Merge tag 'qga-pull-2024-05-01' of https://github.com/kostyanf14/qemu into staging

qga-pull-2024-05-01

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# gpg: Signature made Wed 01 May 2024 12:40:40 AM PDT
# gpg:                using RSA key C2C2C109EA43C63C1423EB84EF5D5E8161BA84E7
# gpg: Good signature from "Kostiantyn Kostiuk (Upstream PR sign) <kkostiuk@redhat.com>" [unknown]
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: C2C2 C109 EA43 C63C 1423  EB84 EF5D 5E81 61BA 84E7

* tag 'qga-pull-2024-05-01' of https://github.com/kostyanf14/qemu:
  qga: Implement SSH commands for Windows
  qga: Refactor common SSH functions
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_set_user_password: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: don't do fork()/exec() when suspending via sysfs
  qga/commands-posix: execute_fsfreeze_hook: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_set_time: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_shutdown: use ga_run_command helper
  qga: introduce ga_run_command() helper for guest cmd execution
  qga: guest-get-fsinfo: add optional 'total-bytes-privileged' field

Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>

9 files changed, 999 insertions, 283 deletions

diff --git a/qga/commands-common-ssh.c b/qga/commands-common-ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..537869fb98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qga/commands-common-ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
+
+GStrv read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp)
+{
+    g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
+    g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
+
+    if (!g_file_get_contents(path, &contents, NULL, &err)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "failed to read '%s': %s", path, err->message);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return g_strsplit(contents, "\n", -1);
+}
+
+bool check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp)
+{
+    size_t n = 0;
+    strList *k;
+
+    for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
+        if (!check_openssh_pub_key(k->value, errp)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        n++;
+    }
+
+    if (nkeys) {
+        *nkeys = n;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp)
+{
+    /* simple sanity-check, we may want more? */
+    if (!key || key[0] == '#' || strchr(key, '\n')) {
+        error_setg(errp, "invalid OpenSSH public key: '%s'", key);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
diff --git a/qga/commands-common-ssh.h b/qga/commands-common-ssh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..14d955fa84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qga/commands-common-ssh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/*
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qapi/qapi-builtin-types.h"
+
+GStrv read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp);
+bool check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp);
+bool check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp);
diff --git a/qga/commands-posix-ssh.c b/qga/commands-posix-ssh.c
index 236f80de44..dd2ecb453a 100644
--- a/qga/commands-posix-ssh.c
+++ b/qga/commands-posix-ssh.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <locale.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 
+#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
 #include "qapi/error.h"
 #include "qga-qapi-commands.h"
 
@@ -81,37 +82,6 @@ mkdir_for_user(const char *path, const struct passwd *p,
 }
 
 static bool
-check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp)
-{
-    /* simple sanity-check, we may want more? */
-    if (!key || key[0] == '#' || strchr(key, '\n')) {
-        error_setg(errp, "invalid OpenSSH public key: '%s'", key);
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    return true;
-}
-
-static bool
-check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp)
-{
-    size_t n = 0;
-    strList *k;
-
-    for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
-        if (!check_openssh_pub_key(k->value, errp)) {
-            return false;
-        }
-        n++;
-    }
-
-    if (nkeys) {
-        *nkeys = n;
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-
-static bool
 write_authkeys(const char *path, const GStrv keys,
                const struct passwd *p, Error **errp)
 {
@@ -139,21 +109,6 @@ write_authkeys(const char *path, const GStrv keys,
     return true;
 }
 
-static GStrv
-read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp)
-{
-    g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
-    g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
-
-    if (!g_file_get_contents(path, &contents, NULL, &err)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "failed to read '%s': %s", path, err->message);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    return g_strsplit(contents, "\n", -1);
-
-}
-
 void
 qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
                                   bool has_reset, bool reset,
diff --git a/qga/commands-posix.c b/qga/commands-posix.c
index 26008db497..7a065c4085 100644
--- a/qga/commands-posix.c
+++ b/qga/commands-posix.c
@@ -76,12 +76,159 @@ static void ga_wait_child(pid_t pid, int *status, Error **errp)
     g_assert(rpid == pid);
 }
 
