+="" ;;
+   no) CONF_QEMUU+=" --audio-drv-list=" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --audio-drv-list=$USE_AUDIO" ;;
+esac
+
 set -e
 
 rm -rf $PKG
@@ -142,8 +148,8 @@ cp $CWD/ipxe-git-$IPXE.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/_ipxe.tar.gz
 (
   # Seabios
   cd tools/firmware
-  tar -xf $CWD/seabios-$SEABIOS.tar.?z
-  mv seabios-$SEABIOS seabios-dir-remote
+  tar -xf $CWD/seabios-$SEABIOS.tar.?z || tar -xf $CWD/seabios-rel-$SEABIOS.tar.?z
+  mv seabios-$SEABIOS seabios-dir-remote || mv seabios-rel-$SEABIOS seabios-dir-remote
   ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir
   make -C seabios-dir defconfig
   # OVMF
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info
index e0ee8e6f20056..fa9672aace6b5 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.info
+++ b/system/xen/xen.info
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 PRGNAM="xen"
-VERSION="4.12.1"
+VERSION="4.13.0"
 HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/"
-DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.12.1.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-d2063b7693e0e35db97b2264aa987eb6341ae779.tar.gz \
+DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.13.0.tar.gz \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-1dd56dbd11082fb622c2ed21cfaced4f47d798a6.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz \
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.12.1.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.12.0.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20180725_ef529e6ab7.tar.bz2"
-MD5SUM="3f96ae93a5d6a3dd89bdf1398e30895e \
-        0de05da7aec358881bb1dff815ecca14 \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.12.1.tar.gz \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20190606_20d2e5a125.tar.bz2"
+MD5SUM="d3b13c4c785601be2f104eaddd7c6a00 \
+        b3ab0488a989a089207302111d12e1a0 \
         36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \
         debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \
         bf8f1f9e3ca83d732c00a79a6ef29bc4 \
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ MD5SUM="3f96ae93a5d6a3dd89bdf1398e30895e \
         7b72caf22b01464ee7d6165f2fd85f44 \
         dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8 \
         e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8 \
-        2fd637b323d247a0948556104a2121c9 \
-        75df1ed5ad9e08b1fb0be78c8b5234b9"
+        6cb6cba431fd725126ddb5ec529ab85c \
+        a6063a0d3d45e6f77deea8c80569653e"
 DOWNLOAD_x86_64=""
 MD5SUM_x86_64=""
 REQUIRES="acpica yajl"
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa296.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa296.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e71ea7f790f27..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa296.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: xen/hypercall: Don't use BUG() for parameter checking in hypercall_create_continuation()
-
-Since c/s 1d429034 "hypercall: update vcpu_op to take an unsigned vcpuid",
-which incorrectly swapped 'i' for 'u' in the parameter type list, guests have
-been able to hit the BUG() in next_args()'s default case.
-
-Correct these back to 'i'.
-
-In addition, make adjustments to prevent this class of issue from occurring in
-the future - crashing Xen is not an appropriate form of parameter checking.
-
-Capitalise NEXT_ARG() to catch all uses, to highlight that it is a macro doing
-non-function-like things behind the scenes, and undef it when appropriate.
-Implement a bad_fmt: block which prints an error, asserts unreachable, and
-crashes the guest.
-
-On the ARM side, drop all parameter checking of p.  It is asymmetric with the
-x86 side, and akin to expecting memcpy() or sprintf() to check their src/fmt
-parameter before use.  A caller passing "" or something other than a string
-literal will be obvious during code review.
-
-This is XSA-296.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index 941bbff4fe..a3da8e9c08 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -383,14 +383,15 @@ void sync_vcpu_execstate(struct vcpu *v)
-     /* Nothing to do -- no lazy switching */
- }
- 
--#define next_arg(fmt, args) ({                                              \
-+#define NEXT_ARG(fmt, args)                                                 \
-+({                                                                          \
-     unsigned long __arg;                                                    \
-     switch ( *(fmt)++ )                                                     \
-     {                                                                       \
-     case 'i': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned int);  break;    \
-     case 'l': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned long); break;    \
-     case 'h': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, void *);        break;    \
--    default:  __arg = 0; BUG();                                             \
-+    default:  goto bad_fmt;                                                 \
-     }                                                                       \
-     __arg;                                                                  \
- })
-@@ -405,9 +406,6 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     unsigned int i;
-     va_list args;
- 
--    /* All hypercalls take at least one argument */
--    BUG_ON( !p || *p == '\0' );
--
-     current->hcall_preempted = true;
- 
-     va_start(args, format);
-@@ -415,7 +413,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     if ( mcs->flags & MCSF_in_multicall )
-     {
-         for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
--            mcs->call.args[i] = next_arg(p, args);
-+            mcs->call.args[i] = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-         /* Return value gets written back to mcs->call.result */
-         rc = mcs->call.result;
-@@ -431,7 +429,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
- 
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-@@ -454,7 +452,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
- 
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-@@ -475,8 +473,16 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     va_end(args);
- 
-     return rc;
-+
-+ bad_fmt:
-+    gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad hypercall continuation format '%c'\n", *p);
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+    domain_crash(current->domain);
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
-+#undef NEXT_ARG
-+
- void startup_cpu_idle_loop(void)
- {
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c b/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-index d483dbaa6b..4643e5eb43 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-@@ -80,14 +80,15 @@ const hypercall_args_t hypercall_args_table[NR_hypercalls] =
- #undef COMP
- #undef ARGS
- 
--#define next_arg(fmt, args) ({                                              \
-+#define NEXT_ARG(fmt, args)                                                 \
-+({                                                                          \
-     unsigned long __arg;                                                    \
-     switch ( *(fmt)++ )                                                     \
-     {                                                                       \
-     case 'i': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned int);  break;    \
-     case 'l': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned long); break;    \
-     case 'h': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, void *);        break;    \
--    default:  __arg = 0; BUG();                                             \
-+    default:  goto bad_fmt;                                                 \
-     }                                                                       \
-     __arg;                                                                  \
- })
-@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     if ( mcs->flags & MCSF_in_multicall )
-     {
-         for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
--            mcs->call.args[i] = next_arg(p, args);
-+            mcs->call.args[i] = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-     }
-     else
-     {
-@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-         {
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-                 case 0: regs->rdi = arg; break;
-@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-         {
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-                 case 0: regs->rbx = arg; break;
-@@ -154,8 +155,16 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     va_end(args);
- 
-     return op;
-+
-+ bad_fmt:
-+    gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad hypercall continuation format '%c'\n", *p);
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+    domain_crash(curr->domain);
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
-+#undef NEXT_ARG
-+
- int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int nr,
-                                 unsigned int mask, ...)
- {
-diff --git a/xen/common/compat/domain.c b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-index 39877b3ab2..2531fa7421 100644
---- a/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int compat_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) ar
-         }
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iuh",
-+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
-                                                cmd, vcpuid, arg);
- 
-         break;
-diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
-index 2308588052..65bcd85e34 100644
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
- 
-         rc = arch_initialise_vcpu(v, arg);
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iuh",
-+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
-                                                cmd, vcpuid, arg);
- 
-         break;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa298.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa298.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aa39042be56bd..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa298.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/PV: check GDT/LDT limits during emulation
-
-Accesses beyond the LDT limit originating from emulation would trigger
-the ASSERT() in pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(). On production builds such
-accesses would cause an attempt to promote the touched page (offset from
-the present LDT base address) to a segment descriptor one. If this
-happens to succeed, guest user mode would be able to elevate its
-privileges to that of the guest kernel. This is particularly easy when
-there's no LDT at all, in which case the LDT base stored internally to
-Xen is simply zero.
-
-Also adjust the ASSERT() that was triggering: It was off by one to
-begin with, and for production builds we also better use
-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() instead with suitable recovery code afterwards.
-
-This is XSA-298.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
-v2: Correct 64-bit-only limit check (by folding into the common one).
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
-@@ -51,7 +51,13 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned
-     const seg_desc_t *pdesc = gdt_ldt_desc_ptr(gate_sel);
- 
-     if ( (gate_sel < 4) ||
--         ((gate_sel >= FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE) && !(gate_sel & 4)) ||
-+         /*
-+          * We're interested in call gates only, which occupy a single
-+          * seg_desc_t for 32-bit and a consecutive pair of them for 64-bit.
-+          */
-+         ((gate_sel >> 3) + !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) >=
-+          (gate_sel & 4 ? v->arch.pv.ldt_ents
-+                        : v->arch.pv.gdt_ents)) ||
-          __get_user(desc, pdesc) )
-         return 0;
- 
-@@ -70,7 +76,7 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned
-     if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
-     {
-         if ( (*ar & 0x1f00) != 0x0c00 ||
--             (gate_sel >= FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE - 8 && !(gate_sel & 4)) ||
-+             /* Limit check done above already. */
-              __get_user(desc, pdesc + 1) ||
-              (desc.b & 0x1f00) )
-             return 0;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.c
-@@ -31,7 +31,14 @@ int pv_emul_read_descriptor(unsigned int
- {
-     seg_desc_t desc;
- 
--    if ( sel < 4)
-+    if ( sel < 4 ||
-+         /*
-+          * Don't apply the GDT limit here, as the selector may be a Xen
-+          * provided one. __get_user() will fail (without taking further
-+          * action) for ones falling in the gap between guest populated
-+          * and Xen ones.
-+          */
-+         ((sel & 4) && (sel >> 3) >= v->arch.pv.ldt_ents) )
-         desc.b = desc.a = 0;
-     else if ( __get_user(desc, gdt_ldt_desc_ptr(sel)) )
-         return 0;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
-@@ -92,12 +92,16 @@ bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int
-     BUG_ON(unlikely(in_irq()));
- 
-     /*
--     * Hardware limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
-+     * Prior limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
-      * safe as updates to the LDT can only be made by MMUEXT_SET_LDT to the
-      * current vcpu, and vcpu_reset() will block until this vcpu has been
-      * descheduled before continuing.
-      */
--    ASSERT((offset >> 3) <= curr->arch.pv.ldt_ents);
-+    if ( unlikely((offset >> 3) >= curr->arch.pv.ldt_ents) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return false;
-+    }
- 
-     if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-         linear = (uint32_t)linear;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0001-x86-mm-L1TF-checks-don-t-leave-a-partial-entry.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0001-x86-mm-L1TF-checks-don-t-leave-a-partial-entry.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fbb9d8086b6f8..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0001-x86-mm-L1TF-checks-don-t-leave-a-partial-entry.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From 33d051917d5ef38f678b507a3c832afde48b9b49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] x86/mm: L1TF checks don't leave a partial entry
-
-On detection of a potential L1TF issue, most validation code returns
--ERESTART to allow the switch to shadow mode to happen and cause the
-original operation to be restarted.
-
-However, in the validation code, the return value -ERESTART has been
-repurposed to indicate 1) the function has partially completed
-something which needs to be undone, and 2) calling put_page_type()
-should cleanly undo it.  This causes problems in several places.
-
-For L1 tables, on receiving an -ERESTART return from alloc_l1_table(),
-alloc_page_type() will set PGT_partial on the page.  If for some
-reason the original operation never restarts, then on domain
-destruction, relinquish_memory() will call free_page_type() on the
-page.
-
-Unfortunately, alloc_ and free_l1_table() aren't set up to deal with
-PGT_partial.  When returning a failure, alloc_l1_table() always
-de-validates whatever it's validated so far, and free_l1_table()
-always devalidates the whole page.  This means that if
-relinquish_memory() calls free_page_type() on an L1 that didn't
-complete due to an L1TF, it will call put_page_from_l1e() on "page
-entries" that have never been validated.
-
-For L2+ tables, setting rc to ERESTART causes the rest of the
-alloc_lN_table() function to *think* that the entry in question will
-have PGT_partial set.  This will cause it to set partial_pte = 1.  If
-relinqush_memory() then calls free_page_type() on one of those pages,
-then free_lN_table() will call put_page_from_lNe() on the entry when
-it shouldn't.
-
-Rather than indicating -ERESTART, indicate -EINTR.  This is the code
-to indicate that nothing has changed from when you started the call
-(which is effectively how alloc_l1_table() handles errors).
-
-mod_lN_entry() shouldn't have any of these types of problems, so leave
-potential changes there for a clean-up patch later.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 3557cd1178..a1b55c10ff 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
-     {
-         if ( !(l1e_get_flags(pl1e[i]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
--            ret = pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, pl1e[i]) ? -ERESTART : 0;
-+            ret = pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, pl1e[i]) ? -EINTR : 0;
-             if ( ret )
-                 goto out;
-         }
-@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-         {
-             if ( !pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, l2e) )
-                 continue;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
-             rc = get_page_from_l2e(l2e, pfn, d, partial);
-@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             if ( !pv_l1tf_check_l3e(d, l3e) )
-                 continue;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
-             rc = get_page_from_l3e(l3e, pfn, d, partial);
-@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             if ( !pv_l1tf_check_l4e(d, l4e) )
-                 continue;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
-             rc = get_page_from_l4e(l4e, pfn, d, partial);
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0002-x86-mm-Don-t-re-set-PGT_pinned-on-a-partially-de-val.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0002-x86-mm-Don-t-re-set-PGT_pinned-on-a-partially-de-val.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a74598e597fad..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0002-x86-mm-Don-t-re-set-PGT_pinned-on-a-partially-de-val.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-From b490792c18f74b76ec8161721c1e07f810e36309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/11] x86/mm: Don't re-set PGT_pinned on a partially
- de-validated page
-
-When unpinning pagetables, if an operation is interrupted,
-relinquish_memory() re-sets PGT_pinned so that the un-pin will
-pickedup again when the hypercall restarts.
-
-This is appropriate when put_page_and_type_preemptible() returns
--EINTR, which indicates that the page is back in its initial state
-(i.e., completely validated).  However, for -ERESTART, this leads to a
-state where a page has both PGT_pinned and PGT_partial set.
-
-This happens to work at the moment, although it's not really a
-"canonical" state; but in subsequent patches, where we need to make a
-distinction in handling between PGT_validated and PGT_partial pages,
-this causes issues.
-
-Move to a "canonical" state by:
-- Only re-setting PGT_pinned on -EINTR
-- Re-dropping the refcount held by PGT_pinned on -ERESTART
-
-In the latter case, the PGT_partial bit will be cleared further down
-with the rest of the other PGT_partial pages.
-
-While here, clean up some trainling whitespace.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 2585327834..59df8a6d8d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static void play_dead(void)
-      * this case, heap corruption or #PF can occur (when heap debugging is
-      * enabled). For example, even printk() can involve tasklet scheduling,
-      * which touches per-cpu vars.
--     * 
-+     *
-      * Consider very carefully when adding code to *dead_idle. Most hypervisor
-      * subsystems are unsafe to call.
-      */
-@@ -1909,9 +1909,34 @@ static int relinquish_memory(
-             break;
-         case -ERESTART:
-         case -EINTR:
-+            /*
-+             * -EINTR means PGT_validated has been re-set; re-set
-+             * PGT_pinned again so that it gets picked up next time
-+             * around.
-+             *
-+             * -ERESTART, OTOH, means PGT_partial is set instead.  Put
-+             * it back on the list, but don't set PGT_pinned; the
-+             * section below will finish off de-validation.  But we do
-+             * need to drop the general ref associated with
-+             * PGT_pinned, since put_page_and_type_preemptible()
-+             * didn't do it.
-+             *
-+             * NB we can do an ASSERT for PGT_validated, since we
-+             * "own" the type ref; but theoretically, the PGT_partial
-+             * could be cleared by someone else.
-+             */
-+            if ( ret == -EINTR )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT(page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_validated);
-+                set_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info);
-+            }
-+            else
-+                put_page(page);
-+
-             ret = -ERESTART;
-+
-+            /* Put the page back on the list and drop the ref we grabbed above */
-             page_list_add(page, list);
--            set_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info);
-             put_page(page);
-             goto out;
-         default:
-@@ -2161,7 +2186,7 @@ void vcpu_kick(struct vcpu *v)
-      * pending flag. These values may fluctuate (after all, we hold no
-      * locks) but the key insight is that each change will cause
-      * evtchn_upcall_pending to be polled.
--     * 
-+     *
-      * NB2. We save the running flag across the unblock to avoid a needless
-      * IPI for domains that we IPI'd to unblock.
-      */
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0003-x86-mm-Separate-out-partial_pte-tristate-into-indivi.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0003-x86-mm-Separate-out-partial_pte-tristate-into-indivi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 226e5487b1579..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0003-x86-mm-Separate-out-partial_pte-tristate-into-indivi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-From 0f9f61e5737fdd346550ec6e30161fa99e4653fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/11] x86/mm: Separate out partial_pte tristate into
- individual flags
-
-At the moment, partial_pte is a tri-state that contains two distinct bits
-of information:
-
-1. If zero, the pte at index [nr_validated_ptes] is un-validated.  If
-   non-zero, the pte was last seen with PGT_partial set.
-
-2. If positive, the pte at index [nr_validated_ptes] does not hold a
-   general reference count.  If negative, it does.
-
-To make future patches more clear, separate out this functionality
-into two distinct, named bits: PTF_partial_set (for #1) and
-PTF_partial_general_ref (for #2).
-
-Additionally, a number of functions which need this information also
-take other flags to control behavior (such as `preemptible` and
-`defer`).  These are hard to read in the caller (since you only see
-'true' or 'false'), and ugly when many are added together.  In
-preparation for adding yet another flag in a future patch, collapse
-all of these into a single `flag` variable.
-
-NB that this does mean checking for what was previously the '-1'
-condition a bit more ugly in the put_page_from_lNe functions (since
-you have to check for both partial_set and general ref); but this
-clause will go away in a future patch.
-
-Also note that the original comment had an off-by-one error:
-partial_flags (like partial_pte before it) concerns
-plNe[nr_validated_ptes], not plNe[nr_validated_ptes+1].
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h |  41 +++++++---
- 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index a1b55c10ff..3f6f8cc9b8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1094,20 +1094,35 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
- }
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_PV
-+
-+/*
-+ * The following flags are used to specify behavior of various get and
-+ * put commands.  The first two are also stored in page->partial_flags
-+ * to indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-+ * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-+ * more information.
