diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'target/arm/helper.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | target/arm/helper.c | 237 |
1 files changed, 158 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index ca4d4a57bf..c77ed85215 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -7529,7 +7529,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr) uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op) { - /* The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in + /* + * The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in * user-only emulation we don't have the MPU. * Luckily since we know we are NonSecure unprivileged (and that in * turn means that the A flag wasn't specified), all the bits in the @@ -7801,7 +7802,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr, uint32_t value, return true; pend_fault: - /* By pending the exception at this point we are making + /* + * By pending the exception at this point we are making * the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the * MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not * pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away @@ -7876,7 +7878,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_read(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t *dest, uint32_t addr, return true; pend_fault: - /* By pending the exception at this point we are making + /* + * By pending the exception at this point we are making * the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the * MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not * pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away @@ -7977,7 +7980,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_preserve_fp_state)(CPUARMState *env) */ } -/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank. +/* + * Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank. * This may change the current stack pointer between Main and Process * stack pointers if it is done for the CONTROL register for the current * security state. @@ -8005,7 +8009,8 @@ static void write_v7m_control_spsel_for_secstate(CPUARMState *env, } } -/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current +/* + * Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current * stack pointer between Main and Process stack pointers. */ static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env, bool new_spsel) @@ -8015,7 +8020,8 @@ static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env, bool new_spsel) void write_v7m_exception(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t new_exc) { - /* Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out + /* + * Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out * of Handler mode; this may result in a change of active stack pointer. */ bool new_is_psp, old_is_psp = v7m_using_psp(env); @@ -8041,7 +8047,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env, bool new_secstate) return; } - /* All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure + /* + * All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure * except for the stack pointer; rearrange the SP appropriately. */ new_ss_msp = env->v7m.other_ss_msp; @@ -8068,7 +8075,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env, bool new_secstate) void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) { - /* Handle v7M BXNS: + /* + * Handle v7M BXNS: * - if the return value is a magic value, do exception return (like BX) * - otherwise bit 0 of the return value is the target security state */ @@ -8083,7 +8091,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) } if (dest >= min_magic) { - /* This is an exception return magic value; put it where + /* + * This is an exception return magic value; put it where * do_v7m_exception_exit() expects and raise EXCEPTION_EXIT. * Note that if we ever add gen_ss_advance() singlestep support to * M profile this should count as an "instruction execution complete" @@ -8108,7 +8117,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) { - /* Handle v7M BLXNS: + /* + * Handle v7M BLXNS: * - bit 0 of the destination address is the target security state */ @@ -8121,7 +8131,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) assert(env->v7m.secure); if (dest & 1) { - /* target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX, + /* + * Target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX, * except that the low bit doesn't indicate Thumb/not. */ env->regs[14] = nextinst; @@ -8152,7 +8163,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) env->regs[13] = sp; env->regs[14] = 0xfeffffff; if (arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) { - /* Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure + /* + * Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure * exception number to non-secure code. This is guaranteed not * to cause write_v7m_exception() to actually change stacks. */ @@ -8167,7 +8179,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest) static uint32_t *get_v7m_sp_ptr(CPUARMState *env, bool secure, bool threadmode, bool spsel) { - /* Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the + /* + * Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the * stack pointer for the requested security state and thread mode. * This pointer will become invalid if the CPU state is updated * such that the stack pointers are switched around (eg changing @@ -8213,7 +8226,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure, mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targets_secure, true); - /* We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector + /* + * We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector * loads are special: they always use the default memory map, and * the default memory map permits reads from all addresses. * Since there's no easy way to pass through to pmsav8_mpu_lookup() @@ -8244,7 +8258,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure, return true; load_fail: - /* All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with + /* + * All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with * HFSR.VECTTBL and .FORCED set. (FORCED is set because * technically the underlying exception is a MemManage or BusFault * that is escalated to HardFault.) This is a terminal exception, @@ -8276,7 +8291,8 @@ static uint32_t v7m_integrity_sig(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t lr) static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, bool ignore_faults) { - /* For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame. + /* + * For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame. * Compare the v8M pseudocode PushCalleeStack(). * In the tailchaining case this may not be the current stack. */ @@ -8327,7 +8343,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, return true; } - /* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may + /* + * Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may * cause us to pend a derived exception. */ sig = v7m_integrity_sig(env, lr); @@ -8351,7 +8368,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, bool ignore_stackfaults) { - /* Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry, + /* + * Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry, * but not the pushing of state to the stack. This is * similar to the pseudocode ExceptionTaken() function. */ @@ -8376,13 +8394,15 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) { if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && (lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK)) { - /* The background code (the owner of the registers in the + /* + * The background code (the owner of the registers in the * exception frame) is Secure. This means it may either already * have or now needs to push callee-saves registers. */ if (targets_secure) { if (dotailchain && !(lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_ES_MASK)) { - /* We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure + /* + * We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure * (which means the callee-saved registers got stacked) * and are now tailchaining to a Secure exception. * Clear DCRS so eventual return from this Secure @@ -8391,7 +8411,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, lr &= ~R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK; } } else { - /* We're going to a non-secure exception; push the + /* + * We're going to a non-secure exception; push the * callee-saves registers to the stack now, if they're * not already saved. */ @@ -8413,14 +8434,16 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_SPSEL_MASK; } - /* Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception + /* + * Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception * code being able to see register values from secure code. * Where register values become architecturally UNKNOWN we leave * them with their previous values. */ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { if (!targets_secure) { - /* Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been + /* + * Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been * pushed to the stack earlier in v7m_push_stack()). * Clear callee-saved registers if the background code is * Secure (in which case these regs were saved in @@ -8441,7 +8464,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, } if (push_failed && !ignore_stackfaults) { - /* Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking: + /* + * Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking: * we might now want to take a different exception which * targets a different security state, so try again from the top. */ @@ -8458,7 +8482,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain, return; } - /* Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception + /* + * Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception * we can go ahead and activate whichever exception we're going to * take (which might now be the derived exception). */ @@ -8661,7 +8686,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr) static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu) { - /* Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry, + /* + * Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry, * similar to pseudocode PushStack(). * Return true if we generate a derived exception (and so * should ignore further stack faults trying to process @@ -8729,7 +8755,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu) } } - /* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack + /* + * Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack * write this will result in a derived exception being pended * (which may be taken in preference to the one we started with * if it has higher priority). @@ -8846,7 +8873,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) bool ftype; bool restore_s16_s31; - /* If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit + /* + * If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit * addresses don't have magic behaviour. However for the v8M * security extensions the magic secure-function-return has to * work in thread mode too, so to avoid doing an extra check in @@ -8860,7 +8888,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) return; } - /* In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly + /* + * In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly * from BXWritePC() and gets the full target PC value including * bit zero. In QEMU's implementation we treat it as a normal * jump-to-register (which is then caught later on), and so split @@ -8893,7 +8922,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { - /* EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before + /* + * EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before * we pick which FAULTMASK to clear. */ if (!env->v7m.secure && @@ -8907,7 +8937,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (env->v7m.exception != ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI) { - /* Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI. + /* + * Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI. * If the security extension is implemented then this only * happens if the raw execution priority is >= 0; the * value of the ES bit in the exception return value indicates @@ -8932,7 +8963,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) /* still an irq active now */ break; case 1: - /* we returned to base exception level, no nesting. + /* + * We returned to base exception level, no nesting. * (In the pseudocode this is written using "NestedActivation != 1" * where we have 'rettobase == false'.) */ @@ -8949,7 +8981,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) { if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { - /* UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP); + /* + * UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP); * we choose to take the UsageFault. */ if ((excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK) || @@ -8968,7 +9001,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) break; case 13: /* Return to Thread using Process stack */ case 9: /* Return to Thread using Main stack */ - /* We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in + /* + * We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in * v8M this bit does not exist (it is RES1). */ if (!rettobase && @@ -9026,7 +9060,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (ufault) { - /* Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception + /* + * Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception * stack, directly take a usage fault on the current stack. */ env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_INVPC_MASK; @@ -9056,7 +9091,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) switch_v7m_security_state(env, return_to_secure); { - /* The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from + /* + * The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from * depends on bits in the magic exception return type value (and * for v8M isn't necessarily the stack pointer we will eventually * end up resuming execution with). Get a pointer to the location @@ -9129,7 +9165,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) v7m_stack_read(cpu, &xpsr, frameptr + 0x1c, mmu_idx); if (!pop_ok) { - /* v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail + /* + * v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail * chained exception on the same stack frame) */ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...derived exception on unstacking\n"); @@ -9137,7 +9174,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) return; } - /* Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined + /* + * Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined * behaviour on v8M (bit 0 is ignored), but for v7M it was specified * to be UNPREDICTABLE. In practice actual v7M hardware seems to ignore * the lsbit, and there are several RTOSes out there which incorrectly @@ -9155,13 +9193,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) { - /* For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field + /* + * For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field * matches the EXCRET value for return to handler/thread * before we commit to changing the SP and xPSR. */ bool will_be_handler = (xpsr & XPSR_EXCP) != 0; if (return_to_handler != will_be_handler) { - /* Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack. + /* + * Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack. * By this point we will have switched to the security state * for the background state, so this UsageFault will target * that state. @@ -9276,7 +9316,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) frameptr += 0x40; } } - /* Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the original + /* + * Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the original * pre-exception SP was not 8-aligned and we added a padding word to * align it, so we undo this by ORing in the bit that increases it * from the current 8-aligned value to the 8-unaligned value. (Adding 4 @@ -9302,13 +9343,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) V7M_CONTROL, SFPA, sfpa); } - /* The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're + /* + * The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're * resuming in Thread mode. If that doesn't match what the * exception return excret specified then this is a UsageFault. * v7M requires we make this check here; v8M did it earlier. */ if (return_to_handler != arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) { - /* Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again; + /* + * Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again; * we know we're v7M so this is never a Secure UsageFault. */ bool ignore_stackfaults; @@ -9330,7 +9373,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu) static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu) { - /* v8M security extensions magic function return. + /* + * v8M security extensions magic function return. * We may either: * (1) throw an exception (longjump) * (2) return true if we successfully handled the function return @@ -9360,7 +9404,8 @@ static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu) frame_sp_p = get_v7m_sp_ptr(env, true, threadmode, spsel); frameptr = *frame_sp_p; - /* These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to + /* + * These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to * do them as secure, so work out what MMU index that is. */ mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(env, true); @@ -9441,7 +9486,8 @@ static void arm_log_exception(int idx) static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, uint32_t addr, uint16_t *insn) { - /* Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success, + /* + * Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success, * or false on failure (in which case we will have pended the appropriate * exception). * We need to do the instruction fetch's MPU and SAU checks @@ -9464,7 +9510,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, &sattrs); if (!sattrs.nsc || sattrs.ns) { - /* This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a + /* + * This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a * region boundary with the second half not being S&NSC. */ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_INVEP_MASK; @@ -9494,7 +9541,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) { - /* Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable + /* + * Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable * memory region is for an SG instruction; if so, then emulate the * effect of the SG instruction and return true. Otherwise pend * the correct kind of exception and return false. @@ -9503,7 +9551,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx; uint16_t insn; - /* We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused + /* + * We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused * an exception for NS executing in S&NSC memory. */ assert(!env->v7m.secure); @@ -9521,7 +9570,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (insn != 0xe97f) { - /* Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF + /* + * Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF * early-SG-check option). */ goto gen_invep; @@ -9532,13 +9582,15 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) } if (insn != 0xe97f) { - /* Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG + /* + * Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG * insn have the same hex value) */ goto gen_invep; } - /* OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction. + /* + * OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction. * We know we're NS in S memory so don't need to repeat those checks. */ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really an SG instruction at 0x%08" PRIx32 @@ -9567,8 +9619,10 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) arm_log_exception(cs->exception_index); - /* For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that - handle it. */ + /* + * For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that + * handle it. + */ switch (cs->exception_index) { case EXCP_UDEF: armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure); @@ -9614,13 +9668,15 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) break; case EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT: case EXCP_DATA_ABORT: - /* Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but + /* + * Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but * the env->exception.fsr will be populated by the code that * raises the fault, in the A profile short-descriptor format. */ switch (env->exception.fsr & 0xf) { case M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC: - /* Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address + /* + * Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address * which is marked as Secure & Non-Secure Callable and the CPU * is in the Non-Secure state. The only instruction which can * be executed like this is SG (and that only if both halves of @@ -9633,7 +9689,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) } break; case M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT: - /* Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or + /* + * Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or * access data in the wrong security state. */ switch (cs->exception_index) { @@ -9675,7 +9732,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false); break; default: - /* All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen + /* + * All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen * for M profile" cases. */ switch (cs->exception_index) { @@ -9741,7 +9799,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) { lr = R_V7M_EXCRET_RES1_MASK | R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK; - /* The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure + /* + * The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure * or NonSecure (ie our current state). * The ES bit indicates whether we're taking this exception * to Secure or NonSecure (ie our target state). We set it @@ -9776,7 +9835,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) v7m_exception_taken(cpu, lr, false, ignore_stackfaults); } -/* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch64 