+static ssize_t ga_pipe_read_str(int fd[2], char **str)
+{
+    ssize_t n, len = 0;
+    char buf[1024];
+
+    close(fd[1]);
+    fd[1] = -1;
+    while ((n = read(fd[0], buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
+        if (n < 0) {
+            if (errno == EINTR) {
+                continue;
+            } else {
+                len = -errno;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        *str = g_realloc(*str, len + n + 1);
+        memcpy(*str + len, buf, n);
+        len += n;
+        *str[len] = '\0';
+    }
+    close(fd[0]);
+    fd[0] = -1;
+
+    return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to run command with input/output redirection,
+ * sending string to stdin and taking error message from
+ * stdout/err.
+ */
+static int ga_run_command(const char *argv[], const char *in_str,
+                          const char *action, Error **errp)
+{
+    pid_t pid;
+    int status;
+    int retcode = -1;
+    int infd[2] = { -1, -1 };
+    int outfd[2] = { -1, -1 };
+    char *str = NULL;
+    ssize_t len = 0;
+
+    if ((in_str && !g_unix_open_pipe(infd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) ||
+        !g_unix_open_pipe(outfd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs");
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    pid = fork();
+    if (pid == 0) {
+        char *cherr = NULL;
+
+        setsid();
+
+        if (in_str) {
+            /* Redirect stdin to infd. */
+            close(infd[1]);
+            dup2(infd[0], 0);
+            close(infd[0]);
+        } else {
+            reopen_fd_to_null(0);
+        }
+
+        /* Redirect stdout/stderr to outfd. */
+        close(outfd[0]);
+        dup2(outfd[1], 1);
+        dup2(outfd[1], 2);
+        close(outfd[1]);
+
+        execvp(argv[0], (char *const *)argv);
+
+        /* Write the cause of failed exec to pipe for the parent to read it. */
+        cherr = g_strdup_printf("failed to exec '%s'", argv[0]);
+        perror(cherr);
+        g_free(cherr);
+        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+    } else if (pid < 0) {
+        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (in_str) {
+        close(infd[0]);
+        infd[0] = -1;
+        if (qemu_write_full(infd[1], in_str, strlen(in_str)) !=
+                strlen(in_str)) {
+            error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "%s: cannot write to stdin pipe",
+                             action);
+            goto out;
+        }
+        close(infd[1]);
+        infd[1] = -1;
+    }
+
+    len = ga_pipe_read_str(outfd, &str);
+    if (len < 0) {
+        error_setg_errno(errp, -len, "%s: cannot read from stdout/stderr pipe",
+                         action);
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, errp);
+    if (*errp) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+        if (len) {
+            error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally: %s",
+                       str);
+        } else {
+            error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
+        }
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    retcode = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+
+    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+        if (len) {
+            error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to %s: %s",
+                       action, str);
+        } else {
+            error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to %s: exit status %d",
+                       action, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+        }
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+out:
+    g_free(str);
+
+    if (infd[0] != -1) {
+        close(infd[0]);
+    }
+    if (infd[1] != -1) {
+        close(infd[1]);
+    }
+    if (outfd[0] != -1) {
+        close(outfd[0]);
+    }
+    if (outfd[1] != -1) {
+        close(outfd[1]);
+    }
+
+    return retcode;
+}
+
 void qmp_guest_shutdown(const char *mode, Error **errp)
 {
     const char *shutdown_flag;
     Error *local_err = NULL;
-    pid_t pid;
-    int status;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SOLARIS
     const char *powerdown_flag = "-i5";
@@ -110,67 +257,31 @@ void qmp_guest_shutdown(const char *mode, Error **errp)
         return;
     }
 
-    pid = fork();
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        /* child, start the shutdown */
-        setsid();
-        reopen_fd_to_null(0);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(1);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(2);
-
+    const char *argv[] = {"/sbin/shutdown",
 #ifdef CONFIG_SOLARIS
-        execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", shutdown_flag, "-g0", "-y",
-              "hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
+                          shutdown_flag, "-g0", "-y",
 #elif defined(CONFIG_BSD)
-        execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", shutdown_flag, "+0",
-               "hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
+                          shutdown_flag, "+0",
 #else
-        execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", "-h", shutdown_flag, "+0",
-               "hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
+                          "-h", shutdown_flag, "+0",
 #endif
-        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-    } else if (pid < 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
-        return;
-    }
+                          "hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *) NULL};
 
-    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
+    ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "shutdown", &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_propagate(errp, local_err);
         return;
     }
 
-    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to shutdown");
-        return;
-    }
-
     /* succeeded */
 }
 
 void qmp_guest_set_time(bool has_time, int64_t time_ns, Error **errp)
 {
     int ret;
-    int status;
-    pid_t pid;
     Error *local_err = NULL;
     struct timeval tv;
-    static const char hwclock_path[] = "/sbin/hwclock";
-    static int hwclock_available = -1;
-
-    if (hwclock_available < 0) {
-        hwclock_available = (access(hwclock_path, X_OK) == 0);
-    }
-
-    if (!hwclock_available) {
-        error_setg(errp, QERR_UNSUPPORTED);
-        return;
-    }
+    const char *argv[] = {"/sbin/hwclock", has_time ? "-w" : "-s", NULL};
 