-+ */
-+#define PTF_partial_set         (1 << 0)
-+#define PTF_partial_general_ref (1 << 1)
-+#define PTF_preemptible         (1 << 2)
-+#define PTF_defer               (1 << 3)
-+
- static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
--    int partial, int preemptible)
-+    unsigned int flags)
- {
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-+    bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
-+         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref;
- 
--    if ( likely(partial >= 0) &&
-+    if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
-     rc = _get_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(rc) && partial >= 0 &&
-+    if ( unlikely(rc) && !partial_ref &&
-          (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
-         put_page(page);
- 
-@@ -1117,7 +1132,7 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l2);
- static int
- get_page_from_l2e(
--    l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     unsigned long mfn = l2e_get_pfn(l2e);
-     int rc;
-@@ -1129,8 +1144,9 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
-         return -EINVAL;
-     }
- 
--    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(_mfn(mfn), PGT_l1_page_table, d,
--                                    partial, false);
-+    ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_preemptible));
-+
-+    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(_mfn(mfn), PGT_l1_page_table, d, flags);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l2_linear_pagetable(l2e, pfn, d) )
-         rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1140,7 +1156,7 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l3);
- static int
- get_page_from_l3e(
--    l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc;
- 
-@@ -1152,7 +1168,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
-     }
- 
-     rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--        l3e_get_mfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, partial, 1);
-+        l3e_get_mfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, flags | PTF_preemptible);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) &&
-          !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) &&
-          get_l3_linear_pagetable(l3e, pfn, d) )
-@@ -1164,7 +1180,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l4);
- static int
- get_page_from_l4e(
--    l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc;
- 
-@@ -1176,7 +1192,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-     }
- 
-     rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--        l4e_get_mfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, partial, 1);
-+        l4e_get_mfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, flags | PTF_preemptible);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l4_linear_pagetable(l4e, pfn, d) )
-         rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1277,7 +1293,7 @@ static void put_data_page(struct page_info *page, bool writeable)
-  * Note also that this automatically deals correctly with linear p.t.'s.
-  */
- static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1300,12 +1316,13 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
-         struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
--        if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+              PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!defer);
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-             rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-         }
--        else if ( defer )
-+        else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1322,7 +1339,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
- }
- 
- static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     struct page_info *pg;
-     int rc;
-@@ -1345,13 +1362,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     pg = l3e_get_page(l3e);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+    if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+         PTF_partial_set )
-     {
--        ASSERT(!defer);
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-         return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     }
- 
--    if ( defer )
-+    if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-         current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1366,7 +1384,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- }
- 
- static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc = 1;
- 
-@@ -1375,13 +1393,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-     {
-         struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e);
- 
--        if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+              PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!defer);
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-             return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         }
- 
--        if ( defer )
-+        if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1492,12 +1511,13 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l2_pgentry_t  *pl2e;
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         l2_pgentry_t l2e;
- 
-@@ -1520,17 +1540,18 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
--            rc = get_page_from_l2e(l2e, pfn, d, partial);
-+            rc = get_page_from_l2e(l2e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', retain 'general ref' */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR )
-@@ -1539,7 +1560,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_pte = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = 0;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-             }
-@@ -1563,7 +1584,8 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l3_pgentry_t  *pl3e;
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-@@ -1578,7 +1600,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         memset(pl3e + 4, 0, (L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 4) * sizeof(*pl3e));
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         l3_pgentry_t l3e = pl3e[i];
- 
-@@ -1597,7 +1619,8 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-             else
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-                     l3e_get_mfn(l3e),
--                    PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d, partial, 1);
-+                    PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d,
-+                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible);
-         }
-         else if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
-@@ -1606,17 +1629,18 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-             rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
--            rc = get_page_from_l3e(l3e, pfn, d, partial);
-+            rc = get_page_from_l3e(l3e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-         }
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-@@ -1633,7 +1657,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         if ( i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1767,10 +1791,11 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l4_pgentry_t  *pl4e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         l4_pgentry_t l4e;
- 
-@@ -1786,12 +1811,13 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
--            rc = get_page_from_l4e(l4e, pfn, d, partial);
-+            rc = get_page_from_l4e(l4e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1801,7 +1827,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_pte = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = 0;
-                 if ( rc == -EINTR )
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                 else
-@@ -1853,19 +1879,20 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l2_pgentry_t *pl2e;
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( ; ; )
-     {
-         if ( is_guest_l2_slot(d, page->u.inuse.type_info, i) )
--            rc = put_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, partial, false);
-+            rc = put_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
- 
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
- 
-         if ( !i-- )
-             break;
-@@ -1887,12 +1914,14 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
- 
-@@ -1904,18 +1933,19 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l3_pgentry_t *pl3e;
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int  i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( ; ; )
-     {
--        rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
-+        rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
- 
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
-         if ( rc == 0 )
-             pl3e[i] = unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
- 
-@@ -1934,12 +1964,14 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
-     return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
-@@ -1950,26 +1982,29 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l4_pgentry_t *pl4e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int  i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     do {
-         if ( is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) )
--            rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
-+            rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
-     } while ( i-- );
- 
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
- 
-@@ -2247,7 +2282,7 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
-         return -EBUSY;
-     }
- 
--    put_page_from_l2e(ol2e, pfn, 0, true);
-+    put_page_from_l2e(ol2e, pfn, PTF_defer);
- 
-     return rc;
- }
-@@ -2315,7 +2350,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
-         if ( !create_pae_xen_mappings(d, pl3e) )
-             BUG();
- 
--    put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, 1);
-+    put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, PTF_defer);
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -2378,7 +2413,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
-         return -EFAULT;
-     }
- 
--    put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, 1);
-+    put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, PTF_defer);
-     return rc;
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_PV */
-@@ -2649,7 +2684,7 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-     if ( !(type & PGT_partial) )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = 1U << PAGETABLE_ORDER;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-     }
- 
-     switch ( type & PGT_type_mask )
-@@ -2946,7 +2981,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-         if ( !(x & PGT_partial) )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = 0;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-         }
-         page->linear_pt_count = 0;
-         rc = alloc_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
-@@ -3122,7 +3157,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(mfn_t mfn)
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
-+    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, PTF_preemptible);
-     switch ( rc )
-     {
-     case 0:
-@@ -3473,7 +3508,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-             if ( op.arg1.mfn != 0 )
-             {
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--                    _mfn(op.arg1.mfn), PGT_root_page_table, currd, 0, 1);
-+                    _mfn(op.arg1.mfn), PGT_root_page_table, currd, PTF_preemptible);
- 
-                 if ( unlikely(rc) )
-                 {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 6faa563167..8406ac3c37 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -228,19 +228,34 @@ struct page_info
-          * setting the flag must not drop that reference, whereas the instance
-          * clearing it will have to.
-          *
--         * If @partial_pte is positive then PTE at @nr_validated_ptes+1 has
--         * been partially validated. This implies that the general reference
--         * to the page (acquired from get_page_from_lNe()) would be dropped
--         * (again due to the apparent failure) and hence must be re-acquired
--         * when resuming the validation, but must not be dropped when picking
--         * up the page for invalidation.
-+         * If partial_flags & PTF_partial_set is set, then the page at
-+         * at @nr_validated_ptes had PGT_partial set as a result of an
-+         * operation on the current page.  (That page may or may not
-+         * still have PGT_partial set.)
-          *
--         * If @partial_pte is negative then PTE at @nr_validated_ptes+1 has
--         * been partially invalidated. This is basically the opposite case of
--         * above, i.e. the general reference to the page was not dropped in
--         * put_page_from_lNe() (due to the apparent failure), and hence it
--         * must be dropped when the put operation is resumed (and completes),
--         * but it must not be acquired if picking up the page for validation.
-+         * If PTF_partial_general_ref is set, then the PTE at
-+         * @nr_validated_ptef holds a general reference count for the
-+         * page.
-+         *
-+         * This happens:
-+         * - During de-validation, if de-validation of the page was
-+         *   interrupted
-+         * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-+         *   validation is preemptible
-+         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
-+         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because we're picking
-+         *   up from a partial de-validation).
-+         *
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is clear,
-+         * then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
-+         * reference should be acquired.
-+         *
-+         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-+         * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
-+         * reference should be dropped.
-+         *
-+         * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
-+         * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-          *
-          * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
-          * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
-@@ -251,7 +266,7 @@ struct page_info
-         struct {
-             u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
-             u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
--            s16 partial_pte:2;
-+            u16 partial_flags:2;
-             s16 linear_pt_count;
-         };
- 
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0004-x86-mm-Use-flags-for-_put_page_type-rather-than-a-bo.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0004-x86-mm-Use-flags-for-_put_page_type-rather-than-a-bo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d07c233225664..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0004-x86-mm-Use-flags-for-_put_page_type-rather-than-a-bo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-From db1d801aa8dcb918a27486a6e8d9cf5d7307dec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/11] x86/mm: Use flags for _put_page_type rather than a
- boolean
-
-This is in mainly in preparation for _put_page_type taking the
-partial_flags value in the future.  It also makes it easier to read in
-the caller (since you see a flag name rather than `true` or `false`).
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 3f6f8cc9b8..0740b61af8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_PV */
- 
--static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-                           struct page_info *ptpg);
- 
- void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner)
-@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
-             ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-         }
-         else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         }
-         else
-         {
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-             if ( likely(!rc) )
-                 put_page(pg);
-         }
-@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-          PTF_partial_set )
-     {
-         ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--        return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     }
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+    rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     if ( likely(!rc) )
-         put_page(pg);
- 
-@@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
-             ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+            return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         }
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-             return 0;
-         }
- 
--        rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         if ( likely(!rc) )
-             put_page(pg);
-     }
-@@ -2757,10 +2757,11 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- }
- 
- 
--static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-                           struct page_info *ptpg)
- {
-     unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
-+    bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible;
- 
-     ASSERT(current_locked_page_ne_check(page));
- 
-@@ -2969,7 +2970,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
-             if ( unlikely(iommu_ret) )
-             {
--                _put_page_type(page, false, NULL);
-+                _put_page_type(page, 0, NULL);
-                 rc = iommu_ret;
-                 goto out;
-             }
-@@ -2996,7 +2997,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
- void put_page_type(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    int rc = _put_page_type(page, false, NULL);
-+    int rc = _put_page_type(page, 0, NULL);
-     ASSERT(rc == 0);
-     (void)rc;
- }
-@@ -3013,7 +3014,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- 
- int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    return _put_page_type(page, true, NULL);
-+    return _put_page_type(page, PTF_preemptible, NULL);
- }
- 
- int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-@@ -3030,7 +3031,7 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
-         return 0;
- 
--    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, true,
-+    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, PTF_preemptible,
-                                  v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
-     {
-     case -EINTR:
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0005-x86-mm-Rework-get_page_and_type_from_mfn-conditional.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0005-x86-mm-Rework-get_page_and_type_from_mfn-conditional.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9cfbb739079b5..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0005-x86-mm-Rework-get_page_and_type_from_mfn-conditional.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From 6f257854c8778774210281c5c21028c4b7739b44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/11] x86/mm: Rework get_page_and_type_from_mfn conditional
-
-Make it easier to read by declaring the conditions in which we will
-retain the ref, rather than the conditions under which we release it.
-
-The only way (page == current->arch.old_guest_table) can be true is if
-preemptible is true; so remove this from the query itself, and add an
-ASSERT() to that effect on the opposite path.
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-NB that alloc_lN_table() mishandle the "linear pt failure" situation
-described in the comment; this will be addressed in a future patch.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 0740b61af8..0a4d39a2c3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1122,8 +1122,43 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
- 
-     rc = _get_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(rc) && !partial_ref &&
--         (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
-+    /*
-+     * Retain the refcount if:
-+     * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-+     * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
-+     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-+     *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-+     *
-+     * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-+     * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
-+     * - mfn has been partially demoted as type `type`; i.e. has
-+     *   PGT_partial set
-+     * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-+     *   page; e.g. we're being called from get_page_from_l2e with
-+     *   type == PGT_l1_table, but the mfn is PGT_l2_table)
-+     *
-+     * If there's an error, in the first case, _get_page_type will
-+     * either return -ERESTART, in which case we want to retain the
-+     * ref (as the caller will consider it retained), or -EINVAL, in
-+     * which case old_guest_table will be set; in both cases, we need
-+     * to retain the ref.
-+     *
-+     * In the second case, if there's an error, _get_page_type() can
-+     * *only* return -EINVAL, and *never* set old_guest_table.  In
-+     * that case we also want to retain the reference, to allow the
-+     * page to continue to be torn down (i.e., PGT_partial cleared)
-+     * safely.
-+     *
-+     * Also note that we shouldn't be able to leave with the reference
-+     * count retained unless we succeeded, or the operation was
-+     * preemptible.
-+     */
-+    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-+        /* nothing */;
-+    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+        ASSERT(preemptible);
-+    else
-         put_page(page);
- 
-     return rc;
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0006-x86-mm-Have-alloc_l-23-_table-clear-partial_flags-wh.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0006-x86-mm-Have-alloc_l-23-_table-clear-partial_flags-wh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 72ee3eac9e4e5..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0006-x86-mm-Have-alloc_l-23-_table-clear-partial_flags-wh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From 4ad70553611a7a4e4494d5a3b51b5cc295a488e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/11] x86/mm: Have alloc_l[23]_table clear partial_flags when
- preempting
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page
-struct: nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated.
-
-At the moment, a distinction is made between promotion and demotion
-with regard to whether the entry itself "holds" a general reference
-count: when entry promotion is interrupted (i.e., returns -ERESTART),
-the entry is not considered to hold a reference; when entry demotion
-is interrupted, the entry is still considered to hold a general
-reference.
-
-PTF_partial_general_ref is used to distinguish between these cases.
-If clear, it's a partial promotion => no general reference count held
-by the entry; if set, it's partial demotion, so a general reference
-count held.  Because promotions and demotions can be interleaved, this
-value is passed to get_page_and_type_from_mfn and put_page_from_l*e,
-to be able to properly handle reference counts.
-
-Unfortunately, when alloc_l[23]_table check hypercall_preempt_check()
-and return -ERESTART, they set nr_entries_validated, but don't clear
-partial_flags.
-
-If we were picking up from a previously-interrupted promotion, that
-means that PTF_partial_set would be set even though
-[nr_entries_validated] was not partially validated.  This means that
-if the page in this state were de-validated, put_page_type() would
-erroneously be called on that entry.
-
-Perhaps worse, if we were racing with a de-validation, then we might
-leave both PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref; and when
-de-validation picked up again, both the type and the general ref would
-be erroneously dropped from [nr_entries_validated].
-
-In a sense, the real issue here is code duplication.  Rather than
-duplicate the interruption code, set rc to -EINTR and fall through to
-the code which already handles that case correctly.
-
-Given the logic at this point, it should be impossible for
-partial_flags to be non-zero; add an ASSERT() to catch any changes.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 25 ++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 0a4d39a2c3..bbd29a68f4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1554,21 +1554,13 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
--        l2_pgentry_t l2e;
-+        l2_pgentry_t l2e = pl2e[i];
- 
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
--            break;
--        }
--
--        if ( !is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, i) )
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-+        else if ( !is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, i) )
-             continue;
--
--        l2e = pl2e[i];
--
--        if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+        else if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
-             if ( !pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, l2e) )
-                 continue;
-@@ -1640,13 +1632,8 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         l3_pgentry_t l3e = pl3e[i];
- 
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
--            break;
--        }
--
--        if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (i == 3) )
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-+        else if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (i == 3) )
-         {
-             if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ||
-                  (l3e_get_flags(l3e) & l3_disallow_mask(d)) )
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0007-x86-mm-Always-retain-a-general-ref-on-partial.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0007-x86-mm-Always-retain-a-general-ref-on-partial.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ef390e2b137db..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0007-x86-mm-Always-retain-a-general-ref-on-partial.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-From 51fe4e67d954649fcf103116be6206a769f0db1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/11] x86/mm: Always retain a general ref on partial
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page struct:
-nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated.
-
-At the moment, a distinction is made between promotion and demotion
-with regard to whether the entry itself "holds" a general reference
-count: when entry promotion is interrupted (i.e., returns -ERESTART),
-the entry is not considered to hold a reference; when entry demotion
-is interrupted, the entry is still considered to hold a general
-reference.
-
-PTF_partial_general_ref is used to distinguish between these cases.
-If clear, it's a partial promotion => no general reference count held
-by the entry; if set, it's partial demotion, so a general reference
-count held.  Because promotions and demotions can be interleaved, this
-value is passed to get_page_and_type_from_mfn and put_page_from_l*e,
-to be able to properly handle reference counts.
-
-Unfortunately, because a refcount is not held, it is possible to
-engineer a situation where PFT_partial_set is set but the page in
-question has been assigned to another domain.  A sketch is provided in
-the appendix.
-
-Fix this by having the parent page table entry hold a general
-reference count whenever PFT_partial_set is set.  (For clarity of
-change, keep two separate flags.  These will be collapsed in a
-subsequent changeset.)
-
-This has two basic implications.  On the put_page_from_lNe() side,
-this mean that the (partial_set && !partial_ref) case can never happen,
-and no longer needs to be special-cased.
-
-Secondly, because both flags are set together, there's no need to carry over
-existing bits from partial_pte.
-
-(NB there is still another issue with calling _put_page_type() on a
-page which had PGT_partial set; that will be handled in a subsequent
-patch.)
-
-On the get_page_and_type_from_mfn() side, we need to distinguish
-between callers which hold a reference on partial (i.e.,
-alloc_lN_table()), and those which do not (new_cr3, PIN_LN_TABLE, and
-so on): pass a flag if the type should be retained on interruption.
-
-NB that since l1 promotion can't be preempted, that get_page_from_l2e
-can't return -ERESTART.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-* Appendix: Engineering PTF_partial_set while a page belongs to a
-  foreign domain
-
-Suppose A is a page which can be promoted to an l3, and B is a page
-which can be promoted to an l2, and A[x] points to B.  B has
-PGC_allocated set but no other general references.
