system/xen: Updated for version 4.8.0.

Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>

25 files changed, 206 insertions, 1371 deletions

diff --git a/system/xen/README b/system/xen/README
index 7422c640a60ed..f5f8c96b6d473 100644
--- a/system/xen/README
+++ b/system/xen/README
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ This script has a few optional dependencies:
   mbootpack - creates LILO compatible kernel images
   libssh2 - mostly used by libvirt, enable with USE_LIBSSH2=yes
   ocaml-findlib - autodetected, builds oxenstored binary
+  spice - enable with USE_SPICE=yes
+
+Linking with the stock libraries:
+
   bluez - enable with USE_BLUEZ=yes
+  gtk - enable with USE_GTK=yes
 
 Reading material:
 
diff --git a/system/xen/doinst.sh b/system/xen/doinst.sh
index 98f701f9c7b59..51c573cb0c7e9 100644
--- a/system/xen/doinst.sh
+++ b/system/xen/doinst.sh
@@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ find etc/rc.d -type f -name 'rc.xen*.new' \
 find etc/default -type f -name 'xen*.new' \
   | while read new ; do config $new ; done
 
-find etc/xen etc/qemu -type f -name '*.new' \
+find etc/xen -type f -name '*.new' \
   | while read new ; do config $new ; done
 
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
index c3c24cc2dc26d..4ea14b1674a4a 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Xen EFI binary.
 
 To make things a bit easier, a copy of Xen EFI binary can be found here:
 
-  http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen.efi.gz
+  http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.8.0.efi.gz
 
 If an automatic boot to Xen kernel is desired, the binary should be renamed and
 copied to the following location: /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
index 07d1a1f8b15e0..f6ea99ce4863d 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 # Modified by Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
 
 KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.38}
-XEN=${XEN:-4.7.1}
+XEN=${XEN:-4.8.0}
 BOOTLOADER=${BOOTLOADER:-lilo}
 
 ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4}
diff --git a/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff b/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff
deleted file mode 100644
index 747ffadbf6b3f..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.0/tools/Makefile.orig	2015-01-12 17:53:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.0/tools/Makefile	2015-02-16 09:19:18.999816844 +0100
-@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@
- 		--disable-docs \
- 		--disable-guest-agent \
- 		--python=$(PYTHON) \
-+		--sysconfdir=/etc \
-+		--@@CONF_LIBSSH2@@able-libssh2 \
-+		--@@CONF_BLUEZ@@able-bluez \
- 		$(CONFIG_QEMUU_EXTRA_ARGS) \
- 		--cpu=$(IOEMU_CPU_ARCH) \
- 		$(IOEMU_CONFIGURE_CROSS); \
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
index e4eabedb97a4a..9694420a23983 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
+++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 # Slackware build script for xen
 
-# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016  Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
+# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017  Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
 # All rights reserved.
 #
 # Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
 #  ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
 PRGNAM=xen
-VERSION=${VERSION:-4.7.1}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-3}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-4.8.0}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
 TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
 
-SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.9.2}
-OVMF=${OVMF:-52a99493cce88a9d4ec8a02d7f1bd1a1001ce60d}
-IPXE=${IPXE:-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e}
+SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.10.0}
+OVMF=${OVMF:-20160905_bc54e50}
+IPXE=${IPXE:-827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c}
 
 if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
   case "$( uname -m )" in
@@ -73,24 +73,37 @@ else
   LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
 fi
 
+CONF_XEN="--disable-qemu-traditional --disable-rombios"
+CONF_QEMUU="--sysconfdir=/etc"
+
+case "${BUILD_STUBDOM:-no}" in
+  yes) CONF_XEN+=" --enable-stubdom" ;;
+    *) CONF_XEN+=" --disable-stubdom" ;;
+esac
+
+case "${WITH_OVMF:-yes}" in
+  no) CONF_XEN+=" --disable-ovmf" ;;
+   *) CONF_XEN+=" --enable-ovmf" ;;
+esac
+
 case "${USE_LIBSSH2:-no}" in
-  yes) CONF_LIBSSH2="en" ;;
-    *) CONF_LIBSSH2="dis" ;;
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-libssh2" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-libssh2" ;;
 esac
 
 case "${USE_BLUEZ:-no}" in
-  yes) CONF_BLUEZ="en" ;;
-    *) CONF_BLUEZ="dis" ;;
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-bluez" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-bluez" ;;
 esac
 
-case "${BUILD_STUBDOM:-no}" in
-  yes) CONF_STUBDOM="en" ;;
-    *) CONF_STUBDOM="dis" ;;
+case "${USE_GTK:-no}" in
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-gtk" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-gtk" ;;
 esac
 
-case "${WITH_OVMF:-yes}" in
-  no) CONF_OVMF="dis" ;;
-   *) CONF_OVMF="en" ;;
+case "${USE_SPICE:-no}" in
+  yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-spice" ;;
+    *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-spice" ;;
 esac
 
 set -e
@@ -111,16 +124,12 @@ find -L . \
 # Apply Xen Security Advisory patches
 for i in $CWD/xsa/* ; do
   case $i in
-    *qemut*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen-traditional -p1 <$i ;;
-     *qemu*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen -p1 <$i ;;
-          *.patch) patch -p1 <$i ;;
+    *qemut*.patch) patch --verbose -d tools/qemu-xen-traditional -p1 <$i ;;
+     *qemu*.patch) patch --verbose -d tools/qemu-xen -p1 <$i ;;
+          *.patch) patch --verbose -p1 <$i ;;
   esac
 done
 
-# Don't link with libssh and bluez by default
-sed "s/@@CONF_LIBSSH2@@/$CONF_LIBSSH2/;s/@@CONF_BLUEZ@@/$CONF_BLUEZ/" \
-  $CWD/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff | patch -p1
-
 # Remove hardlinks
 patch -p1 <$CWD/patches/symlinks_instead_of_hardlinks.diff
 
@@ -137,7 +146,9 @@ cp $CWD/ipxe-git-$IPXE.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/_ipxe.tar.gz
   ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir
   make -C seabios-dir defconfig
   # OVMF
-  tar -xf $CWD/ovmf-git-$OVMF.tar.gz
+  tar -xf $CWD/xen-ovmf-$OVMF.tar.bz2
+  mv xen-ovmf-$OVMF ovmf-dir-remote
+  ln -s ovmf-dir-remote ovmf-dir
   cp ovmf-makefile ovmf-dir/Makefile
 )
 cp $CWD/{lwip,zlib,newlib,pciutils,grub,gmp,tpm_emulator}-*.tar.?z* \
@@ -153,10 +164,8 @@ CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
   --localstatedir=/var \
   --mandir=/usr/man \
   --docdir=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
-  --disable-qemu-traditional \
-  --disable-rombios \
-  --${CONF_STUBDOM}able-stubdom \
-  --${CONF_OVMF}able-ovmf \
+  $CONF_XEN \
+  --with-extra-qemuu-configure-args="$CONF_QEMUU" \
   --build=$ARCH-slackware-linux
 
 make install-xen \
@@ -173,7 +182,7 @@ make install-tools \
   MANDIR=/usr/man \
   DESTDIR=$PKG
 
