diff options
author | Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr> | 2021-10-16 11:12:05 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org> | 2021-10-18 07:50:31 +0700 |
commit | b58940b86d93b1749eab3c75f33f272b4f95056a (patch) | |
tree | 67566adba6b69d963e262c1a8b95e2390c74d8ef /system/xen/xsa | |
parent | 581d8490d19fe10273ec5df2581635b0af2f19d5 (diff) |
system/xen: Updated for version 4.15.1.
Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'system/xen/xsa')
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0001-xen-arm-Create-dom0less-domUs-earlier.patch | 85 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0002-xen-arm-Boot-modules-should-always-be-scrubbed-if-bo.patch | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-1.patch | 120 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-2.patch | 102 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-3.patch | 163 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-4.patch | 79 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-5.patch | 141 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa375.patch | 50 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa377.patch | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa386.patch | 29 |
10 files changed, 29 insertions, 826 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0001-xen-arm-Create-dom0less-domUs-earlier.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0001-xen-arm-Create-dom0less-domUs-earlier.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a21dba440c57..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0001-xen-arm-Create-dom0less-domUs-earlier.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -From b1e5a89f19d9919c3eae17ab9c6a663b0801ad9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 17:47:13 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] xen/arm: Create dom0less domUs earlier - -In a follow-up patch we will need to unallocate the boot modules -before heap_init_late() is called. - -The modules will contain the domUs kernel and initramfs. Therefore Xen -will need to create extra domUs (used by dom0less) before heap_init_late(). - -This has two consequences on dom0less: - 1) Domains will not be unpaused as soon as they are created but - once all have been created. However, Xen doesn't guarantee an order - to unpause, so this is not something one could rely on. - - 2) The memory allocated for a domU will not be scrubbed anymore when an - admin select bootscrub=on. This is not something we advertised, but if - this is a concern we can introduce either force scrub for all domUs or - a per-domain flag in the DT. The behavior for bootscrub=off and - bootscrub=idle (default) has not changed. - -This is part of XSA-372 / CVE-2021-28693. - -Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> -Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> ---- - xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 2 -- - xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 11 ++++++----- - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c -index 374bf655ee34..4203ddcca0e3 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c -@@ -2515,8 +2515,6 @@ void __init create_domUs(void) - - if ( construct_domU(d, node) != 0 ) - panic("Could not set up domain %s\n", dt_node_name(node)); -- -- domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d); - } - } - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -index 2532ec973913..441e0e16e9f0 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, - int cpus, i; - const char *cmdline; - struct bootmodule *xen_bootmodule; -- struct domain *dom0; -+ struct domain *dom0, *d; - struct xen_domctl_createdomain dom0_cfg = { - .flags = XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm | XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap, - .max_evtchn_port = -1, -@@ -987,6 +987,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, - if ( construct_dom0(dom0) != 0) - panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS\n"); - -+ if ( acpi_disabled ) -+ create_domUs(); -+ - heap_init_late(); - - init_trace_bufs(); -@@ -1000,10 +1003,8 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, - - system_state = SYS_STATE_active; - -- if ( acpi_disabled ) -- create_domUs(); -- -- domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0); -+ for_each_domain( d ) -+ domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d); - - /* Switch on to the dynamically allocated stack for the idle vcpu - * since the static one we're running on is about to be freed. */ --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0002-xen-arm-Boot-modules-should-always-be-scrubbed-if-bo.