-
-V1:  PIN_L3 A.
-  A is validated, B is validated.
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated | PGT_pinned
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated (A[x] holds a general ref)
-
-V1: UNPIN A.
-  A begins de-validation.
-  Arrange to be interrupted when i < x
-  V1->old_guest_table = A
-  V1->old_guest_table_ref_held = false
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = i < x
-  B.type_count = 0
-  B.count = 1 | PGC_allocated
-
-V2: MOD_L4_ENTRY to point some l4e to A.
-  Picks up re-validation of A.
-  Arrange to be interrupted halfway through B's validation
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated (PGT_partial holds a general ref)
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = x
-  A.partial_pte = PTF_partial_set
-
-V3: MOD_L3_ENTRY to point some other l3e (not in A) to B.
-  Validates B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated ("other l3e" holds a general ref)
-
-V3: MOD_L3_ENTRY to clear l3e pointing to B.
-  Devalidates B.
-  B.type_count = 0
-  B.count = 1 | PGC_allocated
-
-V3: decrease_reservation(B)
-  Clears PGC_allocated
-  B.count = 0 => B is freed
-
-B gets assigned to a different domain
-
-V1: Restarts UNPIN of A
-  put_old_guest_table(A)
-    ...
-      free_l3_table(A)
-
-Now since A.partial_flags has PTF_partial_set, free_l3_table() will
-call put_page_from_l3e() on A[x], which points to B, while B is owned
-by another domain.
-
-If A[x] held a general refcount for B on partial validation, as it does
-for partial de-validation, then B would still have a reference count of
-1 after PGC_allocated was freed; so B wouldn't be freed until after
-put_page_from_l3e() had happend on A[x].
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 15 ++++---
- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index bbd29a68f4..4d3ebf341d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1102,10 +1102,11 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
-  * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-  * more information.
-  */
--#define PTF_partial_set         (1 << 0)
--#define PTF_partial_general_ref (1 << 1)
--#define PTF_preemptible         (1 << 2)
--#define PTF_defer               (1 << 3)
-+#define PTF_partial_set           (1 << 0)
-+#define PTF_partial_general_ref   (1 << 1)
-+#define PTF_preemptible           (1 << 2)
-+#define PTF_defer                 (1 << 3)
-+#define PTF_retain_ref_on_restart (1 << 4)
- 
- static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
-@@ -1114,7 +1115,11 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-     bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
--         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref,
-+         partial_set = flags & PTF_partial_set,
-+         retain_ref  = flags & PTF_retain_ref_on_restart;
-+
-+    ASSERT(partial_ref == partial_set);
- 
-     if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-@@ -1127,13 +1132,15 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-      * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
-      *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - page is partially validated (rc == -ERESTART), and the
-+     *     caller has asked the ref to be retained in that case
-      *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-      *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-      *
-      * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-      * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
--     * - mfn has been partially demoted as type `type`; i.e. has
--     *   PGT_partial set
-+     * - mfn has been partially promoted / demoted as type `type`;
-+     *   i.e. has PGT_partial set
-      * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-      *   page; e.g. we're being called from get_page_from_l2e with
-      *   type == PGT_l1_table, but the mfn is PGT_l2_table)
-@@ -1156,7 +1163,8 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      */
-     if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-         /* nothing */;
--    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table ||
-+              (retain_ref && rc == -ERESTART) )
-         ASSERT(preemptible);
-     else
-         put_page(page);
-@@ -1354,8 +1362,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-+            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+            BUG();
-         }
-         else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-@@ -1400,8 +1408,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-     if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-          PTF_partial_set )
-     {
--        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--        return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+        BUG();
-     }
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1431,8 +1439,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-         if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+            BUG();
-         }
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1569,13 +1577,22 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-         else
-             rc = get_page_from_l2e(l2e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
- 
--        if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            /* Set 'set', retain 'general ref' */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
--        }
--        else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-+        /*
-+         * It shouldn't be possible for get_page_from_l2e to return
-+         * -ERESTART, since we never call this with PTF_preemptible.
-+         * (alloc_l1_table may return -EINTR on an L1TF-vulnerable
-+         * entry.)
-+         *
-+         * NB that while on a "clean" promotion, we can never get
-+         * PGT_partial.  It is possible to arrange for an l2e to
-+         * contain a partially-devalidated l2; but in that case, both
-+         * of the following functions will fail anyway (the first
-+         * because the page in question is not an l1; the second
-+         * because the page is not fully validated).
-+         */
-+        ASSERT(rc != -ERESTART);
-+
-+        if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             page->partial_flags = 0;
-@@ -1584,6 +1601,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-         else if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR )
-         {
-             gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Failure in alloc_l2_table: slot %#x\n", i);
-+            ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-@@ -1642,7 +1660,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-                     l3e_get_mfn(l3e),
-                     PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d,
--                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible);
-+                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart);
-         }
-         else if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
-@@ -1651,13 +1669,14 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-             rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
--            rc = get_page_from_l3e(l3e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
-+            rc = get_page_from_l3e(l3e, pfn, d,
-+                                   partial_flags | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart);
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-@@ -1833,13 +1852,14 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             rc = -EINTR;
-         }
-         else
--            rc = get_page_from_l4e(l4e, pfn, d, partial_flags);
-+            rc = get_page_from_l4e(l4e, pfn, d,
-+                                   partial_flags | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart);
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1936,9 +1956,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -1986,9 +2004,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -2019,9 +2035,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 8406ac3c37..02079e1324 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -238,22 +238,25 @@ struct page_info
-          * page.
-          *
-          * This happens:
--         * - During de-validation, if de-validation of the page was
-+         * - During validation or de-validation, if the operation was
-          *   interrupted
-          * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-          *   validation is preemptible
-          * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
--         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because we're picking
--         *   up from a partial de-validation).
-+         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-+         *   previous operation)
-          *
--         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is clear,
--         * then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
--         * reference should be acquired.
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-+         * clear, then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it
-+         * is set, no reference should be acquired.
-          *
-          * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-          * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
-          * reference should be dropped.
-          *
-+         * NB at the moment, PTF_partial_set should be set if and only if
-+         * PTF_partial_general_ref is set.
-+         *
-          * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
-          * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-          *
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0008-x86-mm-Collapse-PTF_partial_set-and-PTF_partial_gene.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0008-x86-mm-Collapse-PTF_partial_set-and-PTF_partial_gene.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6cf41d1cd6941..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0008-x86-mm-Collapse-PTF_partial_set-and-PTF_partial_gene.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-From 8a8d836f7f7418e659d37817a66cd7a6b115042b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] x86/mm: Collapse PTF_partial_set and
- PTF_partial_general_ref into one
-
-...now that they are equivalent.  No functional change intended.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 50 +++++++++++-----------------------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 29 +++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 4d3ebf341d..886e93b8aa 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1097,13 +1097,12 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
- 
- /*
-  * The following flags are used to specify behavior of various get and
-- * put commands.  The first two are also stored in page->partial_flags
-- * to indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-+ * put commands.  The first is also stored in page->partial_flags to
-+ * indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-  * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-  * more information.
-  */
- #define PTF_partial_set           (1 << 0)
--#define PTF_partial_general_ref   (1 << 1)
- #define PTF_preemptible           (1 << 2)
- #define PTF_defer                 (1 << 3)
- #define PTF_retain_ref_on_restart (1 << 4)
-@@ -1115,13 +1114,10 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-     bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
--         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref,
-          partial_set = flags & PTF_partial_set,
-          retain_ref  = flags & PTF_retain_ref_on_restart;
- 
--    ASSERT(partial_ref == partial_set);
--
--    if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-+    if ( likely(!partial_set) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
-@@ -1131,14 +1127,14 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * Retain the refcount if:
-      * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-      * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
--     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_set)
-      *   - page is partially validated (rc == -ERESTART), and the
-      *     caller has asked the ref to be retained in that case
-      *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-      *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-      *
--     * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
--     * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
-+     * The partial_set-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-+     * are two scenarios where partial_set might be true coming in:
-      * - mfn has been partially promoted / demoted as type `type`;
-      *   i.e. has PGT_partial set
-      * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-@@ -1161,7 +1157,7 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * count retained unless we succeeded, or the operation was
-      * preemptible.
-      */
--    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-+    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_set )
-         /* nothing */;
-     else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table ||
-               (retain_ref && rc == -ERESTART) )
-@@ -1359,13 +1355,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
-         struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
--        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--              PTF_partial_set )
--        {
--            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--            BUG();
--        }
--        else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-+        if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1405,13 +1395,6 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     pg = l3e_get_page(l3e);
- 
--    if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--         PTF_partial_set )
--    {
--        /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--        BUG();
--    }
--
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-@@ -1436,13 +1419,6 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-     {
-         struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e);
- 
--        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--              PTF_partial_set )
--        {
--            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--            BUG();
--        }
--
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-@@ -1676,7 +1652,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-@@ -1859,7 +1835,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1956,7 +1932,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -2004,7 +1980,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -2035,7 +2011,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 02079e1324..f0fd35bf6b 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ struct page_info
-          * operation on the current page.  (That page may or may not
-          * still have PGT_partial set.)
-          *
--         * If PTF_partial_general_ref is set, then the PTE at
-+         * Additionally, if PTF_partial_set is set, then the PTE at
-          * @nr_validated_ptef holds a general reference count for the
-          * page.
-          *
-@@ -242,23 +242,20 @@ struct page_info
-          *   interrupted
-          * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-          *   validation is preemptible
--         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
--         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-+         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_set was set on this
-+         *   entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-          *   previous operation)
-          *
--         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
--         * clear, then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it
--         * is set, no reference should be acquired.
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_set is clear, then
-+         * a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
-+         * reference should be acquired.
-          *
--         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
--         * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
--         * reference should be dropped.
-+         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_set is clear,
-+         * no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a reference
-+         * should be dropped.
-          *
--         * NB at the moment, PTF_partial_set should be set if and only if
--         * PTF_partial_general_ref is set.
--         *
--         * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
--         * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-+         * NB that PTF_partial_set is defined in mm.c, the only place
-+         * where it is used.
-          *
-          * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
-          * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
-@@ -268,8 +265,8 @@ struct page_info
-          */
-         struct {
-             u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
--            u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
--            u16 partial_flags:2;
-+            u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 1;
-+            u16 partial_flags:1;
-             s16 linear_pt_count;
-         };
- 
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0009-x86-mm-Properly-handle-linear-pagetable-promotion-fa.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0009-x86-mm-Properly-handle-linear-pagetable-promotion-fa.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bbaba794fc7bc..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0009-x86-mm-Properly-handle-linear-pagetable-promotion-fa.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From da3d1d258e54fe600f7f75287183b74d957ec63b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] x86/mm: Properly handle linear pagetable promotion
- failures
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page
-struct: nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated, and a general reference count is held.
-
-Unfortunately, in cases where an entry began with PTF_partial_set set,
-and get_page_from_lNe() returns -EINVAL, the PTF_partial_set bit is
-erroneously dropped.  (This scenario can be engineered mainly by the
-use of interleaving of promoting and demoting a page which has "linear
-pagetable" entries; see the appendix for a sketch.)  This means that
-we will "leak" a general reference count on the page in question,
-preventing the page from being freed.
-
-Fix this by setting page->partial_flags to the partial_flags local
-variable.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-Appendix
-
-Suppose A and B can both be promoted to L2 pages, and A[x] points to B.
-
-V1: PIN_L2 B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: MOD_L3_ENTRY pointing something to A.
-  In the process of validating A[x], grab an extra type / ref on B:
-  B.type_count = 2 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 3 | PGC_allocated
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  A.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: UNPIN B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validate
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: MOD_L3_ENTRY removing the reference to A.
-  De-validate A, down to A[x], which points to B.
-  Drop the final type on B.  Arrange to be interrupted.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = x
-  A.partial_pte = -1
-
-V2: MOD_L3_ENTRY adds a reference to A.
-
-At this point, get_page_from_l2e(A[x]) tries
-get_page_and_type_from_mfn(), which fails because it's the wrong type;
-and get_l2_linear_pagetable() also fails, because B isn't validated as
-an l2 anymore.
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 886e93b8aa..0a094291da 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_flags = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-             }
-@@ -1674,7 +1674,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         if ( i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_flags = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1845,7 +1845,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_flags = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 if ( rc == -EINTR )
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                 else
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0010-x86-mm-Fix-nested-de-validation-on-error.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0010-x86-mm-Fix-nested-de-validation-on-error.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d5f022e892c4..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0010-x86-mm-Fix-nested-de-validation-on-error.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-From b3e169dc8daeae85b0b51c25fdb142e2e552ec7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/11] x86/mm: Fix nested de-validation on error
-
-If an invalid entry is discovered when validating a page-table tree,
-the entire tree which has so far been validated must be de-validated.
-Since this may take a long time, alloc_l[2-4]_table() set current
-vcpu's old_guest_table immediately; put_old_guest_table() will make
-sure that put_page_type() will be called to finish off the
-de-validation before any other MMU operations can happen on the vcpu.
-
-The invariant for partial pages should be:
-
-* Entries [0, nr_validated_ptes) should be completely validated;
-  put_page_type() will de-validate these.
-
-* If [nr_validated_ptes] is partially validated, partial_flags should
-  set PTF_partiaL_set.  put_page_type() will be called on this page to
-  finish off devalidation, and the appropriate refcount adjustments
-  will be done.
-
-alloc_l[2-3]_table() indicates partial validation to its callers by
-setting current->old_guest_table.
-
-Unfortunately, this is mishandled.
-
-Take the case where validating lNe[x] returns an error.
-
-First, alloc_l3_table() doesn't check old_guest_table at all; as a
-result, partial_flags is not set when it should be.  nr_validated_ptes
-is set to x; and since PFT_partial_set clear, de-validation resumes at
-nr_validated_ptes-1.  This means that the l2 page at pl3e[x] will not
-have put_page_type() called on it when de-validating the rest of the
-l3: it will be stuck in the PGT_partial state until the domain is
-destroyed, or until it is re-used as an l2.  (Any other page type will
-fail.)
-
-Worse, alloc_l4_table(), rather than setting PTF_partial_set as it
-should, sets nr_validated_ptes to x+1.  When de-validating, since
-partial is 0, this will correctly resume calling put_page_type at [x];
-but, if the put_page_type() is never called, but instead
-get_page_type() is called, validation will pick up at [x+1],
-neglecting to validate [x].  If the rest of the validation succeeds,
-the l4 will be validated even though [x] is invalid.
-
-Fix this in both cases by setting PTF_partial_set if old_guest_table
-is set.
-
-While here, add some safety catches:
-- old_guest_table must point to the page contained in
-  [nr_validated_ptes].
-- alloc_l1_page shouldn't set old_guest_table
-
-If we experience one of these situations in production builds, it's
-safer to avoid calling put_page_type for the pages in question.  If
-they have PGT_partial set, they will be cleaned up on domain
-destruction; if not, we have no idea whether a type count is safe to
-drop.  Retaining an extra type ref that should have been dropped may
-trigger a BUG() on the free_domain_page() path, but dropping a type
-count that shouldn't be dropped may cause a privilege escalation.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 0a094291da..a432e69c74 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1580,6 +1580,20 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-             if ( i )
-             {
-+                /*
-+                 * alloc_l1_table() doesn't set old_guest_table; it does
-+                 * its own tear-down immediately on failure.  If it
-+                 * did we'd need to check it and set partial_flags as we
-+                 * do in alloc_l[34]_table().
-+                 *
-+                 * Note on the use of ASSERT: if it's non-null and
-+                 * hasn't been cleaned up yet, it should have
-+                 * PGT_partial set; and so the type will be cleaned up
-+                 * on domain destruction.  Unfortunately, we would
-+                 * leak the general ref held by old_guest_table; but
-+                 * leaking a page is less bad than a host crash.
-+                 */
-+                ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-                 page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-@@ -1607,6 +1621,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned int   i;
-     int            rc = 0;
-     unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
-+    l3_pgentry_t   l3e = l3e_empty();
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-@@ -1623,7 +1638,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
--        l3_pgentry_t l3e = pl3e[i];
-+        l3e = pl3e[i];
- 
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-             rc = -EINTR;
-@@ -1675,6 +1690,24 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-+            if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+            {
-+                /*
-+                 * We've experienced a validation failure.  If
-+                 * old_guest_table is set, "transfer" the general
-+                 * reference count to pl3e[nr_validated_ptes] by
-+                 * setting PTF_partial_set.
-+                 *
-+                 * As a precaution, check that old_guest_table is the
-+                 * page pointed to by pl3e[nr_validated_ptes].  If
-+                 * not, it's safer to leak a type ref on production
-+                 * builds.
-+                 */
-+                if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l3e_get_page(l3e) )
-+                    page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                else
-+                    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+            }
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1851,7 +1884,23 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-                 else
-                 {
-                     if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
--                        page->nr_validated_ptes++;
-+                    {
-+                        /*
-+                         * We've experienced a validation failure.  If
-+                         * old_guest_table is set, "transfer" the general
-+                         * reference count to pl3e[nr_validated_ptes] by
-+                         * setting PTF_partial_set.
-+                         *
-+                         * As a precaution, check that old_guest_table is the
-+                         * page pointed to by pl4e[nr_validated_ptes].  If
-+                         * not, it's safer to leak a type ref on production
-+                         * builds.
-+                         */
-+                        if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l4e_get_page(l4e) )
-+                            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                        else
-+                            ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                    }
-                     current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                 }
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0011-x86-mm-Don-t-drop-a-type-ref-unless-you-held-a-ref-t.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0011-x86-mm-Don-t-drop-a-type-ref-unless-you-held-a-ref-t.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ad7e6fee1b9d9..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa299-4.12-0011-x86-mm-Don-t-drop-a-type-ref-unless-you-held-a-ref-t.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
-From ea3dc624c5e6325a9c2f079e52a85965d4ab6ce8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 11/11] x86/mm: Don't drop a type ref unless you held a ref to
- begin with
-
-Validation and de-validation of pagetable trees may take arbitrarily
-large amounts of time, and so must be preemptible.  This is indicated
-by setting the PGT_partial bit in the type_info, and setting
-nr_validated_entries and partial_flags appropriately.  Specifically,
-if the entry at [nr_validated_entries] is partially validated,
-partial_flags should have the PGT_partial_set bit set, and the entry
-should hold a general reference count.  During de-validation,
-put_page_type() is called on partially validated entries.
