diff options
author | Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2020-12-04 18:06:15 -0500 |
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committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2021-01-02 21:03:36 +0100 |
commit | a111824382dad27db8c358b2b9b26cdf30eaf49f (patch) | |
tree | 6407e3733ab7c88c5a588737d403a3f0989eb5e4 /docs | |
parent | 9e62ba48ea7e4a95892f6032f89801e5dcb5c261 (diff) |
docs: Add CFI Documentation
Document how to compile with CFI and how to maintain CFI-safe code
Signed-off-by: Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20201204230615.2392-6-dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[Make build system section in index.rst and add the new file. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/devel/control-flow-integrity.rst | 137 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | docs/devel/index.rst | 5 |
2 files changed, 140 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/devel/control-flow-integrity.rst b/docs/devel/control-flow-integrity.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d89d70733d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/devel/control-flow-integrity.rst @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +============================ +Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) +============================ + +This document describes the current control-flow integrity (CFI) mechanism in +QEMU. How it can be enabled, its benefits and deficiencies, and how it affects +new and existing code in QEMU + +Basics +------ + +CFI is a hardening technique that focusing on guaranteeing that indirect +function calls have not been altered by an attacker. +The type used in QEMU is a forward-edge control-flow integrity that ensures +function calls performed through function pointers, always call a "compatible" +function. A compatible function is a function with the same signature of the +function pointer declared in the source code. + +This type of CFI is entirely compiler-based and relies on the compiler knowing +the signature of every function and every function pointer used in the code. +As of now, the only compiler that provides support for CFI is Clang. + +CFI is best used on production binaries, to protect against unknown attack +vectors. + +In case of a CFI violation (i.e. call to a non-compatible function) QEMU will +terminate abruptly, to stop the possible attack. + +Building with CFI +----------------- + +NOTE: CFI requires the use of link-time optimization. Therefore, when CFI is +selected, LTO will be automatically enabled. + +To build with CFI, the minimum requirement is Clang 6+. If you +are planning to also enable fuzzing, then Clang 11+ is needed (more on this +later). + +Given the use of LTO, a version of AR that supports LLVM IR is required. +The easies way of doing this is by selecting the AR provided by LLVM:: + + AR=llvm-ar-9 CC=clang-9 CXX=lang++-9 /path/to/configure --enable-cfi + +CFI is enabled on every binary produced. + +If desired, an additional flag to increase the verbosity of the output in case +of a CFI violation is offered (``--enable-debug-cfi``). + +Using QEMU built with CFI +------------------------- + +A binary with CFI will work exactly like a standard binary. In case of a CFI +violation, the binary will terminate with an illegal instruction signal. + +Incompatible code with CFI +-------------------------- + +As mentioned above, CFI is entirely compiler-based and therefore relies on +compile-time knowledge of the code. This means that, while generally supported +for most code, some specific use pattern can break CFI compatibility, and +create false-positives. The two main patterns that can cause issues are: + +* Just-in-time compiled code: since such code is created at runtime, the jump + to the buffer containing JIT code will fail. + +* Libraries loaded dynamically, e.g. with dlopen/dlsym, since the library was + not known at compile time. + +Current areas of QEMU that are not entirely compatible with CFI are: + +1. TCG, since the idea of TCG is to pre-compile groups of instructions at + runtime to speed-up interpretation, quite similarly to a JIT compiler + +2. TCI, where the interpreter has to interpret the generic *call* operation + +3. Plugins, since a plugin is implemented as an external library + +4. Modules, since they are implemented as an external library + +5. Directly calling signal handlers from the QEMU source code, since the + signal handler may have been provided by an external library or even plugged + at runtime. + +Disabling CFI for a specific function +------------------------------------- + +If you are working on function that is performing a call using an +incompatible way, as described before, you can selectively disable CFI checks +for such function by using the decorator ``QEMU_DISABLE_CFI`` at function +definition, and add an explanation on why the function is not compatible +with CFI. An example of the use of ``QEMU_DISABLE_CFI`` is provided here:: + + /* + * Disable CFI checks. + * TCG creates binary blobs at runtime, with the transformed code. + * A TB is a blob of binary code, created at runtime and called with an + * indirect function call. Since such function did not exist at compile time, + * the CFI runtime has no way to verify its signature and would fail. + * TCG is not considered a security-sensitive part of QEMU so this does not + * affect the impact of CFI in environment with high security requirements + */ + QEMU_DISABLE_CFI + static inline tcg_target_ulong cpu_tb_exec(CPUState *cpu, TranslationBlock *itb) + +NOTE: CFI needs to be disabled at the **caller** function, (i.e. a compatible +cfi function that calls a non-compatible one), since the check is performed +when the function call is performed. + +CFI and fuzzing +--------------- + +There is generally no advantage of using CFI and fuzzing together, because +they target different environments (production for CFI, debug for fuzzing). + +CFI could be used in conjunction with fuzzing to identify a broader set of +bugs that may not end immediately in a segmentation fault or triggering +an assertion. However, other sanitizers such as address and ub sanitizers +can identify such bugs in a more precise way than CFI. + +There is, however, an interesting use case in using CFI in conjunction with +fuzzing, that is to make sure that CFI is not triggering any false positive +in remote-but-possible parts of the code. + +CFI can be enabled with fuzzing, but with some caveats: +1. Fuzzing relies on the linker performing function wrapping at link-time. +The standard BFD linker does not support function wrapping when LTO is +also enabled. The workaround is to use LLVM's lld linker. +2. Fuzzing also relies on a custom linker script, which is only supported by +lld with version 11+. + +In other words, to compile with fuzzing and CFI, clang 11+ is required, and +lld needs to be used as a linker:: + + AR=llvm-ar-11 CC=clang-11 CXX=lang++-11 /path/to/configure --enable-cfi \ + -enable-fuzzing --extra-ldflags="-fuse-ld=lld" + +and then, compile the fuzzers as usual. diff --git a/docs/devel/index.rst b/docs/devel/index.rst index f10ed77e4c..ea0e1e17ae 100644 --- a/docs/devel/index.rst +++ b/docs/devel/index.rst @@ -15,14 +15,15 @@ Contents: build-system kconfig + testing + fuzzing + control-flow-integrity loads-stores memory migration atomics stable-process - testing qtest - fuzzing decodetree secure-coding-practices tcg |