-if [ "$CONF_STUBDOM" = "en" ]; then
+if [ "$BUILD_STUBDOM" = "yes" ]; then
   make install-stubdom \
     docdir=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
     DOCDIR=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info
index 7e4f29ef5b604..9ea10099d24c1 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.info
+++ b/system/xen/xen.info
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 PRGNAM="xen"
-VERSION="4.7.1"
+VERSION="4.8.0"
 HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/"
-DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.7.1.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz \
+DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz \
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.7.1.tar.gz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \
           http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/seabios-1.9.2.tar.gz \
-          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ovmf-git-52a99493cce88a9d4ec8a02d7f1bd1a1001ce60d.tar.gz"
-MD5SUM="8e258d87a1008a3200eec6989e164fa4 \
-        7496268cebf47d5c9ccb0696e3b26065 \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.10.0.tar.gz \
+          http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20160905_bc54e50.tar.bz2"
+MD5SUM="d738f7c741110342621cb8a4d10b0191 \
+        71c69b5e1db9e01d5f246226eca03c22 \
         36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \
         debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \
         bf8f1f9e3ca83d732c00a79a6ef29bc4 \
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ MD5SUM="8e258d87a1008a3200eec6989e164fa4 \
         7b72caf22b01464ee7d6165f2fd85f44 \
         dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8 \
         e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8 \
-        32201f54c5fb478914d0bb2449b18454 \
-        bd4b1d36212692fa4874ecad2a42abed"
+        633ffc9df0295eeeb4182444eb0300ee \
+        87ba85cfec3993e4ee566dc58724d8a6"
 REQUIRES="acpica yajl"
 DOWNLOAD_x86_64=""
 MD5SUM_x86_64=""
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 956f1c97ad099..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/hvm: Fix the handling of non-present segments
-
-In 32bit, the data segments may be NULL to indicate that the segment is
-ineligible for use.  In both 32bit and 64bit, the LDT selector may be NULL to
-indicate that the entire LDT is ineligible for use.  However, nothing in Xen
-actually checks for this condition when performing other segmentation
-checks.  (Note however that limit and writeability checks are correctly
-performed).
-
-Neither Intel nor AMD specify the exact behaviour of loading a NULL segment.
-Experimentally, AMD zeroes all attributes but leaves the base and limit
-unmodified.  Intel zeroes the base, sets the limit to 0xfffffff and resets the
-attributes to just .G and .D/B.
-
-The use of the segment information in the VMCB/VMCS is equivalent to a native
-pipeline interacting with the segment cache.  The present bit can therefore
-have a subtly different meaning, and it is now cooked to uniformly indicate
-whether the segment is usable or not.
-
-GDTR and IDTR don't have access rights like the other segments, but for
-consistency, they are treated as being present so no special casing is needed
-elsewhere in the segmentation logic.
-
-AMD hardware does not consider the present bit for %cs and %tr, and will
-function as if they were present.  They are therefore unconditionally set to
-present when reading information from the VMCB, to maintain the new meaning of
-usability.
-
-Intel hardware has a separate unusable bit in the VMCS segment attributes.
-This bit is inverted and stored in the present field, so the hvm code can work
-with architecturally-common state.
-
-This is XSA-191.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                 |  8 ++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c             |  4 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 20 +++++++++++---------
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c |  4 ++++
- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index 704fd64..deb1783 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -2512,6 +2512,10 @@ bool_t hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
-          */
-         addr = (uint32_t)(addr + reg->base);
- 
-+        /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+        if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
-+            goto out;
-+
-         switch ( access_type )
-         {
-         case hvm_access_read:
-@@ -2767,6 +2771,10 @@ static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
-     hvm_get_segment_register(
-         v, (sel & 4) ? x86_seg_ldtr : x86_seg_gdtr, &desctab);
- 
-+    /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+    if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
-+        goto fail;
-+
-     /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
-     if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
-         goto fail;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-index 16427f6..4cba406 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
-     {
-     case x86_seg_cs:
-         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->cs, sizeof(*reg));
-+        reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
-         reg->attr.fields.g = reg->limit > 0xFFFFF;
-         break;
-     case x86_seg_ds:
-@@ -660,13 +661,16 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
-     case x86_seg_tr:
-         svm_sync_vmcb(v);
-         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->tr, sizeof(*reg));
-+        reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
-         reg->attr.fields.type |= 0x2;
-         break;
-     case x86_seg_gdtr:
-         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->gdtr, sizeof(*reg));
-+        reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
-         break;
-     case x86_seg_idtr:
-         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->idtr, sizeof(*reg));
-+        reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
-         break;
-     case x86_seg_ldtr:
-         svm_sync_vmcb(v);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 9a8f694..a652c52 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -1035,10 +1035,12 @@ void vmx_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
-     reg->sel = sel;
-     reg->limit = limit;
- 
--    reg->attr.bytes = (attr & 0xff) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
--    /* Unusable flag is folded into Present flag. */
--    if ( attr & (1u<<16) )
--        reg->attr.fields.p = 0;
-+    /*
-+     * Fold VT-x representation into Xen's representation.  The Present bit is
-+     * unconditionally set to the inverse of unusable.
-+     */
-+    reg->attr.bytes =
-+        (!(attr & (1u << 16)) << 7) | (attr & 0x7f) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
- 
-     /* Adjust for virtual 8086 mode */
-     if ( v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode && seg <= x86_seg_tr 
-@@ -1118,11 +1120,11 @@ static void vmx_set_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
-         }
-     }
- 
--    attr = ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
--
--    /* Not-present must mean unusable. */
--    if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
--        attr |= (1u << 16);
-+    /*
-+     * Unfold Xen representation into VT-x representation.  The unusable bit
-+     * is unconditionally set to the inverse of present.
-+     */
-+    attr = (!(attr & (1u << 7)) << 16) | ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
- 
-     /* VMX has strict consistency requirement for flag G. */
-     attr |= !!(limit >> 20) << 15;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 7a707dc..7cb6f98 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1367,6 +1367,10 @@ protmode_load_seg(
-                                  &desctab, ctxt)) )
-         return rc;
- 
-+    /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+    if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
-+        goto raise_exn;
-+
-     /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
-     if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