-
-Unfortunately, there are a number of issues with the current algorithm.
-
-First, doing a "normal" put_page_type() is not safe when no type ref
-is held: there is nothing to stop another vcpu from coming along and
-picking up validation again: at which point the put_page_type may drop
-the only page ref on an in-use page.  Some examples are listed in the
-appendix.
-
-The core issue is that put_page_type() is being called both to clean
-up PGT_partial, and to drop a type count; and has no way of knowing
-which is which; and so if in between, PGT_partial is cleared,
-put_page_type() will drop the type ref erroneously.
-
-What is needed is to distinguish between two states:
-- Dropping a type ref which is held
-- Cleaning up a page which has been partially de/validated
-
-Fix this by telling put_page_type() which of the two activities you
-intend.
-
-When cleaning up a partial de/validation, take no action unless you
-find a page partially validated.
-
-If put_page_type() is called without PTF_partial_set, and finds the
-page in a PGT_partial state anyway, then there's certainly been a
-misaccounting somewhere, and carrying on would almost certainly cause
-a security issue, so crash the host instead.
-
-In put_page_from_lNe, pass partial_flags on to _put_page_type().
-
-old_guest_table may be set either with a fully validated page (when
-using the "deferred put" pattern), or with a partially validated page
-(when a normal "de-validation" is interrupted, or when a validation
-fails part-way through due to invalid entries).  Add a flag,
-old_guest_table_partial, to indicate which of these it is, and use
-that to pass the appropriate flag to _put_page_type().
-
-While here, delete stray trailing whitespace.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-Appendix:
-
-Suppose page A, when interpreted as an l3 pagetable, contains all
-valid entries; and suppose A[x] points to page B, which when
-interpreted as an l2 pagetable, contains all valid entries.
-
-P1: PIN_L3_TABLE
-  A -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | valid
-  B -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | valid
-
-P1: UNPIN_TABLE
-  > Arrange to interrupt after B has been de-validated
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 0
-  A:
-    type_info -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | partial
-    nr_validated_enties -> (less than x)
-
-P2: mod_l4_entry to point to A
-  > Arrange for this to be interrupted while B is being validated
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | partial
-    (nr_validated_entires &c set as appropriate)
-  A:
-    type_info -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | partial
-    nr_validated_entries -> x
-    partial_pte = 1
-
-P3: mod_l3_entry some other unrelated l3 to point to B:
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 1
-
-P1: Restart UNPIN_TABLE
-
-At this point, since A.nr_validate_entries == x and A.partial_pte !=
-0, free_l3_table() will call put_page_from_l3e() on pl3e[x], dropping
-its type count to 0 while it's still being pointed to by some other l3
-
-A similar issue arises with old_guest_table.  Consider the following
-scenario:
-
-Suppose A is a page which, when interpreted as an l2, has valid entries
-until entry x, which is invalid.
-
-V1:  PIN_L2_TABLE(A)
-  <Validate until we try to validate [x], get -EINVAL>
-  A -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | PGT_partial
-  V1 -> old_guest_table = A
-  <delayed>
-
-V2: PIN_L2_TABLE(A)
-  <Pick up where V1 left off, try to re-validate [x], get -EINVAL>
-  A -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | PGT_partial
-  V2 -> old_guest_table = A
-  <restart>
-  put_old_guest_table()
-    _put_page_type(A)
-      A -> PGT_l2_table | 0
-
-V1: <restart>
-  put_old_guest_table()
-    _put_page_type(A) # UNDERFLOW
-
-Indeed, it is possible to engineer for old_guest_table for every vcpu
-a guest has to point to the same page.
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c        |  6 +++
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c            | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h |  4 +-
- 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 59df8a6d8d..f1ae5f89f5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1104,9 +1104,15 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                     /* Fallthrough */
-                 case -ERESTART:
-+                    /*
-+                     * NB that we're putting the kernel-mode table
-+                     * here, which we've already successfully
-+                     * validated above; hence partial = false;
-+                     */
-                     v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     v->arch.old_guest_table =
-                         pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
-+                    v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-                     v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
-                     break;
-                 default:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index a432e69c74..81774368a0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1359,10 +1359,11 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-         }
-         else
-         {
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-             if ( likely(!rc) )
-                 put_page(pg);
-         }
-@@ -1385,6 +1386,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-         unsigned long mfn = l3e_get_pfn(l3e);
-         bool writeable = l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_RW;
- 
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-         ASSERT(!(mfn & ((1UL << (L3_PAGETABLE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)));
-         do {
-             put_data_page(mfn_to_page(_mfn(mfn)), writeable);
-@@ -1397,12 +1399,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-         current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+        current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+    rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     if ( likely(!rc) )
-         put_page(pg);
- 
-@@ -1421,12 +1425,15 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-             return 0;
-         }
- 
--        rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible,
-+                            mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         if ( likely(!rc) )
-             put_page(pg);
-     }
-@@ -1535,6 +1542,14 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-+    /*
-+     * NB that alloc_l2_table will never set partial_pte on an l2; but
-+     * free_l2_table might if a linear_pagetable entry is interrupted
-+     * partway through de-validation.  In that circumstance,
-+     * get_page_from_l2e() will always return -EINVAL; and we must
-+     * retain the type ref by doing the normal partial_flags tracking.
-+     */
-+
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-@@ -1598,6 +1613,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-                 page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-             }
-         }
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-@@ -1704,12 +1720,16 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-                  * builds.
-                  */
-                 if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l3e_get_page(l3e) )
-+                {
-+                    ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table_partial);
-                     page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                }
-                 else
-                     ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-             }
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-         }
-         while ( i-- > 0 )
-             pl3e[i] = unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
-@@ -1897,12 +1917,16 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-                          * builds.
-                          */
-                         if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l4e_get_page(l4e) )
-+                        {
-+                            ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table_partial);
-                             page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                        }
-                         else
-                             ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-                     }
-                     current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                    current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-                 }
-             }
-         }
-@@ -2831,6 +2855,28 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-         x  = y;
-         nx = x - 1;
- 
-+        /*
-+         * Is this expected to do a full reference drop, or only
-+         * cleanup partial validation / devalidation?
-+         *
-+         * If the former, the caller must hold a "full" type ref;
-+         * which means the page must be validated.  If the page is
-+         * *not* fully validated, continuing would almost certainly
-+         * open up a security hole.  An exception to this is during
-+         * domain destruction, where PGT_validated can be dropped
-+         * without dropping a type ref.
-+         *
-+         * If the latter, do nothing unless type PGT_partial is set.
-+         * If it is set, the type count must be 1.
-+         */
-+        if ( !(flags & PTF_partial_set) )
-+            BUG_ON((x & PGT_partial) ||
-+                   !((x & PGT_validated) || page_get_owner(page)->is_dying));
-+        else if ( !(x & PGT_partial) )
-+            return 0;
-+        else
-+            BUG_ON((x & PGT_count_mask) != 1);
-+
-         ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) != 0);
- 
-         switch ( nx & (PGT_locked | PGT_count_mask) )
-@@ -3092,17 +3138,34 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
-         return 0;
- 
--    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, PTF_preemptible,
--                                 v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
-+    rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table,
-+                        PTF_preemptible |
-+                        ( v->arch.old_guest_table_partial ?
-+                          PTF_partial_set : 0 ),
-+                        v->arch.old_guest_ptpg);
-+
-+    if ( rc == -ERESTART || rc == -EINTR )
-     {
--    case -EINTR:
--    case -ERESTART:
-+        v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-         return -ERESTART;
--    case 0:
--        put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * It shouldn't be possible for _put_page_type() to return
-+     * anything else at the moment; but if it does happen in
-+     * production, leaking the type ref is probably the best thing to
-+     * do.  Either way, drop the general ref held by old_guest_table.
-+     */
-+    ASSERT(rc == 0);
-+
-+    put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
-     v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
-+    v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-+    /*
-+     * Safest default if someone sets old_guest_table without
-+     * explicitly setting old_guest_table_partial.
-+     */
-+    v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
- 
-     return rc;
- }
-@@ -3253,11 +3316,11 @@ int new_guest_cr3(mfn_t mfn)
-             switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
-             {
-             case -EINTR:
--                rc = -ERESTART;
--                /* fallthrough */
-             case -ERESTART:
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-+                rc = -ERESTART;
-                 break;
-             default:
-                 BUG_ON(rc);
-@@ -3494,6 +3557,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                     {
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                        curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-                     }
-                 }
-             }
-@@ -3528,6 +3592,11 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-             case -ERESTART:
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                /*
-+                 * EINTR means we still hold the type ref; ERESTART
-+                 * means PGT_partial holds the type ref
-+                 */
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-                 rc = 0;
-                 break;
-             default:
-@@ -3596,11 +3665,15 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                 switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
-                 {
-                 case -EINTR:
--                    rc = -ERESTART;
--                    /* fallthrough */
-                 case -ERESTART:
-                     curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                    /*
-+                     * EINTR means we still hold the type ref;
-+                     * ERESTART means PGT_partial holds the ref
-+                     */
-+                    curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-+                    rc = -ERESTART;
-                     break;
-                 default:
-                     BUG_ON(rc);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-index 214e44ce1c..2cfce7b36b 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ struct arch_domain
- 
-     struct paging_domain paging;
-     struct p2m_domain *p2m;
--    /* To enforce lock ordering in the pod code wrt the 
-+    /* To enforce lock ordering in the pod code wrt the
-      * page_alloc lock */
-     int page_alloc_unlock_level;
- 
-@@ -581,6 +581,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu
-     struct page_info *old_guest_table;  /* partially destructed pagetable */
-     struct page_info *old_guest_ptpg;   /* containing page table of the */
-                                         /* former, if any */
-+    bool old_guest_table_partial;       /* Are we dropping a type ref, or just
-+                                         * finishing up a partial de-validation? */
-     /* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
-      * shadow refcounts are in use */
-     pagetable_t shadow_table[4];        /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 54cce2ce28456..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From 19d6330f142cb941b6340a88592e8a294de0ff8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 17:10:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] xen/arm: p2m: Avoid aliasing guest physical frame
-
-The P2M helpers implementation is quite lax and will end up to ignore
-the unused top bits of a guest physical frame.
-
-This effectively means that p2m_set_entry() will create a mapping for a
-different frame (it is always equal to gfn & (mask unused bits)). Yet
-p2m->max_mapped_gfn will be updated using the original frame.
-
-At the moment, p2m_get_entry() and p2m_resolve_translation_fault()
-assume that p2m_get_root_pointer() will always return a non-NULL pointer
-when the GFN is smaller than p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-
-Unfortunately, because of the aliasing described above, it would be
-possible to set p2m->max_mapped_gfn high enough so it covers frame that
-would lead p2m_get_root_pointer() to return NULL.
-
-As we don't sanity check the guest physical frame provided by a guest, a
-malicious guest could craft a series of hypercalls that will hit the
-BUG_ON() and therefore DoS Xen.
-
-To prevent aliasing, the function p2m_get_root_pointer() is now reworked
-to return NULL If any of the unused top bits are not zero. The caller
-can then decide what's the appropriate action to do. Since the two paths
-(i.e. P2M_ROOT_PAGES == 1 and P2M_ROOT_PAGES != 1) are now very
-similarly, take the opportunity to consolidate them making the code a
-bit simpler.
-
-With this change, p2m_get_entry() will not try to insert a mapping as
-the root pointer is invalid.
-
-Note that root_table is now switch to unsigned long as unsigned int is
-not enough to hold part of a GFN.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 17 +++++------------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index a2749d9b6f..d0045a8b28 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -229,21 +229,14 @@ void p2m_tlb_flush_sync(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- static lpae_t *p2m_get_root_pointer(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                     gfn_t gfn)
- {
--    unsigned int root_table;
--
--    if ( P2M_ROOT_PAGES == 1 )
--        return __map_domain_page(p2m->root);
-+    unsigned long root_table;
- 
-     /*
--     * Concatenated root-level tables. The table number will be the
--     * offset at the previous level. It is not possible to
--     * concatenate a level-0 root.
-+     * While the root table index is the offset from the previous level,
-+     * we can't use (P2M_ROOT_LEVEL - 1) because the root level might be
-+     * 0. Yet we still want to check if all the unused bits are zeroed.
-      */
--    ASSERT(P2M_ROOT_LEVEL > 0);
--
--    root_table = gfn_x(gfn) >> (level_orders[P2M_ROOT_LEVEL - 1]);
--    root_table &= LPAE_ENTRY_MASK;
--
-+    root_table = gfn_x(gfn) >> (level_orders[P2M_ROOT_LEVEL] + LPAE_SHIFT);
-     if ( root_table >= P2M_ROOT_PAGES )
-         return NULL;
- 
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index baedc9c29751f..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 3b896936f7505e929dd869d14afcb185d0ee75f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 17:10:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] xen/arm: p2m: Avoid off-by-one check on
- p2m->max_mapped_gfn
-
-The code base is using inconsistently the field p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-Some of the useres expect that p2m->max_guest_gfn contain the highest
-mapped GFN while others expect highest + 1.
-
-p2m->max_guest_gfn is set as highest + 1, because of that the sanity
-check on the GFN in p2m_resolved_translation_fault() and
-p2m_get_entry() can be bypassed when GFN == p2m->max_guest_gfn.
-
-p2m_get_root_pointer(p2m->max_guest_gfn) may return NULL if it is
-outside of address range supported and therefore the BUG_ON() could be
-hit.
-
-The current value hold in p2m->max_mapped_gfn is inconsistent with the
-expectation of the common code (see domain_get_maximum_gpfn()) and also
-the documentation of the field.
-
-Rather than changing the check in p2m_translation_fault() and
-p2m_get_entry(), p2m->max_mapped_gfn is now containing the highest
-mapped GFN and the callers assuming "highest + 1" are now adjusted.
-
-Take the opportunity to use 1UL rather than 1 as page_order could
-theoritically big enough to overflow a 32-bit integer.
-
-Lastly, the documentation of the field max_guest_gfn to reflect how it
-is computed.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c        | 6 +++---
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 5 +----
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index d0045a8b28..8d20d27961 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static int __p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-         p2m_write_pte(entry, pte, p2m->clean_pte);
- 
-         p2m->max_mapped_gfn = gfn_max(p2m->max_mapped_gfn,
--                                      gfn_add(sgfn, 1 << page_order));
-+                                      gfn_add(sgfn, (1UL << page_order) - 1));
-         p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn = gfn_min(p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn, sgfn);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ int relinquish_p2m_mapping(struct domain *d)
-     p2m_write_lock(p2m);
- 
-     start = p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn;
--    end = p2m->max_mapped_gfn;
-+    end = gfn_add(p2m->max_mapped_gfn, 1);
- 
-     for ( ; gfn_x(start) < gfn_x(end);
-           start = gfn_next_boundary(start, order) )
-@@ -1641,7 +1641,7 @@ int p2m_cache_flush_range(struct domain *d, gfn_t *pstart, gfn_t end)
-     p2m_read_lock(p2m);
- 
-     start = gfn_max(start, p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn);
--    end = gfn_min(end, p2m->max_mapped_gfn);
-+    end = gfn_min(end, gfn_add(p2m->max_mapped_gfn, 1));
- 
-     next_block_gfn = start;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 89f82df380..5fdb6e8183 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -36,10 +36,7 @@ struct p2m_domain {
-     /* Current Translation Table Base Register for the p2m */
-     uint64_t vttbr;
- 
--    /*
--     * Highest guest frame that's ever been mapped in the p2m
--     * Only takes into account ram and foreign mapping
--     */
-+    /* Highest guest frame that's ever been mapped in the p2m */
-     gfn_t max_mapped_gfn;
- 
-     /*
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-3.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f137b89f6ef2..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa301-master-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From 060c2dd3b7c2674a019d94afb2b4ebf3663f6c6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 17:10:42 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] xen/arm: p2m: Don't check the return of
- p2m_get_root_pointer() with BUG_ON()
-
-It turns out that the BUG_ON() was actually reachable with well-crafted
-hypercalls. The BUG_ON() is here to prevent catch logical error, so
-crashing Xen is a bit over the top.
-
-While all the holes should now be fixed, it would be better to downgrade
-the BUG_ON() to something less fatal to prevent any more DoS.
-
-The BUG_ON() in p2m_get_entry() is now replaced by ASSERT_UNREACHABLE()
-to catch mistake in debug build and return INVALID_MFN for production
-build. The interface also requires to set page_order to give an idea of
-the size of "hole". So 'level' is now set so we report a hole of size of
-the an entry of the root page-table. This stays inline with what happen
-when the GFN is higher than p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-
-The BUG_ON() in p2m_resolve_translation_fault() is now replaced by
-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() to catch mistake in debug build and just report a
-fault for producion build.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 13 +++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 8d20d27961..ce59f2b503 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -395,7 +395,12 @@ mfn_t p2m_get_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn,
-      * the table should always be non-NULL because the gfn is below
-      * p2m->max_mapped_gfn and the root table pages are always present.
-      */
--    BUG_ON(table == NULL);
-+    if ( !table )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        level = P2M_ROOT_LEVEL;
-+        goto out;
-+    }
- 
-     for ( level = P2M_ROOT_LEVEL; level < 3; level++ )
-     {
-@@ -1196,7 +1201,11 @@ bool p2m_resolve_translation_fault(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn)
-      * The table should always be non-NULL because the gfn is below
-      * p2m->max_mapped_gfn and the root table pages are always present.