     /* If user has passed a time, validate and set it. */
     if (has_time) {
@@ -201,37 +312,12 @@ void qmp_guest_set_time(bool has_time, int64_t time_ns, Error **errp)
      * just need to synchronize the hardware clock. However, if no time was
      * passed, user is requesting the opposite: set the system time from the
      * hardware clock (RTC). */
-    pid = fork();
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        setsid();
-        reopen_fd_to_null(0);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(1);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(2);
-
-        /* Use '/sbin/hwclock -w' to set RTC from the system time,
-         * or '/sbin/hwclock -s' to set the system time from RTC. */
-        execl(hwclock_path, "hwclock", has_time ? "-w" : "-s", NULL);
-        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-    } else if (pid < 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
+    ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "set hardware clock to system time",
+                   &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_propagate(errp, local_err);
         return;
     }
-
-    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "hwclock failed to set hardware clock to system time");
-        return;
-    }
 }
 
 typedef enum {
@@ -650,8 +736,6 @@ static const char *fsfreeze_hook_arg_string[] = {
 
 static void execute_fsfreeze_hook(FsfreezeHookArg arg, Error **errp)
 {
-    int status;
-    pid_t pid;
     const char *hook;
     const char *arg_str = fsfreeze_hook_arg_string[arg];
     Error *local_err = NULL;
@@ -660,42 +744,15 @@ static void execute_fsfreeze_hook(FsfreezeHookArg arg, Error **errp)
     if (!hook) {
         return;
     }
-    if (access(hook, X_OK) != 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "can't access fsfreeze hook '%s'", hook);
-        return;
-    }
-
-    slog("executing fsfreeze hook with arg '%s'", arg_str);
-    pid = fork();
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        setsid();
-        reopen_fd_to_null(0);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(1);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(2);
 
-        execl(hook, hook, arg_str, NULL);
-        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-    } else if (pid < 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
-        return;
-    }
+    const char *argv[] = {hook, arg_str, NULL};
 
-    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
+    slog("executing fsfreeze hook with arg '%s'", arg_str);
+    ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "execute fsfreeze hook", &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_propagate(errp, local_err);
         return;
     }
-
-    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "fsfreeze hook has terminated abnormally");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    status = WEXITSTATUS(status);
-    if (status) {
-        error_setg(errp, "fsfreeze hook has failed with status %d", status);
-        return;
-    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1569,8 +1626,10 @@ static GuestFilesystemInfo *build_guest_fsinfo(struct FsMount *mount,
         nonroot_total = used + buf.f_bavail;
         fs->used_bytes = used * fr_size;
         fs->total_bytes = nonroot_total * fr_size;
+        fs->total_bytes_privileged = buf.f_blocks * fr_size;
 
         fs->has_total_bytes = true;
+        fs->has_total_bytes_privileged = true;
         fs->has_used_bytes = true;
     }
 
@@ -1869,52 +1928,21 @@ static bool linux_sys_state_supports_mode(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
 
 static void linux_sys_state_suspend(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
 {
-    Error *local_err = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(GError) local_gerr = NULL;
     const char *sysfile_strs[3] = {"disk", "mem", NULL};
     const char *sysfile_str = sysfile_strs[mode];
-    pid_t pid;
-    int status;
 
     if (!sysfile_str) {
         error_setg(errp, "unknown guest suspend mode");
         return;
     }
 
-    pid = fork();
-    if (!pid) {
-        /* child */
-        int fd;
-
-        setsid();
-        reopen_fd_to_null(0);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(1);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(2);
-
-        fd = open(LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, O_WRONLY);
-        if (fd < 0) {
-            _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-        }
-
-        if (write(fd, sysfile_str, strlen(sysfile_str)) < 0) {
-            _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-        }
-
-        _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
-    } else if (pid < 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
-    if (local_err) {
-        error_propagate(errp, local_err);
+    if (!g_file_set_contents(LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, sysfile_str,
+                             -1, &local_gerr)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "suspend: cannot write to '%s': %s",
+                   LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, local_gerr->message);
         return;
     }
-
-    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to suspend");
-    }
-
 }
 
 static void guest_suspend(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
@@ -2123,14 +2151,8 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username,
                                  Error **errp)
 {
     Error *local_err = NULL;
-    char *passwd_path = NULL;
-    pid_t pid;
-    int status;
-    int datafd[2] = { -1, -1 };
-    char *rawpasswddata = NULL;
+    g_autofree char *rawpasswddata = NULL;
     size_t rawpasswdlen;
-    char *chpasswddata = NULL;
-    size_t chpasswdlen;
 
     rawpasswddata = (char *)qbase64_decode(password, -1, &rawpasswdlen, errp);
     if (!rawpasswddata) {
@@ -2141,95 +2163,31 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username,
 
     if (strchr(rawpasswddata, '\n')) {
         error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in raw password");
-        goto out;
+        return;
     }
 
     if (strchr(username, '\n') ||
         strchr(username, ':')) {
         error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in username");
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-#ifdef __FreeBSD__
-    chpasswddata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata);
-    passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("pw");
-#else
-    chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, rawpasswddata);
-    passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("chpasswd");
-#endif
-
-    chpasswdlen = strlen(chpasswddata);
-
-    if (!passwd_path) {
-        error_setg(errp, "cannot find 'passwd' program in PATH");
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (!g_unix_open_pipe(datafd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs");
-        goto out;
+        return;
     }
 
