target-ppc: Eliminate kvmppc_kern_htab global

fa48b43 "target-ppc: Remove hack for ppc_hash64_load_hpte*() with HV KVM"
purports to remove a hack in the handling of hash page tables (HPTs)
managed by KVM instead of qemu.  However, it actually went in the wrong
direction.

That patch requires anything looking for an external HPT (that is one not
managed by the guest itself) to check both env->external_htab (for a qemu
managed HPT) and kvmppc_kern_htab (for a KVM managed HPT).  That's a
problem because kvmppc_kern_htab is local to mmu-hash64.c, but some places
which need to check for an external HPT are outside that, such as
kvm_arch_get_registers().  The latter was subtly broken by the earlier
patch such that gdbstub can no longer access memory.

Basically a KVM managed HPT is much more like a qemu managed HPT than it is
like a guest managed HPT, so the original "hack" was actually on the right
track.

This partially reverts fa48b43, so we again mark a KVM managed external HPT
by putting a special but non-NULL value in env->external_htab.  It then
goes further, using that marker to eliminate the kvmppc_kern_htab global
entirely.  The ppc_hash64_set_external_hpt() helper function is extended
to set that marker if passed a NULL value (if you're setting an external
HPT, but don't have an actual HPT to set, the assumption is that it must
be a KVM managed HPT).

This also has some flow-on changes to the HPT access helpers, required by
the above changes.

Reported-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c b/hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c
index 1733482de6..b2b1b93cfd 100644
--- a/hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c
+++ b/hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c
@@ -122,17 +122,17 @@ static target_ulong h_enter(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
                 break;
             }
         }
-        ppc_hash64_stop_access(token);
+        ppc_hash64_stop_access(cpu, token);
         if (index == 8) {
             return H_PTEG_FULL;
         }
     } else {
         token = ppc_hash64_start_access(cpu, pte_index);
         if (ppc_hash64_load_hpte0(cpu, token, 0) & HPTE64_V_VALID) {
-            ppc_hash64_stop_access(token);
+            ppc_hash64_stop_access(cpu, token);
             return H_PTEG_FULL;
         }
-        ppc_hash64_stop_access(token);
+        ppc_hash64_stop_access(cpu, token);
     }
 
     ppc_hash64_store_hpte(cpu, pte_index + index,
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static RemoveResult remove_hpte(PowerPCCPU *cpu, target_ulong ptex,
     token = ppc_hash64_start_access(cpu, ptex);
     v = ppc_hash64_load_hpte0(cpu, token, 0);
     r = ppc_hash64_load_hpte1(cpu, token, 0);
-    ppc_hash64_stop_access(token);
+    ppc_hash64_stop_access(cpu, token);
 
     if ((v & HPTE64_V_VALID) == 0 ||
         ((flags & H_AVPN) && (v & ~0x7fULL) != avpn) ||
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static target_ulong h_protect(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
     token = ppc_hash64_start_access(cpu, pte_index);
     v = ppc_hash64_load_hpte0(cpu, token, 0);
     r = ppc_hash64_load_hpte1(cpu, token, 0);
-    ppc_hash64_stop_access(token);
+    ppc_hash64_stop_access(cpu, token);
 
     if ((v & HPTE64_V_VALID) == 0 ||
         ((flags & H_AVPN) && (v & ~0x7fULL) != avpn)) {