-         goto raise_exn;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b573a132c9fde..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HVM: don't load LDTR with VM86 mode attrs during task switch
-
-Just like TR, LDTR is purely a protected mode facility and hence needs
-to be loaded accordingly. Also move its loading to where it
-architecurally belongs.
-
-This is XSA-192.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -2728,17 +2728,16 @@ static void hvm_unmap_entry(void *p)
- }
- 
- static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
--    enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel)
-+    enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel, unsigned int eflags)
- {
-     struct segment_register desctab, cs, segr;
-     struct desc_struct *pdesc, desc;
-     u8 dpl, rpl, cpl;
-     bool_t writable;
-     int fault_type = TRAP_invalid_tss;
--    struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
- 
--    if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
-+    if ( eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
-     {
-         segr.sel = sel;
-         segr.base = (uint32_t)sel << 4;
-@@ -2986,6 +2985,8 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
-     if ( rc != HVMCOPY_okay )
-         goto out;
- 
-+    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt, 0) )
-+        goto out;
- 
-     if ( hvm_set_cr3(tss.cr3, 1) )
-         goto out;
-@@ -3008,13 +3009,12 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
-     }
- 
-     exn_raised = 0;
--    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs) ||
--         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs) )
-+    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es, tss.eflags) ||
-+         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs, tss.eflags) ||
-+         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss, tss.eflags) ||
-+         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds, tss.eflags) ||
-+         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs, tss.eflags) ||
-+         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs, tss.eflags) )
-         exn_raised = 1;
- 
-     rc = hvm_copy_to_guest_virt(
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c5486efa544b9..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/PV: writes of %fs and %gs base MSRs require canonical addresses
-
-Commit c42494acb2 ("x86: fix FS/GS base handling when using the
-fsgsbase feature") replaced the use of wrmsr_safe() on these paths
-without recognizing that wr{f,g}sbase() use just wrmsrl() and that the
-WR{F,G}SBASE instructions also raise #GP for non-canonical input.
-
-Similarly arch_set_info_guest() needs to prevent non-canonical
-addresses from getting stored into state later to be loaded by context
-switch code. For consistency also check stack pointers and LDT base.
-DR0..3, otoh, already get properly checked in set_debugreg() (albeit
-we discard the error there).
-
-The SHADOW_GS_BASE check isn't strictly necessary, but I think we
-better avoid trying the WRMSR if we know it's going to fail.
-
-This is XSA-193.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,13 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
-     {
-         if ( !compat )
-         {
--            if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.eip) ||
-+            if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rip) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rsp) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->kernel_sp) ||
-+                 (c.nat->ldt_ents && !is_canonical_address(c.nat->ldt_base)) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->fs_base) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_kernel) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_user) ||
-                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->event_callback_eip) ||
-                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->syscall_callback_eip) ||
-                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->failsafe_callback_eip) )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -2723,19 +2723,22 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
-         switch ( regs->_ecx )
-         {
-         case MSR_FS_BASE:
--            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
-                 goto fail;
-             wrfsbase(msr_content);
-             v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = msr_content;
-             break;
-         case MSR_GS_BASE:
--            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
-                 goto fail;
-             wrgsbase(msr_content);
-             v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = msr_content;
-             break;
-         case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
--            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
-                 goto fail;
-             if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, msr_content) )
-                 goto fail;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 946bd8783dd94..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From 71096b016f7fd54a72af73576948cb25cf42ebcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 15:02:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] libelf: fix stack memory leak when loading 32 bit symbol
- tables
-
-The 32 bit Elf structs are smaller than the 64 bit ones, which means that
-when loading them there's some padding left uninitialized at the end of each
-struct (because the size indicated in e_ehsize and e_shentsize is
-smaller than the size of elf_ehdr and elf_shdr).
-
-Fix this by introducing a new helper that is used to set
-[caller_]xdest_{base/size} and that takes care of performing the appropriate
-memset of the region. This newly introduced helper is then used to set and
-unset xdest_{base/size} in elf_load_bsdsyms. Now that the full struct
-is zeroed, there's no need to specifically zero the undefined section.
-
-This is XSA-194.
-
-Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-
-Also remove the open coded (and redundant with the earlier
-elf_memset_unchecked()) use of caller_xdest_* from elf_init().
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 14 +++-----------
- xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c  | 11 +++++++++--
- xen/include/xen/libelf.h          | 15 +++++++++------
- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-index 4d3ae4d..bc1f87b 100644
---- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t
-     elf->ehdr = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_ehdr, (elf_ptrval)image_input);
-     elf->class = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]);
-     elf->data = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_DATA]);
--    elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
--    elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
- 
-     /* Sanity check phdr. */
-     offset = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_phoff) +
-@@ -284,9 +282,8 @@ do {                                                                \
- #define SYMTAB_INDEX    1
- #define STRTAB_INDEX    2
- 
--    /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to symbol_header. */
--    elf->caller_xdest_base = &header;
--    elf->caller_xdest_size = sizeof(header);
-+    /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to header. */
-+    elf_set_xdest(elf, &header, sizeof(header));
- 
-     /*
-      * Calculate the position of the various elements in GUEST MEMORY SPACE.
-@@ -319,11 +316,7 @@ do {                                                                \
-     elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phentsize, 0);
-     elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phnum, 0);
- 
--    /* Zero the undefined section. */
--    section_handle = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_shdr,
--                     ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(&header.elf_header.section[SHN_UNDEF]));
-     shdr_size = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize);
--    elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(section_handle), 0, shdr_size);
- 
-     /*
-      * The symtab section header is going to reside in section[SYMTAB_INDEX],
-@@ -404,8 +397,7 @@ do {                                                                \