-    pid = fork();
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        close(datafd[1]);
-        /* child */
-        setsid();
-        dup2(datafd[0], 0);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(1);
-        reopen_fd_to_null(2);
-
 #ifdef __FreeBSD__
-        const char *h_arg;
-        h_arg = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h";
-        execl(passwd_path, "pw", "usermod", "-n", username, h_arg, "0", NULL);
+    g_autofree char *chpasswdata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata);
+    const char *crypt_flag = crypted ? "-H" : "-h";
+    const char *argv[] = {"pw", "usermod", "-n", username,
+                          crypt_flag, "0", NULL};
 #else
-        if (crypted) {
-            execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", "-e", NULL);
-        } else {
-            execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", NULL);
-        }
+    g_autofree char *chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username,
+                                                    rawpasswddata);
+    const char *crypt_flag = crypted ? "-e" : NULL;
+    const char *argv[] = {"chpasswd", crypt_flag, NULL};
 #endif
-        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-    } else if (pid < 0) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
-        goto out;
-    }
-    close(datafd[0]);
-    datafd[0] = -1;
-
-    if (qemu_write_full(datafd[1], chpasswddata, chpasswdlen) != chpasswdlen) {
-        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "cannot write new account password");
-        goto out;
-    }
-    close(datafd[1]);
-    datafd[1] = -1;
 