register set with AArch32 +/* + * Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch64 register set with AArch32 * register set. This is necessary when switching between AArch32 and AArch64 * execution state. */ @@ -9790,7 +9850,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env) env->xregs[i] = env->regs[i]; } - /* Unless we are in FIQ mode, x8-x12 come from the user registers r8-r12. + /* + * Unless we are in FIQ mode, x8-x12 come from the user registers r8-r12. * Otherwise, they come from the banked user regs. */ if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_FIQ) { @@ -9803,7 +9864,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env) } } - /* Registers x13-x23 are the various mode SP and FP registers. Registers + /* + * Registers x13-x23 are the various mode SP and FP registers. Registers * r13 and r14 are only copied if we are in that mode, otherwise we copy * from the mode banked register. */ @@ -9858,7 +9920,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env) env->xregs[23] = env->banked_r13[bank_number(ARM_CPU_MODE_UND)]; } - /* Registers x24-x30 are mapped to r8-r14 in FIQ mode. If we are in FIQ + /* + * Registers x24-x30 are mapped to r8-r14 in FIQ mode. If we are in FIQ * mode, then we can copy from r8-r14. Otherwise, we copy from the * FIQ bank for r8-r14. */ @@ -9877,7 +9940,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env) env->pc = env->regs[15]; } -/* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch32 register set with AArch64 +/* + * Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch32 register set with AArch64 * register set. This is necessary when switching between AArch32 and AArch64 * execution state. */ @@ -9891,7 +9955,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env) env->regs[i] = env->xregs[i]; } - /* Unless we are in FIQ mode, r8-r12 come from the user registers x8-x12. + /* + * Unless we are in FIQ mode, r8-r12 come from the user registers x8-x12. * Otherwise, we copy x8-x12 into the banked user regs. */ if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_FIQ) { @@ -9904,7 +9969,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env) } } - /* Registers r13 & r14 depend on the current mode. + /* + * Registers r13 & r14 depend on the current mode. * If we are in a given mode, we copy the corresponding x registers to r13 * and r14. Otherwise, we copy the x register to the banked r13 and r14 * for the mode. @@ -9915,7 +9981,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env) } else { env->banked_r13[bank_number(ARM_CPU_MODE_USR)] = env->xregs[13]; - /* HYP is an exception in that it does not have its own banked r14 but + /* + * HYP is an exception in that it does not have its own banked r14 but * shares the USR r14 */ if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_HYP) { @@ -12758,7 +12825,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg) return value; } case 0x94: /* CONTROL_NS */ - /* We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code + /* + * We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code * can read the NS CONTROL register. */ if (!env->v7m.secure) { @@ -12811,7 +12879,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg) return env->v7m.faultmask[M_REG_NS]; case 0x98: /* SP_NS */ { - /* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're + /* + * This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're * currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL. */ bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK; @@ -12862,7 +12931,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg) void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t maskreg, uint32_t val) { - /* We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract + /* + * We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract * SYSm and the mask bits. * Invalid combinations of SYSm and mask are UNPREDICTABLE; * we choose to treat them as if the mask bits were valid. @@ -12948,7 +13018,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t maskreg, uint32_t val) return; case 0x98: /* SP_NS */ { - /* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're + /* + * This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're * currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL. */ bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK; @@ -13109,7 +13180,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op) bool targetsec = env->v7m.secure; bool is_subpage; - /* Work out what the security state and privilege level we're + /* + * Work out what the security state and privilege level we're * interested in is... */ if (alt) { @@ -13126,12 +13198,14 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op) /* ...and then figure out which MMU index this is */ mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targetsec, targetpriv); - /* We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type + /* + * We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type * for our purposes beyond that we don't want to claim to be * an insn fetch, so we arbitrarily call this a read. */ - /* MPU region info only available for privileged or if + /* + * MPU region info only available for privileged or if * inspecting the other MPU state. */ if (arm_current_el(env) != 0 || alt) { @@ -13236,7 +13310,8 @@ bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size, void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in) { - /* Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory. + /* + * Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory. * Note that we do not implement the (architecturally mandated) * alignment fault for attempts to use this on Device memory * (which matches the usual QEMU behaviour of not implementing either @@ -13249,7 +13324,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in) #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY { - /* Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than + /* + * Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than * the block size so we might have to do more than one TLB lookup. * We know that in fact for any v8 CPU the page size is at least 4K * and the block size must be 2K or less, but TARGET_PAGE_SIZE is only @@ -13276,7 +13352,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in) } } if (i == maxidx) { - /* If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to; + /* + * If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to; * we know we don't need to update dirty status, etc. */ for (i = 0; i < maxidx - 1; i++) { @@ -13285,7 +13362,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in) memset(hostaddr[i], 0, blocklen - (i * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)); return; } - /* OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This + /* + * OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This * might cause an exception if the memory isn't writable, * in which case we will longjmp out of here. We must for * this purpose use the actual register value passed to us @@ -13301,7 +13379,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in) } } - /* Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or + /* + * Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or * similar, or clearing of a block of code we have translations * cached for). Just do a series of byte writes as the architecture * demands. It's not worth trying to use a cpu_physical_memory_map(), |