-     }
- 
-     /* Remove permissions from elf_memcpy_safe. */
--    elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
--    elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
-+    elf_set_xdest(elf, NULL, 0);
- 
- #undef SYMTAB_INDEX
- #undef STRTAB_INDEX
-diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-index 5a4757b..e73e729 100644
---- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
-         return 1;
-     if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->dest_base, elf->dest_size) )
-         return 1;
--    if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size,
--                             elf->caller_xdest_base, elf->caller_xdest_size) )
-+    if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->xdest_base, elf->xdest_size) )
-         return 1;
-     elf_mark_broken(elf, "out of range access");
-     return 0;
-@@ -373,6 +372,14 @@ bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr
-     return ((p_type == PT_LOAD) && (p_flags & (PF_R | PF_W | PF_X)) != 0);
- }
- 
-+void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size)
-+{
-+    elf->xdest_base = addr;
-+    elf->xdest_size = size;
-+    if ( addr != NULL )
-+        elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(addr), 0, size);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Local variables:
-  * mode: C
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-index 95b5370..cf62bc7 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-@@ -210,13 +210,11 @@ struct elf_binary {
-     uint64_t bsd_symtab_pend;
- 
-     /*
--     * caller's other acceptable destination
--     *
--     * Again, these are trusted and must be valid (or 0) so long
--     * as the struct elf_binary is in use.
-+     * caller's other acceptable destination.
-+     * Set by elf_set_xdest.  Do not set these directly.
-      */
--    void *caller_xdest_base;
--    uint64_t caller_xdest_size;
-+    void *xdest_base;
-+    uint64_t xdest_size;
- 
- #ifndef __XEN__
-     /* misc */
-@@ -494,5 +492,10 @@ static inline void ELF_ADVANCE_DEST(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t amount)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/* Specify a (single) additional destination, to which the image may
-+ * cause writes.  As with dest_base and dest_size, the values provided
-+ * are trusted and must be valid so long as the struct elf_binary
-+ * is in use or until elf_set_xdest(,0,0) is called. */
-+void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size);
- 
- #endif /* __XEN_LIBELF_H__ */
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a193a5cca031d..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86emul: fix huge bit offset handling
-
-We must never chop off the high 32 bits.
-
-This is XSA-195.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -2549,6 +2549,12 @@ x86_emulate(
-         else
-         {
-             /*
-+             * Instructions such as bt can reference an arbitrary offset from
-+             * their memory operand, but the instruction doing the actual
-+             * emulation needs the appropriate op_bytes read from memory.
-+             * Adjust both the source register and memory operand to make an
-+             * equivalent instruction.
-+             *
-              * EA       += BitOffset DIV op_bytes*8
-              * BitOffset = BitOffset MOD op_bytes*8
-              * DIV truncates towards negative infinity.
-@@ -2560,14 +2566,15 @@ x86_emulate(
-                 src.val = (int32_t)src.val;
-             if ( (long)src.val < 0 )
-             {
--                unsigned long byte_offset;
--                byte_offset = op_bytes + (((-src.val-1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes-1));
-+                unsigned long byte_offset =
-+                    op_bytes + (((-src.val - 1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L));
-+
-                 ea.mem.off -= byte_offset;
-                 src.val = (byte_offset << 3) + src.val;
-             }
-             else
-             {
--                ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1);
-+                ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L);
-                 src.val &= (op_bytes << 3) - 1;
-             }
-         }
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7193e9ad5ad12..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/emul: Correct the IDT entry calculation in inject_swint()
-
-The logic, as introduced in c/s 36ebf14ebe "x86/emulate: support for emulating
-software event injection" is buggy.  The size of an IDT entry depends on long
-mode being active, not the width of the code segment currently in use.
-
-In particular, this means that a compatibility code segment which hits
-emulation for software event injection will end up using an incorrect offset
-in the IDT for DPL/Presence checking.  In practice, this only occurs on old
-AMD hardware lacking NRip support; all newer AMD hardware, and all Intel
-hardware bypass this path in the emulator.
-
-While here, fix a minor issue with reading the IDT entry.  The return value
-from ops->read() wasn't checked, but in reality the only failure case is if a
-pagefault occurs.  This is not a realistic problem as the kernel will almost
-certainly crash with a double fault if this setup actually occured.
-
-This is part of XSA-196.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 15 +++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 7a707dc..f74aa8f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1630,10 +1630,16 @@ static int inject_swint(enum x86_swint_type type,
-     {
-         if ( !in_realmode(ctxt, ops) )
-         {
--            unsigned int idte_size = (ctxt->addr_size == 64) ? 16 : 8;
--            unsigned int idte_offset = vector * idte_size;
-+            unsigned int idte_size, idte_offset;
-             struct segment_register idtr;
-             uint32_t idte_ctl;
-+            int lm = in_longmode(ctxt, ops);
-+
-+            if ( lm < 0 )
-+                return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-+
-+            idte_size = lm ? 16 : 8;
-+            idte_offset = vector * idte_size;
- 
-             /* icebp sets the External Event bit despite being an instruction. */
-             error_code = (vector << 3) | ECODE_IDT |
-@@ -1661,8 +1667,9 @@ static int inject_swint(enum x86_swint_type type,
-              * Should strictly speaking read all 8/16 bytes of an entry,
-              * but we currently only care about the dpl and present bits.
-              */
--            ops->read(x86_seg_none, idtr.base + idte_offset + 4,
--                      &idte_ctl, sizeof(idte_ctl), ctxt);
-+            if ( (rc = ops->read(x86_seg_none, idtr.base + idte_offset + 4,
-+                                 &idte_ctl, sizeof(idte_ctl), ctxt)) )
-+                goto done;
- 
-             /* Is this entry present? */
-             if ( !(idte_ctl & (1u << 15)) )
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 26580ff8099ef..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/svm: Fix injection of software interrupts
-
-The non-NextRip logic in c/s 36ebf14eb "x86/emulate: support for emulating
-software event injection" was based on an older version of the AMD software
-manual.  The manual was later corrected, following findings from that series.
-
-I took the original wording of "not supported without NextRIP" to mean that
-X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT was not eligible for use.  It turns out that this
-is not the case, and the new wording is clearer on the matter.
-
-Despite testing the original patch series on non-NRip hardware, the
-swint-emulation XTF test case focuses on the debug vectors; it never ended up
-executing an `int $n` instruction for a vector which wasn't also an exception.
-
-During a vmentry, the use of X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION comes with a vector
-check to ensure that it is only used with exception vectors.  Xen's use of
-X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION for `int $n` injection has always been buggy on AMD
-hardware.
-
-Fix this by always using X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT.
-
-Print and decode the eventinj information in svm_vmcb_dump(), as it has
-several invalid combinations which cause vmentry failures.