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0002-xen-arm-Boot-modules-should-always-be-scrubbed-if-bo.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9c322b18a504..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa372-4.15-0002-xen-arm-Boot-modules-should-always-be-scrubbed-if-bo.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -From 09bb28bdef3fb5e7d08bdd641601ca0c0d4d82b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2021 17:38:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] xen/arm: Boot modules should always be scrubbed if - bootscrub={on, idle} - -The function to initialize the pages (see init_heap_pages()) will request -scrub when the admin request idle bootscrub (default) and state == -SYS_STATE_active. When bootscrub=on, Xen will scrub any free pages in -heap_init_late(). - -Currently, the boot modules (e.g. kernels, initramfs) will be discarded/ -freed after heap_init_late() is called and system_state switched to -SYS_STATE_active. This means the pages associated with the boot modules -will not get scrubbed before getting re-purposed. - -If the memory is assigned to an untrusted domU, it may be able to -retrieve secrets from the modules. - -This is part of XSA-372 / CVE-2021-28693. - -Fixes: 1774e9b1df27 ("xen/arm: introduce create_domUs") -Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> -Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> ---- - xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 8 ++++++-- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -index 441e0e16e9f0..8afb78f2c985 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c -@@ -72,8 +72,6 @@ domid_t __read_mostly max_init_domid; - - static __used void init_done(void) - { -- discard_initial_modules(); -- - /* Must be done past setting system_state. */ - unregister_init_virtual_region(); - -@@ -990,6 +988,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, - if ( acpi_disabled ) - create_domUs(); - -+ /* -+ * This needs to be called **before** heap_init_late() so modules -+ * will be scrubbed (unless suppressed). -+ */ -+ discard_initial_modules(); -+ - heap_init_late(); - - init_trace_bufs(); --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ee5229a11c42..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: VT-d: size qinval queue dynamically - -With the present synchronous model, we need two slots for every -operation (the operation itself and a wait descriptor). There can be -one such pair of requests pending per CPU. To ensure that under all -normal circumstances a slot is always available when one is requested, -size the queue ring according to the number of present CPUs. - -This is part of XSA-373 / CVE-2021-28692. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h -@@ -450,17 +450,9 @@ struct qinval_entry { - }q; - }; - --/* Order of queue invalidation pages(max is 8) */ --#define QINVAL_PAGE_ORDER 2 -- --#define QINVAL_ARCH_PAGE_ORDER (QINVAL_PAGE_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT_4K - PAGE_SHIFT) --#define QINVAL_ARCH_PAGE_NR ( QINVAL_ARCH_PAGE_ORDER < 0 ? \ -- 1 : \ -- 1 << QINVAL_ARCH_PAGE_ORDER ) -- - /* Each entry is 16 bytes, so 2^8 entries per page */ - #define QINVAL_ENTRY_ORDER ( PAGE_SHIFT - 4 ) --#define QINVAL_ENTRY_NR (1 << (QINVAL_PAGE_ORDER + 8)) -+#define QINVAL_MAX_ENTRY_NR (1u << (7 + QINVAL_ENTRY_ORDER)) - - /* Status data flag */ - #define QINVAL_STAT_INIT 0 ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/qinval.