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cloop stores the number of compressed blocks in the n_blocks header
field. The file actually contains n_blocks + 1 offsets, where the extra
offset is the end-of-file offset.
The following line in cloop_read_block() results in an out-of-bounds
offsets[] access:
uint32_t bytes = s->offsets[block_num + 1] - s->offsets[block_num];
This patch allocates and loads the extra offset so that
cloop_read_block() works correctly when the last block is accessed.
Notice that we must free s->offsets[] unconditionally now since there is
always an end-of-file offset.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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The offsets[] array allows efficient seeking and tells us the maximum
compressed data size. If the offsets are bogus the maximum compressed
data size will be unrealistic.
This could cause g_malloc() to abort and bogus offsets mean the image is
broken anyway. Therefore we should refuse such images.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Limit offsets_size to 512 MB so that:
1. g_malloc() does not abort due to an unreasonable size argument.
2. offsets_size does not overflow the bdrv_pread() int size argument.
This limit imposes a maximum image size of 16 TB at 256 KB block size.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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The following integer overflow in offsets_size can lead to out-of-bounds
memory stores when n_blocks has a huge value:
uint32_t n_blocks, offsets_size;
[...]
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
[...]
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
[...]
for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);
offsets_size can be smaller than n_blocks due to integer overflow.
Therefore s->offsets[] is too small when the for loop byteswaps offsets.
This patch refuses to open files if offsets_size would overflow.
Note that changing the type of offsets_size is not a fix since 32-bit
hosts still only have 32-bit size_t.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Avoid unbounded s->uncompressed_block memory allocation by checking that
the block_size header field has a reasonable value. Also enforce the
assumption that the value is a non-zero multiple of 512.
These constraints conform to cloop 2.639's code so we accept existing
image files.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Add a cloop format-specific test case. Later patches add tests for
input validation to the script.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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