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authorStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>2019-10-16 17:01:56 +0100
committerDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>2020-01-23 16:41:36 +0000
commitd74830d12ae233186ff74ddf64c552d26bb39e50 (patch)
treefc4d8b4b4eb2bf1b52e8dbfdf8107285b7611877 /tools
parent5baa3b8e95064c2434bd9e2f312edd5e9ae275dc (diff)
virtiofsd: move to an empty network namespace
If the process is compromised there should be no network access. Use an empty network namespace to sandbox networking. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
-rw-r--r--tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c14
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 0570453eef..27ab328722 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -1944,6 +1944,19 @@ static void print_capabilities(void)
printf("}\n");
}
+/*
+ * Called after our UNIX domain sockets have been created, now we can move to
+ * an empty network namespace to prevent TCP/IP and other network activity in
+ * case this process is compromised.
+ */
+static void setup_net_namespace(void)
+{
+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) != 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNET): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
/* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
{
@@ -2035,6 +2048,7 @@ static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
*/
static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo)
{
+ setup_net_namespace();
setup_mount_namespace(lo->source);
}