| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
this revamps the syntax in the configuration to better match httpd(8)
(and in general be less weird) and to allow per-location fastcgi
configurations.
the bare `param' is now deprecated, but for compatibility it acts
like `fastcgi param' would do now. Same story for `fastcgi <pathÂ>'.
|
|
|
|
don't know what i was smoking when I wrote log_request() like that...
|
|
we already check the validity of the format string, but still avoid a
gratious fatal() at runtime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
get rid of check_path(), it's overly complicated. Instead, inline
open_file() in client_read() and rework open_dir() to just use
openat() instead of the complicate dance it was doing.
Simplify open_dir() too in the process: if the directory entry for the
index is not a regular file, pretend it doesn't exist.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in those cases we need to reschedule the function and return, instead
of going on with the cleanup.
|
|
If a TLS handshake fails there's nothing we can do, so don't attempt
to reply an error (the connected client is not speaking Gemini as
it's not using TLS at all) and instead just close the connection.
Fixes issue #13
|
|
|
|
|
|
limit how one given virtual host can be reached based on its `listen
on' lists
|
|
|
|
|
|
Listening by default on all the addresses is so bad I don't know
why I haven't changed this before. Anyway.
Add a `listen on $hostname port $port' syntax to the config file
and deprecate the old "port" and "ipv6" global setting. Still try
to honour them when no "listen on" directive is used for backward
compatibily, but this will go away in the next next version hopefully.
At the moment the `listen on' in server context don't filter the
host, i.e. one can still reach a host from a address not specified
in the corresponding `liste on', this will be added later.
|
|
|
|
it fails bandly at runtime on various linux distros and on freebsd.
Until a fix is found, disable it so I can move forward.
|
|
and wrap siginfo behind #ifdef SIGINFO. avoids some warnings in !BSD.
|
|
|
|
Incorporate the OpenSMTPD' privsep crypto engine. The idea behind
it is to never load the certificate' private keys in a networked
process, instead they are loaded in a separate process (the `crypto'
one) which signs payloads on the behalf of the server processes.
This way, we greatly reduce the risk of leaking the certificate'
private key should the server process be compromised.
This currently compiles only on LibreSSL (portable fix is in the
way).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while here also make them a list rather than a fixed-size array.
|
|
Was temporarly disabled during the transition to real privsep.
While here, fix a memory leak when using `require client ca'.
Also, avoid leaking info about the parent address space layout to
server processes by not sending pointer values.
|
|
|
|
server_configure_done is the code we ran in IMSG_RECONF_END splitted
in a separate functions.
This is all needed for ge.c which doesn't do privsep but needs to
bootstrap the server process.
|
|
|
|
It uses the 'common' proc.c from various OpenBSD-daemons.
gmid grew organically bit by bit and it was also the first place where I
tried to implement privsep. It wasn't done very well, in fact the
parent process (that retains root privileges) just fork()s a generation
of servers, all sharing *exactly* the same address space. No good!
Now, we fork() and re-exec() ourselves, so that each process has a fresh
address space.
Some features (require client ca for example) are temporarly disabled,
will be fixed in subsequent commits. The "ge" program is also
temporarly disabled as it needs tweaks to do privsep too.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fatal usually appends the error string. Add 'fatalx' that doesn't.
Fix callers and move the prototypes to log.h
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
will help in future restructuring to have fixed-size objects.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The FreeBSD and Linux' sandbox can't deal with `fastcgi' and `proxy'
configuration rules: new sockets needs to be opened and it's either
impossible (the former) or a huge pain in the arse (the latter).
The sandbox is still always used in case only static files are served.
|
|
I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts
and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD.
This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is
the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure
defaults.
On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated
as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under
FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it
work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however.
For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost:
fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were
FastCGI applications.
fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will
follow.
|
|
|