-      */
--    BUG_ON(table == NULL);
-+    if ( !table )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        goto out;
-+    }
- 
-     /*
-      * Go down the page-tables until an entry has the valid bit unset or
--- 
-2.23.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0001-IOMMU-add-missing-HVM-check.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0001-IOMMU-add-missing-HVM-check.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d52163406f0c..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0001-IOMMU-add-missing-HVM-check.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 0c9c0fbb356e3210cb77b3d738be50981b26058a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 13:36:59 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] IOMMU: add missing HVM check
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Fix an unguarded d->arch.hvm access in assign_device().
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit 41fd1009cd7416b73d745a77c24b4e8d1a296fe6)
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index 8108ed5f9a..d7420bd8bf 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1452,7 +1452,8 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
- 
-     /* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been 
-      * enabled for this domain */
--    if ( unlikely(d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled ||
-+    if ( unlikely((is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-+                   d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled) ||
-                   vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) ||
-                   p2m_get_hostp2m(d)->global_logdirty) )
-         return -EXDEV;
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0002-passthrough-quarantine-PCI-devices.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0002-passthrough-quarantine-PCI-devices.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 181ece3bb72a2..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa302-4.12-0002-passthrough-quarantine-PCI-devices.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
-From 278d8e585a9f110a1af0bd92a9fc43733c9c7227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 17:52:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] passthrough: quarantine PCI devices
-
-When a PCI device is assigned to an untrusted domain, it is possible for
-that domain to program the device to DMA to an arbitrary address. The
-IOMMU is used to protect the host from malicious DMA by making sure that
-the device addresses can only target memory assigned to the guest. However,
-when the guest domain is torn down the device is assigned back to dom0,
-thus allowing any in-flight DMA to potentially target critical host data.
-
-This patch introduces a 'quarantine' for PCI devices using dom_io. When
-the toolstack makes a device assignable (by binding it to pciback), it
-will now also assign it to DOMID_IO and the device will only be assigned
-back to dom0 when the device is made unassignable again. Whilst device is
-assignable it will only ever transfer between dom_io and guest domains.
-dom_io is actually only used as a sentinel domain for quarantining purposes;
-it is not configured with any IOMMU mappings. Assignment to dom_io simply
-means that the device's initiator (requestor) identifier is not present in
-the IOMMU's device table and thus any DMA transactions issued will be
-terminated with a fault condition.
-
-In addition, a fix to assignment handling is made for VT-d.  Failure
-during the assignment step should not lead to a device still being
-associated with its prior owner. Hand the device to DomIO temporarily,
-until the assignment step has completed successfully.  Remove the PI
-hooks from the source domain then earlier as well.
-
-Failure of the recovery reassign_device_ownership() may not go silent:
-There e.g. may still be left over RMRR mappings in the domain assignment
-to which has failed, and hence we can't allow that domain to continue
-executing.
-
-NOTE: This patch also includes one printk() cleanup; the
-      "XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device: " tag is dropped in iommu_do_pci_domctl(),
-      since similar printk()-s elsewhere also don't log such a tag.
-
-This is XSA-302.
-
-Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ec99857f59f7f06236f11ca8b0b2303e5e745cc4)
----
- tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c                     | 25 +++++++++++-
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                           |  2 +
- xen/common/domctl.c                         | 14 ++++++-
- xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c | 10 ++++-
- xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c             |  9 +++++
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c               | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c         | 40 ++++++++++++++++---
- xen/include/xen/pci.h                       |  3 ++
- 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-index 88c324ea23..d6a23fb5f8 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-@@ -754,6 +754,7 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                             libxl_device_pci *pcidev,
-                                             int rebind)
- {
-+    libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
-     unsigned dom, bus, dev, func;
-     char *spath, *driver_path = NULL;
-     int rc;
-@@ -779,7 +780,7 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-     }
-     if ( rc ) {
-         LOG(WARN, PCI_BDF" already assigned to pciback", dom, bus, dev, func);
--        return 0;
-+        goto quarantine;
-     }
- 
-     /* Check to see if there's already a driver that we need to unbind from */
-@@ -810,6 +811,19 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-         return ERROR_FAIL;
-     }
- 
-+quarantine:
-+    /*
-+     * DOMID_IO is just a sentinel domain, without any actual mappings,
-+     * so always pass XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED to avoid assignment being
-+     * unnecessarily denied.
-+     */
-+    rc = xc_assign_device(ctx->xch, DOMID_IO, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev),
-+                          XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED);
-+    if ( rc < 0 ) {
-+        LOG(ERROR, "failed to quarantine "PCI_BDF, dom, bus, dev, func);
-+        return ERROR_FAIL;
-+    }
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -817,9 +831,18 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_remove(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                                libxl_device_pci *pcidev,
-                                                int rebind)
- {
-+    libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
-     int rc;
-     char *driver_path;
- 
-+    /* De-quarantine */
-+    rc = xc_deassign_device(ctx->xch, DOMID_IO, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev));
-+    if ( rc < 0 ) {
-+        LOG(ERROR, "failed to de-quarantine "PCI_BDF, pcidev->domain, pcidev->bus,
-+            pcidev->dev, pcidev->func);
-+        return ERROR_FAIL;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Unbind from pciback */
-     if ( (rc=pciback_dev_is_assigned(gc, pcidev)) < 0 ) {
-         return ERROR_FAIL;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 3557cd1178..11d753d8d2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -295,9 +295,11 @@ void __init arch_init_memory(void)
-      * Initialise our DOMID_IO domain.
-      * This domain owns I/O pages that are within the range of the page_info
-      * array. Mappings occur at the priv of the caller.
-+     * Quarantined PCI devices will be associated with this domain.
-      */
-     dom_io = domain_create(DOMID_IO, NULL, false);
-     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(dom_io));
-+    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
- 
-     /*
-      * Initialise our COW domain.
-diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
-index d08b6274e2..e3c4be2b48 100644
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -391,6 +391,16 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- 
-     switch ( op->cmd )
-     {
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
-+        if ( op->domain == DOMID_IO )
-+        {
-+            d = dom_io;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        else if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-+            return -ESRCH;
-+        /* fall through */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-         {
-@@ -412,7 +422,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- 
-     if ( !domctl_lock_acquire() )
-     {
--        if ( d )
-+        if ( d && d != dom_io )
-             rcu_unlock_domain(d);
-         return hypercall_create_continuation(
-             __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
-@@ -1074,7 +1084,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
-     domctl_lock_release();
- 
-  domctl_out_unlock_domonly:
--    if ( d )
-+    if ( d && d != dom_io )
-         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- 
-     if ( copyback && __copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1) )
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-index 33a3798f36..15c13e1163 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(
-     u8 bus = pdev->bus;
-     const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(domain);
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     BUG_ON( !hd->arch.root_table || !hd->arch.paging_mode ||
-             !iommu->dev_table.buffer );
- 
-@@ -277,6 +281,10 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(struct domain *domain,
-     int req_id;
-     u8 bus = pdev->bus;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     BUG_ON ( iommu->dev_table.buffer == NULL );
-     req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
-     dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
-@@ -363,7 +371,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8 devfn,
-             ivrs_mappings[req_id].read_permission);
-     }
- 
--    return reassign_device(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
-+    return reassign_device(pdev->domain, d, devfn, pdev);
- }
- 
- static void deallocate_next_page_table(struct page_info *pg, int level)
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-index a6697d58fb..2762e1342f 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-@@ -232,6 +232,9 @@ void iommu_teardown(struct domain *d)
- {
-     struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
- 
-+    if ( d == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     hd->status = IOMMU_STATUS_disabled;
-     hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
-     tasklet_schedule(&iommu_pt_cleanup_tasklet);
-@@ -241,6 +244,9 @@ int iommu_construct(struct domain *d)
- {
-     struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
- 
-+    if ( d == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     if ( hd->status == IOMMU_STATUS_initialized )
-         return 0;
- 
-@@ -521,6 +527,9 @@ int __init iommu_setup(void)
-     printk("I/O virtualisation %sabled\n", iommu_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
-     if ( iommu_enabled )
-     {
-+        if ( iommu_domain_init(dom_io) )
-+            panic("Could not set up quarantine\n");
-+
-         printk(" - Dom0 mode: %s\n",
-                iommu_hwdom_passthrough ? "Passthrough" :
-                iommu_hwdom_strict ? "Strict" : "Relaxed");
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index d7420bd8bf..d66a8a1daf 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1426,19 +1426,29 @@ static int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
-     return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev));
- }
- 
--/*
-- * If the device isn't owned by the hardware domain, it means it already
-- * has been assigned to other domain, or it doesn't exist.
-- */
- static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
- {
-     struct pci_dev *pdev;
-+    int rc = 0;
- 
-     pcidevs_lock();
--    pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    if ( !pdev )
-+        rc = -ENODEV;
-+    /*
-+     * If the device exists and it is not owned by either the hardware
-+     * domain or dom_io then it must be assigned to a guest, or be
-+     * hidden (owned by dom_xen).
-+     */
-+    else if ( pdev->domain != hardware_domain &&
-+              pdev->domain != dom_io )
-+        rc = -EBUSY;
-+
-     pcidevs_unlock();
- 
--    return pdev ? 0 : -EBUSY;
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-@@ -1452,7 +1462,8 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
- 
-     /* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been 
-      * enabled for this domain */
--    if ( unlikely((is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-+    if ( d != dom_io &&
-+         unlikely((is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-                    d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled) ||
-                   vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) ||
-                   p2m_get_hostp2m(d)->global_logdirty) )
-@@ -1468,12 +1479,20 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--    pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
-+    pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    rc = -ENODEV;
-     if ( !pdev )
--    {
--        rc = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn) ? -EBUSY : -ENODEV;
-         goto done;
--    }
-+
-+    rc = 0;
-+    if ( d == pdev->domain )
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    rc = -EBUSY;
-+    if ( pdev->domain != hardware_domain &&
-+         pdev->domain != dom_io )
-+        goto done;
- 
-     if ( pdev->msix )
-         msixtbl_init(d);
-@@ -1496,6 +1515,10 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-     }
- 
-  done:
-+    /* The device is assigned to dom_io so mark it as quarantined */
-+    if ( !rc && d == dom_io )
-+        pdev->quarantine = true;
-+
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) )
-         iommu_teardown(d);
-     pcidevs_unlock();
-@@ -1508,6 +1531,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
- {
-     const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
-     struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
-+    struct domain *target;
-     int ret = 0;
- 
-     if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
-@@ -1518,12 +1542,16 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-     if ( !pdev )
-         return -ENODEV;
- 
-+    /* De-assignment from dom_io should de-quarantine the device */
-+    target = (pdev->quarantine && pdev->domain != dom_io) ?
-+        dom_io : hardware_domain;
-+
-     while ( pdev->phantom_stride )
-     {
-         devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
-         if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
-             break;
--        ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn,
-+        ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, target, devfn,
-                                                 pci_to_dev(pdev));
-         if ( !ret )
-             continue;
-@@ -1534,7 +1562,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-     }
- 
-     devfn = pdev->devfn;
--    ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn,
-+    ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, target, devfn,
-                                             pci_to_dev(pdev));
-     if ( ret )
-     {
-@@ -1544,6 +1572,9 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-         return ret;
-     }
- 
-+    if ( pdev->domain == hardware_domain  )
-+        pdev->quarantine = false;
-+
-     pdev->fault.count = 0;
- 
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) )
-@@ -1722,7 +1753,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
-             ret = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_domctl,
-                                                 "h", u_domctl);
-         else if ( ret )
--            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device: "
-+            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
-                    "assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u to dom%d failed (%d)\n",
-                    seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
-                    d->domain_id, ret);
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-index 1db1cd9f2d..a8d1baa064 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -1338,6 +1338,10 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
-     int agaw, rc, ret;
-     bool_t flush_dev_iotlb;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
-     spin_lock(&iommu->lock);
-     maddr = bus_to_context_maddr(iommu, bus);
-@@ -1573,6 +1577,10 @@ int domain_context_unmap_one(
-     int iommu_domid, rc, ret;
-     bool_t flush_dev_iotlb;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
-     spin_lock(&iommu->lock);
- 
-@@ -1705,6 +1713,10 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(struct domain *domain, u8 devfn,
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        goto out;
-+
-     /*
-      * if no other devices under the same iommu owned by this domain,
-      * clear iommu in iommu_bitmap and clear domain_id in domid_bitmp
-@@ -2441,6 +2453,15 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
-     if ( ret )
-         return ret;
- 
-+    if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
-+    {
-+        list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
-+        pdev->domain = dom_io;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( !has_arch_pdevs(source) )
-+        vmx_pi_hooks_deassign(source);
-+
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(target) )
-         vmx_pi_hooks_assign(target);
- 
-@@ -2459,15 +2480,13 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
-         pdev->domain = target;
-     }
- 
--    if ( !has_arch_pdevs(source) )
--        vmx_pi_hooks_deassign(source);
--
-     return ret;
- }
- 
- static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-     struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev, u32 flag)
- {
-+    struct domain *s = pdev->domain;
-     struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
-     int ret = 0, i;
-     u16 bdf, seg;
-@@ -2510,8 +2529,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-         }
-     }
- 
--    ret = reassign_device_ownership(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
--    if ( ret )
-+    ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
-+    if ( ret || d == dom_io )
-         return ret;
- 
-     /* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
-@@ -2524,11 +2543,20 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-             ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, flag);
-             if ( ret )
-             {
--                reassign_device_ownership(d, hardware_domain, devfn, pdev);
-+                int rc;
-+
-+                rc = reassign_device_ownership(d, s, devfn, pdev);
-                 printk(XENLOG_G_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                        " cannot map reserved region (%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"] for Dom%d (%d)\n",
-                        rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address,
-                        d->domain_id, ret);
-+                if ( rc )
-+                {
-+                    printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
-+                           " failed to reclaim %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from %pd (%d)\n",
-+                           seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), d, rc);
-+                    domain_crash(d);
-+                }
-                 break;
-             }
-         }
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-index 8b21e8dc84..a031fd6020 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
- 
-     nodeid_t node; /* NUMA node */
- 
-+    /* Device to be quarantined, don't automatically re-assign to dom0 */
-+    bool quarantine;
-+
-     /* Device with errata, ignore the BARs. */
-     bool ignore_bars;
- 
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0001-xen-arm32-entry-Split-__DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP-in-two.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0001-xen-arm32-entry-Split-__DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP-in-two.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index afb1096c1d30b..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0001-xen-arm32-entry-Split-__DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP-in-two.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From c8cb33fa64c9ccbfa2a494a9dad2e0a763c09176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 13:07:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/4] xen/arm32: entry: Split __DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP in two
-
-The preprocessing macro __DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP is used to generate trap
-entry function. While the macro is fairly small today, follow-up patches
-will increase the size signicantly.
-
-In general, assembly macros are more readable as they allow you to name
-parameters and avoid '\'. So the actual implementation of the trap is
-now switched to an assembly macro.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 0b4cd19abd..4a762e04f1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -126,24 +126,28 @@ abort_guest_exit_end:
- skip_check:
-         mov pc, lr
- 
--/*
-- * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
-- * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-- */
-+        /*
-+         * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
-+         * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-+         */
-+        .macro vector trap, iflags
-+        SAVE_ALL
-+        cpsie   \iflags
-+        adr     lr, return_from_trap
-+        mov     r0, sp
-+        /*
-+         * Save the stack pointer in r11. It will be restored after the
-+         * trap has been handled (see return_from_trap).
-+         */
-+        mov     r11, sp
-+        bic     sp, #7      /* Align the stack pointer (noop on guest trap) */
-+        b       do_trap_\trap
-+        .endm
-+
- #define __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, iflags)                               \
-         ALIGN;                                                          \
- trap_##trap:                                                            \
--        SAVE_ALL;                                                       \
--        cpsie iflags;                                                   \
--        adr lr, return_from_trap;                                       \
--        mov r0, sp;                                                     \
--        /*                                                              \
--         * Save the stack pointer in r11. It will be restored after the \
--         * trap has been handled (see return_from_trap).                \
--         */                                                             \
--        mov r11, sp;                                                    \
--        bic sp, #7; /* Align the stack pointer (noop on guest trap) */  \
--        b do_trap_##trap
-+        vector trap, iflags
- 
- /* Trap handler which unmask IRQ/Abort, keep FIQ masked */
- #define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, ai)
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0002-xen-arm32-entry-Fold-the-macro-SAVE_ALL-in-the-macro.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0002-xen-arm32-entry-Fold-the-macro-SAVE_ALL-in-the-macro.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 35f9c0475e62c..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0002-xen-arm32-entry-Fold-the-macro-SAVE_ALL-in-the-macro.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From be7379207c83fa74f8a6c22a8ea213f02714776f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 13:15:48 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/4] xen/arm32: entry: Fold the macro SAVE_ALL in the macro
- vector
-
-Follow-up rework will require the macro vector to distinguish between
-a trap from a guest vs while in the hypervisor.