-    ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
+    ga_run_command(argv, chpasswddata, "set user password", &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_propagate(errp, local_err);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to set user password");
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-out:
-    g_free(chpasswddata);
-    g_free(rawpasswddata);
-    g_free(passwd_path);
-    if (datafd[0] != -1) {
-        close(datafd[0]);
-    }
-    if (datafd[1] != -1) {
-        close(datafd[1]);
+        return;
     }
 }
 #else /* __linux__ || __FreeBSD__ */
diff --git a/qga/commands-win32.c b/qga/commands-win32.c
index 6242737b00..6fee0e1e6f 100644
--- a/qga/commands-win32.c
+++ b/qga/commands-win32.c
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static GuestFilesystemInfo *build_guest_fsinfo(char *guid, Error **errp)
     fs = g_malloc(sizeof(*fs));
     fs->name = g_strdup(guid);
     fs->has_total_bytes = false;
+    fs->has_total_bytes_privileged = false;
     fs->has_used_bytes = false;
     if (len == 0) {
         fs->mountpoint = g_strdup("System Reserved");
diff --git a/qga/commands-windows-ssh.c b/qga/commands-windows-ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a642e3ba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qga/commands-windows-ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU Guest Agent win32-specific command implementations for SSH keys.
+ * The implementation is opinionated and expects the SSH implementation to
+ * be OpenSSH.
+ *
+ * Copyright Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. 2024
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *  Aidan Leuck <aidan_leuck@selinc.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include <aclapi.h>
+#include <qga-qapi-types.h>
+
+#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
+#include "commands-windows-ssh.h"
+#include "guest-agent-core.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "lmaccess.h"
+#include "lmapibuf.h"
+#include "lmerr.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+
+#include "qga-qapi-commands.h"
+#include "sddl.h"
+#include "shlobj.h"
+#include "userenv.h"
+
+#define AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE "authorized_keys"
+#define AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE_ADMIN "administrators_authorized_keys"
+#define LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID "S-1-5-18"
+#define ADMIN_SID "S-1-5-32-544"
+
+/*
+ * Frees userInfo structure. This implements the g_auto cleanup
+ * for the structure.
+ */
+void free_userInfo(PWindowsUserInfo info)
+{
+    g_free(info->sshDirectory);
+    g_free(info->authorizedKeyFile);
+    LocalFree(info->SSID);
+    g_free(info->username);
+    g_free(info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the admin SSH folder for OpenSSH. OpenSSH does not store
+ * the authorized_key file in the users home directory for security reasons and
+ * instead stores it at %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh. This function returns the path to
+ * that directory on the users machine
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * errp -> error structure to set when an error occurs
+ * returns: The path to the ssh folder in %PROGRAMDATA% or NULL if an error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+static char *get_admin_ssh_folder(Error **errp)
+{
+    /* Allocate memory for the program data path */
+    g_autofree char *programDataPath = NULL;
+    char *authkeys_path = NULL;
+    PWSTR pgDataW = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(GError) gerr = NULL;
+
+    /* Get the KnownFolderPath on the machine. */
+    HRESULT folderResult =
+        SHGetKnownFolderPath(&FOLDERID_ProgramData, 0, NULL, &pgDataW);
+    if (folderResult != S_OK) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to retrieve ProgramData folder");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Convert from a wide string back to a standard character string. */
+    programDataPath = g_utf16_to_utf8(pgDataW, -1, NULL, NULL, &gerr);
+    CoTaskMemFree(pgDataW);
+    if (!programDataPath) {
+        error_setg(errp,
+                   "Failed converting ProgramData folder path to UTF-16 %s",
+                   gerr->message);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Build the path to the file. */
+    authkeys_path = g_build_filename(programDataPath, "ssh", NULL);
+    return authkeys_path;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the path to the SSH folder for the specified user. If the user is an
+ * admin it returns the ssh folder located at %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh. If the user is
+ * not an admin it returns %USERPROFILE%/.ssh
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * username -> Username to get the SSH folder for
+ * isAdmin -> Whether the user is an admin or not
+ * errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur.
+ * returns: path to the ssh folder as a string.
+ */
+static char *get_ssh_folder(const char *username, const bool isAdmin,
+                            Error **errp)
+{
+    DWORD maxSize = MAX_PATH;
+    g_autofree char *profilesDir = g_new0(char, maxSize);
+
+    if (isAdmin) {
+        return get_admin_ssh_folder(errp);
+    }
+
+    /* If not an Admin the SSH key is in the user directory. */
+    /* Get the user profile directory on the machine. */
+    BOOL ret = GetProfilesDirectory(profilesDir, &maxSize);
+    if (!ret) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "failed to retrieve profiles directory");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Builds the filename */
+    return g_build_filename(profilesDir, username, ".ssh", NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates an entry for the user so they can access the ssh folder in their
+ * userprofile.
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * userInfo -> Information about the current user
+ * pACL -> Pointer to an ACL structure
+ * errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur
+ * returns -> 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static bool create_acl_user(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
+{
+    const int aclSize = 1;
+    PACL newACL = NULL;
+    EXPLICIT_ACCESS eAccess[1];
+    PSID userPSID = NULL;
+
+    /* Get a pointer to the internal SID object in Windows */
+    bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(userInfo->SSID, &userPSID);
+    if (!converted) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve user %s SID",
+                         userInfo->username);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Set the permissions for the user. */
+    eAccess[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
+    eAccess[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
+    eAccess[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)userPSID;
+
+    /* Set the ACL entries */
+    DWORD setResult;
+
+    /*
+     * If we are given a pointer that is already initialized, then we can merge
+     * the existing entries instead of overwriting them.
+     */
+    if (*pACL) {
+        setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, *pACL, &newACL);
+    } else {
+        setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, NULL, &newACL);
+    }
+
+    if (setResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "failed to set ACL entries for user %s %lu",
+                         userInfo->username, setResult);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Free any old memory since we are going to overwrite the users pointer. */