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/qinval.c -@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ - - #define VTD_QI_TIMEOUT 1 - -+static unsigned int __read_mostly qi_pg_order; -+static unsigned int __read_mostly qi_entry_nr; -+ - static int __must_check invalidate_sync(struct vtd_iommu *iommu); - - static void print_qi_regs(struct vtd_iommu *iommu) -@@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ static unsigned int qinval_next_index(st - tail >>= QINVAL_INDEX_SHIFT; - - /* (tail+1 == head) indicates a full queue, wait for HW */ -- while ( ( tail + 1 ) % QINVAL_ENTRY_NR == -+ while ( ((tail + 1) & (qi_entry_nr - 1)) == - ( dmar_readq(iommu->reg, DMAR_IQH_REG) >> QINVAL_INDEX_SHIFT ) ) - cpu_relax(); - -@@ -68,7 +71,7 @@ static void qinval_update_qtail(struct v - - /* Need hold register lock when update tail */ - ASSERT( spin_is_locked(&iommu->register_lock) ); -- val = (index + 1) % QINVAL_ENTRY_NR; -+ val = (index + 1) & (qi_entry_nr - 1); - dmar_writeq(iommu->reg, DMAR_IQT_REG, (val << QINVAL_INDEX_SHIFT)); - } - -@@ -403,8 +406,28 @@ int enable_qinval(struct vtd_iommu *iomm - - if ( iommu->qinval_maddr == 0 ) - { -- iommu->qinval_maddr = alloc_pgtable_maddr(QINVAL_ARCH_PAGE_NR, -- iommu->node); -+ if ( !qi_entry_nr ) -+ { -+ /* -+ * With the present synchronous model, we need two slots for every -+ * operation (the operation itself and a wait descriptor). There -+ * can be one such pair of requests pending per CPU. One extra -+ * entry is needed as the ring is considered full when there's -+ * only one entry left. -+ */ -+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_NR_CPUS * 2 >= QINVAL_MAX_ENTRY_NR); -+ qi_pg_order = get_order_from_bytes((num_present_cpus() * 2 + 1) << -+ (PAGE_SHIFT - -+ QINVAL_ENTRY_ORDER)); -+ qi_entry_nr = 1u << (qi_pg_order + QINVAL_ENTRY_ORDER); -+ -+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO VTDPREFIX, -+ "QI: using %u-entry ring(s)\n", qi_entry_nr); -+ } -+ -+ iommu->qinval_maddr = -+ alloc_pgtable_maddr(qi_entry_nr >> QINVAL_ENTRY_ORDER, -+ iommu->node); - if ( iommu->qinval_maddr == 0 ) - { - dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX, -@@ -418,15 +441,16 @@ int enable_qinval(struct vtd_iommu *iomm - - spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->register_lock, flags); - -- /* Setup Invalidation Queue Address(IQA) register with the -- * address of the page we just allocated. QS field at -- * bits[2:0] to indicate size of queue is one 4KB page. -- * That's 256 entries. Queued Head (IQH) and Queue Tail (IQT) -- * registers are automatically reset to 0 with write -- * to IQA register. -+ /* -+ * Setup Invalidation Queue Address (IQA) register with the address of the -+ * pages we just allocated. The QS field at bits[2:0] indicates the size -+ * (page order) of the queue. -+ * -+ * Queued Head (IQH) and Queue Tail (IQT) registers are automatically -+ * reset to 0 with write to IQA register. - */ - dmar_writeq(iommu->reg, DMAR_IQA_REG, -- iommu->qinval_maddr | QINVAL_PAGE_ORDER); -+ iommu->qinval_maddr | qi_pg_order); - - dmar_writeq(iommu->reg, DMAR_IQT_REG, 0); - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d61a3b42bf38..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: AMD/IOMMU: size command buffer dynamically - -With the present synchronous model, we need two slots for every -operation (the operation itself and a wait command). There can be one -such pair of commands pending per CPU. To ensure that under all normal -circumstances a slot is always available when one is requested, size the -command ring according to the number of present CPUs. - -This is part of XSA-373 / CVE-2021-28692. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu-defs.h -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu-defs.h -@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@ - #ifndef AMD_IOMMU_DEFS_H - #define AMD_IOMMU_DEFS_H - --/* IOMMU Command Buffer entries: in power of 2 increments, minimum of 256 */ --#define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_DEFAULT_ENTRIES 512 -- - /* IOMMU Event Log entries: in power of 2 increments, minimum of 256 */ - #define IOMMU_EVENT_LOG_DEFAULT_ENTRIES 512 - -@@ -164,8 +161,8 @@ struct amd_iommu_dte { - #define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_LENGTH_MASK 0x0F000000 - #define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_LENGTH_SHIFT 24 - --#define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_SIZE 16 --#define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_POWER_OF2_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE 8 -+#define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_ORDER 4 -+#define IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_MAX_ENTRIES (1u << 15) - - #define IOMMU_CMD_OPCODE_MASK 0xF0000000 - #define IOMMU_CMD_OPCODE_SHIFT 