-
-The macro SAVE_ALL already has code to distinguish between the two and
-it is only called by the vector macro. So fold the former into the
-latter. This will help to avoid duplicating the check.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 4a762e04f1..150cbc0b4b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -13,27 +13,6 @@
- #define RESTORE_BANKED(mode) \
-         RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(SP_##mode) ; RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(LR_##mode) ; RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(SPSR_##mode)
- 
--#define SAVE_ALL                                                        \
--        sub sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */      \
--        push {r0-r12}; /* Save R0-R12 */                                \
--                                                                        \
--        mrs r11, ELR_hyp;               /* ELR_hyp is return address. */\
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc];                                       \
--                                                                        \
--        str lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr];                                        \
--                                                                        \
--        add r11, sp, #UREGS_kernel_sizeof+4;                            \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp];                                       \
--                                                                        \
--        mrc CP32(r11, HSR);             /* Save exception syndrome */   \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_hsr];                                      \
--                                                                        \
--        mrs r11, SPSR_hyp;                                              \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr];                                     \
--        and r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK;                                        \
--        cmp r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP;                                         \
--        blne save_guest_regs
--
- save_guest_regs:
- #ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-         /*
-@@ -52,7 +31,7 @@ save_guest_regs:
-         ldr r11, =0xffffffff  /* Clobber SP which is only valid for hypervisor frames. */
-         str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp]
-         SAVE_ONE_BANKED(SP_usr)
--        /* LR_usr is the same physical register as lr and is saved in SAVE_ALL */
-+        /* LR_usr is the same physical register as lr and is saved by the caller */
-         SAVE_BANKED(svc)
-         SAVE_BANKED(abt)
-         SAVE_BANKED(und)
-@@ -131,7 +110,28 @@ skip_check:
-          * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-          */
-         .macro vector trap, iflags
--        SAVE_ALL
-+        /* Save registers in the stack */
-+        sub     sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp) /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
-+        push    {r0-r12}                       /* Save R0-R12 */
-+        mrs     r11, ELR_hyp                   /* ELR_hyp is return address */
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc]
-+
-+        str     lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr]
-+
-+        add     r11, sp, #(UREGS_kernel_sizeof + 4)
-+
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp]
-+
-+        mrc     CP32(r11, HSR)                 /* Save exception syndrome */
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_hsr]
-+
-+        mrs     r11, SPSR_hyp
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr]
-+        and     r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
-+        cmp     r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP
-+        blne    save_guest_regs
-+
-+        /* We are ready to handle the trap, setup the registers and jump. */
-         cpsie   \iflags
-         adr     lr, return_from_trap
-         mov     r0, sp
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0003-xen-arm32-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0003-xen-arm32-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 516845214880c..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0003-xen-arm32-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-From 098fe877967870ffda2dfd9629a5fd272f6aacdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2019 17:49:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] xen/arm32: Don't blindly unmask interrupts on trap
- without a change of level
-
-Exception vectors will unmask interrupts regardless the state of them in
-the interrupted context.
-
-One of the consequences is IRQ will be unmasked when receiving an
-undefined instruction exception (used by WARN*) from the hypervisor.
-This could result to unexpected behavior such as deadlock (if a lock was
-shared with interrupts).
-
-In a nutshell, interrupts should only be unmasked when it is safe to do.
-Xen only unmask IRQ and Abort interrupts, so the logic can stay simple.
-
-As vectors exceptions may be shared between guest and hypervisor, we now
-need to have a different policy for the interrupts.
-
-On exception from hypervisor, each vector will select the list of
-interrupts to inherit from the interrupted context. Any interrupts not
-listed will be kept masked.
-
-On exception from the guest, the Abort and IRQ will be unmasked
-depending on the exact vector.
-
-The interrupts will be kept unmasked when the vector cannot used by
-either guest or hypervisor.
-
-Note that each vector is not anymore preceded by ALIGN. This is fine
-because the alignment is already bigger than what we need.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 150cbc0b4b..ec90cca093 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
- #include <asm/alternative.h>
- #include <public/xen.h>
- 
-+/*
-+ * Short-hands to defined the interrupts (A, I, F)
-+ *
-+ * _ means the interrupt state will not change
-+ * X means the state of interrupt X will change
-+ *
-+ * To be used with msr cpsr_* only
-+ */
-+#define IFLAGS_AIF      PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_IRQ_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK
-+#define IFLAGS_A_F      PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK
-+
- #define SAVE_ONE_BANKED(reg)    mrs r11, reg; str r11, [sp, #UREGS_##reg]
- #define RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(reg) ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_##reg]; msr reg, r11
- 
-@@ -106,10 +117,18 @@ skip_check:
-         mov pc, lr
- 
-         /*
--         * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
--         * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-+         * Macro to define a trap entry.
-+         *
-+         *  @guest_iflags: Optional list of interrupts to unmask when
-+         *      entering from guest context. As this is used with cpsie,
-+         *      the letter (a, i, f) should be used.
-+         *
-+         *  @hyp_iflags: Optional list of interrupts to inherit when
-+         *      entering from hypervisor context. Any interrupts not
-+         *      listed will be kept unchanged. As this is used with cpsr_*,
-+         *      IFLAGS_* short-hands should be used.
-          */
--        .macro vector trap, iflags
-+        .macro vector trap, guest_iflags=n, hyp_iflags=0
-         /* Save registers in the stack */
-         sub     sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp) /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
-         push    {r0-r12}                       /* Save R0-R12 */
-@@ -127,12 +146,39 @@ skip_check:
- 
-         mrs     r11, SPSR_hyp
-         str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr]
--        and     r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
--        cmp     r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP
--        blne    save_guest_regs
- 
-+        /*
-+         * We need to distinguish whether we came from guest or
-+         * hypervisor context.
-+         */
-+        and     r0, r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
-+        cmp     r0, #PSR_MODE_HYP
-+
-+        bne     1f
-+        /*
-+         * Trap from the hypervisor
-+         *
-+         * Inherit the state of the interrupts from the hypervisor
-+         * context. For that we need to use SPSR (stored in r11) and
-+         * modify CPSR accordingly.
-+         *
-+         * CPSR = (CPSR & ~hyp_iflags) | (SPSR & hyp_iflags)
-+         */
-+        mrs     r10, cpsr
-+        bic     r10, r10, #\hyp_iflags
-+        and     r11, r11, #\hyp_iflags
-+        orr     r10, r10, r11
-+        msr     cpsr_cx, r10
-+        b       2f
-+
-+1:
-+        /* Trap from the guest */
-+        bl      save_guest_regs
-+        .if     \guest_iflags != n
-+        cpsie   \guest_iflags
-+        .endif
-+2:
-         /* We are ready to handle the trap, setup the registers and jump. */
--        cpsie   \iflags
-         adr     lr, return_from_trap
-         mov     r0, sp
-         /*
-@@ -144,20 +190,6 @@ skip_check:
-         b       do_trap_\trap
-         .endm
- 
--#define __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, iflags)                               \
--        ALIGN;                                                          \
--trap_##trap:                                                            \
--        vector trap, iflags
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask IRQ/Abort, keep FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, ai)
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask Abort, keep IRQ/FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, a)
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask IRQ, keep Abort/FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOABORT(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, i)
--
-         .align 5
- GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector)
-         b trap_reset                    /* 0x00 - Reset */
-@@ -228,14 +260,62 @@ decode_vectors:
- 
- #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
- 
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(reset)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(undefined_instruction)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(hypervisor_call)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(prefetch_abort)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(guest_sync)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(irq)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(fiq)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOABORT(data_abort)
-+/* Vector not used by the Hypervisor. */
-+trap_reset:
-+        vector reset
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the Hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception can be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
-+trap_undefined_instruction:
-+        vector undefined_instruction, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_AIF
-+
-+/* We should never reach this trap */
-+trap_hypervisor_call:
-+        vector hypervisor_call
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception can be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
-+trap_prefetch_abort:
-+       vector prefetch_abort, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_AIF
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * Data Abort should be rare and most likely fatal. It is best to not
-+ * unmask any interrupts to limit the amount of code that can run before
-+ * the Data Abort is treated.
-+ */
-+trap_data_abort:
-+        vector data_abort
-+
-+/* Vector only used by the guest. We can unmask Abort/IRQ. */
-+trap_guest_sync:
-+        vector guest_sync, guest_iflags=ai
-+
-+
-+/* Vector used by the hypervisor and the guest. */
-+trap_irq:
-+        vector irq, guest_iflags=a, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_A_F
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector used by the hypervisor and the guest.
-+ *
-+ * FIQ are not meant to happen, so we don't unmask any interrupts.
-+ */
-+trap_fiq:
-+        vector fiq
- 
- return_from_trap:
-         /*
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0004-xen-arm64-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0004-xen-arm64-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 106cbf98f1771..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa303-0004-xen-arm64-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From c6d290ce157a044dec417fdda8db71e41a37d744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 18:10:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] xen/arm64: Don't blindly unmask interrupts on trap
- without a change of level
-
-Some of the traps without a change of the level (i.e. hypervisor ->
-hypervisor) will unmask interrupts regardless the state of them in the
-interrupted context.
-
-One of the consequences is IRQ will be unmasked when receiving a
-synchronous exception (used by WARN*()). This could result to unexpected
-behavior such as deadlock (if a lock was shared with interrupts).
-
-In a nutshell, interrupts should only be unmasked when it is safe to
-do. Xen only unmask IRQ and Abort interrupts, so the logic can stay
-simple:
-    - hyp_error: All the interrupts are now kept masked. SError should
-      be pretty rare and if ever happen then we most likely want to
-      avoid any other interrupts to be generated. The potential main
-      "caller" is during virtual SError synchronization on the exit
-      path from the guest (see check_pending_vserror).
-
-    - hyp_sync: The interrupts state is inherited from the interrupted
-      context.
-
-    - hyp_irq: All the interrupts but IRQ state are inherited from the
-      interrupted context. IRQ is kept masked.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-index 2d9a2713a1..3e41ba65b6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -188,24 +188,63 @@ hyp_error_invalid:
-         entry   hyp=1
-         invalid BAD_ERROR
- 
-+/*
-+ * SError received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * Technically, we could unmask the IRQ if it were unmasked in the
-+ * interrupted context. However, this require to check the PSTATE. For
-+ * simplicity, as SError should be rare and potentially fatal,
-+ * all interrupts are kept masked.
-+ */
- hyp_error:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #2
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hyp_serror
-         exit    hyp=1
- 
--/* Traps taken in Current EL with SP_ELx */
-+/*
-+ * Synchronous exception received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception could be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
- hyp_sync:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #6
-+
-+        /* Inherit interrupts */
-+        mrs     x0, SPSR_el2
-+        and     x0, x0, #(PSR_DBG_MASK | PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_IRQ_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK)
-+        msr     daif, x0
-+
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hyp_sync
-         exit    hyp=1
- 
-+/*
-+ * IRQ received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception could be executed with all the interrupts but IRQ
-+ * unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked some
-+ * of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupt context
-+ * and keep IRQ masked.
-+ *
-+ * XXX: We may want to consider an ordering between interrupts (e.g. if
-+ * SError are masked, then IRQ should be masked too). However, this
-+ * would require some rework in some paths (e.g. panic, livepatch) to
-+ * ensure the ordering is enforced everywhere.
-+ */
- hyp_irq:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #4
-+
-+        /* Inherit D, A, F interrupts and keep I masked */
-+        mrs     x0, SPSR_el2
-+        mov     x1, #(PSR_DBG_MASK | PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK)
-+        and     x0, x0, x1
-+        orr     x0, x0, #PSR_IRQ_MASK
-+        msr     daif, x0
-+
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_irq
-         exit    hyp=1
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c2ed2c2ced89f..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/vtd: Hide superpage support for SandyBridge IOMMUs
-
-Something causes SandyBridge IOMMUs to choke when sharing EPT pagetables, and
-an EPT superpage gets shattered.  The root cause is still under investigation,
-but the end result is unusable in combination with CVE-2018-12207 protections.
-
-This is part of XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-index 16eada9fa2..a71c8b0f84 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu);
- int __must_check me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain,
-                                u8 bus, u8 devfn, int map);
- void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *);
-+void quirk_iommu_caps(struct iommu *iommu);
-+
- bool_t platform_supports_intremap(void);
- bool_t platform_supports_x2apic(void);
- 
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-index b3664ecbe0..5d34f75306 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -1215,6 +1215,8 @@ int __init iommu_alloc(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
-     if ( !(iommu->cap + 1) || !(iommu->ecap + 1) )
-         return -ENODEV;
- 
-+    quirk_iommu_caps(iommu);
-+
-     if ( cap_fault_reg_offset(iommu->cap) +
-          cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) * PRIMARY_FAULT_REG_LEN >= PAGE_SIZE ||
-          ecap_iotlb_offset(iommu->ecap) >= PAGE_SIZE )
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-index d6db862678..b02688e316 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
-@@ -540,3 +540,28 @@ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
-         break;
-     }
- }
-+
-+void __init quirk_iommu_caps(struct iommu *iommu)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * IOMMU Quirks:
-+     *
-+     * SandyBridge IOMMUs claim support for 2M and 1G superpages, but don't
-+     * implement superpages internally.
-+     *
-+     * There are issues changing the walk length under in-flight DMA, which
-+     * has manifested as incompatibility between EPT/IOMMU sharing and the
-+     * workaround for CVE-2018-12207 / XSA-304.  Hide the superpages
-+     * capabilities in the IOMMU, which will prevent Xen from sharing the EPT
-+     * and IOMMU pagetables.
-+     *
-+     * Detection of SandyBridge unfortunately has to be done by processor
-+     * model because the client parts don't expose their IOMMUs as PCI devices
-+     * we could match with a Device ID.
-+     */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-+         boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
-+         (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x2a ||
-+          boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x2d) )
-+        iommu->cap &= ~(0xful << 34);
-+}
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 66d4301838e6e..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/vtx: Disable executable EPT superpages to work around
- CVE-2018-12207
-
-CVE-2018-12207 covers a set of errata on various Intel processors, whereby a
-machine check exception can be generated in a corner case when an executable
-mapping changes size or cacheability without TLB invalidation.  HVM guest
-kernels can trigger this to DoS the host.
-
-To mitigate, in affected hardware, all EPT superpages are marked NX.  When an
-instruction fetch violation is observed against the superpage, the superpage
-is shattered to 4k and has execute permissions restored.  This prevents the
-guest kernel from being able to create the necessary preconditions in the iTLB
-to exploit the vulnerability.
-
-This does come with a workload-dependent performance overhead, caused by
-increased TLB pressure.  Performance can be restored, if guest kernels are
-trusted not to mount an attack, by specifying ept=exec-sp on the command line.
-
-This is part of XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index 85081fdc94..e283017015 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ Controls for interacting with the system Extended Firmware Interface.
-     uncacheable.
- 
- ### ept
--> `= List of [ ad=<bool>, pml=<bool> ]`
-+> `= List of [ ad=<bool>, pml=<bool>, exec-sp=<bool> ]`
- 
- > Applicability: Intel
- 
-@@ -926,6 +926,16 @@ introduced with the Nehalem architecture.
-     disable PML.  `pml=0` can be used to prevent the use of PML on otherwise
-     capable hardware.
- 
-+*   The `exec-sp` boolean controls whether EPT superpages with execute
-+    permissions are permitted.  In general this is good for performance.
-+
-+    However, on processors vulnerable CVE-2018-12207, HVM guest kernels can
-+    use executable superpages to crash the host.  By default, executable
-+    superpages are disabled on affected hardware.
-+
-+    If HVM guest kernels are trusted not to mount a DoS against the system,
-+    this option can enabled to regain performance.
-+
- ### extra_guest_irqs
- > `= [<domU number>][,<dom0 number>]`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index 2089a77270..84191d4e4b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -1814,6 +1814,24 @@ int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla,
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        /*
-+         * Workaround for XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207.  If we take an execution
-+         * fault against a non-executable superpage, shatter it to regain
-+         * execute permissions.
-+         */
-+        if ( page_order > 0 && npfec.insn_fetch && npfec.present && !violation )
-+        {
-+            int res = p2m_set_entry(p2m, _gfn(gfn), mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K,
-+                                    p2mt, p2ma);
-+
-+            if ( res )
-+                printk(XENLOG_ERR "Failed to shatter gfn %"PRI_gfn": %d\n",
-+                       gfn, res);
-+
-+            rc = !res;
-+            goto out_put_gfn;
-+        }
-+
-         if ( violation )
-         {
-             /* Should #VE be emulated for this fault? */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index 56519fee84..ec5ab860ad 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ integer_param("ple_window", ple_window);
- 
- static bool __read_mostly opt_ept_pml = true;
- static s8 __read_mostly opt_ept_ad = -1;
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_ept_exec_sp = -1;
- 
- static int __init parse_ept_param(const char *s)
- {
-@@ -82,6 +83,8 @@ static int __init parse_ept_param(const char *s)
-             opt_ept_ad = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("pml", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-             opt_ept_pml = val;
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("exec-sp", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+            opt_ept_exec_sp = val;
-         else
-             rc = -EINVAL;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 26b7ddb5fe..28cba8ec28 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -2445,6 +2445,102 @@ static void pi_notification_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- static void __init lbr_tsx_fixup_check(void);
- static void __init bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_check(void);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Calculate whether the CPU is vulnerable to Instruction Fetch page
-+ * size-change MCEs.
-+ */
-+static bool __init has_if_pschange_mc(void)
-+{
-+    uint64_t caps = 0;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * If we are virtualised, there is nothing we can do.  Our EPT tables are
-+     * shadowed by our hypervisor, and not walked by hardware.
-+     */
-+    if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
-+        return false;
-+
-+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
-+        rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
-+
-+    if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO )
-+        return false;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * IF_PSCHANGE_MC is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at
-+     * this time.
-+     */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
-+         boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
-+        return false;
-+
-+    switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Core processors since at least Nehalem are vulnerable.
-+         */
-+    case 0x1f: /* Auburndale / Havendale */
-+    case 0x1e: /* Nehalem */
-+    case 0x1a: /* Nehalem EP */
-+    case 0x2e: /* Nehalem EX */
-+    case 0x25: /* Westmere */
-+    case 0x2c: /* Westmere EP */
-+    case 0x2f: /* Westmere EX */
-+    case 0x2a: /* SandyBridge */
-+    case 0x2d: /* SandyBridge EP/EX */
-+    case 0x3a: /* IvyBridge */
-+    case 0x3e: /* IvyBridge EP/EX */
-+    case 0x3c: /* Haswell */
-+    case 0x3f: /* Haswell EX/EP */
-+    case 0x45: /* Haswell D */
-+    case 0x46: /* Haswell H */
-+    case 0x3d: /* Broadwell */
-+    case 0x47: /* Broadwell H */
-+    case 0x4f: /* Broadwell EP/EX */
-+    case 0x56: /* Broadwell D */
-+    case 0x4e: /* Skylake M */
-+    case 0x5e: /* Skylake D */
-+    case 0x55: /* Skylake-X / Cascade Lake */
-+    case 0x8e: /* Kaby / Coffee / Whiskey Lake M */
-+    case 0x9e: /* Kaby / Coffee / Whiskey Lake D */
-+        return true;
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Atom processors are not vulnerable.
