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|
/*
* Copyright (c) 2021 Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "gmid.h"
#if DISABLE_SANDBOX
#warning "Sandbox disabled! Please report issues upstream instead of disabling the sandbox."
void
sandbox_server_process(void)
{
return;
}
void
sandbox_executor_process(void)
{
log_notice(NULL, "Sandbox disabled! "
"Please report issues upstream instead of disabling the sandbox.");
}
void
sandbox_logger_process(void)
{
return;
}
#elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
#include <sys/capsicum.h>
void
sandbox_server_process(void)
{
if (cap_enter() == -1)
fatal("cap_enter");
}
void
sandbox_executor_process(void)
{
/*
* We cannot capsicum the executor process because it needs to
* fork(2)+execve(2) cgi scripts
*/
return;
}
void
sandbox_logger_process(void)
{
if (cap_enter() == -1)
fatal("cap_enter");
}
#elif defined(__linux__)
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if HAVE_LANDLOCK
# include "landlock_shim.h"
#endif
/* uncomment to enable debugging. ONLY FOR DEVELOPMENT */
/* #define SC_DEBUG */
#ifdef SC_DEBUG
# define SC_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
#else
# define SC_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
#endif
#if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SC_ARG_LO 0
# define SC_ARG_HI sizeof(uint32_t)
#elif (BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN)
# define SC_ARG_LO sizeof(uint32_t)
# define SC_ARG_HI 0
#else
# error "Uknown endian"
#endif
/* make the filter more readable */
#define SC_ALLOW(nr) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_##nr, 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
/*
* SC_ALLOW_ARG and the SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH below are courtesy of
* https://roy.marples.name/git/dhcpcd/blob/HEAD:/src/privsep-linux.c
*/
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg, _val) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg)]) + SC_ARG_LO), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, \
((_val) & 0xffffffff), 0, 3), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg)]) + SC_ARG_HI), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, \
(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_val) >> 32)) & 0xffffffff), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
/*
* I personally find this quite nutty. Why can a system header not
* define a default for this?
*/
#if defined(__i386__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_I386
#elif defined(__x86_64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
#elif defined(__arc__)
# if defined(__A7__)
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACT
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACTBE
# endif
# elif defined(__HS__)
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2BE
# endif
# else
# error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"
# endif
#elif defined(__arm__)
# ifndef EM_ARM
# define EM_ARM 40
# endif
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARMEB
# endif
#elif defined(__aarch64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
#elif defined(__alpha__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ALPHA
#elif defined(__hppa__)
# if defined(__LP64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC
# endif
#elif defined(__ia64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_IA64
#elif defined(__microblaze__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MICROBLAZE
#elif defined(__m68k__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_M68K
#elif defined(__mips__)
# if defined(__MIPSEL__)
# if defined(__LP64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
# endif
# elif defined(__LP64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
# endif
#elif defined(__nds32__)
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32
#else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32BE
#endif
#elif defined(__nios2__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NIOS2
#elif defined(__or1k__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_OPENRISC
#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
# endif
#elif defined(__powerpc__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC
#elif defined(__riscv)
# if defined(__LP64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV32
# endif
#elif defined(__s390x__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
#elif defined(__s390__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_S390
#elif defined(__sh__)
# if defined(__LP64__)
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SH64
# endif
# else
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SH
# endif
# endif
#elif defined(__sparc__)
# if defined(__arch64__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64
# else
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC
# endif
#elif defined(__xtensa__)
# define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_XTENSA
#else
# error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"
#endif
static struct sock_filter filter[] = {
/* load the *current* architecture */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
/* ensure it's the same that we've been compiled on */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
/* if not, kill the program */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SC_FAIL),
/* load the syscall number */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
#ifdef __NR_accept
SC_ALLOW(accept),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_accept4
SC_ALLOW(accept4),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_brk
SC_ALLOW(brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
SECCOMP_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime64),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(close),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_epoll_ctl
SC_ALLOW(epoll_ctl),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_epoll_pwait
SC_ALLOW(epoll_pwait),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_epoll_wait
SC_ALLOW(epoll_wait),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fcntl
SC_ALLOW(fcntl),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fcntl64
SC_ALLOW(fcntl64),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat
SC_ALLOW(fstat),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat64
SC_ALLOW(fstat64),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getdents64
SC_ALLOW(getdents64),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_ioctl
/* allow ioctl only on fd 1, glibc doing stuff? */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 0, 1),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_lseek
SC_ALLOW(lseek),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
SC_ALLOW(mmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_munmap
SC_ALLOW(munmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
SC_ALLOW(newfstatat),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_oldfstat
SC_ALLOW(oldfstat),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_openat
SC_ALLOW(openat),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_prlimit64
SC_ALLOW(prlimit64),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_read
SC_ALLOW(read),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_recvmsg
SC_ALLOW(recvmsg),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_readv
SC_ALLOW(readv),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_rt_sigaction
SC_ALLOW(rt_sigaction),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_rt_sigreturn
SC_ALLOW(rt_sigreturn),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_sendmsg
SC_ALLOW(sendmsg),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_statx
SC_ALLOW(statx),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_writev
SC_ALLOW(writev),
#endif
/* disallow everything else */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SC_FAIL),
};
#ifdef SC_DEBUG
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void
sandbox_seccomp_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx)
{
(void)signum;
(void)ctx;
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)\n",
__func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
_exit(1);
}
static void
sandbox_seccomp_catch_sigsys(void)
{
struct sigaction act;
sigset_t mask;
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
act.sa_sigaction = &sandbox_seccomp_violation;
act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
#endif /* SC_DEBUG */
#if HAVE_LANDLOCK
static inline int
open_landlock(void)
{
int fd;
/*
* These are all the actions that we may want to
* allow. Anything not specified here is implicitly blocked
* (e.g. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE.)