28 ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static int queue_iommu_command(struct am - { - uint32_t tail, head; - -- tail = iommu->cmd_buffer.tail + IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_SIZE; -+ tail = iommu->cmd_buffer.tail + sizeof(cmd_entry_t); - if ( tail == iommu->cmd_buffer.size ) - tail = 0; - -@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static int queue_iommu_command(struct am - if ( head != tail ) - { - memcpy(iommu->cmd_buffer.buffer + iommu->cmd_buffer.tail, -- cmd, IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_SIZE); -+ cmd, sizeof(cmd_entry_t)); - - iommu->cmd_buffer.tail = tail; - return 1; ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c -@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void register_iommu_cmd_buffer_in - writel(entry, iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_BASE_LOW_OFFSET); - - power_of2_entries = get_order_from_bytes(iommu->cmd_buffer.size) + -- IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_POWER_OF2_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE; -+ PAGE_SHIFT - IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_ORDER; - - entry = 0; - iommu_set_addr_hi_to_reg(&entry, addr_hi); -@@ -1018,9 +1018,31 @@ static void *__init allocate_ring_buffer - static void * __init allocate_cmd_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu) - { - /* allocate 'command buffer' in power of 2 increments of 4K */ -+ static unsigned int __read_mostly nr_ents; -+ -+ if ( !nr_ents ) -+ { -+ unsigned int order; -+ -+ /* -+ * With the present synchronous model, we need two slots for every -+ * operation (the operation itself and a wait command). There can be -+ * one such pair of requests pending per CPU. One extra entry is -+ * needed as the ring is considered full when there's only one entry -+ * left. -+ */ -+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_NR_CPUS * 2 >= IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_MAX_ENTRIES); -+ order = get_order_from_bytes((num_present_cpus() * 2 + 1) << -+ IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_ORDER); -+ nr_ents = 1u << (order + PAGE_SHIFT - IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_ORDER); -+ -+ AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("using %u-entry cmd ring(s)\n", nr_ents); -+ } -+ -+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(cmd_entry_t) != (1u << IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_ENTRY_ORDER)); -+ - return allocate_ring_buffer(&iommu->cmd_buffer, sizeof(cmd_entry_t), -- IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_DEFAULT_ENTRIES, -- "Command Buffer", false); -+ nr_ents, "Command Buffer", false); - } - - static void * __init allocate_event_log(struct amd_iommu *iommu) diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-3.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c7ddf5d6441c..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: VT-d: eliminate flush related timeouts - -Leaving an in-progress operation pending when it appears to take too -long is problematic: If e.g. a QI command completed later, the write to -the "poll slot" may instead be understood to signal a subsequently -started command's completion. Also our accounting of the timeout period -was actually wrong: We included the time it took for the command to -actually make it to the front of the queue, which could be heavily -affected by guests other than the one for which the flush is being -performed. - -Do away with all timeout detection on all flush related code paths. -Log excessively long processing times (with a progressive threshold) to -have some indication of problems in this area. - -Additionally log (once) if qinval_next_index() didn't immediately find -an available slot. Together with the earlier change sizing the queue(s) -dynamically, we should now have a guarantee that with our fully -synchronous model any demand for slots can actually be satisfied. - -This is part of XSA-373 / CVE-2021-28692. