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authorChristian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>2023-06-07 18:29:33 +0200
committerChristian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>2023-06-08 17:04:58 +0200
commitf6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda (patch)
treeff8c37ba95f9fe4fd84bba1b225b8cb95b4c8d7a /hw/9pfs
parent45ae97993a75f975f1a01d25564724c7e10a543f (diff)
9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host side. With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups: - Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough' security model. or - Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as root). These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before, however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this. Fixes: CVE-2023-2861 Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com> Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com> Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn> Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru> Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/9pfs')
-rw-r--r--hw/9pfs/9p-util.h39
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index c314cf381d..df1b583a5e 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
#define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+
#ifdef O_PATH
#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
#else
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ static inline int errno_to_dotl(int err) {
#endif
#define qemu_openat openat
+#define qemu_fstat fstat
#define qemu_fstatat fstatat
#define qemu_mkdirat mkdirat
#define qemu_renameat renameat
@@ -108,6 +111,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
errno = serrno;
}
+/**
+ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
+ *
+ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
+ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
+ *
+ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
+ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
+ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
+ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
+ */
+static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
+{
+ struct stat stbuf;
+
+ if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
+ close_preserve_errno(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+ error_report_once(
+ "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
+ "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
+ );
+ close(fd);
+ errno = ENXIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
{
return qemu_openat(dirfd, name,
@@ -142,6 +177,10 @@ again:
return -1;
}
+ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
serrno = errno;
/* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
* do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()