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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2015-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
"""Test node responses to invalid network messages."""
import os
import struct
from test_framework import messages
from test_framework.mininode import P2PDataStore
from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
class msg_unrecognized:
"""Nonsensical message. Modeled after similar types in test_framework.messages."""
command = b'badmsg'
def __init__(self, str_data):
self.str_data = str_data.encode() if not isinstance(str_data, bytes) else str_data
def serialize(self):
return messages.ser_string(self.str_data)
def __repr__(self):
return "{}(data={})".format(self.command, self.str_data)
class msg_nametoolong(msg_unrecognized):
command = b'thisnameiswayyyyyyyyytoolong'
class InvalidMessagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.num_nodes = 1
self.setup_clean_chain = True
def run_test(self):
"""
0. Send a bunch of large (4MB) messages of an unrecognized type. Check to see
that it isn't an effective DoS against the node.
1. Send an oversized (4MB+) message and check that we're disconnected.
2. Send a few messages with an incorrect data size in the header, ensure the
messages are ignored.
3. Send an unrecognized message with a command name longer than 12 characters.
"""
node = self.nodes[0]
self.node = node
node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
conn2 = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
msg_limit = 4 * 1000 * 1000 # 4MB, per MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
valid_data_limit = msg_limit - 5 # Account for the 4-byte length prefix
#
# 0.
#
# Send as large a message as is valid, ensure we aren't disconnected but
# also can't exhaust resources.
#
msg_at_size = msg_unrecognized("b" * valid_data_limit)
assert len(msg_at_size.serialize()) == msg_limit
increase_allowed = 0.5
if [s for s in os.environ.get("BITCOIN_CONFIG", "").split(" ") if "--with-sanitizers" in s and "address" in s]:
increase_allowed = 3.5
with node.assert_memory_usage_stable(increase_allowed=increase_allowed):
self.log.info(
"Sending a bunch of large, junk messages to test "
"memory exhaustion. May take a bit...")
# Run a bunch of times to test for memory exhaustion.
for _ in range(80):
node.p2p.send_message(msg_at_size)
# Check that, even though the node is being hammered by nonsense from one
# connection, it can still service other peers in a timely way.
for _ in range(20):
conn2.sync_with_ping(timeout=2)
# Peer 1, despite serving up a bunch of nonsense, should still be connected.
self.log.info("Waiting for node to drop junk messages.")
node.p2p.sync_with_ping(timeout=120)
assert node.p2p.is_connected
#
# 1.
#
# Send an oversized message, ensure we're disconnected.
#
msg_over_size = msg_unrecognized("b" * (valid_data_limit + 1))
assert len(msg_over_size.serialize()) == (msg_limit + 1)
with node.assert_debug_log(["Oversized message from peer=0, disconnecting"]):
# An unknown message type (or *any* message type) over
# MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH should result in a disconnect.
node.p2p.send_message(msg_over_size)
node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
node.disconnect_p2ps()
conn = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
conn.wait_for_verack()
#
# 2.
#
# Send messages with an incorrect data size in the header.
#
actual_size = 100
msg = msg_unrecognized("b" * actual_size)
# TODO: handle larger-than cases. I haven't been able to pin down what behavior to expect.
for wrong_size in (2, 77, 78, 79):
self.log.info("Sending a message with incorrect size of {}".format(wrong_size))
# Unmodified message should submit okay.
node.p2p.send_and_ping(msg)
# A message lying about its data size results in a disconnect when the incorrect
# data size is less than the actual size.
#
# TODO: why does behavior change at 78 bytes?
#
node.p2p.send_raw_message(self._tweak_msg_data_size(msg, wrong_size))
# For some reason unknown to me, we sometimes have to push additional data to the
# peer in order for it to realize a disconnect.
try:
node.p2p.send_message(messages.msg_ping(nonce=123123))
except IOError:
pass
node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=10)
node.disconnect_p2ps()
node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
#
# 3.
#
# Send a message with a too-long command name.
#
node.p2p.send_message(msg_nametoolong("foobar"))
node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
# Node is still up.
conn = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
conn.sync_with_ping()
def _tweak_msg_data_size(self, message, wrong_size):
"""
Return a raw message based on another message but with an incorrect data size in
the message header.
"""
raw_msg = self.node.p2p.build_message(message)
bad_size_bytes = struct.pack("<I", wrong_size)
num_header_bytes_before_size = 4 + 12
# Replace the correct data size in the message with an incorrect one.
raw_msg_with_wrong_size = (
raw_msg[:num_header_bytes_before_size] +
bad_size_bytes +
raw_msg[(num_header_bytes_before_size + len(bad_size_bytes)):]
)
assert len(raw_msg) == len(raw_msg_with_wrong_size)
return raw_msg_with_wrong_size
if __name__ == '__main__':
InvalidMessagesTest().main()
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