-
-This is part of XSA-196.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c      | 13 +++++--------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c |  4 ++++
- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-index 4391744..76efc3e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -1231,17 +1231,14 @@ static void svm_inject_trap(const struct hvm_trap *trap)
-     {
-     case X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT: /* int $n */
-         /*
--         * Injection type 4 (software interrupt) is only supported with
--         * NextRIP support.  Without NextRIP, the emulator will have performed
--         * DPL and presence checks for us.
-+         * Software interrupts (type 4) cannot be properly injected if the
-+         * processor doesn't support NextRIP.  Without NextRIP, the emulator
-+         * will have performed DPL and presence checks for us, and will have
-+         * moved eip forward if appropriate.
-          */
-         if ( cpu_has_svm_nrips )
--        {
-             vmcb->nextrip = regs->eip + _trap.insn_len;
--            event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT;
--        }
--        else
--            event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION;
-+        event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT;
-         break;
- 
-     case X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION: /* icebp */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-index ded5d19..f93dfed 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ void svm_vmcb_dump(const char *from, struct vmcb_struct *vmcb)
-            vmcb->tlb_control,
-            (unsigned long long)vmcb->_vintr.bytes,
-            (unsigned long long)vmcb->interrupt_shadow);
-+    printk("eventinj %016"PRIx64", valid? %d, ec? %d, type %u, vector %#x\n",
-+           vmcb->eventinj.bytes, vmcb->eventinj.fields.v,
-+           vmcb->eventinj.fields.ev, vmcb->eventinj.fields.type,
-+           vmcb->eventinj.fields.vector);
-     printk("exitcode = %#Lx exitintinfo = %#Lx\n",
-            (unsigned long long)vmcb->exitcode,
-            (unsigned long long)vmcb->exitintinfo.bytes);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 878f7d35665bd..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: xen: fix ioreq handling
-
-Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
-internal variables.
-
-This is XSA-197.
-
-Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-
---- a/i386-dm/helper2.c
-+++ b/i386-dm/helper2.c
-@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(CPUState *env,
- {
-     uint32_t i;
- 
-+    if (req->size > sizeof(unsigned long)) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "PIO: bad size (%u)\n", req->size);
-+        exit(-1);
-+    }
-+
-     if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
-         if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
-             req->data = do_inp(env, req->addr, req->size);
-@@ -404,6 +409,11 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(CPUState *env
- {
-     uint32_t i;
- 
-+    if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "MMIO: bad size (%u)\n", req->size);
-+        exit(-1);
-+    }
-+
-     if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
-         if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
-             for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
-@@ -516,11 +526,13 @@ static int __handle_buffered_iopage(CPUS
-         req.df = 1;
-         req.type = buf_req->type;
-         req.data_is_ptr = 0;
-+        xen_rmb();
-         qw = (req.size == 8);
-         if (qw) {
-             buf_req = &buffered_io_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
-                                                    IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
-             req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
-+            xen_rmb();
-         }
- 
-         __handle_ioreq(env, &req);
-@@ -552,7 +564,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaqu
- 
-     __handle_buffered_iopage(env);
-     if (req) {
--        __handle_ioreq(env, req);
-+        ioreq_t copy = *req;
-+
-+        xen_rmb();
-+        __handle_ioreq(env, &copy);
-+        req->data = copy.data;
- 
-         if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
-             fprintf(logfile, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f7845cffd2a57..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: xen: fix ioreq handling
-
-Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
-internal variables.
-
-This is XSA-197.
-
-Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-
---- a/xen-hvm.c
-+++ b/xen-hvm.c
-@@ -810,6 +810,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(ioreq_t *req)
-     trace_cpu_ioreq_pio(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
-                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
- 
-+    if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
-+        hw_error("PIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
-+    }
-+
-     if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
-         if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
-             req->data = do_inp(req->addr, req->size);
-@@ -846,6 +850,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
-     trace_cpu_ioreq_move(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
-                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
- 
-+    if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
-+        hw_error("MMIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
-+    }
-+
-     if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
-         if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
-             for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
-@@ -1010,11 +1018,13 @@ static int handle_buffered_iopage(XenIOS
-         req.df = 1;
-         req.type = buf_req->type;
-         req.data_is_ptr = 0;
-+        xen_rmb();
-         qw = (req.size == 8);
-         if (qw) {
-             buf_req = &buf_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
-                                            IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
-             req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
-+            xen_rmb();
-         }
- 
-         handle_ioreq(state, &req);
-@@ -1045,7 +1055,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaqu
- 
-     handle_buffered_iopage(state);
-     if (req) {
--        handle_ioreq(state, req);
-+        ioreq_t copy = *req;
-+
-+        xen_rmb();
-+        handle_ioreq(state, &copy);
-+        req->data = copy.data;
- 
-         if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
-             fprintf(stderr, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dbf708491edf4..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From 71a389ae940bc52bf897a6e5becd73fd8ede94c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:37:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] pygrub: Properly quote results, when returning them to the
- caller:
-
-* When the caller wants sexpr output, use `repr()'
-  This is what Xend expects.
-
-  The returned S-expressions are now escaped and quoted by Python,
-  generally using '...'.  Previously kernel and ramdisk were unquoted
-  and args was quoted with "..." but without proper escaping.  This
-  change may break toolstacks which do not properly dequote the
-  returned S-expressions.
-
-* When the caller wants "simple" output, crash if the delimiter is
-  contained in the returned value.
-
-  With --output-format=simple it does not seem like this could ever
-  happen, because the bootloader config parsers all take line-based
-  input from the various bootloader config files.
-
-  With --output-format=simple0, this can happen if the bootloader
-  config file contains nul bytes.
-
-This is XSA-198.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
- tools/pygrub/src/pygrub | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-index 40f9584..dd0c8f7 100755
---- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-@@ -721,14 +721,17 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg):
-     return cfg
- 
- def format_sxp(kernel, ramdisk, args):
--    s = "linux (kernel %s)" % kernel
