diff options
author | Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com> | 2021-01-16 19:41:34 +0000 |
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committer | Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com> | 2021-01-16 19:41:34 +0000 |
commit | 881a9dd9c2aebbf73f333dd3d8be4ce5400f717f (patch) | |
tree | f3177f9b6c2d956f25c6ca46fd036eadf96370ec /README.md | |
parent | bd726b55be4df8535a2b200a252193649566007a (diff) |
split into two processes: listener and executor
this way, we can sandbox the listener with seccomp (todo) or capsicum
(already done) and still have CGI scripts. When we want to exec, we
tell the executor what to do, the executor executes the scripts and
send the fd backt to the listener.
Diffstat (limited to 'README.md')
-rw-r--r-- | README.md | 40 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 14 deletions
@@ -2,16 +2,15 @@ > dead simple, zero configuration Gemini server -gmid is a simple and minimal Gemini server. It requires no -configuration whatsoever so it's well suited for local development -machines. +gmid is a simple and minimal Gemini server. It can run without +configuration, so it's well suited for local development, but at the +same time has a configuration file flexible enough to meet the +requirements of most capsules. -Care has been taken to assure that gmid doesn't serve files outside -the given directory, and it won't follow symlinks. Furthermore, on -OpenBSD, gmid is also `pledge(2)`ed and `unveil(2)`ed: the set of -pledges are `stdio rpath inet`, with the addition of `proc exec` if -CGI scripts are enabled, while the given directory is unveiled with -`rx`. +gmid was initially written to serve static files, but can also +optionally execute CGI scripts. It was also written with security in +mind: on FreeBSD and OpenBSD is sandboxed via `capsicum(4)`and +`pledge(2)`/`unveil(2)` respectively. ## Features @@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ CGI scripts are enabled, while the given directory is unveiled with - (very) low memory footprint - small codebase, easily hackable - virtual hosts - - sandboxed on OpenBSD and FreeBSD + - sandboxed by default on OpenBSD and FreeBSD ## Drawbacks @@ -31,10 +30,6 @@ CGI scripts are enabled, while the given directory is unveiled with connection per-second you'd probably want to run multiple gmid instances behind relayd/haproxy or a different server. - - the sandbox on FreeBSD is **NOT** activated if CGI scripts are - enabled: CGI script cannot be used with the way `capsicum(4)` works - - ## Building gmid depends a POSIX libc and libtls. It can probably be linked @@ -53,3 +48,20 @@ The Makefile isn't able to produce a statically linked executable strip gmid to enjoy your ~2.3M statically-linked gmid. + + +## Architecture/Security considerations + +gmid is composed by two processes: a listener and an executor. The +listener process is the only one that needs internet access and is +sandboxed. When a CGI script needs to be executed, the executor +(outside of the sandbox) sets up a pipe and gives one end to the +listener, while the other is bound to the CGI script standard output. +This way, is still possible to execute CGI scripts without restriction +even if the presence of a sandbox. + +On OpenBSD, the listener process runs with the `stdio recvfd rpath +inet` pledges and has `unveil(2)`ed only the directories that it +serves; the executor has `stdio sendfd proc exec` as pledges. + +On FreeBSD, the executor process is sandboxed with `capsicum(4)`. |