-+         */
-+    case 0x1c: /* Pineview */
-+    case 0x26: /* Lincroft */
-+    case 0x27: /* Penwell */
-+    case 0x35: /* Cloverview */
-+    case 0x36: /* Cedarview */
-+    case 0x37: /* Baytrail / Valleyview (Silvermont) */
-+    case 0x4d: /* Avaton / Rangely (Silvermont) */
-+    case 0x4c: /* Cherrytrail / Brasswell */
-+    case 0x4a: /* Merrifield */
-+    case 0x5a: /* Moorefield */
-+    case 0x5c: /* Goldmont */
-+    case 0x5d: /* SoFIA 3G Granite/ES2.1 */
-+    case 0x65: /* SoFIA LTE AOSP */
-+    case 0x5f: /* Denverton */
-+    case 0x6e: /* Cougar Mountain */
-+    case 0x75: /* Lightning Mountain */
-+    case 0x7a: /* Gemini Lake */
-+    case 0x86: /* Jacobsville */
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Knights processors are not vulnerable.
-+         */
-+    case 0x57: /* Knights Landing */
-+    case 0x85: /* Knights Mill */
-+        return false;
-+
-+    default:
-+        printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming vulnerable to IF_PSCHANGE_MC\n",
-+               boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
-+        return true;
-+    }
-+}
-+
- const struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
- {
-     set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_VMXE);
-@@ -2465,6 +2561,17 @@ const struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
-      */
-     if ( cpu_has_vmx_ept && (cpu_has_vmx_pat || opt_force_ept) )
-     {
-+        bool cpu_has_bug_pschange_mc = has_if_pschange_mc();
-+
-+        if ( opt_ept_exec_sp == -1 )
-+        {
-+            /* Default to non-executable superpages on vulnerable hardware. */
-+            opt_ept_exec_sp = !cpu_has_bug_pschange_mc;
-+
-+            if ( cpu_has_bug_pschange_mc )
-+                printk("VMX: Disabling executable EPT superpages due to CVE-2018-12207\n");
-+        }
-+
-         vmx_function_table.hap_supported = 1;
-         vmx_function_table.altp2m_supported = 1;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
-index 952ebad82f..834d4798c8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
-@@ -174,6 +174,12 @@ static void ept_p2m_type_to_flags(struct p2m_domain *p2m, ept_entry_t *entry,
-             break;
-     }
-     
-+    /*
-+     * Don't create executable superpages if we need to shatter them to
-+     * protect against CVE-2018-12207.
-+     */
-+    if ( !opt_ept_exec_sp && is_epte_superpage(entry) )
-+        entry->x = 0;
- }
- 
- #define GUEST_TABLE_MAP_FAILED  0
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
-index ebaa74449b..371b912887 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
-@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
- #include <asm/hvm/trace.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h>
- 
-+extern int8_t opt_ept_exec_sp;
-+
- typedef union {
-     struct {
-         u64 r       :   1,  /* bit 0 - Read permission */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 637259bd1f..32746aa8ae 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #define ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL		(_AC(1, ULL) << 3)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 4)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 5)
-+#define ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO	(_AC(1, ULL) << 6)
- 
- #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD			0x0000010b
- #define FLUSH_CMD_L1D			(_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-3.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 04b4c454f24fa..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa304-4.12-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/vtx: Allow runtime modification of the exec-sp setting
-
-See patch for details.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index e283017015..84221fe60a 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -936,6 +936,21 @@ introduced with the Nehalem architecture.
-     If HVM guest kernels are trusted not to mount a DoS against the system,
-     this option can enabled to regain performance.
- 
-+    This boolean may be modified at runtime using `xl set-parameters
-+    ept=[no-]exec-sp` to switch between fast and secure.
-+
-+    *   When switching from secure to fast, preexisting HVM domains will run
-+        at their current performance until they are rebooted; new domains will
-+        run without any overhead.
-+
-+    *   When switching from fast to secure, all HVM domains will immediately
-+        suffer a performance penalty.
-+
-+    **Warning: No guarantee is made that this runtime option will be retained
-+      indefinitely, or that it will retain this exact behaviour.  It is
-+      intended as an emergency option for people who first chose fast, then
-+      change their minds to secure, and wish not to reboot.**
-+
- ### extra_guest_irqs
- > `= [<domU number>][,<dom0 number>]`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index ec5ab860ad..c4d8a5ba78 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -95,6 +95,41 @@ static int __init parse_ept_param(const char *s)
- }
- custom_param("ept", parse_ept_param);
- 
-+static int parse_ept_param_runtime(const char *s)
-+{
-+    int val;
-+
-+    if ( !cpu_has_vmx_ept || !hvm_funcs.hap_supported ||
-+         !(hvm_funcs.hap_capabilities &
-+           (HVM_HAP_SUPERPAGE_2MB | HVM_HAP_SUPERPAGE_1GB)) )
-+    {
-+        printk("VMX: EPT not available, or not in use - ignoring\n");
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( (val = parse_boolean("exec-sp", s, NULL)) < 0 )
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+
-+    if ( val != opt_ept_exec_sp )
-+    {
-+        struct domain *d;
-+
-+        opt_ept_exec_sp = val;
-+
-+        rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+        for_each_domain ( d )
-+            if ( paging_mode_hap(d) )
-+                p2m_change_entry_type_global(d, p2m_ram_rw, p2m_ram_rw);
-+        rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+    }
-+
-+    printk("VMX: EPT executable superpages %sabled\n",
-+           val ? "en" : "dis");
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+custom_runtime_only_param("ept", parse_ept_param_runtime);
-+
- /* Dynamic (run-time adjusted) execution control flags. */
- u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_control __read_mostly;
- u32 vmx_cpu_based_exec_control __read_mostly;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-index f518f86493..16608098b1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -289,15 +289,20 @@ static void change_entry_type_global(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                      p2m_type_t ot, p2m_type_t nt)
- {
-     p2m->change_entry_type_global(p2m, ot, nt);
--    p2m->global_logdirty = (nt == p2m_ram_logdirty);
-+    /* Don't allow 'recalculate' operations to change the logdirty state. */
-+    if ( ot != nt )
-+        p2m->global_logdirty = (nt == p2m_ram_logdirty);
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * May be called with ot = nt = p2m_ram_rw for its side effect of
-+ * recalculating all PTEs in the p2m.
-+ */
- void p2m_change_entry_type_global(struct domain *d,
-                                   p2m_type_t ot, p2m_type_t nt)
- {
-     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
- 
--    ASSERT(ot != nt);
-     ASSERT(p2m_is_changeable(ot) && p2m_is_changeable(nt));
- 
-     p2m_lock(hostp2m);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e1a91a52640b6..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/tsx: Introduce tsx= to use MSR_TSX_CTRL when available
-
-To protect against the TSX Async Abort speculative vulnerability, Intel have
-released new microcode for affected parts which introduce the MSR_TSX_CTRL
-control, which allows TSX to be turned off.  This will be architectural on
-future parts.
-
-Introduce tsx= to provide a global on/off for TSX, including its enumeration
-via CPUID.  Provide stub virtualisation of this MSR, as it is not exposed to
-guests at the moment.
-
-VMs may have booted before microcode is loaded, or before hosts have rebooted,
-and they still want to migrate freely.  A VM which booted seeing TSX can
-migrate safely to hosts with TSX disabled - TSX will start unconditionally
-aborting, but still behave in a manner compatible with the ABI.
-
-The guest-visible behaviour is equivalent to late loading the microcode and
-setting the RTM_DISABLE bit in the course of live patching.
-
-This is part of XSA-305 / CVE-2019-11135
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index e283017015..b7e1bf8e8b 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -2033,6 +2033,20 @@ Xen version.
- ### tsc (x86)
- > `= unstable | skewed | stable:socket`
- 
-+### tsx
-+    = <bool>
-+
-+    Applicability: x86
-+    Default: true
-+
-+Controls for the use of Transactional Synchronization eXtensions.
-+
-+On Intel parts released in Q3 2019 (with updated microcode), and future parts,
-+a control has been introduced which allows TSX to be turned off.
-+
-+On systems with the ability to turn TSX off, this boolean offers system wide
-+control of whether TSX is enabled or disabled.
-+
- ### ucode (x86)
- > `= [<integer> | scan]`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index 8a8d8f060f..9b9a4435fb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ obj-y += sysctl.o
- obj-y += time.o
- obj-y += trace.o
- obj-y += traps.o
-+obj-y += tsx.o
- obj-y += usercopy.o
- obj-y += x86_emulate.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_TBOOT) += tboot.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-index 57e80694f2..1727497459 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-@@ -524,6 +524,20 @@ void recalculate_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d)
-     if ( cpu_has_itsc && (d->disable_migrate || d->arch.vtsc) )
-         __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_ITSC, max_fs);
- 
-+    /*
-+     * On hardware with MSR_TSX_CTRL, the admin may have elected to disable
-+     * TSX and hide the feature bits.  Migrating-in VMs may have been booted
-+     * pre-mitigation when the TSX features were visbile.
-+     *
-+     * This situation is compatible (albeit with a perf hit to any TSX code in
-+     * the guest), so allow the feature bits to remain set.
-+     */
-+    if ( cpu_has_tsx_ctrl )
-+    {
-+        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HLE, max_fs);
-+        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_RTM, max_fs);
-+    }
-+
-     /* Clamp the toolstacks choices to reality. */
-     for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fs); i++ )
-         fs[i] &= max_fs[i];
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-index 56de0fe9e1..c2722d7c73 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
-     case MSR_FLUSH_CMD:
-         /* Write-only */
-     case MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT:
-+    case MSR_TSX_CTRL:
-         /* Not offered to guests. */
-         goto gp_fault;
- 
-@@ -260,6 +261,7 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
-     case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
-         /* Read-only */
-     case MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT:
-+    case MSR_TSX_CTRL:
-         /* Not offered to guests. */
-         goto gp_fault;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-index cf790f36ef..c1c7c44000 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-@@ -1594,6 +1594,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- 
-     early_microcode_init();
- 
-+    tsx_init(); /* Needs microcode.  May change HLE/RTM feature bits. */
-+
-     identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
- 
-     set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index 737a44f055..e21cf0a310 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
-     if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) )
-         wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, default_xen_spec_ctrl);
- 
-+    tsx_init(); /* Needs microcode.  May change HLE/RTM feature bits. */
-+
-     if ( xen_guest )
-         hypervisor_ap_setup();
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..a8ec2ccc69
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
-+#include <xen/init.h>
-+#include <asm/msr.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * Valid values:
-+ *   1 => Explicit tsx=1
-+ *   0 => Explicit tsx=0
-+ *  -1 => Default, implicit tsx=1
-+ *
-+ * This is arranged such that the bottom bit encodes whether TSX is actually
-+ * disabled, while identifying various explicit (>=0) and implicit (<0)
-+ * conditions.
-+ */
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_tsx = -1;
-+int8_t __read_mostly cpu_has_tsx_ctrl = -1;
-+
-+static int __init parse_tsx(const char *s)
-+{
-+    int rc = 0, val = parse_bool(s, NULL);
-+
-+    if ( val >= 0 )
-+        opt_tsx = val;
-+    else
-+        rc = -EINVAL;
-+
-+    return rc;
-+}
-+custom_param("tsx", parse_tsx);
-+
-+void tsx_init(void)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * This function is first called between microcode being loaded, and CPUID
-+     * being scanned generally.  Calculate from raw data whether MSR_TSX_CTRL
-+     * is available.
-+     */
-+    if ( unlikely(cpu_has_tsx_ctrl < 0) )
-+    {
-+        uint64_t caps = 0;
-+
-+        if ( boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level >= 7 &&
-+             (cpuid_count_edx(7, 0) & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS)) )
-+            rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
-+
-+        cpu_has_tsx_ctrl = !!(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL);
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( cpu_has_tsx_ctrl )
-+    {
-+        uint64_t val;
-+
-+        rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_CTRL, val);
-+
-+        val &= ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR);
-+        /* Check bottom bit only.  Higher bits are various sentinals. */
-+        if ( !(opt_tsx & 1) )
-+            val |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
-+
-+        wrmsrl(MSR_TSX_CTRL, val);
-+    }
-+    else if ( opt_tsx >= 0 )
-+        printk_once(XENLOG_WARNING
-+                    "MSR_TSX_CTRL not available - Ignoring tsx= setting\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local variables:
-+ * mode: C
-+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
-+ * c-basic-offset: 4
-+ * tab-width: 4
-+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
-+ * End:
-+ */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 32746aa8ae..d5f3899f73 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #define ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 4)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 5)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO	(_AC(1, ULL) << 6)
-+#define ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL		(_AC(1, ULL) << 7)
- 
- #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD			0x0000010b
- #define FLUSH_CMD_L1D			(_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
-@@ -60,6 +61,10 @@
- #define MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT             0x0000010f
- #define TSX_FORCE_ABORT_RTM             (_AC(1, ULL) <<  0)
- 
-+#define MSR_TSX_CTRL                    0x00000122
-+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE            (_AC(1, ULL) <<  0)
-+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR            (_AC(1, ULL) <<  1)
-+
- /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
- #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0		0x000000c1
- #define MSR_IA32_A_PERFCTR0		0x000004c1
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-index d33ac34d29..1b52712180 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-@@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ static always_inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ebx(
-     return ebx;
- }
- 
-+static always_inline unsigned int cpuid_count_edx(
-+    unsigned int leaf, unsigned int subleaf)
-+{
-+    unsigned int edx, tmp;
-+
-+    cpuid_count(leaf, subleaf, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp, &edx);
-+
-+    return edx;
-+}
-+
- static inline unsigned long read_cr0(void)
- {
-     unsigned long cr0;
-@@ -609,6 +619,9 @@ static inline uint8_t get_cpu_family(uint32_t raw, uint8_t *model,
-     return fam;
- }
- 
-+extern int8_t opt_tsx, cpu_has_tsx_ctrl;
-+void tsx_init(void);
-+
- #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
- 
- #endif /* __ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib.h b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-index 89939f43c8..6529f12dae 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-@@ -114,6 +114,16 @@ extern int printk_ratelimit(void);
- #define gprintk(lvl, fmt, args...) \
-     printk(XENLOG_GUEST lvl "%pv " fmt, current, ## args)
- 
-+#define printk_once(fmt, args...)               \
-+({                                              \
-+    static bool __read_mostly once_;            \
-+    if ( unlikely(!once_) )                     \
-+    {                                           \
-+        once_ = true;                           \
-+        printk(fmt, ## args);                   \
-+    }                                           \
-+})
-+
- #ifdef NDEBUG
- 
- static inline void
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 07fba86287f8a..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa305-4.12-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the TSX Asynchronous Abort sidechannel
-
-See patch documentation and comments.
-
-This is part of XSA-305 / CVE-2019-11135
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index b7e1bf8e8b..74e1e35b88 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ extreme care.**
- An overall boolean value, `spec-ctrl=no`, can be specified to turn off all
- mitigations, including pieces of infrastructure used to virtualise certain
- mitigation features for guests.  This also includes settings which `xpti`,
--`smt`, `pv-l1tf` control, unless the respective option(s) have been
-+`smt`, `pv-l1tf`, `tsx` control, unless the respective option(s) have been
- specified earlier on the command line.
- 
- Alternatively, a slightly more restricted `spec-ctrl=no-xen` can be used to
-@@ -2037,7 +2037,7 @@ Xen version.
-     = <bool>
- 
-     Applicability: x86
--    Default: true
-+    Default: false on parts vulnerable to TAA, true otherwise
- 
- Controls for the use of Transactional Synchronization eXtensions.
- 
-@@ -2047,6 +2047,19 @@ a control has been introduced which allows TSX to be turned off.
- On systems with the ability to turn TSX off, this boolean offers system wide
- control of whether TSX is enabled or disabled.
- 
-+On parts vulnerable to CVE-2019-11135 / TSX Asynchronous Abort, the following
-+logic applies:
-+
-+ * An explicit `tsx=` choice is honoured, even if it is `true` and would
-+   result in a vulnerable system.
-+
-+ * When no explicit `tsx=` choice is given, parts vulnerable to TAA will be
-+   mitigated by disabling TSX, as this is the lowest overhead option.
-+
-+ * If the use of TSX is important, the more expensive TAA mitigations can be
-+   opted in to with `smt=0 spec-ctrl=md-clear`, at which point TSX will remain
-+   active by default.
-+
- ### ucode (x86)
- > `= [<integer> | scan]`
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index b37d40e643..800139d79c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             if ( opt_pv_l1tf_domu < 0 )
-                 opt_pv_l1tf_domu = 0;
- 
-+            if ( opt_tsx == -1 )
-+                opt_tsx = -3;
-+
-         disable_common:
-             opt_rsb_pv = false;
-             opt_rsb_hvm = false;
-@@ -306,7 +309,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-     printk("Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
- 
-     /* Hardware features which pertain to speculative mitigations. */
--    printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS/IBPB" : "",
-            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP"     : "",
-            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH)) ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "",
-@@ -318,7 +321,9 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA)                  ? " RSBA"      : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL)            ? " SKIP_L1DFL": "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO)                ? " SSB_NO"    : "",
--           (caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO)                ? " MDS_NO"    : "");
-+           (caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO)                ? " MDS_NO"    : "",
-+           (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)              ? " TSX_CTRL"  : "",
-+           (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)                ? " TAA_NO"    : "");
- 
-     /* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
-     if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING) )
-@@ -332,7 +337,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-                "\n");
- 
-     /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
--    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s\n",
-            thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "N/A" :
-            thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
-            thunk == THUNK_LFENCE    ? "LFENCE" :
-@@ -341,6 +346,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)  ? "IBRS+" :  "IBRS-",
-            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)           ? "" :
-            (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)  ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
-+           !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)              ? "" :
-+           (opt_tsx & 1)                             ? " TSX+" : " TSX-",
-            opt_ibpb                                  ? " IBPB"  : "",
-            opt_l1d_flush                             ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "",
-            opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm       ? " VERW"  : "");
-@@ -862,6 +869,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- {
-     enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
-     bool use_spec_ctrl = false, ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled;
-+    bool cpu_has_bug_taa;
-     uint64_t caps = 0;
- 
-     if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
-@@ -1086,6 +1094,53 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-             "enabled.  Mitigations will not be fully effective.  Please\n"
-             "choose an explicit smt=<bool> setting.  See XSA-297.\n");
- 
-+    /*
-+     * Vulnerability to TAA is a little complicated to quantify.
