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For bare-metal SGX on real hardware, the hardware provides guarantees
SGX state at reboot. For instance, all pages start out uninitialized.
The vepc driver provides a similar guarantee today for freshly-opened
vepc instances, but guests such as Windows expect all pages to be in
uninitialized state on startup, including after every guest reboot.
Qemu can invoke the ioctl to bring its vEPC pages back to uninitialized
state. There is a possibility that some pages fail to be removed if they
are SECS pages, and the child and SECS pages could be in separate vEPC
regions. Therefore, the ioctl returns the number of EREMOVE failures,
telling Qemu to try the ioctl again after it's done with all vEPC regions.
The related kernel patches:
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021201155.1523989-3-pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20211101162009.62161-6-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move qmp_query_sgx() and hmp_info_sgx() from target/i386/monitor.c
to hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_info() indirection and the
"hw/i386/sgx.h" header.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-5-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move qmp_query_sgx_capabilities() from target/i386/monitor.c to
hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_capabilities() indirection.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-4-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-3-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Libvirt can use query-sgx-capabilities to get the host
sgx capabilities to decide how to allocate SGX EPC size to VM.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The QMP and HMP interfaces can be used by monitor or QMP tools to retrieve
the SGX information from VM side when SGX is enabled on Intel platform.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Expose SGX to the guest if and only if KVM is enabled and supports
virtualization of SGX. While the majority of ENCLS can be emulated to
some degree, because SGX uses a hardware-based root of trust, the
attestation aspects of SGX cannot be emulated in software, i.e.
ultimately emulation will fail as software cannot generate a valid
quote/report. The complexity of partially emulating SGX in Qemu far
outweighs the value added, e.g. an SGX specific simulator for userspace
applications can emulate SGX for development and testing purposes.
Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet advertised to the guest as
KVM blocks access to the PROVISIONKEY by default and requires userspace
to provide additional credentials (via ioctl()) to expose PROVISIONKEY.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-13-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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