-+    s = "linux (kernel %s)" % repr(kernel)
-     if ramdisk:
--        s += "(ramdisk %s)" % ramdisk
-+        s += "(ramdisk %s)" % repr(ramdisk)
-     if args:
--        s += "(args \"%s\")" % args
-+        s += "(args %s)" % repr(args)
-     return s
-                 
- def format_simple(kernel, ramdisk, args, sep):
-+    for check in (kernel, ramdisk, args):
-+        if check is not None and sep in check:
-+            raise RuntimeError, "simple format cannot represent delimiter-containing value"
-     s = ("kernel %s" % kernel) + sep
-     if ramdisk:
-         s += ("ramdisk %s" % ramdisk) + sep
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 69608f6fc3187..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86emul: CMPXCHG8B ignores operand size prefix
-
-Otherwise besides mis-handling the instruction, the comparison failure
-case would result in uninitialized stack data being handed back to the
-guest in rDX:rAX (32 bits leaked for 32-bit guests, 96 bits for 64-bit
-ones).
-
-This is XSA-200.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
-@@ -435,6 +435,24 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
-         goto fail;
-     printf("okay\n");
- 
-+    printf("%-40s", "Testing cmpxchg8b (%edi) [opsize]...");
-+    instr[0] = 0x66; instr[1] = 0x0f; instr[2] = 0xc7; instr[3] = 0x0f;
-+    res[0]      = 0x12345678;
-+    res[1]      = 0x87654321;
-+    regs.eflags = 0x200;
-+    regs.eip    = (unsigned long)&instr[0];
-+    regs.edi    = (unsigned long)res;
-+    rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &emulops);
-+    if ( (rc != X86EMUL_OKAY) ||
-+         (res[0] != 0x12345678) ||
-+         (res[1] != 0x87654321) ||
-+         (regs.eax != 0x12345678) ||
-+         (regs.edx != 0x87654321) ||
-+         ((regs.eflags&0x240) != 0x200) ||
-+         (regs.eip != (unsigned long)&instr[4]) )
-+        goto fail;
-+    printf("okay\n");
-+
-     printf("%-40s", "Testing movsxbd (%%eax),%%ecx...");
-     instr[0] = 0x0f; instr[1] = 0xbe; instr[2] = 0x08;
-     regs.eflags = 0x200;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -4775,8 +4775,12 @@ x86_emulate(
-         generate_exception_if((modrm_reg & 7) != 1, EXC_UD, -1);
-         generate_exception_if(ea.type != OP_MEM, EXC_UD, -1);
-         if ( op_bytes == 8 )
-+        {
-             host_and_vcpu_must_have(cx16);
--        op_bytes *= 2;
-+            op_bytes = 16;
-+        }
-+        else
-+            op_bytes = 8;
- 
-         /* Get actual old value. */
-         if ( (rc = ops->read(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off, old, op_bytes,
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50983b852faca..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm64: handle guest-generated EL1 asynchronous abort
-
-In current code, when the hypervisor receives an asynchronous abort
-from a guest, the hypervisor will do panic, the host will be down.
-We have to prevent such security issue, so, in this patch we crash
-the guest, when the hypervisor receives an asynchronous abort from
-the guest.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9815, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -204,9 +204,12 @@ guest_fiq_invalid:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=0
-         invalid BAD_FIQ
-
--guest_error_invalid:
-+guest_error:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=0
--        invalid BAD_ERROR
-+        msr     daifclr, #2
-+        mov     x0, sp
-+        bl      do_trap_guest_error
-+        exit    hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_sync_compat:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=1
-@@ -225,9 +228,12 @@ guest_fiq_invalid_compat:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=1
-         invalid BAD_FIQ
-
--guest_error_invalid_compat:
-+guest_error_compat:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=1
--        invalid BAD_ERROR
-+        msr     daifclr, #2
-+        mov     x0, sp
-+        bl      do_trap_guest_error
-+        exit    hyp=0, compat=1
-
- ENTRY(return_to_new_vcpu32)
-         exit    hyp=0, compat=1
-@@ -286,12 +292,12 @@ ENTRY(hyp_traps_vector)
-         ventry  guest_sync                      // Synchronous 64-bit EL0/EL1
-         ventry  guest_irq                       // IRQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
-         ventry  guest_fiq_invalid               // FIQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
--        ventry  guest_error_invalid             // Error 64-bit EL0/EL1
-+        ventry  guest_error                     // Error 64-bit EL0/EL1
-
-         ventry  guest_sync_compat               // Synchronous 32-bit EL0/EL1
-         ventry  guest_irq_compat                // IRQ 32-bit EL0/EL1
-         ventry  guest_fiq_invalid_compat        // FIQ 32-bit EL0/EL1
--        ventry  guest_error_invalid_compat      // Error 32-bit EL0/EL1
-+        ventry  guest_error_compat              // Error 32-bit EL0/EL1
-
- /*
-  * struct vcpu *__context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
---- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-@@ -2723,6 +2723,21 @@ asmlinkage void do_trap_hypervisor(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-     }
- }
-
-+asmlinkage void do_trap_guest_error(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+{
-+    enter_hypervisor_head(regs);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Currently, to ensure hypervisor safety, when we received a
-+     * guest-generated vSerror/vAbort, we just crash the guest to protect
-+     * the hypervisor. In future we can better handle this by injecting
-+     * a vSerror/vAbort to the guest.
-+     */
-+    gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest(Dom-%u) will be crashed by vSError\n",
-+             current->domain->domain_id);
-+    domain_crash_synchronous();
-+}
-+
- asmlinkage void do_trap_irq(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
-     enter_hypervisor_head(regs);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bd1f8f89d7fe..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm64: handle async aborts delivered while at EL2
-
-If EL1 generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into EL2
-(by HVC or IRQ) before the abort has been delivered, the hypervisor
-could not catch it, because the PSTATE.A bit is masked all the time
-in hypervisor. So this asynchronous abort may be slipped to next
-running guest with PSTATE.A bit unmasked.
-
-In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at EL2, by
-clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In this patch, we unmask the PSTATE.A bit
-to open a window to catch guest-generated asynchronous abort in all
-EL1 -> EL2 swich paths. If we catched such asynchronous abort in
-checking window, the hyp_error exception will be triggered and the
-abort source guest will be crashed.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9816, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -173,6 +173,43 @@ hyp_error_invalid:
-         entry   hyp=1
-         invalid BAD_ERROR
-
-+hyp_error:
-+        /*
-+         * Only two possibilities:
-+         * 1) Either we come from the exit path, having just unmasked
-+         *    PSTATE.A: change the return code to an EL2 fault, and
-+         *    carry on, as we're already in a sane state to handle it.
-+         * 2) Or we come from anywhere else, and that's a bug: we panic.
-+         */
-+        entry   hyp=1
-+        msr     daifclr, #2
-+
-+        /*
-+         * The ELR_EL2 may be modified by an interrupt, so we have to use the
-+         * saved value in cpu_user_regs to check whether we come from 1) or
-+         * not.
-+         */
-+        ldr     x0, [sp, #UREGS_PC]
-+        adr     x1, abort_guest_exit_start
-+        cmp     x0, x1
-+        adr     x1, abort_guest_exit_end
-+        ccmp    x0, x1, #4, ne
-+        mov     x0, sp
-+        mov     x1, #BAD_ERROR
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Not equal, the exception come from 2). It's a bug, we have to
-+         * panic the hypervisor.
-+         */
-+        b.ne    do_bad_mode
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Otherwise, the exception come from 1). It happened because of
-+         * the guest. Crash this guest.
-+         */
-+        bl      do_trap_guest_error
-+        exit    hyp=1
-+