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h -@@ -127,6 +127,34 @@ do { - } \ - } while (0) - -+#define IOMMU_FLUSH_WAIT(what, iommu, offset, op, cond, sts) \ -+do { \ -+ static unsigned int __read_mostly threshold = 1; \ -+ s_time_t start = NOW(); \ -+ s_time_t timeout = start + DMAR_OPERATION_TIMEOUT * threshold; \ -+ \ -+ for ( ; ; ) \ -+ { \ -+ sts = op(iommu->reg, offset); \ -+ if ( cond ) \ -+ break; \ -+ if ( timeout && NOW() > timeout ) \ -+ { \ -+ threshold |= threshold << 1; \ -+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX \ -+ " IOMMU#%u: %s flush taking too long\n", \ -+ iommu->index, what); \ -+ timeout = 0; \ -+ } \ -+ cpu_relax(); \ -+ } \ -+ \ -+ if ( !timeout ) \ -+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX \ -+ " IOMMU#%u: %s flush took %lums\n", \ -+ iommu->index, what, (NOW() - start) / 10000000); \ -+} while ( false ) -+ - int vtd_hw_check(void); - void disable_pmr(struct vtd_iommu *iommu); - int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd); ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c -@@ -373,8 +373,8 @@ static void iommu_flush_write_buffer(str - dmar_writel(iommu->reg, DMAR_GCMD_REG, val | DMA_GCMD_WBF); - - /* Make sure hardware complete it */ -- IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, DMAR_GSTS_REG, dmar_readl, -- !(val & DMA_GSTS_WBFS), val); -+ IOMMU_FLUSH_WAIT("write buffer", iommu, DMAR_GSTS_REG, dmar_readl, -+ !(val & DMA_GSTS_WBFS), val); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags); - } -@@ -423,8 +423,8 @@ int vtd_flush_context_reg(struct vtd_iom - dmar_writeq(iommu->reg, DMAR_CCMD_REG, val); - - /* Make sure hardware complete it */ -- IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, DMAR_CCMD_REG, dmar_readq, -- !(val & DMA_CCMD_ICC), val); -+ IOMMU_FLUSH_WAIT("context", iommu, DMAR_CCMD_REG, dmar_readq, -+ !(val & DMA_CCMD_ICC), val); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags); - /* flush context entry will implicitly flush write buffer */ -@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ int vtd_flush_iotlb_reg(struct vtd_iommu - dmar_writeq(iommu->reg, tlb_offset + 8, val); - - /* Make sure hardware complete it */ -- IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, (tlb_offset + 8), dmar_readq, -- !(val & DMA_TLB_IVT), val); -+ IOMMU_FLUSH_WAIT("iotlb", iommu, (tlb_offset + 8), dmar_readq, -+ !(val & DMA_TLB_IVT), val); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags); - - /* check IOTLB invalidation granularity */ ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/qinval.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/qinval.c -@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ - #include "extern.h" - #include "../ats.h" - --#define VTD_QI_TIMEOUT 1 -- - static unsigned int __read_mostly qi_pg_order; - static unsigned int __read_mostly qi_entry_nr; - -@@ -60,7 +58,11 @@ static unsigned int qinval_next_index(st - /* (tail+1 == head) indicates a full queue, wait for HW */ - while ( ((tail + 1) & (qi_entry_nr - 1)) == - ( dmar_readq(iommu->reg, DMAR_IQH_REG) >> QINVAL_INDEX_SHIFT ) ) -+ { -+ printk_once(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX " IOMMU#%u: no QI slot available\n", -+ iommu->index); - cpu_relax(); -+ } - - return tail; - } -@@ -180,23 +182,32 @@ static int __must_check queue_invalidate - /* Now we don't support interrupt method */ - if ( sw ) - { -- s_time_t timeout; -- -- /* In case all wait descriptor writes to same addr with same data */ -- timeout = NOW() + MILLISECS(flush_dev_iotlb ? -- iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout : VTD_QI_TIMEOUT); -+ static unsigned int __read_mostly threshold = 1; -+ s_time_t start = NOW(); -+ s_time_t timeout = start + (flush_dev_iotlb -+ ? iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout -+ : 100) * MILLISECS(threshold); - - while ( ACCESS_ONCE(*this_poll_slot) != QINVAL_STAT_DONE ) - { -- if ( NOW() > timeout ) -+ if ( timeout && NOW() > timeout ) - { -- print_qi_regs(iommu); -+ threshold |= threshold << 1; - printk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX -- " Queue invalidate wait descriptor timed out\n"); -- return -ETIMEDOUT; -+ " IOMMU#%u: QI%s wait descriptor taking too long\n", -+ iommu->index, flush_dev_iotlb ? " dev" : ""); -+ print_qi_regs(iommu); -+ timeout = 0; - } - cpu_relax(); - } -+ -+ if ( !timeout ) -+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX -+ " IOMMU#%u: QI%s wait descriptor took %lums\n", -+ iommu->index, flush_dev_iotlb ? " dev" : "", -+ (NOW() - start) / 10000000); -+ - return 0; - } - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-4.