+    LocalFree(*pACL);
+    *pACL = newACL;
+
+    LocalFree(userPSID);
+    return true;
+error:
+    LocalFree(userPSID);
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a base ACL for both normal users and admins to share
+ * pACL -> Pointer to an ACL structure
+ * errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur
+ * returns: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static bool create_acl_base(PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
+{
+    PSID adminGroupPSID = NULL;
+    PSID systemPSID = NULL;
+
+    const int aclSize = 2;
+    EXPLICIT_ACCESS eAccess[2];
+
+    /* Create an entry for the system user. */
+    const char *systemSID = LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID;
+    bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(systemSID, &systemPSID);
+    if (!converted) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve system SID");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* set permissions for system user */
+    eAccess[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
+    eAccess[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
+    eAccess[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
+    eAccess[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)systemPSID;
+
+    /* Create an entry for the admin user. */
+    const char *adminSID = ADMIN_SID;
+    converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(adminSID, &adminGroupPSID);
+    if (!converted) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve Admin SID");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Set permissions for admin group. */
+    eAccess[1].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
+    eAccess[1].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
+    eAccess[1].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
+    eAccess[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
+    eAccess[1].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP;
+    eAccess[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)adminGroupPSID;
+
+    /* Put the entries in an ACL object. */
+    PACL pNewACL = NULL;
+    DWORD setResult;
+
+    /*
+     *If we are given a pointer that is already initialized, then we can merge
+     *the existing entries instead of overwriting them.
+     */
+    if (*pACL) {
+        setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, *pACL, &pNewACL);
+    } else {
+        setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, NULL, &pNewACL);
+    }
+
+    if (setResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "failed to set base ACL entries for system user and "
+                         "admin group %lu",
+                         setResult);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    LocalFree(adminGroupPSID);
+    LocalFree(systemPSID);
+
+    /* Free any old memory since we are going to overwrite the users pointer. */
+    LocalFree(*pACL);
+
+    *pACL = pNewACL;
+
+    return true;
+
+error:
+    LocalFree(adminGroupPSID);
+    LocalFree(systemPSID);
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the access control on the authorized_keys file and any ssh folders that
+ * need to be created. For administrators the required permissions on the
+ * file/folders are that only administrators and the LocalSystem account can
+ * access the folders. For normal user accounts only the specified user,
+ * LocalSystem and Administrators can have access to the key.
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * userInfo -> pointer to structure that contains information about the user
+ * PACL -> pointer to an access control structure that will be set upon
+ * successful completion of the function.
+ * errp -> error structure that will be set upon error.
+ * returns: 1 upon success 0 upon failure.
+ */
+static bool create_acl(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
+{
+    /*
+     * Creates a base ACL that both admins and users will share
+     * This adds the Administrators group and the SYSTEM group
+     */
+    if (!create_acl_base(pACL, errp)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the user is not an admin give the user creating the key permission to
+     * access the file.
+     */
+    if (!userInfo->isAdmin) {
+        if (!create_acl_user(userInfo, pACL, errp)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+/*
+ * Create the SSH directory for the user and d sets appropriate permissions.
+ * In general the directory will be %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh if the user is an admin.
+ * %USERPOFILE%/.ssh if not an admin
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * userInfo -> Contains information about the user
+ * errp -> Structure that will contain errors if the function fails.
+ * returns: zero upon failure, 1 upon success
+ */
+static bool create_ssh_directory(WindowsUserInfo *userInfo, Error **errp)
+{
+    PACL pNewACL = NULL;
+    g_autofree PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD = NULL;
+
+    /* Gets the appropriate ACL for the user */
+    if (!create_acl(userInfo, &pNewACL, errp)) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate memory for a security descriptor */
+    pSD = g_malloc(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
+    if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(pSD, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "Failed to initialize security descriptor");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Associate the security descriptor with the ACL permissions. */
+    if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pSD, TRUE, pNewACL, FALSE)) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "Failed to set security descriptor ACL");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Set the security attributes on the folder */
+    SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sAttr;
+    sAttr.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
+    sAttr.nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
+    sAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor = pSD;
+
+    /* Create the directory with the created permissions */
+    BOOL created = CreateDirectory(userInfo->sshDirectory, &sAttr);
+    if (!created) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to create directory %s",
+                         userInfo->sshDirectory);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Free memory */
+    LocalFree(pNewACL);
+    return true;
+error:
+    LocalFree(pNewACL);
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets permissions on the authorized_key_file that is created.
+ *
+ * parameters: userInfo -> Information about the user
+ * errp -> error structure that will contain errors upon failure
+ * returns: 1 upon success, zero upon failure.
+ */
+static bool set_file_permissions(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, Error **errp)
+{
+    PACL pACL = NULL;
+    PSID userPSID;
+
+    /* Creates the access control structure */
+    if (!create_acl(userInfo, &pACL, errp)) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Get the PSID structure for the user based off the string SID. */
+    bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(userInfo->SSID, &userPSID);
+    if (!converted) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve user %s SID",
+                         userInfo->username);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Prevents permissions from being inherited and use the DACL provided. */