- /* Traps taken in Current EL with SP_ELx */
- hyp_sync:
-         entry   hyp=1
-@@ -189,15 +226,29 @@ hyp_irq:
-
- guest_sync:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=0
-+        bl      check_pending_vserror
-+        /*
-+         * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+         * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+         */
-+        cbnz    x0, 1f
-         msr     daifclr, #2
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hypervisor
-+1:
-         exit    hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_irq:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=0
-+        bl      check_pending_vserror
-+        /*
-+         * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+         * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+         */
-+        cbnz    x0, 1f
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_irq
-+1:
-         exit    hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_fiq_invalid:
-@@ -213,15 +264,29 @@ guest_error:
-
- guest_sync_compat:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=1
-+        bl      check_pending_vserror
-+        /*
-+         * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+         * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+         */
-+        cbnz    x0, 1f
-         msr     daifclr, #2
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hypervisor
-+1:
-         exit    hyp=0, compat=1
-
- guest_irq_compat:
-         entry   hyp=0, compat=1
-+        bl      check_pending_vserror
-+        /*
-+         * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+         * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+         */
-+        cbnz    x0, 1f
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_irq
-+1:
-         exit    hyp=0, compat=1
-
- guest_fiq_invalid_compat:
-@@ -270,6 +335,62 @@ return_from_trap:
-         eret
-
- /*
-+ * This function is used to check pending virtual SError in the gap of
-+ * EL1 -> EL2 world switch.
-+ * The x0 register will be used to indicate the results of detection.
-+ * x0 -- Non-zero indicates a pending virtual SError took place.
-+ * x0 -- Zero indicates no pending virtual SError took place.
-+ */
-+check_pending_vserror:
-+        /*
-+         * Save elr_el2 to check whether the pending SError exception takes
-+         * place while we are doing this sync exception.
-+         */
-+        mrs     x0, elr_el2
-+
-+        /* Synchronize against in-flight ld/st */
-+        dsb     sy
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Unmask PSTATE asynchronous abort bit. If there is a pending
-+         * SError, the EL2 error exception will happen after PSTATE.A
-+         * is cleared.
-+         */
-+        msr     daifclr, #4
-+
-+        /*
-+         * This is our single instruction exception window. A pending
-+         * SError is guaranteed to occur at the earliest when we unmask
-+         * it, and at the latest just after the ISB.
-+         *
-+         * If a pending SError occurs, the program will jump to EL2 error
-+         * exception handler, and the elr_el2 will be set to
-+         * abort_guest_exit_start or abort_guest_exit_end.
-+         */
-+abort_guest_exit_start:
-+
-+        isb
-+
-+abort_guest_exit_end:
-+        /* Mask PSTATE asynchronous abort bit, close the checking window. */
-+        msr     daifset, #4
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Compare elr_el2 and the saved value to check whether we are
-+         * returning from a valid exception caused by pending SError.
-+         */
-+        mrs     x1, elr_el2
-+        cmp     x0, x1
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Not equal, the pending SError exception took place, set
-+         * x0 to non-zero.
-+         */
-+        cset    x0, ne
-+
-+        ret
-+
-+/*
-  * Exception vectors.
-  */
-         .macro  ventry  label
-@@ -287,7 +408,7 @@ ENTRY(hyp_traps_vector)
-         ventry  hyp_sync                        // Synchronous EL2h
-         ventry  hyp_irq                         // IRQ EL2h
-         ventry  hyp_fiq_invalid                 // FIQ EL2h
--        ventry  hyp_error_invalid               // Error EL2h
-+        ventry  hyp_error                       // Error EL2h
-
-         ventry  guest_sync                      // Synchronous 64-bit EL0/EL1
-         ventry  guest_irq                       // IRQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index af7fc3703e0d2..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm: crash the guest when it traps on external abort
-
-If we spot a data or prefetch abort bearing the ESR_EL2.EA bit set, we
-know that this is an external abort, and that should crash the guest.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9817, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-@@ -2383,6 +2383,15 @@ static void do_trap_instr_abort_guest(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
-     int rc;
-     register_t gva = READ_SYSREG(FAR_EL2);
- 
-+    /*
-+     * If this bit has been set, it means that this instruction abort is caused
-+     * by a guest external abort. Currently we crash the guest to protect the
-+     * hypervisor. In future one can better handle this by injecting a virtual
-+     * abort to the guest.
-+     */
-+    if ( hsr.iabt.eat )
-+        domain_crash_synchronous();
-+
-     switch ( hsr.iabt.ifsc & 0x3f )
-     {
-     case FSC_FLT_PERM ... FSC_FLT_PERM + 3:
-@@ -2437,6 +2446,15 @@ static void do_trap_data_abort_guest(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * If this bit has been set, it means that this data abort is caused
-+     * by a guest external abort. Currently we crash the guest to protect the
-+     * hypervisor. In future one can better handle this by injecting a virtual
-+     * abort to the guest.
-+     */
-+    if ( dabt.eat )
-+        domain_crash_synchronous();
-+
-     info.dabt = dabt;
- #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_32
-     info.gva = READ_CP32(HDFAR);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8060a5be13613..0000000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm32: handle async aborts delivered while at HYP
-
-If guest generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into HYP
-(by HVC or IRQ) before the abort has been delivered, the hypervisor
-could not catch it, because the PSTATE.A bit is masked all the time
-in hypervisor. So this asynchronous abort may be slipped to next
-running guest with PSTATE.A bit unmasked.
-
-In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at HYP, by
-clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In this patch, we unmask the PSTATE.A bit
-to open a window to catch guest-generated asynchronous abort in all
-Guest -> HYP switch paths. If we caught such asynchronous abort in
-checking window, the HYP data abort exception will be triggered and
-the abort source guest will be crashed.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9818, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -42,6 +42,61 @@ save_guest_regs:
-         SAVE_BANKED(fiq)
-         SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R8_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R9_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R10_fiq)
-         SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R11_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R12_fiq);
-+        /*
-+         * Start to check pending virtual abort in the gap of Guest -> HYP
-+         * world switch.
-+         *
-+         * Save ELR_hyp to check whether the pending virtual abort exception
-+         * takes place while we are doing this trap exception.
-+         */
-+        mrs r1, ELR_hyp
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Force loads and stores to complete before unmasking asynchronous
-+         * aborts and forcing the delivery of the exception.
-+         */
-+        dsb sy
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Unmask asynchronous abort bit. If there is a pending asynchronous
-+         * abort, the data_abort exception will happen after A bit is cleared.
-+         */
-+        cpsie a
-+
-+        /*
-+         * This is our single instruction exception window. A pending
-+         * asynchronous abort is guaranteed to occur at the earliest when we