-+     *
-+     * In the pipeline, it is just another way to get speculative access to
-+     * stale load port, store buffer or fill buffer data, and therefore can be
-+     * considered a superset of MDS (on TSX-capable parts).  On parts which
-+     * predate MDS_NO, the existing VERW flushing will mitigate this
-+     * sidechannel as well.
-+     *
-+     * On parts which contain MDS_NO, the lack of VERW flushing means that an
-+     * attacker can still use TSX to target microarchitectural buffers to leak
-+     * secrets.  Therefore, we consider TAA to be the set of TSX-capable parts
-+     * which have MDS_NO but lack TAA_NO.
-+     *
-+     * Note: cpu_has_rtm (== hle) could already be hidden by `tsx=0` on the
-+     *       cmdline.  MSR_TSX_CTRL will only appear on TSX-capable parts, so
-+     *       we check both to spot TSX in a microcode/cmdline independent way.
-+     */
-+    cpu_has_bug_taa =
-+        (cpu_has_rtm || (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)) &&
-+        (caps & (ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)) == ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * On TAA-affected hardware, disabling TSX is the preferred mitigation, vs
-+     * the MDS mitigation of disabling HT and using VERW flushing.
-+     *
-+     * On CPUs which advertise MDS_NO, VERW has no flushing side effect until
-+     * the TSX_CTRL microcode is loaded, despite the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit being
-+     * advertised, and there isn't a MD_CLEAR_2 flag to use...
-+     *
-+     * If we're on affected hardware, able to do something about it (which
-+     * implies that VERW now works), no explicit TSX choice and traditional
-+     * MDS mitigations (no-SMT, VERW) not obviosuly in use (someone might
-+     * plausibly value TSX higher than Hyperthreading...), disable TSX to
-+     * mitigate TAA.
-+     */
-+    if ( opt_tsx == -1 && cpu_has_bug_taa && (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) &&
-+         ((hw_smt_enabled && opt_smt) ||
-+          !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE)) )
-+    {
-+        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
-+        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
-+
-+        opt_tsx = 0;
-+        tsx_init();
-+    }
-+
-     print_details(thunk, caps);
- 
-     /*
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
-index a8ec2ccc69..2d202a0d4e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
-@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
-  * Valid values:
-  *   1 => Explicit tsx=1
-  *   0 => Explicit tsx=0
-- *  -1 => Default, implicit tsx=1
-+ *  -1 => Default, implicit tsx=1, may change to 0 to mitigate TAA
-+ *  -3 => Implicit tsx=1 (feed-through from spec-ctrl=0)
-  *
-  * This is arranged such that the bottom bit encodes whether TSX is actually
-  * disabled, while identifying various explicit (>=0) and implicit (<0)
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index d5f3899f73..3971b992d3 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
- #define ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 5)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO	(_AC(1, ULL) << 6)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL		(_AC(1, ULL) << 7)
-+#define ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO		(_AC(1, ULL) << 8)
- 
- #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD			0x0000010b
- #define FLUSH_CMD_L1D			(_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa312.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa312.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..ae3fa4041ba06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa312.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 9f807cf84a9a7a011cf1df7895c54d6031a7596d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2019 08:12:21 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] xen/arm: Place a speculation barrier sequence following an
+ eret instruction
+
+Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform
+speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return.
+Since the register state is often controlled by lower privilege level
+at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a
+side-channel attack.
+
+Newer CPUs may implement a new SB barrier instruction which acts
+as an architected speculation barrier. For current CPUs, the sequence
+DSB; ISB is known to prevent speculation.
+
+The latter sequence is heavier than SB but it would never be executed
+(this is speculation after all!).
+
+Introduce a new macro 'sb' that could be used when a speculation barrier
+is required. For now it is using dsb; isb but this could easily be
+updated to cater SB in the future.
+
+This is XSA-312.
+
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S   | 1 +
+ xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S   | 3 +++
+ xen/include/asm-arm/macros.h | 9 +++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
+index 31ccfb2631..b228d44b19 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ return_to_hypervisor:
+         add sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
+         clrex
+         eret
++        sb
+ 
+ /*
+  * struct vcpu *__context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
+index d35855af96..175ea2981e 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
+@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ guest_sync:
+          */
+         mov     x1, xzr
+         eret
++        sb
+ 
+ check_wa2:
+         /* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */
+@@ -393,6 +394,7 @@ wa2_end:
+ #endif /* !CONFIG_ARM_SSBD */
+         mov     x0, xzr
+         eret
++        sb
+ guest_sync_slowpath:
+         /*
+          * x0/x1 may have been scratch by the fast path above, so avoid
+@@ -457,6 +459,7 @@ return_from_trap:
+         ldr     lr, [sp], #(UREGS_SPSR_el1 - UREGS_LR) /* CPSR, PC, SP, LR */
+ 
+         eret
++        sb
+ 
+ /*
+  * Consume pending SError generated by the guest if any.
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/macros.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/macros.h
+index 91ea3505e4..4833671f4c 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/macros.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/macros.h
+@@ -20,4 +20,13 @@
+     .endr
+     .endm
+ 
++    /*
++     * Speculative barrier
++     * XXX: Add support for the 'sb' instruction
++     */
++    .macro sb
++    dsb nsh
++    isb
++    .endm
++
+ #endif /* __ASM_ARM_MACROS_H */
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..95fde7ead4db3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: xenoprof: clear buffer intended to be shared with guests
+
+alloc_xenheap_pages() making use of MEMF_no_scrub is fine for Xen
+internally used allocations, but buffers allocated to be shared with
+(unpriviliged) guests need to be zapped of their prior content.
+
+This is part of XSA-313.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/common/xenoprof.c
++++ b/xen/common/xenoprof.c
+@@ -253,6 +253,9 @@ static int alloc_xenoprof_struct(
+         return -ENOMEM;
+     }
+ 
++    for ( i = 0; i < npages; ++i )
++        clear_page(d->xenoprof->rawbuf + i * PAGE_SIZE);
++
+     d->xenoprof->npages = npages;
+     d->xenoprof->nbuf = nvcpu;
+     d->xenoprof->bufsize = bufsize;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..d81b8232d2df0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa313-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: xenoprof: limit consumption of shared buffer data
+
+Since a shared buffer can be written to by the guest, we may only read
+the head and tail pointers from there (all other fields should only ever
+be written to). Furthermore, for any particular operation the two values
+must be read exactly once, with both checks and consumption happening
+with the thus read values. (The backtrace related xenoprof_buf_space()
+use in xenoprof_log_event() is an exception: The values used there get
+re-checked by every subsequent xenoprof_add_sample().)
+
+Since that code needed touching, also fix the double increment of the
+lost samples count in case the backtrace related xenoprof_add_sample()
+invocation in xenoprof_log_event() fails.
+
+Where code is being touched anyway, add const as appropriate, but take
+the opportunity to entirely drop the now unused domain parameter of
+xenoprof_buf_space().
+
+This is part of XSA-313.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/common/xenoprof.c
++++ b/xen/common/xenoprof.c
+@@ -479,25 +479,22 @@ static int add_passive_list(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ 
+ 
+ /* Get space in the buffer */
+-static int xenoprof_buf_space(struct domain *d, xenoprof_buf_t * buf, int size)
++static int xenoprof_buf_space(int head, int tail, int size)
+ {
+-    int head, tail;
+-
+-    head = xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_head);
+-    tail = xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_tail);
+-
+     return ((tail > head) ? 0 : size) + tail - head - 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Check for space and add a sample. Return 1 if successful, 0 otherwise. */
+-static int xenoprof_add_sample(struct domain *d, xenoprof_buf_t *buf,
++static int xenoprof_add_sample(const struct domain *d,
++                               const struct xenoprof_vcpu *v,
+                                uint64_t eip, int mode, int event)
+ {
++    xenoprof_buf_t *buf = v->buffer;
+     int head, tail, size;
+ 
+     head = xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_head);
+     tail = xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_tail);
+-    size = xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_size);
++    size = v->event_size;
+     
+     /* make sure indexes in shared buffer are sane */
+     if ( (head < 0) || (head >= size) || (tail < 0) || (tail >= size) )
+@@ -506,7 +503,7 @@ static int xenoprof_add_sample(struct do
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ( xenoprof_buf_space(d, buf, size) > 0 )
++    if ( xenoprof_buf_space(head, tail, size) > 0 )
+     {
+         xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_log[head].eip) = eip;
+         xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_log[head].mode) = mode;
+@@ -530,7 +527,6 @@ static int xenoprof_add_sample(struct do
+ int xenoprof_add_trace(struct vcpu *vcpu, uint64_t pc, int mode)
+ {
+     struct domain *d = vcpu->domain;
+-    xenoprof_buf_t *buf = d->xenoprof->vcpu[vcpu->vcpu_id].buffer;
+ 
+     /* Do not accidentally write an escape code due to a broken frame. */
+     if ( pc == XENOPROF_ESCAPE_CODE )
+@@ -539,7 +535,8 @@ int xenoprof_add_trace(struct vcpu *vcpu
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    return xenoprof_add_sample(d, buf, pc, mode, 0);
++    return xenoprof_add_sample(d, &d->xenoprof->vcpu[vcpu->vcpu_id],
++                               pc, mode, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ void xenoprof_log_event(struct vcpu *vcpu, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
+@@ -570,17 +567,22 @@ void xenoprof_log_event(struct vcpu *vcp
+     /* Provide backtrace if requested. */
+     if ( backtrace_depth > 0 )
+     {
+-        if ( (xenoprof_buf_space(d, buf, v->event_size) < 2) ||
+-             !xenoprof_add_sample(d, buf, XENOPROF_ESCAPE_CODE, mode, 
+-                                  XENOPROF_TRACE_BEGIN) )
++        if ( xenoprof_buf_space(xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_head),
++                                xenoprof_buf(d, buf, event_tail),
++                                v->event_size) < 2 )
+         {
+             xenoprof_buf(d, buf, lost_samples)++;
+             lost_samples++;
+             return;
+         }
++
++        /* xenoprof_add_sample() will increment lost_samples on failure */
++        if ( !xenoprof_add_sample(d, v, XENOPROF_ESCAPE_CODE, mode,
++                                  XENOPROF_TRACE_BEGIN) )
++            return;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ( xenoprof_add_sample(d, buf, pc, mode, event) )
++    if ( xenoprof_add_sample(d, v, pc, mode, event) )
+     {
+         if ( is_active(vcpu->domain) )
+             active_samples++;
+--- a/xen/include/xen/xenoprof.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/xenoprof.h
+@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ struct xenoprof {
+ 
+ #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ #define XENOPROF_COMPAT(x) 0
+-#define xenoprof_buf(d, b, field) ((b)->field)
++#define xenoprof_buf(d, b, field) ACCESS_ONCE((b)->field)
+ #else
+ #define XENOPROF_COMPAT(x) ((x)->is_compat)
+-#define xenoprof_buf(d, b, field) (*(!(d)->xenoprof->is_compat ? \
+-                                       &(b)->native.field : \
+-                                       &(b)->compat.field))
++#define xenoprof_buf(d, b, field) ACCESS_ONCE(*(!(d)->xenoprof->is_compat \
++                                                ? &(b)->native.field \
++                                                : &(b)->compat.field))
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct domain;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa314-4.13.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa314-4.13.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..67e006681e0ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa314-4.13.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From ab49f005f7d01d4004d76f2e295d31aca7d4f93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 20:54:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] xen/rwlock: Add missing memory barrier in the unlock path of
+ rwlock
+
+The rwlock unlock paths are using atomic_sub() to release the lock.
+However the implementation of atomic_sub() rightfully doesn't contain a
+memory barrier. On Arm, this means a processor is allowed to re-order
+the memory access with the preceeding access.
+
+In other words, the unlock may be seen by another processor before all
+the memory accesses within the "critical" section.
+
+The rwlock paths already contains barrier indirectly, but they are not
+very useful without the counterpart in the unlock paths.
+
+The memory barriers are not necessary on x86 because loads/stores are
+not re-ordered with lock instructions.
+
+So add arch_lock_release_barrier() in the unlock paths that will only
+add memory barrier on Arm.
+
+Take the opportunity to document each lock paths explaining why a
+barrier is not necessary.
+
+This is XSA-314.
+
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+
+---
+ xen/include/xen/rwlock.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/include/xen/rwlock.h b/xen/include/xen/rwlock.h
+index 3dfea1ac2a..516486306f 100644
+--- a/xen/include/xen/rwlock.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/rwlock.h
+@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static inline int _read_trylock(rwlock_t *lock)
+     if ( likely(!(cnts & _QW_WMASK)) )
+     {
+         cnts = (u32)atomic_add_return(_QR_BIAS, &lock->cnts);
++        /*
++         * atomic_add_return() is a full barrier so no need for an
++         * arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++         */
+         if ( likely(!(cnts & _QW_WMASK)) )
+             return 1;
+         atomic_sub(_QR_BIAS, &lock->cnts);
+@@ -64,11 +68,19 @@ static inline void _read_lock(rwlock_t *lock)
+     u32 cnts;
+ 
+     cnts = atomic_add_return(_QR_BIAS, &lock->cnts);
++    /*
++     * atomic_add_return() is a full barrier so no need for an
++     * arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++     */
+     if ( likely(!(cnts & _QW_WMASK)) )
+         return;
+ 
+     /* The slowpath will decrement the reader count, if necessary. */
+     queue_read_lock_slowpath(lock);
++    /*
++     * queue_read_lock_slowpath() is using spinlock and therefore is a
++     * full barrier. So no need for an arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++     */
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void _read_lock_irq(rwlock_t *lock)
+@@ -92,6 +104,7 @@ static inline unsigned long _read_lock_irqsave(rwlock_t *lock)
+  */
+ static inline void _read_unlock(rwlock_t *lock)
+ {
++    arch_lock_release_barrier();
+     /*
+      * Atomically decrement the reader count
+      */
+@@ -121,11 +134,20 @@ static inline int _rw_is_locked(rwlock_t *lock)
+  */
+ static inline void _write_lock(rwlock_t *lock)
+ {
+-    /* Optimize for the unfair lock case where the fair flag is 0. */
++    /*
++     * Optimize for the unfair lock case where the fair flag is 0.
++     *
++     * atomic_cmpxchg() is a full barrier so no need for an
++     * arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++     */
+     if ( atomic_cmpxchg(&lock->cnts, 0, _QW_LOCKED) == 0 )
+         return;
+ 
+     queue_write_lock_slowpath(lock);
++    /*
++     * queue_write_lock_slowpath() is using spinlock and therefore is a
++     * full barrier. So no need for an arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++     */
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void _write_lock_irq(rwlock_t *lock)
+@@ -157,11 +179,16 @@ static inline int _write_trylock(rwlock_t *lock)
+     if ( unlikely(cnts) )
+         return 0;
+ 
++    /*
++     * atomic_cmpxchg() is a full barrier so no need for an
++     * arch_lock_acquire_barrier().
++     */
+     return likely(atomic_cmpxchg(&lock->cnts, 0, _QW_LOCKED) == 0);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void _write_unlock(rwlock_t *lock)
+ {
++    arch_lock_release_barrier();
+     /*
+      * If the writer field is atomic, it can be cleared directly.
+      * Otherwise, an atomic subtraction will be used to clear it.
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa316-xen.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa316-xen.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..4962b4e7161cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa316-xen.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
+Subject: xen/gnttab: Fix error path in map_grant_ref()
+
+Part of XSA-295 (c/s 863e74eb2cffb) inadvertently re-positioned the brackets,
+changing the logic.  If the _set_status() call fails, the grant_map hypercall
+would fail with a status of 1 (rc != GNTST_okay) instead of the expected
+negative GNTST_* error.
+
+This error path can be taken due to bad guest state, and causes net/blk-back
+in Linux to crash.
+
+This is XSA-316.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index 9fd6e60416..4b5344dc21 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ map_grant_ref(
+     {
+         if ( (rc = _set_status(shah, status, rd, rgt->gt_version, act,
+                                op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly, 1,
+-                               ld->domain_id) != GNTST_okay) )
++                               ld->domain_id)) != GNTST_okay )
+             goto act_release_out;
+ 
+         if ( !act->pin )
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa318.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa318.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..f4becdf81e7a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa318.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: gnttab: fix GNTTABOP_copy continuation handling
+
+The XSA-226 fix was flawed - the backwards transformation on rc was done
+too early, causing a continuation to not get invoked when the need for
+preemption was determined at the very first iteration of the request.
+This in particular means that all of the status fields of the individual
+operations would be left untouched, i.e. set to whatever the caller may
+or may not have initialized them to.
+
+This is part of XSA-318.
+
+Reported-by: Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@amazon.de>
+Tested-by: Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@amazon.de>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -3576,8 +3576,7 @@ do_grant_table_op(
+         rc = gnttab_copy(copy, count);
+         if ( rc > 0 )
+         {
+-            rc = count - rc;
+-            guest_handle_add_offset(copy, rc);
++            guest_handle_add_offset(copy, count - rc);
+             uop = guest_handle_cast(copy, void);
+         }
+         break;
+@@ -3644,6 +3643,9 @@ do_grant_table_op(
+   out:
+     if ( rc > 0 || opaque_out != 0 )
+     {
++        /* Adjust rc, see gnttab_copy() for why this is needed. */
++        if ( cmd == GNTTABOP_copy )
++            rc = count - rc;
+         ASSERT(rc < count);
+         ASSERT((opaque_out & GNTTABOP_CMD_MASK) == 0);
+         rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op, "ihi",
author	Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>	2020-04-15 14:52:28 +0200
committer	Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>	2020-04-19 10:52:33 +0700
commit	08a409483ce6acd12bfb884dac0d0603cc85ce28 (patch)
tree	e822a4e5f46a8ab9768224bdf2f97ed28b625e4e /system
parent	bddbdfdccbc87f272fd604ef992b4df2f6e71f45 (diff)