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-4.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 17592cbf2d04..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-4.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: AMD/IOMMU: wait for command slot to be available - -No caller cared about send_iommu_command() indicating unavailability of -a slot. Hence if a sufficient number prior commands timed out, we did -blindly assume that the requested command was submitted to the IOMMU -when really it wasn't. This could mean both a hanging system (waiting -for a command to complete that was never seen by the IOMMU) or blindly -propagating success back to callers, making them believe they're fine -to e.g. free previously unmapped pages. - -Fold the three involved functions into one, add spin waiting for an -available slot along the lines of VT-d's qinval_next_index(), and as a -consequence drop all error indicator return types/values. - -This is part of XSA-373 / CVE-2021-28692. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -@@ -20,43 +20,30 @@ - #include "iommu.h" - #include "../ats.h" - --static int queue_iommu_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 cmd[]) -+static void send_iommu_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, -+ const uint32_t cmd[4]) - { -- uint32_t tail, head; -+ uint32_t tail; - - tail = iommu->cmd_buffer.tail + sizeof(cmd_entry_t); - if ( tail == iommu->cmd_buffer.size ) - tail = 0; - -- head = readl(iommu->mmio_base + -- IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_HEAD_OFFSET) & IOMMU_RING_BUFFER_PTR_MASK; -- if ( head != tail ) -+ while ( tail == (readl(iommu->mmio_base + -+ IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_HEAD_OFFSET) & -+ IOMMU_RING_BUFFER_PTR_MASK) ) - { -- memcpy(iommu->cmd_buffer.buffer + iommu->cmd_buffer.tail, -- cmd, sizeof(cmd_entry_t)); -- -- iommu->cmd_buffer.tail = tail; -- return 1; -+ printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "AMD IOMMU %pp: no cmd slot available\n", -+ &PCI_SBDF2(iommu->seg, iommu->bdf)); -+ cpu_relax(); - } - -- return 0; --} -- --static void commit_iommu_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu) --{ -- writel(iommu->cmd_buffer.tail, -- iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_TAIL_OFFSET); --} -+ memcpy(iommu->cmd_buffer.buffer + iommu->cmd_buffer.tail, -+ cmd, sizeof(cmd_entry_t)); - --static int send_iommu_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 cmd[]) --{ -- if ( queue_iommu_command(iommu, cmd) ) -- { -- commit_iommu_command_buffer(iommu); -- return 1; -- } -+ iommu->cmd_buffer.tail = tail; - -- return 0; -+ writel(tail, iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_TAIL_OFFSET); - } - - static void flush_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu) diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-5.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-5.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0c6b1ea7c5e9..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa373-4.15-5.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: AMD/IOMMU: drop command completion timeout - -First and foremost - such timeouts were not signaled to callers, making -them believe they're fine to e.g. free previously unmapped pages. - -Mirror VT-d's behavior: A fixed number of loop iterations is not a -suitable way to detect timeouts in an environment (CPU and bus speeds) -independent manner anyway. Furthermore, leaving an in-progress operation -pending when it appears to take too long is problematic: If a command -completed later, the signaling of its completion may instead be -understood to signal a subsequently started command's completion. - -Log excessively long processing times (with a progressive threshold) to -have some indication of problems in this area. Allow callers to specify -a non-default timeout bias for this logging, using the same values as -VT-d does, which in particular means a (by default) much larger value -for device IO TLB invalidation. - -This is part of XSA-373 / CVE-2021-28692. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> - ---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c -@@ -46,10 +46,12 @@ static void send_iommu_command(struct am - writel(tail, iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_CMD_BUFFER_TAIL_OFFSET); - } - --static void flush_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu) -+static void flush_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu, -+ unsigned int timeout_base) - { -- unsigned int cmd[4], status, loop_count; -- bool comp_wait; -+ uint32_t cmd[4]; -+ s_time_t start, timeout; -+ static unsigned int __read_mostly threshold = 1; - - /* RW1C 'ComWaitInt' in status register */ - writel(IOMMU_STATUS_COMP_WAIT_INT, -@@ -65,22 +67,29 @@ static void flush_command_buffer(struct - IOMMU_COMP_WAIT_I_FLAG_SHIFT, &cmd[0]); - send_iommu_command(iommu, cmd); - -- /* Make loop_count long enough for polling completion wait bit */ -- loop_count = 1000; -- do { -- status = readl(iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_STATUS_MMIO_OFFSET); -- comp_wait = status & IOMMU_STATUS_COMP_WAIT_INT; -- --loop_count; -- } while ( !comp_wait && loop_count ); -- -- if ( comp_wait ) -+ start = NOW(); -+ timeout = start + (timeout_base ?: 100) * MILLISECS(threshold); -+ while ( !(readl(iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_STATUS_MMIO_OFFSET) & -+ IOMMU_STATUS_COMP_WAIT_INT) ) - { -- /* RW1C 'ComWaitInt' in status register */ -- writel(IOMMU_STATUS_COMP_WAIT_INT, -- iommu->mmio_base + IOMMU_STATUS_MMIO_OFFSET); -- return; -+ if ( timeout && NOW() > timeout ) -+ { -+ threshold |= threshold << 1; -+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING -+ "AMD IOMMU %pp: %scompletion wait taking too long\n", -+ &PCI_SBDF2(iommu->seg, iommu->bdf), -+ timeout_base ? "iotlb " : ""); -+ timeout = 0; -+ } -+ cpu_relax(); - } -- AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Warning: ComWaitInt bit did not assert!\n"); -+ -+ if ( !timeout ) -+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING -+ "AMD IOMMU %pp: %scompletion wait took %lums\n", -+ &PCI_SBDF2(iommu->seg, iommu->bdf), -+ timeout_base ? "iotlb " : "", -+ (NOW() - start) / 10000000); - } - - /* Build low level iommu command messages */ -@@ -291,7 +300,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(u8 devfn, con - /* send INVALIDATE_IOTLB_PAGES command */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); - invalidate_iotlb_pages(iommu, maxpend, 0, queueid, daddr, req_id, order); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags); - } - -@@ -328,7 +337,7 @@ static void _amd_iommu_flush_pages(struc - { - spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); - invalidate_iommu_pages(iommu, daddr, dom_id, order); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, 0); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags); - } - -@@ -352,7 +361,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_device(struct amd_i - ASSERT( spin_is_locked(&iommu->lock) ); - - invalidate_dev_table_entry(iommu, bdf); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, 0); - } - - void amd_iommu_flush_intremap(struct amd_iommu *iommu, uint16_t bdf) -@@ -360,7 +369,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_intremap(struct amd - ASSERT( spin_is_locked(&iommu->lock) ); - - invalidate_interrupt_table(iommu, bdf); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, 0); - } - - void amd_iommu_flush_all_caches(struct amd_iommu *iommu) -@@ -368,7 +377,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_all_caches(struct a - ASSERT( spin_is_locked(&iommu->lock) ); - - invalidate_iommu_all(iommu); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, 0); - } - - void amd_iommu_send_guest_cmd(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 cmd[]) -@@ -378,7 +387,8 @@ void amd_iommu_send_guest_cmd(struct amd - spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); - - send_iommu_command(iommu, cmd); -- flush_command_buffer(iommu); -+ /* TBD: Timeout selection may require peeking into cmd[]. */ -+ flush_command_buffer(iommu, 0); - - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags); - } diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa375.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa375.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aa2e5ad4674f..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa375.