+    const SE_OBJECT_TYPE securityBitFlags =
+        DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
+
+    /* Set the ACL on the file. */
+    if (SetNamedSecurityInfo(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
+                             securityBitFlags, userPSID, NULL, pACL,
+                             NULL) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "failed to set file security for file %s",
+                         userInfo->authorizedKeyFile);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    LocalFree(pACL);
+    LocalFree(userPSID);
+    return true;
+
+error:
+    LocalFree(pACL);
+    LocalFree(userPSID);
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Writes the specified keys to the authenticated keys file.
+ * parameters:
+ * userInfo: Information about the user we are writing the authkeys file to.
+ * authkeys: Array of keys to write to disk
+ * errp: Error structure that will contain any errors if they occur.
+ * returns: 1 if successful, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static bool write_authkeys(WindowsUserInfo *userInfo, GStrv authkeys,
+                           Error **errp)
+{
+    g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
+
+    contents = g_strjoinv("\n", authkeys);
+
+    if (!g_file_set_contents(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, contents, -1, &err)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "failed to write to '%s': %s",
+                   userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, err->message);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!set_file_permissions(userInfo, errp)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieves information about a Windows user by their username
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * userInfo -> Double pointer to a WindowsUserInfo structure. Upon success, it
+ * will be allocated with information about the user and need to be freed.
+ * username -> Name of the user to lookup.
+ * errp -> Contains any errors that occur.
+ * returns: 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
+ */
+static bool get_user_info(PWindowsUserInfo *userInfo, const char *username,
+                          Error **errp)
+{
+    DWORD infoLevel = 4;
+    LPUSER_INFO_4 uBuf = NULL;
+    g_autofree wchar_t *wideUserName = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(GError) gerr = NULL;
+    PSID psid = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Converts a string to a Windows wide string since the GetNetUserInfo
+     * function requires it.
+     */
+    wideUserName = g_utf8_to_utf16(username, -1, NULL, NULL, &gerr);
+    if (!wideUserName) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* allocate data */
+    PWindowsUserInfo uData = g_new0(WindowsUserInfo, 1);
+
+    /* Set pointer so it can be cleaned up by the callee, even upon error. */
+    *userInfo = uData;
+
+    /* Find the information */
+    NET_API_STATUS result =
+        NetUserGetInfo(NULL, wideUserName, infoLevel, (LPBYTE *)&uBuf);
+    if (result != NERR_Success) {
+        /* Give a friendlier error message if the user was not found. */
+        if (result == NERR_UserNotFound) {
+            error_setg(errp, "User %s was not found", username);
+            goto error;
+        }
+
+        error_setg(errp,
+                   "Received unexpected error when asking for user info: Error "
+                   "Code %lu",
+                   result);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Get information from the buffer returned by NetUserGetInfo. */
+    uData->username = g_strdup(username);
+    uData->isAdmin = uBuf->usri4_priv == USER_PRIV_ADMIN;
+    psid = uBuf->usri4_user_sid;
+
+    char *sidStr = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * We store the string representation of the SID not SID structure in
+     * memory. Callees wanting to use the SID structure should call
+     * ConvertStringSidToSID.
+     */
+    if (!ConvertSidToStringSid(psid, &sidStr)) {
+        error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
+                         "failed to get SID string for user %s", username);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Store the SSID */
+    uData->SSID = sidStr;
+
+    /* Get the SSH folder for the user. */
+    char *sshFolder = get_ssh_folder(username, uData->isAdmin, errp);
+    if (sshFolder == NULL) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* Get the authorized key file path */
+    const char *authorizedKeyFile =
+        uData->isAdmin ? AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE_ADMIN : AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE;
+    char *authorizedKeyPath =
+        g_build_filename(sshFolder, authorizedKeyFile, NULL);
+    uData->sshDirectory = sshFolder;
+    uData->authorizedKeyFile = authorizedKeyPath;
+
+    /* Free */
+    NetApiBufferFree(uBuf);
+    return true;
+error:
+    if (uBuf) {
+        NetApiBufferFree(uBuf);
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the list of authorized keys for a user.
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * username -> Username to retrieve the keys for.
+ * errp -> Error structure that will display any errors through QMP.
+ * returns: List of keys associated with the user.
+ */
+GuestAuthorizedKeys *qmp_guest_ssh_get_authorized_keys(const char *username,
+                                                       Error **errp)
+{
+    GuestAuthorizedKeys *keys = NULL;
+    g_auto(GStrv) authKeys = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(GuestAuthorizedKeys) ret = NULL;
+    g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
+
+    /* Gets user information */
+    if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Reads authkeys for the user */
+    authKeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, errp);
+    if (authKeys == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Set the GuestAuthorizedKey struct with keys from the file */
+    ret = g_new0(GuestAuthorizedKeys, 1);
+    for (int i = 0; authKeys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+        g_strstrip(authKeys[i]);
+        if (!authKeys[i][0] || authKeys[i][0] == '#') {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        QAPI_LIST_PREPEND(ret->keys, g_strdup(authKeys[i]));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Steal the pointer because it is up for the callee to deallocate the
+     * memory.
+     */
+    keys = g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+    return keys;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds an ssh key for a user.
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * username -> User to add the SSH key to
+ * strList -> Array of keys to add to the list
+ * has_reset -> Whether the keys have been reset
+ * reset -> Boolean to reset the keys (If this is set the existing list will be
+ * cleared) and the other key reset. errp -> Pointer to an error structure that
+ * will get returned over QMP if anything goes wrong.
+ */
+void qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
+                                       bool has_reset, bool reset, Error **errp)
+{
+    g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
+    g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
+    strList *k;
+    size_t nkeys, nauthkeys;
+
+    /* Make sure the keys given are valid */
+    if (!check_openssh_pub_keys(keys, &nkeys, errp)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Gets user information */