-+         * unmask it, and at the latest just after the ISB.
-+         *
-+         * If a pending abort occurs, the program will jump to data_abort
-+         * exception handler, and the ELR_hyp will be set to
-+         * abort_guest_exit_start or abort_guest_exit_end.
-+         */
-+        .global abort_guest_exit_start
-+abort_guest_exit_start:
-+
-+        isb
-+
-+        .global abort_guest_exit_end
-+abort_guest_exit_end:
-+        /* Mask CPSR asynchronous abort bit, close the checking window. */
-+        cpsid a
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Compare ELR_hyp and the saved value to check whether we are
-+         * returning from a valid exception caused by pending virtual
-+         * abort.
-+         */
-+        mrs r2, ELR_hyp
-+        cmp r1, r2
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Not equal, the pending virtual abort exception took place, the
-+         * initial exception does not have any significance to be handled.
-+         * Exit ASAP.
-+         */
-+        bne return_from_trap
-+
-         mov pc, lr
-
- #define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap)                                         \
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/traps.c
-@@ -63,7 +63,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_trap_prefetch_abort(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-
- asmlinkage void do_trap_data_abort(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
--    do_unexpected_trap("Data Abort", regs);
-+    if ( VABORT_GEN_BY_GUEST(regs) )
-+        do_trap_guest_error(regs);
-+    else
-+        do_unexpected_trap("Data Abort", regs);
- }
-
- /*
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/processor.h
-@@ -55,6 +55,17 @@ struct cpu_user_regs
-
-     uint32_t pad1; /* Doubleword-align the user half of the frame */
- };
-+
-+/* Functions for pending virtual abort checking window. */
-+void abort_guest_exit_start(void);
-+void abort_guest_exit_end(void);
-+
-+#define VABORT_GEN_BY_GUEST(r)  \
-+( \
-+    ( (unsigned long)abort_guest_exit_start == (r)->pc ) || \
-+    ( (unsigned long)abort_guest_exit_end == (r)->pc ) \
-+)
-+
- #endif
-
- /* Layout as used in assembly, with src/dest registers mixed in */
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
-@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ void vcpu_regs_user_to_hyp(struct vcpu *vcpu,
- int call_smc(register_t function_id, register_t arg0, register_t arg1,
-              register_t arg2);
-
-+void do_trap_guest_error(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
-+
- #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
- #endif /* __ASM_ARM_PROCESSOR_H */
- /*
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..51d38dcba50f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86: force EFLAGS.IF on when exiting to PV guests
+
+Guest kernels modifying instructions in the process of being emulated
+for another of their vCPU-s may effect EFLAGS.IF to be cleared upon
+next exiting to guest context, by converting the being emulated
+instruction to CLI (at the right point in time). Prevent any such bad
+effects by always forcing EFLAGS.IF on. And to cover hypothetical other
+similar issues, also force EFLAGS.{IOPL,NT,VM} to zero.
+
+This is XSA-202.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ compat_process_trap:
+ /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
+ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+         ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
++        mov   $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11d
++        and   UREGS_eflags(%rsp),%r11d
+ .Lcr4_orig:
+         .skip .Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt, 0x90
+ .Lcr4_orig_end:
+@@ -144,6 +146,8 @@ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+                              (.Lcr4_orig_end - .Lcr4_orig), \
+                              (.Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt)
+         .popsection
++        or    $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++        mov   %r11d,UREGS_eflags(%rsp)
+         RESTORE_ALL adj=8 compat=1
+ .Lft0:  iretq
+         _ASM_PRE_EXTABLE(.Lft0, handle_exception)
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -40,28 +40,29 @@ restore_all_guest:
+         testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
+         jz    iret_exit_to_guest
+ 
++        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
++        andq  $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11
++        orq   $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++
+         /* Don't use SYSRET path if the return address is not canonical. */
+         movq  8(%rsp),%rcx
+         sarq  $47,%rcx
+         incl  %ecx
+         cmpl  $1,%ecx
+-        ja    .Lforce_iret
++        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
++        ja    iret_exit_to_guest
+ 
+         cmpw  $FLAT_USER_CS32,16(%rsp)# CS
+-        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
+-        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
+         movq  32(%rsp),%rsp           # RSP
+         je    1f
+         sysretq
+ 1:      sysretl
+ 
+-.Lforce_iret:
+-        /* Mimic SYSRET behavior. */
+-        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
+-        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
+         ALIGN
+ /* No special register assumptions. */
+ iret_exit_to_guest:
++        andl  $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),24(%rsp)
++        orl   $X86_EFLAGS_IF,24(%rsp)
+         addq  $8,%rsp
+ .Lft0:  iretq
+         _ASM_PRE_EXTABLE(.Lft0, handle_exception)
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..c9661a4c91fe5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/HVM: add missing NULL check before using VMFUNC hook
+
+This is XSA-203.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+@@ -1694,6 +1694,8 @@ static int hvmemul_vmfunc(
+ {
+     int rc;
+ 
++    if ( !hvm_funcs.altp2m_vcpu_emulate_vmfunc )
++        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+     rc = hvm_funcs.altp2m_vcpu_emulate_vmfunc(ctxt->regs);
+     if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+         hvmemul_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE,
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..360296b2bc249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2016 15:42:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/emul: Correct the handling of eflags with SYSCALL
+
+A singlestep #DB is determined by the resulting eflags value from the
+execution of SYSCALL, not the original eflags value.
+
+By using the original eflags value, we negate the guest kernels attempt to
+protect itself from a privilege escalation by masking TF.
+
+Have the SYSCALL emulation recalculate tf after the instruction is complete.
+
+This is XSA-204
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+index d82e85d..ff952a9 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+@@ -4561,6 +4561,23 @@ x86_emulate(
+              (rc = ops->write_segment(x86_seg_ss, &sreg, ctxt)) )
+             goto done;
+ 
++        /*
++         * SYSCALL (unlike most instructions) evaluates its singlestep action
++         * based on the resulting EFLG_TF, not the starting EFLG_TF.
++         *
++         * As the #DB is raised after the CPL change and before the OS can
++         * switch stack, it is a large risk for privilege escalation.
++         *
++         * 64bit kernels should mask EFLG_TF in MSR_FMASK to avoid any
++         * vulnerability.  Running the #DB handler on an IST stack is also a
++         * mitigation.
++         *
++         * 32bit kernels have no ability to mask EFLG_TF at all.  Their only
++         * mitigation is to use a task gate for handling #DB (or to not use
++         * enable EFER.SCE to start with).
++         */
++        tf = _regs.eflags & EFLG_TF;
++
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -5412,7 +5429,7 @@ x86_emulate(
+ 
+     *ctxt->regs = _regs;
+ 
+-    /* Inject #DB if single-step tracing was enabled at instruction start. */
++    /* Should a singlestep #DB be raised? */
+     if ( tf && (rc == X86EMUL_OKAY) && ops->inject_hw_exception )
+         rc = ops->inject_hw_exception(EXC_DB, -1, ctxt) ? : X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
+