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Protect against Speculative Code Store Bypass - -Modern x86 processors have far-better-than-architecturally-guaranteed self -modifying code detection. Typically, when a write hits an instruction in -flight, a Machine Clear occurs to flush stale content in the frontend and -backend. - -For self modifying code, before a write which hits an instruction in flight -retires, the frontend can speculatively decode and execute the old instruction -stream. Speculation of this form can suffer from type confusion in registers, -and potentially leak data. - -Furthermore, updates are typically byte-wise, rather than atomic. Depending -on timing, speculation can race ahead multiple times between individual -writes, and execute the transiently-malformed instruction stream. - -Xen has stubs which are used in certain cases for emulation purposes. Inhibit -speculation between updating the stub and executing it. - -This is XSA-375 / CVE-2021-0089. - -Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> - -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c -index 8889509d2a..11467a1e3a 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c -@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode, - /* Runtime confirmation that we haven't clobbered an adjacent stub. */ - BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 < (p - ctxt->io_emul_stub)); - -+ block_speculation(); /* SCSB */ -+ - /* Handy function-typed pointer to the stub. */ - return (void *)stub_va; - -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c -index c25d88d0d8..f42ff2a837 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c -@@ -1257,6 +1257,7 @@ static inline int mkec(uint8_t e, int32_t ec, ...) - # define invoke_stub(pre, post, constraints...) do { \ - stub_exn.info = (union stub_exception_token) { .raw = ~0 }; \ - stub_exn.line = __LINE__; /* Utility outweighs livepatching cost */ \ -+ block_speculation(); /* SCSB */ \ - asm volatile ( pre "\n\tINDIRECT_CALL %[stub]\n\t" post "\n" \ - ".Lret%=:\n\t" \ - ".pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa377.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa377.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1a1887b60e09..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa377.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate TAA after S3 resume - -The user chosen setting for MSR_TSX_CTRL needs restoring after S3. - -All APs get the correct setting via start_secondary(), but the BSP was missed -out. - -This is XSA-377 / CVE-2021-28690. - -Fixes: 8c4330818f6 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the TSX Asynchronous Abort sidechannel") -Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> - -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c -index 91a8c4d0bd..31a56f02d0 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c -@@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state) - - microcode_update_one(); - -+ tsx_init(); /* Needs microcode. May change HLE/RTM feature bits. */ -+ - if ( !recheck_cpu_features(0) ) - panic("Missing previously available feature(s)\n"); - diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa386.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa386.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..83f24d30d53f --- /dev/null +++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa386.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Subject: VT-d: fix deassign of device with RMRR +Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 15:05:42 +0200 + +Ignoring a specific error code here was not meant to short circuit +deassign to _just_ the unmapping of RMRRs. This bug was previously +hidden by the bogus (potentially indefinite) looping in +pci_release_devices(), until f591755823a7 ("IOMMU/PCI: don't let domain +cleanup continue when device de-assignment failed") fixed that loop. + +This is CVE-2021-28702 / XSA-386. + +Fixes: 8b99f4400b69 ("VT-d: fix RMRR related error handling") +Reported-by: Ivan Kardykov <kardykov@tabit.pro> +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Tested-by: Ivan Kardykov <kardykov@tabit.pro> + +--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c ++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +@@ -2409,7 +2409,7 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership( + ret = iommu_identity_mapping(source, p2m_access_x, + rmrr->base_address, + rmrr->end_address, 0); +- if ( ret != -ENOENT ) ++ if ( ret && ret != -ENOENT ) + return ret; + } + } + |