*/
struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
};
fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
if (fd == -1) {
switch (errno) {
case ENOSYS:
fatal("%s: failed to create ruleset. "
"Landlock doesn't seem to be supported by the "
"current kernel.", __func__);
case EOPNOTSUPP:
log_warn(NULL, "%s: failed to create ruleset. "
"Landlock seems to be currently disabled; "
"continuing without it.", __func__);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: failed to create ruleset: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
}
return fd;
}
static int
landlock_unveil_path(int landlock_fd, const char *path, int perms)
{
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr pb;
int err, saved_errno;
pb.allowed_access = perms;
if ((pb.parent_fd = open(path, O_PATH)) == -1)
return -1;
err = landlock_add_rule(landlock_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
&pb, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
close(pb.parent_fd);
errno = saved_errno;
return err ? -1 : 0;
}
static int
landlock_apply(int fd)
{
int r, saved_errno;
if (fd == -1)
return 0;
r = landlock_restrict_self(fd, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
close(fd);
errno = saved_errno;
return r ? -1 : 0;
}
static int
server_landlock(void)
{
int fd, perms;
struct vhost *h;
struct location *l;
/*
* These are all the actions allowed for the root directories
* of the vhosts.
*/
perms = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
if ((fd = open_landlock()) == -1)
return 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
if (l->dir == NULL)
continue;
if (landlock_unveil_path(fd, l->dir, perms) == -1)
fatal("%s: landlock_unveil_path(%s): %s",
__func__, l->dir, strerror(errno));
}
}
return landlock_apply(fd);
}
static int
logger_landlock(void)
{
int fd;
if ((fd = open_landlock()) == -1)
return 0;
/* no rules. the logger doesn't need fs access at all. */
return landlock_apply(fd);
}
#endif
void
sandbox_server_process(void)
{
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = (unsigned short) (sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0])),
.filter = filter,
};
#ifdef SC_DEBUG
sandbox_seccomp_catch_sigsys();
#endif
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
fatal("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
#if HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (server_landlock() == -1)
fatal("%s: server_landlock: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
#endif
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) == -1)
fatal("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
sandbox_executor_process(void)
{
/*
* We cannot use seccomp for the executor process because we
* don't know what the child will do. Also, our filter will
* be inherited so the child cannot set its own seccomp
* policy.
*/
return;
}
void
sandbox_logger_process(void)
{
/*
* Here we could use a seccomp filter to allow only recvfd,
* write/writev and memory allocations, but syslog is a beast
* and I don't know what syscalls it could end up doing.
* Landlock is a simpler beast, use it to disallow any file
* sytsem access.
*/
#if HAVE_LANDLOCK
if (logger_landlock() == -1)
fatal("%s: logger_landlock: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
#endif
return;
}
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
#include <unistd.h>
void
sandbox_server_process(void)
{
struct vhost *h;
struct location *l;
TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
if (l->dir == NULL)
continue;
if (unveil(l->dir, "r") == -1)
fatal("unveil %s for domain %s",
l->dir,
h->domain);
}
}
if (pledge("stdio recvfd rpath inet", NULL) == -1)
fatal("pledge");
}
void
sandbox_executor_process(void)
{
struct vhost *h;
struct location *l;
struct fcgi *f;
size_t i;
TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
if (l->dir == NULL)
continue;
/* r so we can chdir into the directory */
if (unveil(l->dir, "rx") == -1)
fatal("unveil %s for domain %s",
l->dir, h->domain);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < FCGI_MAX; i++) {
f = &fcgi[i];
if (f->path != NULL) {
if (unveil(f->path, "rw") == -1)
fatal("unveil %s", f->path);
}
if (f->prog != NULL) {
if (unveil(f->prog, "rx") == -1)
fatal("unveil %s", f->prog);
}
}
/*
* rpath: to chdir into the correct directory
* proc exec: CGI
* dns inet unix: FastCGI
*/
if (pledge("stdio rpath sendfd proc exec dns inet unix", NULL))
err(1, "pledge");
}
void
sandbox_logger_process(void)
{
if (pledge("stdio recvfd", NULL) == -1)
err(1, "pledge");
}
#else
#warning "No sandbox method known for this OS"
void
sandbox_server_process(void)
{
return;
}
void
sandbox_executor_process(void)
{
log_notice(NULL, "no sandbox method known for this OS");
}
void
sandbox_logger_process(void)
{
return;
}
#endif
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