diff options
author | Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr> | 2022-12-27 03:46:38 +0100 |
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committer | Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org> | 2022-12-31 09:14:57 +0700 |
commit | 4c5d49121ff141d87898db3cbc61cd8764caee72 (patch) | |
tree | 1d01465990a01f6f65a4fd9437f703ae6bb8176c /system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch | |
parent | 45f679b7089945ea5c77d829c2729f226e71509b (diff) |
system/xen: Updated for version 4.17.0.
Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch | 60 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dc626c7f542f3..0000000000000 --- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa410-4.16-05.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Subject: x86/shadow: tolerate failure of sh_set_toplevel_shadow() - -Subsequently sh_set_toplevel_shadow() will be adjusted to install a -blank entry in case prealloc fails. There are, in fact, pre-existing -error paths which would put in place a blank entry. The 4- and 2-level -code in sh_update_cr3(), however, assume the top level entry to be -valid. - -Hence bail from the function in the unlikely event that it's not. Note -that 3-level logic works differently: In particular a guest is free to -supply a PDPTR pointing at 4 non-present (or otherwise deemed invalid) -entries. The guest will crash, but we already cope with that. - -Really mfn_valid() is likely wrong to use in sh_set_toplevel_shadow(), -and it should instead be !mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN). Avoid such a change -in security context, but add a respective assertion. - -This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> -Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -2516,6 +2516,7 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu - /* Now figure out the new contents: is this a valid guest MFN? */ - if ( !mfn_valid(gmfn) ) - { -+ ASSERT(mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN)); - new_entry = pagetable_null(); - goto install_new_entry; - } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -@@ -3312,6 +3312,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc - if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 4, 0) != 0 ) - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); - sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l4_shadow, sh_make_shadow); -+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) ) -+ { -+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down); -+ return; -+ } - if ( !shadow_mode_external(d) && !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) ) - { - mfn_t smfn = pagetable_get_mfn(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0]); -@@ -3370,6 +3375,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc - if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 2, 0) != 0 ) - guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask); - sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l2_shadow, sh_make_shadow); -+ if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) ) -+ { -+ ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down); -+ return; -+ } - #else - #error This should never happen - #endif |