+    if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Determine whether we should reset the keys */
+    reset = has_reset && reset;
+    if (!reset) {
+        /* Read existing keys into memory */
+        authkeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* Check that the SSH key directory exists for the user. */
+    if (!g_file_test(userInfo->sshDirectory, G_FILE_TEST_IS_DIR)) {
+        BOOL success = create_ssh_directory(userInfo, errp);
+        if (!success) {
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Reallocates the buffer to fit the new keys. */
+    nauthkeys = authkeys ? g_strv_length(authkeys) : 0;
+    authkeys = g_realloc_n(authkeys, nauthkeys + nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+
+    /* zero out the memory for the reallocated buffer */
+    memset(authkeys + nauthkeys, 0, (nkeys + 1) * sizeof(char *));
+
+    /* Adds the keys */
+    for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
+        /* Check that the key doesn't already exist */
+        if (g_strv_contains((const gchar *const *)authkeys, k->value)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        authkeys[nauthkeys++] = g_strdup(k->value);
+    }
+
+    /* Write the authkeys to the file. */
+    write_authkeys(userInfo, authkeys, errp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an SSH key for a user
+ *
+ * parameters:
+ * username -> Username to remove the key from
+ * strList -> List of strings to remove
+ * errp -> Contains any errors that occur.
+ */
+void qmp_guest_ssh_remove_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
+                                          Error **errp)
+{
+    g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
+    g_autofree struct passwd *p = NULL;
+    g_autofree GStrv new_keys = NULL; /* do not own the strings */
+    g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
+    GStrv a;
+    size_t nkeys = 0;
+
+    /* Validates the keys passed in by the user */
+    if (!check_openssh_pub_keys(keys, NULL, errp)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Gets user information */
+    if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Reads the authkeys for the user */
+    authkeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, errp);
+    if (authkeys == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Create a new buffer to hold the keys */
+    new_keys = g_new0(char *, g_strv_length(authkeys) + 1);
+    for (a = authkeys; *a != NULL; a++) {
+        strList *k;
+
+        /* Filters out keys that are equal to ones the user specified. */
+        for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
+            if (g_str_equal(k->value, *a)) {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (k != NULL) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        new_keys[nkeys++] = *a;
+    }
+
+    /* Write the new authkeys to the file. */
+    write_authkeys(userInfo, new_keys, errp);
+}
diff --git a/qga/commands-windows-ssh.h b/qga/commands-windows-ssh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40ac67c4d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qga/commands-windows-ssh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Header file for commands-windows-ssh.c
+ *
+ * Copyright Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. 2024
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *  Aidan Leuck <aidan_leuck@selinc.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include <glib/gstrfuncs.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+typedef struct WindowsUserInfo {
+    char *sshDirectory;
+    char *authorizedKeyFile;
+    char *username;
+    char *SSID;
+    bool isAdmin;
+} WindowsUserInfo;
+
+typedef WindowsUserInfo *PWindowsUserInfo;
+
+void free_userInfo(PWindowsUserInfo info);
+G_DEFINE_AUTO_CLEANUP_FREE_FUNC(PWindowsUserInfo, free_userInfo, NULL);
diff --git a/qga/meson.build b/qga/meson.build
index 46c1d83d7f..587ec4e5e8 100644
--- a/qga/meson.build
+++ b/qga/meson.build
@@ -66,13 +66,15 @@ qga_ss.add(files(
   'guest-agent-command-state.c',
   'main.c',
   'cutils.c',
+  'commands-common-ssh.c'
 ))
 if host_os == 'windows'
   qga_ss.add(files(
     'channel-win32.c',
     'commands-win32.c',
     'service-win32.c',
-    'vss-win32.c'
+    'vss-win32.c',
+    'commands-windows-ssh.c'
   ))
 else
   qga_ss.add(files(
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ gen_tlb = []
 qga_libs = []
 if host_os == 'windows'
   qga_libs += ['-lws2_32', '-lwinmm', '-lpowrprof', '-lwtsapi32', '-lwininet', '-liphlpapi', '-lnetapi32',
-               '-lsetupapi', '-lcfgmgr32']
+               '-lsetupapi', '-lcfgmgr32', '-luserenv']
   if have_qga_vss
     qga_libs += ['-lole32', '-loleaut32', '-lshlwapi', '-lstdc++', '-Wl,--enable-stdcall-fixup']
     subdir('vss-win32')
@@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ test_env.set('G_TEST_BUILDDIR', meson.current_build_dir())
 # this when an alternative is implemented or when the underlying glib
 # issue is identified/fix
 if host_os != 'windows' and not get_option('fuzzing')
-  srcs = [files('commands-posix-ssh.c')]
+  srcs = [files('commands-common-ssh.c', 'commands-posix-ssh.c')]
   i = 0
   foreach output: qga_qapi_outputs
     if output.startswith('qga-qapi-types') or output.startswith('qga-qapi-visit')
diff --git a/qga/qapi-schema.json b/qga/qapi-schema.json
index d5af155007..b3de1fb6b3 100644
--- a/qga/qapi-schema.json
+++ b/qga/qapi-schema.json
@@ -1026,7 +1026,10 @@
 #
 # @used-bytes: file system used bytes (since 3.0)
 #
-# @total-bytes: non-root file system total bytes (since 3.0)
+# @total-bytes: filesystem capacity in bytes for unprivileged users (since 3.0)
+#
+# @total-bytes-privileged: filesystem capacity in bytes for privileged users
+#     (since 9.1)
 #
 # @disk: an array of disk hardware information that the volume lies
 #     on, which may be empty if the disk type is not supported
@@ -1036,7 +1039,7 @@
 { 'struct': 'GuestFilesystemInfo',
   'data': {'name': 'str', 'mountpoint': 'str', 'type': 'str',
            '*used-bytes': 'uint64', '*total-bytes': 'uint64',
-           'disk': ['GuestDiskAddress']} }
+           '*total-bytes-privileged': 'uint64', 'disk': ['GuestDiskAddress']} }
 
 ##
 # @guest-get-fsinfo:
@@ -1567,9 +1570,8 @@
 { 'struct': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys',
   'data': {
       'keys': ['str']
-  },
-  'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
-
+  }
+}
 
 ##
 # @guest-ssh-get-authorized-keys:
@@ -1585,8 +1587,8 @@
 ##
 { 'command': 'guest-ssh-get-authorized-keys',
   'data': { 'username': 'str' },
-  'returns': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys',
-  'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
+  'returns': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys'
+}
 
 ##
 # @guest-ssh-add-authorized-keys:
@@ -1604,8 +1606,8 @@
 # Since: 5.2
 ##
 { 'command': 'guest-ssh-add-authorized-keys',
-  'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'], '*reset': 'bool' },
-  'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
+  'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'], '*reset': 'bool' }
+}
 
 ##
 # @guest-ssh-remove-authorized-keys:
@@ -1622,8 +1624,8 @@
 # Since: 5.2
 ##
 { 'command': 'guest-ssh-remove-authorized-keys',
-  'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'] },
-  'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
+  'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'] }
+}
 
 ##
 # @GuestDiskStats: